A Comparative Study of Cultural Change and Stability
in Displaced Communities in the Pacific

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REPORT NUMBER 9

CULTURAL CONSEQUENCES OF A VOLCANIC ERUPTION EXPERIENCED BY THE MOUNT LAMINGTON OROKAIVA

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PREFACE

121 The following report presents data designed to be used in
"A Comparative Study of Cultural Change and Stability in Displaced
Communities," a project directed by H. G. Barnett. The report
follows closely a list of topics specified as variables in the
study. In a preliminary statement on the project, Professor
Barnett (n.d.) states the reasons why the Orokaiva, living on the
[731] slopes of Mount Lamington, were included in the project. In 1951,
Mount Lamington erupted, some 4,000 people were killed, and the
survivors were resettled under close governmental supervision.
This resettlement, as a consequence of a natural disaster, makes
the Orokaiva case comparable to the other 11 cases included in
Professor Barnett's study. The focus of our attention must
therefore be the social and other cultural consequences of this
government-sponsored resettlement.

731 I should at once note certain differences between this
Orokaiva case and most of the others included in the study. Mount
101 Lamington forms the centre of a rather populous district which is
[133] segmented into very small units socially and politically, but
which forms a definite unity in cultural respects. (See Map I.)
[361] Differences in language, social structure, political and economic
organisation and material culture, in a wide area North of Mount
Lamington, and included in the Popondetta, Sohe Popondetta and
Saiho divisions of the Northern District, are so small as to be
almost insignificant. Only one of the refugee camps established
immediately after the eruption was outside this culture area, and
its occupants were shifted back to the Orokaiva district within a
few weeks. From that point onwards, people were no longer separated
from their culture but only from their land. As resettlement
proceeded, even separation from traditional land holdings was soon
terminated, so that the typical "resettled" village, though in a
different spot from the pre-eruption village, still had access to
the same land holdings.

121 In these circumstances, many of the traumatic experiences
which are the subject of the other case studies in this project are
731 not replicated in the Orokaiva case. There is no question, however,
about the serious social consequences both of the eruption and of
the large-scale government intervention that followed. To trace
these consequences at the present time is no easy task. As all
the Orokaiva returned to their own land a number of years ago, a
great part of this report is an historical reconstruction and the
Orokaiva are neither devoted nor accurate historians. Most
happenings are covered over in their memory just as the jungle
rapidly covers over past cultivations and past settlements. Some
songs, some myths, and the harrowing personal experiences remain.

731 For survivors from the settlements actually destroyed by the
121 eruption, the loss of many relatives remains a cataclysmic memory, feelingly recounted. But the fine points of organisation of the resettlement camps are very much harder to recover.

In this preface, my main purpose is to explain my research
648 procedure. I should also, however, mention one or two general facts as a background to my report. The British Protectorate of New Guinea was proclaimed in 1884; the Territory of British New Guinea was placed under the authority of the Commonwealth of Australia in 1902. The effective conquest and pacification of the Northern District in which the Orokaiva live, occurred between 1894 and, say, 1906. It was to some extent speeded up by the presence of some gold miners who had to be protected and the road from Buna to Kokoda was built towards the end of that period.
[777] After the first world war, Europeans set up rubber plantations on a small scale; the Anglican Mission became established, especially along the coast. The process of pacification was a somewhat bloodthirsty event. If the Orokaiva are asked to state when they discovered what they call the "new day," i.e., modern civilisation, they refer neither to this conquest, nor to the events following the eruption, but rather to the second world war and its aftermath.

648 The Japanese conquered most of the Northern District in
1942 and were driven back, in the beginning of 1943, by the
177 combined Australian and American forces which crossed the Owen Stanley range and defeated the Japanese along the Kokoda trail. Some Orokaiva collaborated with the Japanese and killed or betrayed Europeans who were left behind in the district. When the allied forces came, the Orokaiva were able for the first time to establish really comradely relations with white men who, moreover, were generous with gifts and left behind much valuable equipment. The returning Australian government developed a new colonial policy after the war eliminating the old use of compulsion and corporal punishment while the Anglican Mission and later the government did much to improve educational facilities. Access to trade goods on a major scale began about that time. Training in the handling of cash crops, notably coffee, also dates back to the immediate post-war period. The eruption, which occurred in 1951, certainly had significant social consequences, but it is not easy to keep these consequences, i.e., the modernisation that can be directly ascribed to government measures arising out of the eruption, distinct from the policy of social development that was being followed at this time throughout the district.

With regard to the eruption, we must distinguish three
731 types of effect: first, a part of the district, notably that occupied by the Sangara tribe, felt the direct blast and suffered very heavy casualties, while all survivors were evacuated; secondly, a part of the district, occupied by several tribes, was endangered

131 by the eruption though casualties were comparatively light and was also evacuated, though opened up again shortly afterwards; thirdly, a part of the district was not evacuated at all. Some villages in this last-mentioned part of the district became hosts of evacuated groups.

121 In the present study, as in all others included in the project, two villages were chosen for special study, one that belonged to the evacuated category and one other. Furthermore, both these villages were studied at two points of time, namely the time of the eruption and the time of the field study. In order to keep to this specification, it seemed less expedient to choose as the village for special study one of those which had been depopulated by the blast. The survivors of such villages were brought together into much larger villages which still exist today and which form an interesting subject for study but reconstruction of the pre-eruption situation is virtually impossible. Often the few survivors that can be found were very young when they managed to escape and it was precisely the maturer people who almost always died. The site itself has mostly disappeared.

The evacuated village chosen for special study is therefore one where few deaths occurred due to the eruption and where the period of enforced absence was short. The disadvantage of this choice was obvious: the effect of the eruption was comparatively mild; the difference between the resettled village and the pre-eruption village was comparatively small. As against this, there were two considerations: the most traumatic experience for the depopulated villages was, of course, the loss of so many friends and relatives. Here the effect of depopulation was, from every viewpoint, far more severe than the effect of relocation. It would have been almost impossible to keep the focus of the study from shifting away from the variables chosen for comparison. Furthermore, Sivepe, the village chosen for study, had been the subject of a number of previous investigations by the New Guinea Research Unit of the Australian National University, so that useful supplementary data were to hand.

As the control community, I chose Inonda, which had similarly been a sample village where the New Guinea Research Unit had collected data. This village belonged to the category that had never been evacuated, but had played host to a village of evacuees, Sewa, which has close consanguineal links with Inonda. One might argue that a better choice of a "control community" would be one lacking all links with the eruption, but such a village would have been hard to find close to the mountain. I feel sure, in any case, that the presence of the Sewa people after the eruption did not affect the variables in which this study is interested.

While the material on Sivepe and Inonda fulfills the formal requirements of this study, I felt I should present a somewhat

121 broader view of the social consequences of the eruption, and
therefore included a third village, Hohorita, which lies at the
centre of the area most deeply affected by the calamity. Sivepe,
lying West of the volcano, escaped the full blast of the explosion;
Inonda, to the East, was not directly affected at all, but Hohorita
is a village made up of the survivors from Sangara villages situated
in the blast area. Hohorita, as well as Kiorota which I visited
briefly, has a far larger population than Orokaiva villages normally
contain; these people were brought together, as a result of
government organisation immediately after the eruption, from more
than a dozen of the destroyed villages, comprise more than a dozen
clans and constitute a new type of residential unit the origin of
which may be directly traced to the eruption. Both Hohorita and
Kiorota are situated on land owned by one of the constituent clans.
With over 400 inhabitants, they face serious problems of factionalism.
The government, which had an active hand in fostering them, had hoped
they would solve basic problems of Orokaiva social fragmentation.
In fact, one may almost say that the large consolidated village was
a principal aim of government planning for the persons displaced
by the eruption. Hence, it seems necessary to include consideration
of this residential form in the present study.
101 Of the 12 months spent in the Territory of Papua, my wife
and I lived in Orokaiva villages for more than 10 months, dividing
the rest of the time between Port Moresby and the administrative
centre of Popondetta. Most of the field period was spent in Sivepe,
[122] with three weeks in Inonda and five weeks in Hohorita. In Inonda
we made use of a house previously used by the New Guinea Research
Unit; in Sivepe a village house was built for us while at Hohorita
we were squatting in an uncompleted village house--an unsatisfactory
arrangement which accounts, in part, for the brevity of our stay.
[114] Fortunately, we had extremely competent research assistance at
Hohorita, after we stopped residing there. The head teacher, Mr.
[124] Harold Heru, prepared extremely good genealogical records, showing
residence of matrilateral and affinal kin as well as clan structure
and residence.
123 The basic source of the material that follows are my own
field notes. These are supplemented by government records, the
129 publications on the Orokaiva and the eruption published by F. E.
Williams, Reay, Belshaw, Keesing, Crocombe, Hogbin, Rimoldi,
Waddell. I also collected tape recordings containing 50 basic
126 documents in the Orokaiva language; transcriptions in Orokaiva
and translations into English are available. A number of Europeans
115 who were concerned with the administration of the temporary refugee
camps were interviewed, including Dr. Gunther, Mr. F. Kaad, Mr. C.
127 Searle, Mr. R. Hart and others too numerous to mention. Miss
Nancy White, a mission teacher at Hohorita, apart from giving other
help, put at my disposal a valuable collection of her diary notes,
important letters written to her and Orokaiva texts collected at
the Sasembata mission school in the years 1952 - 1953.

PART I: INFLUENCES EXTERNAL TO THE COMMUNITY

CHAPTER 1: The Eruption and Evacuation of Survivors

Section 1: Mount Lamington: Cosmic Centre and Volcano

823 Mount Lamington has long had, to the Orokaiva people, a
significance somewhat similar to that of Mount Olympos to the
773 Ancient Greeks. It is the *omphalos kosmou* of Orokaiva myth: the
origin of death, warfare, fire--and generally of all those cultural
elements established by the transforming deities--are traced to the
Mountain, while the division of the people into distinct language
groups is likewise a primordial event that occurred on the Mountain.
[775] The departed spirits of the Orokaiva have their home there, headed
by the first man to have suffered death, Sumbiripa, to whom all the
activity of the Mountain is ascribed. Signs from Sumbiripa reach
the living regularly, because at all times the Mountain has rumbled
and sent forth tremors and smoke.

These facts appear clearly from the cycle of myths, centred
on the Mountain, collected by me in the vernacular in 1966-1967.
The cycle is far too elaborate to be explained as a recent development.
It might, however, be argued that before the disaster of 1951, the
omphalos kosmou was located elsewhere and that it has since been
"relocated" to Mount Lamington. The fact that F. E. Williams was
unaware of the mythical importance of Mount Lamington gives some
force to that contention. As against this there is the testimony
of missionaries (Tomlin, 1951; Benson, 1955) who knew the Orokaiva
well before the eruption and who had no doubt that Mount Lamington
[776] was then regarded as the home of the dead. Even more conclusive
are statements from numerous informants at Hohorita and Sivepe, all
of whom interpreted the eruption as the work of Sumbiripa, the Lord
of the Dead, who lived in the Mountain.

Does this mythology provide evidence for previous volcanic
[174] eruptions? Marie Reay, who was in the district at the time of the
eruption, found that "the natives had no knowledge, or legend, of an
earlier eruption." (Quoted in Taylor 1958; 21.) I wonder, however,
whether in those chaotic days she had much opportunity to make a
systematic study of the mythology. I collected a myth of the origin
of death which is certainly suggestive of earlier volcanic activity
though it is impossible to be sure of the physical phenomena to
which it alludes. I recorded four versions of this myth in full
vernacular texts, one from Sivepe, one from Torogota (another
village in the Sasembata area), one from Hohorita and one from a

823 collection of vernacular texts written by a young man from Kiorota in 1952 (White, n.d.).

773 According to all versions, a man named Sumbiri and his wife Suja went hunting on the Mountain. They stayed there for several weeks, while the husband caught wallaby and cuscus and found some birds' eggs. In three of the versions, the Mountain began to rise while Sumbiri (ignoring a taboo) slept with his wife. Several crags then formed on one of which the couple was lodged, unable to climb down. Separated from the world, they leapt into the crater that had formed between the crags. The fourth version, collected at Hohorita and belonging to the Sangara tribe, describes a fight between a pig (presumably the first pig ever hunted by man) and a large dog or dogs, during which the mountain began to change shape. Originally it was "one Mountain but now it became divided into parts so that there remained a number of peaks too steep to climb up or down." Pig and dog(s) disappeared into the hole that was formed; the man and woman found themselves separated on different crags and died of loneliness and despair. The mountain is called *Sumbiripa Kanekari*, "The Separation of Sumbiripa." This Sangara version is notably the richest in mythological content.

[179] Is it possible that these versions all originated after the eruption? Though it cannot be ruled out, it seems unlikely. One of them was written down by a student mission teacher as early as 1952; the Sivepe version recorded by me presents the mythical event and the eruption of 1951 as two distinct successive events. None of the events that most deeply impressed people about the eruption of 1951 (explosion, flame, darkness, wind, deaths) are incorporated at all in any of the versions. It seems more likely that the myth refers to an event remote in time and not remembered more clearly than most modern Europeans are aware of the factual basis of the Book of Genesis. Nonetheless, the myth points to an earlier structural change in the Mountain, caused by volcanic activity, and sufficiently recent to have left some impact on human memory.

Section 2: Preliminaries of the Eruption

133
731 For some time prior to the eruption, Mount Lamington behaved rather unusually. Orokaiva and Europeans each gave their own explanations for this unusual behaviour. The Europeans, being politically more powerful, were able to impose their plan on the Orokaiva. The Europeans felt no qualms in doing so, as they regarded their own views to be scientifically based, whereas the Orokaiva view was based on the presumed anger of Sumbiripa. As we shall see, this was a case where bad science was more dangerous than sound superstition.

133 Just when these preliminaries started is not clear; it may have been one week before the disaster or several weeks. The rumbling and tremors in the mountain, which were usual enough, became more severe; smoke was beginning to come out of the crater in thick puffs high into the sky; the number of craters rose from one to four or five. Ash covered the peaks, areas along the slopes became burnt; sometimes there were flashes of fire; several landslides appeared as brown streaks in the forest. Swarm-pattern earthquakes became widely felt throughout the area. On Thursday, 18 January 1951, the more active phase of the eruption began (Taylor, 1958). The emission rate increased throughout the day; the smoke gushing forth "at a great rate" varied from black to grey and spasms were noted in the crater activity. The emission was described by more distant observers as a slow-moving continuous dark-grey column ascending to many thousands of feet. A survivor who looked at the mountain through a telescope on that day noticed that a large hill had built itself up between the hills at the foot of Lamington and the mountain at the rear. That night, the mountain was shooting fire like an immense fire works. In the Sivepe area, at this time, and on Friday, stones were falling on the gardens, earthquakes were very severe and some houses had collapsed.

731 The Orokaiva interpretation of these events will be clear
from what I have already written. It is explicitly supplied by
Benson (1955) who reported that the fearsome happenings in the
mountain were ascribed to the anger of Sumbiripa. I shall show
[114] later that the same view was taken in Sivepe. The clearest description
of the state of mind of the people close to the mountain (those who
were mostly to become the victims of the blast a few days later) was
given in a letter by Margaret de Bibra, head teacher at Martyr's
School in the Sangara Anglican Mission. Miss de Bibra died during
the eruption but her letter was found after her death (White, n.d.).

> The Papuans--well, most are calm, many are
> apprehensive and some really frightened,
> especially those whose villages are near the
> mount. It is all understandable, in fact it
> is to their credit that there is no panic.
> Lamington has not been a volcano within the
> memory of living man, nor in the legend of the
> [823] people. (But see above, E. S.) True, Lamington
> is feared as the home of spirits and no local
> man--even Christian--will venture to the top.
> As one of our Church Councillors said: 'The
> mountain people do not understand. They are
> afraid. We understand a little and we are
> afraid too. Our fathers did not know of it.
> The trembling of the earth--yes, but not

731 the fire. At night it is like a torch,
and we do not understand the sign.'

We cannot be entirely sure what the mountain people would have done had they not been under European influence. Informants at Hohorita told me that the people wished to run away, but that the Europeans persuaded them to stay. It is likely that people seriously considered leaving the mountain during the few days before the eruption, but it is also likely that they feared the dangers and troubles that would have followed their departure. Where could they have gone? How could they have found food? Most important of all: would other clans occupy their land during their absence? The evidence shows that, in the circumstances, the mountain people contented themselves with statements of their apprehensions to European authorities and placed upon them the responsibility of deciding what should be done in this unusual and frightening predicament.

731 657 The two main power centres of the Orokaiva district at that time were both very close to the mountain (see Map II).[A] The headquarters of the Northern District government administration was at Higaturu; Martyr's School and the main mission centre was at Sangara; both these places were subsequently destroyed by the blast and their residents killed. These were the foci of decision. Two of my informants were able to tell me something of what happened there: Fa. Albert McLaren, who was at Sangara until the day before the eruption and Mr. C. Searle who visited Higaturu on Friday, 19 January. Both told me of apprehensive Orokaiva asking European authorities what they should do.

[133] The District Commissioner decided to discourage the people from leaving their home villages. He maintained throughout that there was no need to worry about the mountain. The circumstances that led him to this decision were described to me by Mr. Searle, by Mr. Paul Sebire, Assistant District Commissioner, Popondetta, in 1966 and by other informants. There had been several earlier eruptions in the district, one at Tufi in 1943 and another at Rabaul in 1937. The District Commissioner at Higaturu, Mr. Cowley, was well informed about the former while the latter had been witnessed by the Chief Justice of the Territory, Mr. M. Philips. The District Commissioner asked the Chief Justice for an opinion and the latter overflew the mountain on Friday, 19 January, to assess the situation. The Chief Justice advised that evacuation of the station was unnecessary. On the assumption that Mount Lamington was like the other volcano which he had seen in eruption, The Chief Justice believed that Mount Lamington could not be very dangerous, seeing that emissions on such a large scale had already occurred. On that premise the pressure built up inside the mountain had already been reduced, and only relatively harmless cold ejecta could now be expected.

[A] [See Cat. 118, pp. End Map 2(A)-End Map 2(B)--Analyst]

731 657 This line of reasoning was spread around fairly rapidly. According to Father Albert, a message from the District Commissioner was read in churches on the Sunday after the Chief Judge's visit, i.e., on the morning of the eruption. This message said that the volcano would erupt, but there would be no reason to worry. Ashes would come but they would be cold. People should not run away. Not only the Churches, but also the Village Constables were advised in these terms. The Village Constable at Sivepe gave me a somewhat different description of the District Commissioner's message, but it was equally reassuring. Supposedly, there was water under the volcano which would come out sooner or later. The people should be told that this would happen. People were told, said the Village Constable, people waited two or three days and then the mountain blew up.

As Sivepe is not particularly close to the district centre of Higaturu, we may notice that district organisation in 1951 must have had a rather efficient communication system, using both the Church network and the Village Constable network. The Village Constable at Sivepe told me that he used to be in very regular contact with Higaturu and that the communication came to him during a routine visit. He added that he had been asked to return the Higaturu the following Tuesday for another meeting about the volcano.

In view of the subsequent events, there has naturally been criticism of the District Commissioner because he did not order the evacuation in time while he did evacuate his own wife and child. In his defense it may be said that he was expecting a proper vulcanological investigation that would have taken place as from Monday, 22 January. Furthermore, by calling a meeting of Village Constables for Tuesday, 23 January, he showed serious concern to keep the population informed and protected. Finally, it would have been hard for two laymen like himself and the Chief Justice to spot the difference between preliminaries of the "Vulcanian" type of explosion, similar to those of Rabaul and Tufi which they expected and the disastrous Peléan explosion that actually occurred.

731 There is no evidence that any Orokaiva people fled their villages before the eruption. This is striking because their own interpretation of the events, namely the anger of Sumbiripa, was a frightening one indeed. We shall gradually come to see that the alternative of leaving their villages was, to the Orokaiva, perhaps more frightening still.

Section 3: The Day of the Eruption

121 As the eruption itself is the central event of this entire
report, I shall dwell upon it in some detail. I shall discuss it
128 from five vantage points: the vulcanologist's, the experience of
the Sangara people, the Sivepe and the Inonda people, and finally
133 the action of the administration. The vulcanological aspects have
been fully dealt with in G. A. M. Taylor's book, The 1951 Eruption
731 of Mount Lamington, Papua (1958). Taylor writes: "At 1040 hours
on Sunday, 21 January, 1951, a paroxysmal explosion burst from the
crater and produced a nuée ardente which completely devastated a
surrounding area of 68 square miles." This explosion had a marked
resemblance to that of Mount Pelée at St. Pierre on Martinique in
1902, when 29,000 people perished in a few minutes. The effect of
the Peléan type of explosion is very different from the more usual
one which is called "Vulcanian," and which occurred, for instance,
at the famous eruption of Vesuvius described by Pliny. One may
compare it, rather, with the effect of an atomic bomb; the lethal
effect of the nuée ardente seemed to be due mainly to sudden damage
to the respiratory system caused by inhaling hot dust. Almost 4,000
people were killed. Destruction in the inner zone of devastation
was almost complete: the rain forest on the slopes was flattened
and in some places the earth was swept bare, not even stumps
remaining as evidence of the previous forest cover. At Higaturu,
six miles from the crater, only one house remained reasonably
intact; most of the buildings on the government station were
carried away. Of the people who lived in this inner zone of
devastation scarcely a single one remained alive.

Taylor classified a further 27 square miles as "partially devastated," "a thin heated strip which bordered the abrupt edge of the zone of complete destruction." The survivors who saved themselves by running away from the blast all came from villages in this marginal area. The line of demarcation was rather precise; everyone from the Sangara mission station was killed, and this station lay just inside the borderline of the area of complete devastation. The people of Isivita, just outside the border of partial destruction, were mostly saved. The people now inhabiting Hohorita came from villages such as Tunana, Seemu, Sehundeturu, all of which lie in the area of partial devastation. From the village of Sombo, on the boundary of the area of complete devastation, one man escaped (Table 1).[A]

I interviewed members of 15 Hohorita households about their
731 experiences during the day of the eruption. Some of them escaped
[124] because they happened to have gone hunting, or were visiting their
mother's relatives; one man who had gone to the Sangara church that
morning was saved because he had gone home to Ambogo immediately

[A] [See Cat. 116, p. 205--Analyst]

731 afterwards, but most of those who attended church that morning were killed at Sangara. All spoke of the cloud of fire that descended after the explosion. One man described how he saw it killing people ahead of him and how, with his brother, he ran past the burnt bodies. Another man told that the wind hit him and threw him down; for hours he remained unconscious and the people who were with him had all gone.

When the blast came, everyone near the mountain began to run away from it. In this mass flight, some near the edges of the area of devastation were saved by strange accidents, such as the couple who sat down to pray and then a wind came and blew the hot dust back to the mountain. This gust of wind was mentioned by several survivors. After the explosion, a very wide area, far beyond the area of devastation, became covered with a black cloud so that the fugitives soon found themselves running in total darkness. Most of the fugitives say that they fled to the Sangara Plantation, a point directly North of their villages and outside the immediate danger zone.

Sangara Plantation lay, and still lies, on the only "arterial" road of the district, which runs from certain coastal points to Kokoda; it also lay on the branch road which led to the pre-eruption government station at Higaturu and the pre-eruption mission station of Sangara. Thus Sangara Plantation became the first rallying point for the fugitives from the Sangara side of the Mount Lamington slopes. There was, on this first day, a steady stream of people descending on the plantation but it seems that to some extent this point was regarded as a haven of safety. It lay outside the area of partial devastation; the only effect of the eruption was the darkness enveloping the plantation and the scattering of debris. [464] The plantation, where rubber and cocoa are produced, employed a number of Orokaiva men as well as men from other districts. I shall describe later how the plantation very soon became a centre for the Australian rescue and resettlement organisation. At the same time it became a base for Orokaiva men who soon began to rush back over the devastated countryside in the hope of finding relatives who might have survived.

Along the Western slopes, the eruption caused few casualties but no less terror. The greatest immediate danger to life were fallen debris, especially large stones which formed deep pits in the village grounds and demolished some of the houses. Pumice and ashes also fell over the countryside to a depth of some inches and visibility was very low. Most people moved down the mountain slope at once, along the bush tracks but mainly along the branch road running in this direction was Mr. C. Searle's estate in Awala. Like the Sangara Plantation, this lay on the arterial road to Kokoda. It seems that some of the fugitives, including those belonging to the village now called Sivepe, stayed at this plantation

731 during the night. It did not, however, become a rallying point for resettlement organisation. It was too close to the mountain. Half an hour after the eruption, crowds of Orokaiva carrying pigs, dogs and babies, were already rushing past Awala Station westwards along the road to Kokoda. All these people from the Western slopes stopped at the Waseta Mission, a few miles past Awala, as they were reassured by the presence of a nucleus of Australian organisation. The Sivepe people and others who came from a relatively greater distance, stayed at Awala the night of January 21 and some reached Waseta the next day.

Along the Eastern side of the Mountain, among the settlements along the road to Oro Bay, there was no acute danger, but there was fear. Inonda, which was chosen as the control community, was never "resettled "in the sense that its people at any time left their village lands. When they saw the ash and smoke they did, however, consider themselves in danger because of the anger of Sumbiripa. Perhaps in response to police messages, perhaps spontaneously (Inonda informants say the latter) they shifted to the Inonda air strip, which was about a mile along the road in the direction of the coast and there waited for the white man to arrive. Meanwhile, the people of Seva, a related village close to (but well without) the line of partial destruction as shown by Taylor, evacuated their village and joined their relatives at Inonda. This was a more orderly evacuation than most, because the Papuan deacon (who lives at Inonda today and whom I interviewed) had somewhat varied the District Commissioner's message when he delivered it in church on that fatal morning. Though he followed his instructions by advising the adults to remain at Seva, he also said that they had better send their children to Inonda. Thus, when the mountain erupted some time after the service, the children had already gone. Upon arrival at Inonda, the Seva people joined their hosts and camped by the airstrip.

Section 4: The Beginning of Administrative Action

If it had not been for the influence of European administration, this flight from the mountain would probably have been followed by a fairly early return. Administrative measure, at first aimed purely at the relief of distress, soon began to include measures to restrain the fugitives from returning. These measures followed vulcanological predictions, this time based on sound scientific investigation, concerning the likely future behaviour of the
121 mountain. In considering administrative action, there are four aspects to be distinguished: first, the investigation as to the
125 nature of the disaster; secondly, the organisation of food and medical supplies and other immediate relief measure; thirdly, a

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121 vulcanological study to guide future policy and fourthly, the planning of longer-term resettlement, with which this report is 128 principally concerned.

During the first day, communication was a difficult problem. 731 A plane sent to Popondetta on the day of the eruption could not land. All official radio communication channels in or near the devastation area were broken down. The government in Port Moresby was informed about the disaster by radio through a private transmitter owned by Mr. Searle and operated from Awala. In the afternoon a car containing an agricultural officer and a technician from the Anglican Mission (Mr. R. Hart) traveled from Popondetta to investigate the situation. This car, after making inquiries at Sangara Station, reached Awala and reported to the government. In the evening there was a second eruption, this time without a nuéeardente but noisier than the morning eruption, the fall of ash was heavier and much larger stones were ejected over a larger distance. The fall of ash was heavy enough to warrant the closing of the aerodrome at Port Moresby, some 140 miles away, on the following morning due to limited visibility. Searle has to stop transmitting messages from Awala as too many stones were falling and an electrical disturbance made transmission impossible. He shifted to Waseta which then became the centre of organised activity on the Western side of the mountain.

On Monday 22 January, the full resources of the administration were directed at rescue work. The Administrator, Col. J. K. Murray, and the Director of Health, Dr. J. Gunther arrived at Popondetta. Mr. Fred Kaad, an officer of the Department of District Administration (now Head of the Australian School of Pacific Administration, Sydney, where I interviewed him) was seconded from Lae to head an organisation to help the fugitives. On the Monday, he reached Popondetta and paid a brief visit to Inonda airstrip. The vulcanologist, G. A. M. Taylor, arrived the same day and began to observe the mountain which he continued to do for two years, being present for all the main active phases of the post-climactic period. At Waseta, the immediate food shortage was relieved from Mr. Searle's stores, but soon food, medicines and blankets began to be air-dropped. At Inonda, an expedition was organised to find missing people from Seva; some Seva people who had been wounded by the eruption were flown to Popondetta for treatment. Mr. W. Schleusner, from Sangara Estate, visited Higaturu and reported the devastation; he counted 200 dead. A district office was set up at Popondetta, to replace the destroyed office at Higaturu; from this office it was decided, on the same day, that refugee camps were to be established at Cape Killerton, for the Sangara survivors and all others from the Eastern and Northern side of the mountain, while the people from the West, now mostly gathered at Waseta, were to be encamped at Wairope, by the side of the Kumusi River.

731 The vulcanologist, from the facts already at his disposal, was able to warn the administration that a prolonged phase of violent explosive activity was to be expected. This is characteristic of Peléan eruptions: at Mont Pélée paroxysmal activity lasted for four months and St. Vincent produced powerful explosions ten months after its initial activity. Hence, the refugees would be in danger were they to return to their villages. A generous area was therefore at once tentatively marked off as uninhabitable; this stretched from Inonda, Higarata to Mongi to Agenahambo, to the Kumusi and in a wide circle round the rest of the mountain. Special permission was needed to enter this restricted area; thus, the refugees would be forbidden, by regulation, to return to their homes.

This policy lies at the core of the entire resettlement scheme: the inhabitants, first of the camps, later of the resettlement villages, never exercised a free choice of residence but were kept by a benevolent government from returning to places where they [628] might come to further harm. Clearly, no other course was open to the Australian government: in its own eyes and in the eyes of the world it was responsible for the well-being of the Orokaiva survivors; the continuing danger of the volcano was a scientific fact of which the Orokaiva could not possibly be aware nor could they be expected to believe it; there were at that time no forms of political organisation such that Orokaiva leaders could have taken decisions on residence that would have been binding upon the people and such that the Australian government could have systematically approached and consulted them. The decision to relocate, therefore, from the beginning rested solely upon the Australian government. No Orokaiva participated in the discussions, held on 22 January, during which the policy was laid down. As a result of the discussions, officers went to the Sangara Estate, to Waseta, and to other centres of the affected population and transmitted the Administrator's instructions. If arguments were needed, they were clear enough and extremely cogent: the government expected further trouble at the mountain.

Section 5: The Decision to Relocate

121 Under this heading there are three aspects to consider: the participants, the procedure and attitudes towards the necessity of 128 relocation. In the previous section I have made it clear that only the administration participated in the decision-taking process; this 657 was in line with the then existing governmental structure. The local government councils which today might conceivably be involved in discussions did not yet exist in 1951. The only existing

657 intermediaries between government and people were the village constables. These were definitely not conceived by the government in the role of consultants on matters of policy. They were, however, a crucial link in the chain of command. The government was accustomed to transmit its orders directly to the village constables whose duty it then became to see that the people under their control obeyed the orders. It goes without saying that in this moment of crisis these accustomed methods of communication were followed.

731 The people who came down on the Sangara side were (judging by the ones I interviewed) no longer together in village groups. Some just said they ran to the plantation and then to Cape Killerton, others mentioned a European at the plantation who told them to go to Cape Killerton. A small band of rescue workers entered the devastated area to look for survivors. Of the casualties they carried back, an unknown number died, but 70 were evacuated to hospitals at Lae and Port Moresby. Only three of the evacuees died. (Taylor, 1958: 48.) Other casualties were treated at a field hospital in Popondetta. After the rescue workers had buried those who had died outside the area of devastation, they proceeded to Cape Killerton. The Seva people likewise went there, but a week or so later reappeared at Inonda.

To the West of the mountain, where the casualties were far lighter, the people had a number of alternate courses of action. Data from Sivepe and the Sasembata area show no uniform reaction to the disaster even though village constables continued to exercise authority and village communities were not torn asunder. The Sivepe pattern was probably not untypical.

Here the village constable was not actually in the village at the moment of the eruption. He had gone to Kendata, a village two miles closer to the mountain, to see what was wrong with the mountain. A feast was in progress there, but only the two leaders of the feast were still at Kendata. The rest had become frightened at the smoke from the mountain and escaped to the bush. While the village constable, with four companions, was at Kendata, the mountain blew up. He returned at once to his own village, entering the wrong house because it was too dark to see. When the thunder and lightning wore off, he said, he saw white stuff (pumice) on the ground; the roosters started to sing; it was daybreak; the light started again. Many of the people had gone down; he took as many as possible with him to Awala. He arrived at Awala on Sunday night. (It was not Monday night, as a superficial reading of this paragraph might suggest because on that Sunday, the day broke twice, once in the morning, and once in the afternoon when visibility improved by a temporary lull in the emission of ash.)

But not everyone went to Awala; one or two, as at Kendata, had gone to the bush for safety; some old people simply refused to leave the village land and stopped at a hamlet called Kakita, 731 [775] near the boundary of Sivepe gardens. A crippled woman who could not run away described to me how, during the period of darkness, people who had come out of the mountain (i.e., dead people) tried to kill her but did not succeed. On Tuesday, Mr. Kaad went to survey this area, prior to setting up camp at Waseta. Apart from these old people and the crippled woman, he also found that some local people of the Sasembata area, who had fled on the Sunday, had already returned and were milling round their old homes. He told them all to go to the camp at Wairope.

The village constable's story also contained a reference to this meeting with Mr. Kaad, but introduced some of those slight twists or reinterpretation of the facts which are always characteristic of Orokaiva information. According to this story, the village constable met Mr. Kaad at Awala and said to him: "I want my people to go and see their dogs, pigs and chickens." Mr. Kaad then permitted three or four men from each village to go and look and come back again. When the people returned after their period in camp, the animals were still there. The evidence shows plainly that Mr. Kaad had to show a certain firmness to induce all these people to stay away from their villages. Even two days after the eruption they appear to have felt an inclination to return.

One interesting detail of the Sivepe experience was that the old people did not leave their village land at all on the day of the eruption. The Sangara people, who escaped from devastated villages, invariably told me that none of the older people were saved. They gave as the reason that these old people were unable to run fast enough. After obtaining this Sivepe evidence, I reinterviewed one or two of the Sangara people and it would seem that the old felt no real desire to escape from the mountain.

Kaad's arrival seems to have induced the stragglers to move on to Waseta and from there to Wairope. The government's air-dropped supply of emergency rations began to be delivered to Wairope. The centre of this camp was the government rest house, while the refugees began to build shanties for themselves. I collected few data about the Wairope camp because its duration was only a few days. During this time, government and mission personnel began to arrive from Port Moresby via Kokoda, while Mr. Searle continued to do the radio communication work. The camp had to be abandoned a fortnight later because of dangerous flooding of the Kumusi River on whose banks it was lodged. Taylor describes the phenomenon as follows:

> Mudflows, which were a characteristic aftermath of the explosive activity (of the volcano), were a natural consequence of increased run-off from the denuded slopes and of the great abundance of loose fragmental material. The run-off became great rumbling torrents of viscous mud

> and assorted debris which periodically descended the watercourses . . . An air inspection of the headwaters of the Kumusi River was made on 8 February, 1951, and the camp was seen to be in an extremely vulnerable position. (Taylor, 1958: 56-57)

The camp was evacuated and a few days later the resthouse was swept. An evacuation camp was established at Ilimo, a few miles West of the Kumusi near the road to Kokoda. This is the camp I shall describe in some detail in subsequent chapters. A photograph taken of Wairopi Camp by Dr. Taylor indicates that much building activity must have been going on during the short tenancy of that camp (Fig. 104). It also shows the torrential flood which necessitated departure.

The camp at Ilimo, to which the displaced communities were now removed, became an interesting experiment in social education and a rather influential one, due to the farsighted leadership of Mr. Kaad. It will be discussed in later sections. The maximum population of this camp was around 2,000 but before the end of February some 500 of these persons had already been permitted to return home. Reappraisal of the danger zone by the vulcanologist led to a redrawing of the boundary, such that areas West of the line drawn from Waseta to Sairopi were resettled; certain groups closely related to the population of the resettled area left the camp to stay with their relations, thus soon reducing camp population to 1,000. Meanwhile, rations were still distributed, as needed, to resettled groups. By the end of May, Ilimo camp was evacuated and resettlement entered a new and more permanent phase.

In this second phase, the boundaries of the danger area were redrawn again closer to the mountain. By this time--though the vulcanologist could not have been sure of this yet--the paroxysmal activity of the mountain had ceased. The areas resettled were all well outside the boundaries of full or partial devastation. The entire road from Popondetta to Ajeka was opened up for unrestricted settlement, and the road from Saiho to Kendata was opened up as far as Kongohambo (just past the Sasembata Mission Station). The areas between these road lines and the mountain were still declared unfit for habitation, though it was recognised that the resettled villagers would use these areas for gardening and hunting.

Before discussing this phase of resettlement further, I should refer to the other fugitives who made their way to Cape Killerton. This site had been chosen because it was clearly outside the danger zone and accessible to ship-borne supplies. On the other hand, there soon proved to be a shortage of drinking water. After a week Cape Killerton was abandoned as a resettlement camp and the population shifted by ship to Oro Bay. Two camps were established in this area: one at Eroro Bay where the Sangara survivors were settled and one at Oro Bay for people who had likewise fled in the direction of the Sangara Plantation but who were not members of the Sangara tribe. Most of these came from farther West and are sometimes referred to as the Isivita people. The Seva people who had gone to Cape Killerton in response to official instructions did not stay at either of these camps but made their way back to Inonda. This was consistent with a general pattern for groups who were offered hospitality by undisturbed villages to be allowed to leave the camps, while continuing to receive such subsistence rations as they needed.

In April, the Oro Bay Camp was emptied out by the device of transporting batches of 35 persons every other day to Cape Killerton, trucking them to Popondetta, flying them to Kokoda and making them walk the 20 miles to Ilimo. The Sangara people were shifted from Eroro Bay to Popondetta, and later settled in a new village site at the boundary of the Sangara tribal domain, at Irihambo. Thus, by the end of May, nobody remained in the evacuation camps, but all the victims had either gone back to their old villages, or been allotted to new resettlement villages, usually along the boundary of the restricted area near the mountain.

What were the attitudes of the Orokaiva towards the necessity of relocating? In order to answer this question we must, first of all, distinguish between the different types of situation baldly sketched in the preceding paragraphs. First, relocation occurred at different points in the history of the volcanic eruption: (a) immediately following the first disastrous explosions; (b) during the two months after the disaster, when paroxysmal activity continued (especially on the 6th and 18th of February and 5th of March) and secondary activity as well as mudflows continued to frighten the people; (c) at a time then the worst manifestations of the anger of Sumbiripa seemed to be past. During the first of these periods, the necessity of government measures do not appear to have been seriously questioned. It must be kept in mind that even in the Western area, where the disaster claimed few lives, the evacuation of the prohibited areas was achieved in a day or so after the government instruction went out, at a time when the government's enforcement powers were minimal.

Sivepe informants, describing the events to me, were very emphatic about the profound fear caused by the eruption. There was little incredulity when the officers of the government told the village constables that further eruptions could be expected. We may safely assume, from our general knowledge of the Orokaiva that if such incredulity had existed, people would not have left their district so easily and the reluctance of the older ones could not so easily have been overcome.

731 In the second phase, which is well documented through the
reports of Keesing and Belshaw, attitudes were more complex. Our
present concern is solely with the question whether the evacuees
continued to regard absence from their home villages as necessary.
Later, we shall refer to the gratitude that was shown to the
Europeans for helping them in their hour of need, the extraordinary
degree of cooperation and orderliness that prevailed, the sense
of guilt that may have motivated the people in their compliant
attitudes. We shall also refer to the anxieties the people under-
went at this period: the usual anxieties of camp life, the
uncertainties of the whereabouts of many kinsfolk who might or
might not be alive, the fear that somehow they would be unable to
[823] get their land and villages back. Informants stressed to me that
the worst suffering of those days was simply home sickness, the
sense of desolation at being separated from the places to which
they so intimately belonged. Hence, in spite of the fear for the
mountain, the Orokaiva very soon began to exert pressure upon the
camp authorities to let them return home.

731 This pressure is especially evident from Belshaw's data:
657 people argued that the Europeans would not necessarily know what
would be a safe area should the volcano blow up again--hence the
maintaining of the camps could not logically be justified by their
supposed safety (Belshaw, page 244). When the authorities inquired
whether the people favoured consolidation of villages, many of the
answers "were framed so as to assure the authorities that all
would be well if they left the refugee camps immediately; everything
was subordinated to this end." (Belshaw, page 246). Every excuse
was given for making trips to the home area, and the authorities
seem to have tried to restrict the number of persons joining such
expeditions; also, they evidently forbade women to join their
husbands, all no doubt to ensure that people would really return
to camp. In spite of this battle of wits, the period was one of
relatively excellent Orokaiva-White relations. The point is,
however, that the evacuation camps were soon regarded as increasingly
unpleasant and unnecessary.

731 Attitudes also varied according to the distance between
the camps and the home villages. At Cape Killerton and Oro Bay,
[823] the Orokaiva were deeply disturbed at being in foreign territory,
far from their homes, and close to the sea which they particularly
feared. I was told this by all Sangara informants and it is also
[753] stated in Keesing's report. My informants also ascribed sickness
of many people, especially old people, to homesickness. This does
not conform to the medical record, as presented to me verbally by
Dr. Gunther who was personally in charge of medical care in the
[164] camps. Dr. Gunther said there was not much sickness; there were
cases of spinal meningitis and paratyphoid, which he ascribed to
close living together in the camps and which were "not very much
[753] more" frequent than in any camp. It is significant, however,

731 that the Orokaiva explained these cases not by sorcery (as they
[753] regularly do) but by homesickness.

The administration, in any case, seemed to be concerned about the malaise of refugees kept in coastal camps. All Australian informants to whom I spoke agreed that it was this malaise (and protests by the Orokaiva) which led to a shift of the Eroro Bay refugees to Popondetta at the earliest opportunity (in April). A few weeks later they were allowed to go to Irihambo, a new settlement at the boundary of Sangara territory. Thus, one of the variables of special significance in the comparative study of displaced communities--removal from the home territory--was of minor significance in the case of the Orokaiva. Almost as soon as the immediate danger of the eruption was passed, people pressed for a return to their home territory and this pressure was not
[182] resisted for long. If the eruption had a lasting effect on Orokaiva norms of behaviour and belief, this was not due to changes of location, but rather to the experience of the disaster and the unexpected scope of Australian assistance, and to new residential patterns introduced when the displaced communities were resettled.

657 The government had long followed a policy of consolidating hamlets and villages, not only in Orokaiva territory but in all
361 parts of Papua. This policy existed long before the government began to pursue actively its present objectives of social and economic development. When I asked senior officials of the administration for the reasons behind this policy, I was always told that village consolidation made patrolling and the maintenance of law and order easier and that regulations concerning hygiene, housing standards, road building were more easily enforced. It was the practise, well before the eruption, to keep lists showing the names of all inhabitants of the Orokaiva district. These lists were subdivided into village lists; a patrol officer visited (and still visits) each listed village once a year and all the persons listed as living in that village must then report themselves present. Deaths and births and marriages are recorded. It seems to have been the practise for patrol officers to instruct groups living in small hamlets to join other village units. Thus, in Sivepe many amalgamations of population groups occurred over the years and the people claimed that all these amalgamations were made in response to government instructions. Even if this is not always strictly true, there is nothing novel in the pressure put upon Orokaiva after the eruption to go and live in consolidated villages.

On the other hand, there were several factors favouring such
[731] a development. The first of these was the continued restriction placed upon residence near the mountain. Even after May, 1951, there were several thousand Orokaiva who could not return to their old village sites. The villages where they were settled were

657 361 731 either new or of far greater size than before the eruption. Some of these still exist today and still stand out by their unusual size. When one finds a village with a population of over 200, this is almost invariably (I know of no exceptions myself) a village set up near Mount Lamington after the eruption--either immediately after the eruption, such as the present Mamuni, Awala, Soroputa, Agenahambo, Koipa, or set up a few years later, when most of the restricted area near the volcano was made available for settlement, such as Hohorita, Kiorota, Bagavatura, Kendata (see Table 2). These more recent villages are made up of people who, immediately after the closing down of the evacuation camps, were placed in resettlement villages such as Irihambo, Koipa, Agenahambo, Kongohambo and then resettled again closer to the mountain when this became possible. In all these cases, the unusually large size of the villages is due purely to government action.

The case of Sivepe, though atypical, may illustrate this. Before release from the Ilimo camp, it was arranged that the Sivepe people would be settled at Awala, which was on the main road and at a respectable distance from the mountain. The Awala people agreed to this; the Sivepe people agreed. Thus they went to Awala and the government intended that they should stay there in a large consolidated village. One of the two main clans now making up Sivepe expressed a strong desire to return home and, as Sivepe was outside the restricted area after May, 1951 (the boundary being at Kongohambo), no objection was made but the consolidation of Sivepe with another village was insisted upon. This did not bring Sivepe anywhere near the size of one of the major resettlement villages, but some measure of consolidation was achieved nonetheless. Here we see the operation of several administrative principles. First, we see the pressure towards large villages; Awala has 250 inhabitants even now; if Sivepe and other villages in the vicinity had been added to it, as had been intended, Awala would now have something like 600 inhabitants. On the other hand, Mr. Kaad, who administered this resettlement, evidently did not believe he should exert very strong pressure. He therefore allowed the settlement of Sivepe and several other villages between Sivepe and Awala. The one Sivepe clan which had stayed behind in Awala in 1951, returned to Sivepe a year later.

We may therefore distinguish two types of post-eruption settlements: (1) very large villages created with government encouragement; (2) medium-sized villages (generally still larger than pre-eruption villages) created with government connivance. What were Orokaiva attitudes to the necessity of this kind of relocation? I find this question hard to answer because the term "necessity" (employed in the questionnaire to which this report is the answer) does not fit what I understand to be Orokaiva logic. Settlements such as Irihambo, Awala, Kongohambo were certainly regarded as "necessary" for the mere reason that the government

657 (or in the case of Irihambo, the Bishop) had decreed them. Had
these people been Westerners rather than Orokaiva, they might have
361 asked themselves the question whether the decision of the government
731 to prohibit the Kongohambo people, for instance, to go and live
further East in their old villages was a reasonable one. However,
there is nothing self-evident in the asking of such a question.
Criticism of an administrative decision is, i.e., a calculation of
probabilities, fiduciary responsibilities and expediencies. For
the Orokaiva, the problem was not whether the government decision
was a "necessary" one, but rather: what was the most advantageous
action they could themselves take in the circumstances. The
advantages of going back to their old village sites were obvious.
[984] But these were clearly outweighed by two grave disadvantages:
first, the probability of punishment by Australian authorities and
secondly, the chance (to which I shall refer in detail later)
that the whole eruption might have been a punishment by the Christian
God for their earlier disobedience to government and Church demands,
and that further disobedience might elicit a further eruption. It
seemed foolhardy indeed to challenge both the government and the
mountain at the same time. In this sense, we may confidently say
that the Orokaiva felt the necessity of relocation.

CHAPTER 2: Physical Environments

Section 1: General Remarks

131 I have shown in the last chapter that the surviving victims of the Mount Lamington disaster were resettled on land they owned (or close to land they owned) prior to the eruption. Thus, resettlement did not lead to a lasting change in physical environment. Certainly, upon their return, the people found their houses beyond repair due to damage done by stones and other volcanic materials; the village grounds were gutted with holes and some trees destroyed. It did not take them longer than a year, however, to build a new village. After the first year, they no longer needed government supplies for subsistence; they were able to plant out their own taro seedlings and re-establish their traditional crops. [121] Nonetheless, certain minor changes in topography and resources occurred at Sivepe, and these must be briefly mentioned.

121 It will also be necessary to refer to differences in physical environment as between the community chosen for special study (Sivepe) and the control community (Inonda). It would undoubtedly have improved my research design if the physical environment in the two villages could have been more or less identical. I should therefore explain why this flaw could not be avoided. Ecologically, certain definite differences exist between land close to the volcano and land on the lowlying flats to the North and East: differences in soil composition, rainfall and population density, to mention only a few basic ones. Though these differences are overshadowed by near-identity in culture and language, they will inevitably intrude in a study as detailed as the present one. It would have been ideal if a control community could have been found which resembled Sivepe in ecology but which had not experienced resettlement. Such villages, however, did not exist, as all the Orokaiva on the slopes of the volcano were evacuated and underwent, in some form or other, the same kind of experiences as Sivepe. Hence, in the present chapter, a comparative study of the ecologies of Sivepe and Inonda must be undertaken.

There is a second question to which brief reference must be made here, namely the effect on physical environments of changes in land utilization. Throughout this report we shall be comparing conditions at the time of the eruption and the present. In the intervening period, cash cropping has become established among the Orokaiva on a significant scale and other significant cultural changes have taken place. We should therefore inquire what effect

121 these changes have had on the physical environment, especially
topography and natural resources.

Section 2: Climate

132 The temperature varies between 70° and 90°F. throughout
the year, both in Sivepe and Inonda. The Inonda people think that
the nights at Sivepe (and on the mountain generally) are rather
cold and it is true that in Inonda night temperatures are noticeably
higher. The temperature also fluctuates slightly with the season,
being higher just before and during the wettest season, i.e., from
[821] September to February. The Orokaiva like the sun to shine strongly.
They think a strong sun heals the sick and they like working in
[789] the sun. One recurring theme in spells to improve the growth of
taro is that the sun should shine strongly. This puzzled me a
little at first, but students of swidden agriculture seem to be
agreed that the fertility of the gardens depends considerably upon
the dryness of the weather during the period when gardens are
cleared and the felled vegetation burnt. (See, for instance,
Geertz, 1966: 22-23.)

Rainfall varies considerably from place to place, month to
month and year to year. I have quoted some data, for Popondetta
and Awala, extending over a number of years. Inonda rainfall is
somewhat below that of Popondetta; Sivepe rainfall is significantly
higher than at Awala. Thus Inonda usually gets 80 to 90 inches of
rain per year while Sivepe gets at least 200 (Tables 3 and 4).
Europeans tend to divide the year into a "wet" and a "dry" season.
[821] This is not a very accurate division and Orokaiva do not use it.
It rains some days in every month and the notion of a dry season
can be arrived at only statistically; it will then be seen to fall
in June-August at Awala and Sivepe; in May-September at Popondetta
and Inonda. This dry period, for the Orokaiva, is the clearing
[241] and planting period par excellence. The Orokaiva know that the
best harvests occur if it rains little during this operation. They
may not be able to explain this by the fertility gained from the
ash (they think it is the sun that gives the fertility during
planting) but one does notice a certain sense of urgency at this time
of year to attend to clearing and planting.

In October the heaviest rains begin and this is the period
132 when crops grow fastest. Thus the crops planted during the dry
241 period are apt to develop particularly well while crops planted
earlier are able to mature. It is true that planting and harvesting
continue for most of the year but the rainfall variations do
influence the yield of taro planted at different seasons; hence
the Orokaiva do have a clear notion of optimal seasons for certain
operations. The dry period is the optimal planting period, while the
months preceding are the period of optimal harvest.

241 221 Food must be planted at most periods of the year as most Orokaiva crops cannot be stored, but there is a difference according to the purpose of the plantings. Seed planted outside the optimal period can be grown for no purpose except subsistence; plantings made in the optimal period may be in preparation for feasts. Their purpose is not only subsistence but also abundance. The Orokaiva calendar contains a specific feasting season which immediately precedes the "planting" season. Taro planted between July and September reaches maturity between April and June. This is the season of feasts and abundance.

241 221 824 A distinction must be made between the ideological and the statistical work calendar. The latter has been set out here from data collected by Waddell (n.d.) in Sivepe and shows that at no period agricultural activities are confined to one particular phase of the work, such as planting or weeding or cultivating or harvesting. There are, however, clear fluctuations showing an emphasis on planting during certain periods and on harvesting, etc. during other periods (Table 5).[A] The ideological calendar, as given to me by informants, both in Sivepe and Hohorita, distinguishes seven phases related to the annual cycle of three forest trees. The calendar noted by Crocombe in Inonda (1963: 6) though more summary, follows the same principle, while differing in some minor details.

1. When the *garepa* flowers, the taro should be ready to harvest. (The reference is, as in this whole calendar, to the *main* taro harvest.) But this flowering has several phases: the flowers are first white, later yellow, finally bloodred. When some of them are bloodred, the taro is "really" ready. This is the time when small feasts are given for the owner of the land, but not yet big feasts, for it is only the first of the crop that are really ready.
2. When all the garepa flowers are bloodred, feasting time has really started. This is, in the Mount Lamington area, around Easter time.
3. Another sure sign of the approach of the feasting season is the ripening of the tauga nut (called hauga in the Sangara dialect). While garepa is watched during the time of shortage before the main harvest, tauga is watched during the time of plenty. The nuts are plentiful, delicious and rich in first-class protein.
4. At the end of May, about two months after the beginning of the feasting season, white flowers appear on the barambu tree. This is a sign that the seeds should now quickly be planted in the land. The dry period is beginning; the period when clearing and burning can be done with the least loss of fertility. As these flowers appear, feasts will still be in progress in the villages, but the old men will begin to make moralistic speeches that feasting should now be over and people should return to garden work.
5. Soon after this, perhaps a month later, the leaves of the tauga begin to fall; it is good if by that time a good deal of

[A] [See Cat. 116, pp. 209-210--Analyst]

241 planting is already completed for when the old people see the
221 tauga leaves drop over the newly planted gardens they say that the taro will have good leaves; their virtue is said to come from the
824 tauga leaves that drop. The driest part of the year is now at hand and few taro shoots suitable for planting are developing; hence, the best planting time is past.

[132] 6. The flowering of the tauga announces the beginning of the rainy season. This falls around the beginning of October.

7. At about Christmas, immature tauga nuts begin to fall from
[789] the trees. This is the beginning of the time of shortage and also the occasion of some further garden magic to encourage the swelling of the main taro crop. Some minor feasts occur around this time. People then begin to look forward to the time the garapa will flower again.

We may compare this with Waddell's statistical data, which
241 compares man-weeks spent on all types of activities in Sivepe over the periods 3 February-3 May, 1964; 20 July-6 September, 1964; and 9 November, 1964-3 January, 1965. His figures do not rally particularly closely with the idealogical pattern set out by informants and he explains this by an untypical rainfall pattern in 1964; it was unusuolly dry.

Rainfall fluctuations have a profound effect on the yield of the main crop taro. Because of the porosity of the ground, very heavy rainfall is needed to ensure a good harvest. Feasts can be held only in years when the rainfall has been good and the harvest accordingly abundant. In other years people are close to starvation level in the months before the harvest. It is then they rely on supplementary crops such as sago.

In recent years, two further calendars have become superimposed
805 upon the traditional one: that of the Christian festivals and that
[439] of the European economy, notably monthly coffee sales from June to December and the payment of Local Government Council tax supposedly
[651] in September.

Section 3: Topography

121 In this section I shall specifically describe the differences in topography between Sivepe and Inonda, but this description will illustrate at the same time the fundamental differences between the ecological base of Orokaiva mountain settlements such as are found on the slopes of Mount Lamington and of the plains settlements found North and East of the mountain. I have drawn my data from a regional land and soil survey done by the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation in 1954, as well as from remarks of Crocombe and Hogbin (1963) and Rimoldi (1966).

133 Sivepe lies on an altitude of 1,300 feet, seven miles from Mount Lamington. Although the mountain rises to a height of 5,634 [361] feet, most present settlements are on the lower slopes, rarely very much higher than Sivepe. A wide range of annual and perennial [241] crops, including taro, on which the Orokaiva depend, do not grow well at altitudes much above 1,500 feet. Thus, the eruption has [931] had no appreciable permanent influence on the location of village sites. The restricted area is at present a circle of two miles' [361] radius from the crater of Mount Lamington; there are not now, nor were there before the eruption, permanent settlements closer than four miles from the crater.

The Sivepe terrain (if I may borrow the terminology of the CSIRO report) is characterised by a gentle radial slope on wide planar ridges between the larger steep-sided streams flowing from Mount Lamington into the Kumusi River. Numerous smaller creeks, together with these streams, form an effective fine-textured radial drainage system. Drainage is facilitated, moreover, by the extreme porosity of the soil.

Sivepe (see Map III)[A] is on a soil association of the Awala 134 land system which has an 8 to 12 inch very dark brown topsoil. Chemical tests suggest that these loams are fertile, rich in nitrogen and phosphorus. The fine-textured subsoils range from 10 [823] to 22 inches in depth. Rimoldi points out that this dominant soil type, which the Orokaiva call *mume* (a word whose principal meaning is night, darkness), is only one of five found in the district and distinguished by Orokaiva by colour, texture and moisture. The others are *bohori* (red), which is popular for cultivation if it is not sandy; *gindiri* (stony, with high sand fraction); *pusu* (clay) and *pesara* (swamp). Mume is the most widely used soil for gardens.

In contrast, Inonda (see Map IV)[B] is no more than 200 to 133 300 feet above sea level. It lies partly (to draw on the CSIRO report again) on the flood plains of the Girua and Sambogo rivers and partly in the moderately sloping foothills of the northern side of the extinct strato-volcanic Hydrographers Range. The Sambogo and Girua Rivers flow in a northerly direction draining from the Hydrographers Range and Mount Lamington respectively. They are swiftly flowing, rocky-bedded rivers which, together with their numerous tributaries, give the area a moderate to good drainage system. To the east the drainage system in the vicinity of the Embi Lakes has been blocked by recent volcanic activity and drainage is much poorer. A vast coastal plain between 20 and 30 miles wide stretches north-westwards from the Hydrographers for over 60 miles. Inonda lies at the southern end of this plain, about 15 miles inland from the coast.

Crocombe and Hogbin classify Inonda soils on the basis of 134 five soil associations listed in the CSIRO survey: (i) the Popondetta Association, with black to very dark topsoil underlain by yellowish-grey volcanic sand subsoil. The topsoil looks like

A [See Cat. 116, p. End Map 3--Analyst]
B [See Cat. 116, p. End Map 4--Analyst]

134 the *mume* of Sivepe, but it is far shallower, less well drained and
covered with kunai grass (predominantly imperata sp.). It is not
[241] used for gardens because of the difficulty of freeing the ground
from grass roots. (ii) the Girua Association: coarse textured,
recent riverine deposits lying beside the Sambogo and Girua Rivers.
This soil, called *tumene* is the favourite gardening land. (iii)
the Warisota Association: recent, well drained medium textured
clay loams, becoming fine textured with depth and found on the
Hydrographers foothills. They are gray to grey brown, and are
called hora or *hohori*. They are not favoured (though occasionally
used) for gardens, as they tend to dry out during the dry season,
which is much longer and dryer than at Sivepe. The other two soil
types are too stony [illegible] sandy to be used for anything except foraging
and hunting.

162 There is a striking difference in population density between
the two districts. Sivepe, with a population of 137, occupies and
161 owns about 0.75 square miles of land, an average of about 180
persons per square mile. We may compare this with Inonda, with a
population of 45 and about four square miles of land--an average
of 11 persons per square mile. Sivepe is not at all untypical for
the Saiho Census Division in which it is located; this is the
division which includes the Mount Lamington foothills as well as
some sparsely populated areas in the vicinity. Average population
density in this division is 75, with local densities of 200 and
over "not at all rare" (Rimoldi, 1966: 4). Inonda also has a
population density characteristic of the census division in which
it is located; the Buna Division is occupied by about eight persons
per square mile (see Table 6).

Rimoldi's analysis shows that the Sivepe population density
161 is close to the upper limit the land can sustain with present
311 technology and social organisation. The sample he chose for study
(50 persons of the Jegase and Timumu clans) happened to have less
land than the average, namely a total of 138 acres. He showed that
of this area, 110 acres are required to maintain present standards
of subsistence agriculture (1966: 20-21). This leaves hardly any
margin for land unsuitable for cultivation and for unequal distribution
of land as between families. It also makes little provision for a
balance of forest land which must be preserved, as forest resources
are essential for the maintaining of the Orokaiva economy. It is
true that the other major Sivepe clan (Seho) has greater land
resources, and that the Seho people allow the others to use forest
trees from their land for building and other purposes. Nonetheless,
land resources are almost as tight as they can be.

In contrast, Inonda has plenty of room. When Sewa Village
joined Inonda after the eruption, there was plenty of garden land
for everybody. Crocombe and Hogbin claim that 580 acres may be
classed as good garden land, whereas the present level of subsistence
gardening can be maintained with 127 acres (1963: 10).

In the period from January, 1951-1967, the location of the
361 villages now known as Sivepe and Inonda changed several times. In
[114] the Sivepe area settlements had always been unstable. Rimoldi
has made a valiant attempt to reconstruct shifts of residence from
the time of European contact to the present; involved though his
reconstruction is, it probably tells only part of the story. In
50 years, the groups now represented in Sivepe had between them
been involved in shifts of residence between a series of 14 village
sites within an area of about two square miles adjoining the Sobu
[659] River. It is clear that the government carried out some village
consolidations in the district after the second world war, but
before the eruption. Most of the people now living at Sivepe were,
at that time, shifted to a village called Pamba, which had been
occupied earlier by the Seho clan only. After the eruption, Pamba
was at first reoccupied, but soon the village was shifted almost
a mile away, to a place which was called Sivepe. This new village
(see Map V)[A] differed from the pre-eruption one in layout, method
of house construction and spacing of the dwellings. It conformed
to the model advocated by the administration and observed by the
refugees when they were at Wairopi and Ilimo. In 1965, Sivepe was
shifted to its present site, and higher building standards and
better sanitation were again introduced (see Map VI).[B]

Both these shifts were connected with topographical relation-
[578] ships and social relationships outside the village. The first of
them, in 1952, seems to have been precipitated by a quarrel between
[628] the Timumu clan of Pamba and the resettlement village of Kongohambo,
which then had a population of almost 1,000, over garden damage
caused by pigs. Sivepe was much farther away from Kongohambo than
Pamba. The second shift was in the opposite direction. It was a
move which brought the village closer to the road, closer to the
mission, and the reduced distance from Kongohambo no longer mattered
as this is now a village of average size, with which good relations
exist. The people who lived in Kongohambo in 1952 have returned to
their homes closer to the mountain.

These shifts in village sites are accounted for by almost a
361 superfluity of reasons. Rimoldi was told of almost all the shifts
657 he recorded that they were made upon the instructions of the
government. I was told of shifts that were made because of deaths
attributed to sorcery and because of quarrels between neighboring
361 villages which were too close together for comfort. I witnessed
[628] one shift after a death of an old man where sorcery was not
suspected (as he was old) but being unbaptised he could not be
[759] buried in the Christian cemetery which made people fearful of his
ghost. The population of this village shifted to nearby Hohorita,
[764] a move which was in any case favoured by the government. A reason
[775] that was also sometimes given was that the houses were all old and
the place was becoming unsanitary. A reason never explicitly given,
but perhaps as important as any other is the Orokaiva's dislike for

A [See Cat. 116, p. End Map 5--Analyst]
B [See Cat. 116, p. End Map 6--Analyst]

361 cultivating gardens that are more than a mile or so away from his
village.

When Rimoldi made his careful notes of cultivated gardens,
241 these seemed to be predominantly in the Northeastern part of the
311 village domain. These gardens are ordinarily fallowed for eight
years or so and then cultivated for one season. The gardens in the
Southwestern part of the village domain were undoubtedly being
cultivated shortly after the eruption; they are again being cultivated
today. It therefore seems to make sense that after the eruption
people were living in Pamba, in that part of the domain and that
the new Sivepe is again in that area.

731 Inonda experienced three shifts since the eruption: first
to the vicinity of the airstrip (1951), then to the village
361 described by Crocombe and Hogbin (1955), then to the village where
I myself stayed (established 1964; see Map VII).[A] The pre-eruption
village was just behind this new village, again suggesting an
orderly exploitation of garden land. In 1964, Inonda returned to
garden land that had been fallowed since the eruption. People told
me that before shifting to the present site, they had to walk much
too far to their gardens.

361 While the layout of Pamba was traditional--with the houses
close together and little space between the rows--both post-eruption
657 settlements of Sivepe and all the four post-war Inonda settlements
followed what one may call the Australian standard plan: two fairly
regular parallel rows of equidistant houses facing each other, with
a few houses joining the two rows, thus forming a quadrangle, and
a wide field in the middle, used for playing soccer and basketball
and as a separation of the two "halves" of the village which tend
to belong to different clans. A modern village will contain, in
[364] addition to residences, privies for each family, while some have
[345] built a hall for the women's club, sponsored by the government.
Inonda built a very stylish one, using as a floor a slab of concrete
[575] which the Americans laid down during the war. Sivepe got no further
than the foundations, after which a quarrel blocked progress. In
addition all villages contain a number of arara or jataka--covered
platforms where men sit and receive visitors. Many villages, including
[591] Sivepe, still have a bachelor's house. Typically, each house is
occupied by a two-generation family comprising no more than one
married couple. A stream is always close to the village.

The change in village layout as between Pamba and the two
later Sivepe villages must be discussed in a little more detail as
the eruption was clearly influential here. The Australian government
has long been concerned about village layouts; this interest went
beyond consolidations and included the improvement of housing
657 standards, village sanitation and roads. We find Wilfred Beaver,
in the Annual Report for 1914-15, already claiming that he had
364 "insisted on these three essentials in village life," in the

A [See Cat. 116, p. End Map 7--Analyst]

657 Kumusi Division in which both Sivepe and Inonda are situated. It
364 would be wrong, however, to imagine that the tidiness which will
strike a modern visitor to Orokaiva villages may really be ascribed
to resident magistrates and patrol officers. Col. Kenneth McKay
who visited these villages in 1906 reported that he saw village
grounds absolutely bare of grass, being swept so clean that a man
might literally eat his dinner off it (quoted in Monckton, 1922:
[462] 131-132). The sweeping of village grounds as a feminine duty is,
indeed, already a subject of Orokaiva mythology.

364 Beaver, in the report already cited, sets out his concept
of village improvement as follows: "In the old days, doubtless,
361 the people were careful enough not to leave food refuse about the
village for fear of sorcery, but a good cleared space around the
outskirts of the settlement was beyond them. There is certainly a
danger that in maintaining this cleared area the people may be
tempted to build their houses closer together, but I have not yet
found this tendency." (1916: 49). Today, this cleared space around
the outskirts is very sparing, though the privies that have
become customary tend to be a few yards behind the houses and
clearance extends just beyond them. There have, however, been
interesting changes in housing architecture, to which I shall refer
in due course. One significant change in the village "eco-system"
has been the gradual elimination of the pig complex.

342 The Pre-contact house was invariably built with a pig
enclosure so that man and pig spent the night together. The
231 Australians lost no time in imposing the taboos of their own
657 society: they did not object to human symbiosis with dogs; they
even encouraged symbiosis with fowls but regarded symbiosis with
pigs as the height of barbarism. The new house designs made no
provision for them, so that they were left free to sleep under
231 the houses, or elsewhere, as they wished. Since the Local
Government Council was established in 1956, a vigorous campaign
657 was conducted to eliminate them altogether. Thus, Inonda had no
pigs in 1966, except for one which belonged to a Seva man who had
left it with an Inonda man "to look after," and a very little one
that had just been caught in the bush. When the new Sivepe was
established in 1965, it was decided that this would be a pigless
village; the remaining pigs were left in the old village. In
practice, they wandered through the surrounding bush and gardens, so
that it became useful to shoot them all as quickly as possible.
Other villages, however, had not progressed so far in the direction
of the pigless village ideal. Hohorita was indeed nearly pigless
when I visited, but this was perhaps because a feast had been held
there very recently.

659 Belshaw makes the following remarks about village development:
"Before the eruption, a new type of village had been established in
361 the Kokoda sub-district, consisting of a large village square of
neatly clipped grass, with houses arranged in a single row along

657 three sides of it. (Administration) attempts to introduce such
361 villages in the Higaturu sub-district had largely failed and the
standard of housing was much lower. Further, the people of this
area tended to live in small clan-hamlets and resisted propaganda
[731] for them to come together into larger village groups. After the
eruption, however, the general desire for new things, the sense of
[784] guilt at having resisted such innovations before, and a feeling of
insecurity combined to make most of the people reconsider their
earlier decisions. Although the move was not quite universal, by
far the greater proportion of people decided to rebuild their house
in large village units situated close to existing or proposed jeep
roads, and on administrative advice decided to follow the Kokoda
village plan with substantially improved housing" (1951: 245).

At the time of Belshaw's research the only resettled areas were those West of the Waseta-Sairope line, and the villages Belshaw visited appear to have been in the Sairope area. As it turned out, the Kokoda village plan was in fact adopted in a great many villages in the Higaturu sub-district, though by no means as an immediate result of any decisions that may have been taken at Ilimo. In the Sivepe area, it seems clear that the people's first plan was to return to Pamba and only when Pamba became uncomfortable, partly through quarrels, partly through damage done by the eruption and partly through administration pressure, did they decide to build a new village in the new style. Within a radius of three miles from Sivepe, there are still a considerable number of old-style villages even today: Hamburata, Gorombi, Torogota, to mention only three larger ones. Others, such as Duve and Binduta, were beginning to adopt the new style only around the time of my visit in 1966. In 1951, only those villages in which the government took a strong direct interest, such as Awala, Kongohambo, and the villages visited by Belshaw (but I could not enumerate them all) adopted the Kokoda style.

There is also a minor incompleteness in Belshaw's data when he refers to the neatly clipped grass and the rows of houses as being innovations due to the Kokoda influence. The neatly clipped grass was in evidence in 1906 and the regular rows of houses were reported by F. E. Williams (1930: 68). This was, admittedly, reported as late as the 1920's but the layout is consistent with the less explicit descriptions of Orokaiva villages given by Walker (1901) and by Monckton in his descriptions of his battles with the Dobudura and Sangara. The novelty of the Kokoda plan lies rather in the wide central field, the house design and use of materials, and the sanitation.

Undoubtedly, credit for the introduction of the plan must be given to the Ilimo experience but the spreading of the plan over the majority of Orokaiva villages must rather be ascribed to the growing influence of the Local Government Council in the 1960's.

657 Sivepe, as it happens, was one of the villages in which the plan
361 was pioneered.

Finally, I should refer briefly to communications. One
[491] general effect of the eruption was a shifting of villages to the
side of jeep roads, as Belshaw also mentioned. The administration
favoured this trend which greatly facilitated patrolling the
villages. The Orokaiva always seem to have a liking for the
Australian-built roads; Monckton already refers to their fondness
for travelling over it and explains it gave a sense of security
against possible attack by hostile tribes. Though this can hardly
be the reason today, the liking remains. Over the last few years,
the roads have begun to yield economic and practical advantage:
trucks collecting coffee visit the villages and occasionally
people can pick up rides from passing vehicles. Speed of travel
is also improved for pedestrians. I shall discuss ideological
aspects of this liking later.

872 The accessibility of facilities has also improved since
the eruption. Sivepe children now all go to the school at the
797 Sasembata mission station which teaches up to Standard 6. Inonda
children were first introduced to schooling after the eruption
when the Seva people joined them accompanied by a mission teacher.
[368] After this mission teacher retired, Inonda was dependent on a
school at Hohota. Only a few children went to this school because
it was six miles away, across a deep river, but today, after
the building of a new road and a bridge, and the latest shift of
Inonda village, this distance has been reduced to about three
miles and school attendance is regular.

The eruption changes the centre of gravity of the district.
368 The pre-eruption settlements of Higaturu and Sangara contained all
731 governmental and mission facilities, including the hospital and
the schooling past Standard 2. Sivepe's link with these facilities
was by a bush track running through Isivita. Today, Popondetta is
the centre, but the hospital is at Saiho, the senior college near
Agenahambo, the Local Government Council in the new Higaturu, near
[491] Agenahambo. Thus the main road to Popondetta, now greatly improved,
has become the main artery. Nonetheless, for those who have to
walk, the bush tracks from Sivepe to Saiho, Awala and Agenahambo
are still important thoroughfares used by many dozen people every
day.

Section 4: Resources

423 I have already referred to the main resource, owned by the
Orokaiva, which is their land. The Sivepe people own only about
311 480 acres, almost entirely gardening land, and very little of
their land is in virgin bush. This small area is useful for certain

311 products, such as slow-growing trees, which are used for house
posts, drums, and other artifacts. A great deal of Sivepe land
423 is in young bush but this is fallowed garden land. After eight
years or so, it grows sizeable trees, and sometimes it is fallowed
for much longer. In this bush, many trees may be found that have
actually been planted by man and are owned by individuals.
Prominent among these are breadfruit, various nut trees, fruit
trees and trees with other specific uses. Some of these are
224 deliberately planted in bush. People go to the bush to collect
these, to forage and to hunt. Although hunting expeditions do
[222] occur periodically, and cause much excitement, they yield very
little meat. Not only is the area too small to contain much game,
[136] but also it appears that very few birds and no game apart from
small marsupials are actually still left. The same is true for
[411] the rivers which contain very little fish. I could not help
wondering, in fact, whether the meat collected was an adequate
[262] return for the number of cartridges used to kill it. Hunting
expeditions occurred only when there was a feast, and when the
offering of fresh meat to guests was especially desirable.
(Tinned meat might be cheaper than the cartridges but much less
esteemed.)

311 In this respect, the situation was very different in Inonda
where only a fraction of the land was used for gardening so that
almost all of it was hunting land. Most of this was in kunai
grass, which was very often burnt over. The effect of these burnings
was very often that good garden land also fell a victim to fire,
224 valuable trees were destroyed and villages endangered. The yield
in meat was much higher, however, so that in Inonda, meat actually
223 became an economic resource: it was sold on the market and used
as gifts in return for feathers and other valuables. There are
more birds at Inonda than at Sivepe, more marsupials and also a
good chance of an occasional wild pig. Neither at Sivepe nor at
Inonda is there evidence today of the use of traditional hunting
techniques, though traditional fishing techniques have survived.
[411] The decline in game and fish population is ascribed to the intro-
duction of guns and snorkels which greatly increased yields for
[223] some years, but then led to a greater scarcity than had ever been
known in the past. Guns and snorkels were introduced shortly after
[177] the second world war.

There are two kinds of domestic livestock: pigs and fowls.
231 The number of pigs has, as I already pointed out, declined greatly
in both villages. It was impossible to know how many pigs were
owned by Sivepe people in 1966-67, because they disappeared as the
old village became deserted and were never seen at all in the new
village. Rimoldi reports 24 pigs owned by his sample of 50 Sivepe
people alone which suggests that even in 1963, when he stayed
there, the whole village must have owned at least 60. During my
period of study, only a few of them were killed, and only when

231 they marauded gardens, so that I assume that a good number could
be rounded up if Sivepe were to hold a major feast. They were not
at all accessible, however, and none were caught during such hunting
[422] expeditions as the people organised. On the occasions when marauding
pigs were shot, the pigs were always recognized and presented by
the killer to the owner who then presented his pig to some other
person. No doubt these pigs were a resource and perhaps I was at
fault for not taking a census, but with no pigs visibly in evidence,
I considered these assets as too shadowy. In Inonda, where Crocombe
and Hogbin reported 12 pigs in 1962, only two were left in 1966.
235 My prognosis for pigs as an economic resource is poor. The fowl
population, on the other hand, had remained very much as it was at
[262] these earlier investigations: eggs were discovered and eaten
occasionally, but the use of the fowl was for feasting when visitors
[239] had to be entertained. It was also noticeable that the roosters
were deprived of many of their choicest feathers at a time when
[293] headdresses had to be refurbished for dancing or spears decorated.
At a visit from Togahou, which by traditional etiquette, as I
[411] understand it, should have rated at least one pig, the people of
[574] Sivepe killed only fowls. This was, I was told, because there
were no pigs available; hence the fowls were a proper substitute.
It would seem that the fowl is rapidly becoming the substitute for
the pig on many ceremonial occasions, though not yet for all
occasions.

There is a great shortage of both pigs and fowls for these
438 ceremonial occasions. Pigs are bought for high prices ($20 to
439 $30)--from neighboring villages and even, as Crocombe and Hogbin
say, from European planters. Fowls tend to be made available on
[435] big occasions by whoever has them so that their number does not
increase--a few dozen in each of the two villages.

We may distinguish, among local plant resources which yield
241 economic products, those plants which are native to the district
311 and those which have been introduced by Europeans for cash cropping
purposes. Starting our survey with the former of these two
categories, we shall deal first with food plants and next with
economic trees. I have tabulated average food plants per household
as shown for Rimoldi's Sivepe sample and as shown by Crocombe and
Hogbin for Inonda (Table 7).[A] The pattern for the two places is
remarkably similar except that sweet potato is a notably more
important crop at Inonda than at Sivepe. The reason for this is
that it is more dependable under drought conditions such as often
occur at Inonda and also, it seems to do better at Inonda. The
fact that the Inonda taro acreage is higher than the Sivepe acreage
reflects no more than the higher yield per acre in the latter place.
There is no evidence that any major change occurred in the quantities
grown or the methods of cultivation over the period with which we
are concerned, though a small increase in the consumption of
Xantosoma taro may be a symptom that people may be starting to

A [See Cat. 116, p. 212--Analyst]

241 devote less time to the cultivation of the more laborious (but more
311 favoured) Colocasia taro.

During the post-eruption period there have been, as we shall
[433] see below, many pressures on the Orokaiva to reallocate their
working time, by raising the standard of village building construction,
by taking on outside labour to raise taxes and buy luxuries, by
increasing the acreage in cash crops. In many cultures dependent
on swidden agriculture these pressures have led to more slipshod
methods of cultivation, or smaller plantings or shorter fallowing
periods. Among the Orokaiva, the only effect so far has been, in
all probability, a decline in the surpluses grown for feasts. This
is a change to be discussed later and related to religious changes.
In Sivepe there would clearly be a danger, if cash-cropping was
expanded to the extent some administration officers would like to
see, that fallowing periods in subsistence gardens would need to
be shortened. There is no evidence that subsistence gardening, so
far, has been affected by cash cropping, as both the acreage and
the time devoted to cash crops is too small. (For details of time
allocation to activities in both villages, see Table 8.)A

245 The average Sivepe family, according to Rimoldi, has 62
cultivated trees of local origin from which crops are gathered in
season. No corresponding figure is available for Inonda, but it
would be about 30. The list of most important trees varies a
little between the two districts because of differences of climate
and soil.

Sivepe	Inonda
Coconut	Sago
Breadfruit (oga and eumba)	Coconut
Betelnut (areca)	Betelnut
Sago	Hauga nut (tauga)
Pandanus	Breadfruit
Tauga nut (cycas media)	Pandanus
Puga nut (terminalia okaria)	(Ajimo)
Bark cloth tree (ajimo)	
Mango	

An important difference between the resources of the two
villages is that coconuts at Inonda will yield copra; hence, a
copra drying house was built and this has been and can be a source
[262] of income. At Sivepe, the flesh is thinner and coconuts are grown
for drinking, cooking, feeding dogs and chickens, while the nuts are
also eaten regularly and form a useful source of protein. Another
249 difference is that neither betelnut nor tauga and puga do well at
all in the Inonda district and quantities are negligible. The lack
of betelnuts is felt very strongly, as the Inonda people are as
276 fond of chewing it as other Orokaiva. Hence, it is usually obtained

438 A [See Cat. 116, p. 213--Analyst]

276 from relatives who live in the mountain districts or else obtained
439 by barter, or bought from other villages or at the Popondetta
market.

Sago is made and eaten when other crops fail, but the plants
245 are also used as building material. As the supply of sago is very
[262] limited in both villages, the plants are highly prized. Inonda
people owned only 21 trees so that the bulk of supplies was obtained
from other areas, e.g., from wild sago trees over which they claim
rights. In Sivepe, the total supply is in the vicinity of,
probably, 300. This suffices for the local need, both as an
occasional supplementation of the food supply and for building, when
a great quantity is needed.

The special position of sago among economic trees was shown
[799] clearly in Miss White's description of the building of Sasembata
mission station shortly after the eruption. This was a big project
in which all the surrounding villages (including Sivepe) collaborated.
Labour was given free and so were all building materials--apart
from sago for which payment was expected and made. I was told by
informants this was because sago is a cultivated, not a bush tree.
During my field work period, the mission again needed sago roofing
for expansion and repair of buildings, but this time no payment
was made. However, each household was asked for a contribution of
only two strips of roofing. Thus, it was again treated as a
resource of special value as other materials were not supplied in
such strict rations.

The ajimo tree, used for manufacturing bark cloth was not
reported in Inonda by Crocombe and Hogbin but we did find a small
[287] quantity growing. Though bark cloth is only used for dancing
costumes nowadays, in both villages, these dances still take place
from time to time. The women's clubs have stimulated the production
of painted bark cloth for sale, but this has not led to extra
plantings. Sivepe's supply of ajimo trees was only one or two
for most households, sufficient for an occasional festive garment
with none to spare, but there was an abundance of ajimo in some
other villages in the Sasembata district. Here we may notice a
definite change between the pre-eruption period and the present
at pre-eruption Inonda and because at Pamba, bark cloth was still
the daily wear for everybody, so that the ajimo was an important
economic tree. With this exception, there would seem to have been
no change in the resources of economic trees of local origin.

241 The three introduced cash crops of significance in the two
villages have been rice (pre-eruption), coffee and rubber; in
177 both villages, one man grew a little cocoa. These industries,
which developed in intensive interaction with Australian authorities,
are perhaps better discussed in detail in a later chapter when these
[243] relationships are analysed. Rice plots were developed in the period
between the second world war and the eruption; the plots in both

241 villages had to be abandoned at the time of the eruption and rice
177 growing was never resumed. The growing of rubber by Orokaiva in
the Northern District has a long and somewhat unhappy history which
[243] will be referred to later; at the time of the eruption, just before
the Korean War drove up the prices, the rubber trees planted by
249 the Orokaiva were hardly harvested at all; Rimoldi reports that
in 1963 the existing stands at Sivepe were tapped to some extent
311 and the coagulum sold to a factory at Awala. There were six tappers
177 in his population sample of 50, who together earned $70 in one year.
[434] When I began my field work, the tapping had ceased as the factory
was no longer buying indigenously grown rubber, but a rubber
[474] cooperative was set up early in 1967, with the encouragement of
the Department of Agriculture, in a village about one mile from
Sivepe. The Department of Agriculture was also encouraging the
people to plant superior Malayan rubber trees and two men had
planted 250 and 72 trees respectively. Rimoldi reports that
"members of the clans now represented in Sivepe and Binduta"
owned four plots ranging from less than half an acre to about
three acres in area.

Since that time, however, a new plot has been established, four and one-half acres in size, on which theoretically seven men were to establish rubber stands. The Malayan trees were planted here, as well as self-sown trees from the other plots which were dug up and replanted. These plantings occurred shortly after Rimoldi left. If the new cooperative venture succeeds, it is likely that the new plot--most of which still remains unplanted--will be exploited, but people were clearly waiting to see whether sales at attractive prices would eventuate.

Orokaiva coffee plantations are wholly a post-eruption
245 development, inaugurated by the Agriculture Department shortly
177 after it was set up in Popondetta and greatly strengthened by the
311 setting up of a coffee cooperative, first under the Higaturu Local
Government Council and later independently. First plantings in
Sivepe were before 1954, in Inonda in 1955. Rimoldi reported that
in 1964, there were 1,100 coffee trees in Sivepe, owned by five
growers. Crocombe and Hogbin reported 801 trees in Inonda in
1962, owned by three households. Since that time, Inonda has not
added to its plantings, but Sivepe, along with the whole of the
Saiho Division, has greatly increased its cash-cropping activities
[434] since the 1964 census. The number of growers has increased from
five to 14--every able-bodied man in the vigor of life has his
coffee garden from which he derives an annual income of between
$50 and $100. This increase is the result of vigorous encouragement
of plantings by the Agriculture Department, a change of ideology
under the impact of the Local Government Councils and a great
improvement in the marketing arrangements. In 1966, Sivepe coffee
was collected and promptly paid for in Garombi village, about 15
minutes' walk from Sivepe. I did not take another coffee census

245 but would estimate plantings to be about 4,000 trees, occupying
177 an area of eight acres.

Among resources which produce significant current income in
311 Sivepe and Inonda, two other types must be briefly mentioned here,
though they must be more fully discussed elsewhere. Income is
434 earned by men who are normally resident in the villages. When
these men are married and living away from the village with their
167 families, they provide support to the home people on critical
occasions and also, when villagers pay visits to them. I briefly
met a few Sivepe men who settled in Port Moresby and these men
were called upon, during the year of my study, to pay several plane
fares and feed several men who tried their luck in looking for jobs
in Port Moresby.

Secondly, men who return to the village after outside
167 employment are bringing savings into the village which forms a
464 significant source of revenue. Such savings often form part of the
bride-wealth paid by clansmen and it is thus the affines who spend
[583] it. During the year, four Sivepe men went to Port Moresby for
employment and three returned; one Sivepe man took up a job on a
plantation for a while, largely to pay overdue taxes; a number of
434 men ordinarily working outside came home for short visits. Probably
the most regular income is derived from absentees when the men go
837 out to work by themselves, leaving their wives and children behind
in the village. Six such split families existed in Sivepe; in
613 every case, regular envelopes containing money were posted to the
wife. In the cases I investigated, eight to ten envelopes arrived
in a year, each containing $10 and sometimes $20. These envelopes
represent a considerable percentage of village income. As long as
the money keeps coming, a man knows that his relations will closely
watch his wife and will carry out obligations towards his affines;
thus, his wife will be kept under strong moral constraint from all
sides. It would be cynical to explain the generosity with which
men maintain their wives wholly by such motives, but the Orokaiva
do regard "looking after" the wives of absentees as a valuable
service and the envelopes are thus a form of repayment. "Looking
after" the wife and children, indeed, comprises a wide range of
services which must be performed by men of the lineage and which
are a reasonable charge against the income of a wage earner. As
most places of employment in Papua-New Guinea do not provide for
married accommodation, we may regard villagers and migrants as
engaged in a joint economic enterprise in which each group performs
services and obtains benefits.

At the time of the eruption several Sivepe men were working
464 on plantations; today, Sivepe people are interested only in the
better-paid town jobs, mostly in Port Moresby. In Inonda, however,
two men often take up short spells of plantation work while a
third, trained as a driver by an anthropologist, has a regular
government job in Popondetta.

511 177 Capital goods, though few, should be briefly mentioned. Apart from a house and his clothing, the average man owns very little. The sum of his possessions make a very small pile: a bush knife and two or three implements, some kitchen utensils, a small box of feathers and ornaments, usually carefully locked, perhaps a few dollars of savings, and--in both Inonda and Sivepe--an interest in a coffee-hulling machine presented by an anthropologist. About half the people have a storm lantern; two Sivepe men had a pressure lamp, lit on weighty occasions only. With the exception of the valuables, these capital goods are innovations; at the time of the eruption people had far fewer, and these were mostly acquired after the second world war or from American soldiers.

433 Comparing the development of Sivepe and Inonda over the last 15 years, we note several significant differences in the exploitation of resources: Sivepe, but not Inonda, has rapidly expanded its coffee production in the 1960's; Sivepe but not Inonda is deriving a significant cash income from "looking after" the wives of migrants. I have referred to several other differences, but these seem to me the most significant, as they do not appear to me to follow directly from ecological differences.

CHAPTER III: Social Environment

Section 1: Opportunity for Contact with Outsiders

The experience of the eruption led to outside contacts that
731 would not otherwise have occurred. These outside contacts obviously
177 were among the basic causes of social changes arising out of the
eruption. In the present study, it is by no means easy to
distinguish between outside contacts which arose out of the eruption,
directly or indirectly, and those which existed prior to the
eruption or were the result of social changes unconnected with the
121 eruption. But before we can address ourselves to this substantive
question, it must first be clear what we shall mean by "outside
contacts." The term "outsiders" is used repeatedly in Professor
Barnett's specification of the variables to be included in the
comparative study. What, exactly, are outsiders? In order to
answer this question, I have to offer a few generalizations about
Orokaiva social structure for which the documentation cannot be
included here. A full treatment is given in my doctoral dissertation.

We may view the Orokaiva picture of his social universe as
571 a set of widening concentric circles: family, local clan group,
village, the clan within limits of kinship recognition, the
consanguineal group within limits of kinship recognition, a group
of contiguous friendly villages, the wider set of persons with
which an individual entertains institutionalized friendship links,
while beyond these limits we may discern even wider circles which
become evident in special circumstances. This is an entirely
619 ego-centred model. I saw no evidence of groups of villages which
displayed a true corporate unity. Thus village A would have close
628 relations with villages B and C, but village B would not have
similarly close bonds with A and C. More likely, villages B and
C would treat each other with marked reserve and B would have close
relations with A and D; C would have close relations with A and E.

571 Patrilineages were very shallow in genealogical depth.
Though the kinship structure would need to be classified as
613 predominantly patrilineal, I noted a strong consanguineal emphasis.
591 Bonds based on real or fictional siblingship, affinity, matrilineality,
institutionalized friendship and--above all--residence and an
uninterrupted flow of reciprocal transactions were stronger than
all but the closest patrilineal bonds. Though residence was
predominantly patri-virilocal, there were many non-agnates in
local groups sharing the same clan name; inheritance was not
necessarily in the patriline.

571 The social universe of the different families diverged markedly from one another; the small number of extended families composing a minor patrilineage (marked by the possession of a common plant emblem) would share each other's social network and obligations to a large extent, but the same could not even be said for clansmen of different plant emblem groups. In such a culture, the term "outsider" must be situationally defined. For certain situations, only those who share a clan emblem are insiders; for other situations, only clansmen; for others, only residents of the same village, while I can also think of situations where the group of "insiders" embraces a much larger group. We may list the following set of widening concentric circles, as useful for the present study:

(a) Closely allied villages (especially Sivepe, Garombi, Binduta)

(b) The Sasembata district: defined as comprising Sasembata parish or the three Sasembata local government council wards. This is an area close to the road from Kendata to Boru, and never more than an hour's walking distance away from it.

(c) The wider solidarity group to which Williams and several other earlier authors have referred as the "Waseta tribe" (see map)

(d) The indigenous population of Ilimo camp

(e) The "Orokaiva" people

(f) Papuans and New Guineas other than Orokaiva, without special administrative roles

(g) Papuans and New Guineas with offices in the administration, and the Church

(h) Chinese traders

(i) Persons referred to as "taupa" (white men)

(k) The Americans (a special, and by this time somewhat mythical category)

(l) White men believed to be dead ancestors who have returned

For the purpose of this study, I have avoided systematic reference to social structure and emphasized residence rather than kinship. The Inonda pattern resembles, in general, that of Sivepe, except that the sparseness of the population makes the immediate [628] social environment somewhat simpler. Sivepe has significant relations of one sort or another with dozens of villages; Inonda's social universe hardly comprises more than half a dozen, and small ones at that. On the maps Inonda is shown as part of the Sauaha "tribe," but Crocombe and Hogbin treat Sauaha as simply another clan in the vicinity and it is likely that the larger military grouping of which they formed part were Monckton's dreaded Dobuduru.

121 It is our task to consider changes in the patterns of contact with each of these 11 categories of outsiders (as between

121 January, 1951 and 1967), both in Sivepe and Inonda. In our treatment
of the patterns of contact, we need to consider the following
variables specified in the Barnett memorandum (1-C #1,2,3,4,5,6,7):
role and status of persons involved in transactions, the occasions
of contacts and transactions, their purpose, frequency, degree of
formality, degree of affectivity, the fiduciary element present
in the transactions, their locations; we have to specify how
comprehensive the exchanges were (did they involve affinity,
friendship?), who were the initiators and what view each of the
partners in these exchanges took of the other. In dealing with
every one of the categories of outsiders we must, in addition,
inquire whether these categories are actually homogeneous; it will
often be found that we have to differentiate within the categories.
For instance, we have to look whether the Orokaiva distinguish
between the different roles, statuses and ethnic origins of persons
belonging to the category "taupa." The most convenient way of
presenting these data will be by taking each of the 11 categories
in turn, dealing with all the variables that seem appropriate to
that category.

Section 2: Contacts with Closely Allied Villages

628 The concept of a "closely allied" village is a difficult
one: it is not often, in these days of peace, that a village
[621] really acts as a corporate unit, so that contacts between villages
tend to be, in actual fact, contacts between individuals in these
[571] villages who are linked by agnatic, consanguineal, affinal or
friendship ties. Out of such ties, inter-village contacts may
arise. For instance one village may give a feast for another
village and here the unit invited is definitely very often the
village; or one village may come to the aid of another after there
has been a death and bring food to all members of the bereaved
[764] village. The most significant inter-village contacts--those which
would occur in time of war when one village went to the aid of
another--could no longer be observed, but the ritual immediately
after a death resembled that customary when a village was attacked
by an enemy. The conch-shell was blown and the closely allied
villages would come to the aid of the bereaved one. Hardly anyone
would stay behind, if the death was in a really closely allied
village. Thus hardly anyone was left in Hohorita, with 400
inhabitants, when an old man died at Sombou which was a closely
allied village. On the other hand, if the link between two villages
is slightly less close, only those families with kinship or friendship
connections will go to the bereaved village. In order to be "closely
allied" in the sense just suggested, a village should be geographically
close (not much more than a mile away, in the cases of Sivepe, Inonda,

628 Hohorita), there should be a great many linkages between individuals, and there should be no major dissension, between the villages, for the time being.

I have already mentioned that each village has its own range of "closely allied" settlements: the Sivepe people would always mention Garombi and Binduta, while some families would also mention Sasembata, Kongohambo and Torogota; nobody would ever mention Isoge. But in Garombi and Binduta, Isoge was classified as a "closely allied" village. It was the same in Inonda, which mentioned Ajoro and Musou, while Ajoro mentioned Inenda and Hohota (see Map VIII).[A]

It is not easy to find a single criterion by which a village may be classified as "closely allied." One approach might be to count the number of informants who have close consanguines and/or affines in the village under consideration. On that basis (see Table 9)[B] the ten "closest" villages to Sivepe would be: Sasembata, Garombi, Awala, Hamburata, Korogombata (i.e., Binduta), Hojane, Binduta, Isivita, Togahou and Soroputa. Now these are not anything like the ten villages geographically closest to Sivepe. Togahou and Isivita are both situated outside the Waseta tribal district as defined by Williams. The list does not include Kongohambo which is less than one mile from the present site of Sivepe village.

On the other hand, if frequency of social contacts be a measure, the number of contacts with another village is determined to a large extent by geographical distance. Though only three Sivepe informants had first or second degree consanguines in Kongohambo, and only one Sivepe girl, to my knowledge, was married in Kongohambo, there were more distant links which were assiduously maintained and the closer links led to far more visits than, for instance, the links with Togahou, which was 15 miles away.

628 If we compare the contacts between "closely allied" villages
as between 1951 and 1967, the most striking difference is the
731 effect of newly formed organizational units in which certain
villages are administratively grouped together. Before the eruption,
there was a great deal of contact between persons in these villages,
through individual kinship and friendship links, but collective
contacts remained confined to feasts, deaths and the settlement of
[582] quarrels. Individual contacts, presumably, were as frequent then as
they are now, as it is characteristic of the "closely allied"
villages that marriages were regularly contracted between them,
so that most people would have some affinal or maternal kin in the
allied village.

628 After the eruption, however, several modern organizations of
a range wider than the village were set up under Australian influence.
631 The building and maintaining of the Sasembata mission station, and
731 the holding of regular Sunday services there, led to regular
institutionalized cooperation between the villages. The men built
[794] the school and the hospital together, the children went to school
together, the people worshipped and attended church festivals
[797]

[A] [See Cat. 116, p. End Map 7--Analyst]

[B] [See Cat. 116, p. 214--Analyst]

628 together, the church council, with representatives from all the
villages, deliberated together. This cooperation was a gradual
631 development occurring over the years under consideration; it will
731 be traced in detail in a later chapter. The setting up of wards
under the Higaturu Local Government Council led to further occasions
[794] for formal cooperation between villages belonging to the same ward.
It was characteristic of both the church and the government council
[797] organizations that they divided the Sasembata district into areas
with definite boundaries, each area comprising several villages.
The church recognized two such divisions, the government council
three. I have already emphasized that the idea of such boundaries
[192] was a novel one (see Map IX).[A] It is beginning to have two kinds
of effect: first, the strengthening of bonds between villages
within the same ward or the same section of a mission parish
(e.g., bonds between Sivepe and Isoge, which up to now have not
been closely allied) and secondly, the loosening of bonds between
villages divided by the boundaries which are now being defined
(e.g., bonds between Sivepe and Kongohambo, hitherto closely allied,
but now separated by administrative procedures).

These generalizations will be documented below; my task at
628 present is to consider contacts between Sivepe and closely allied
423 villages arising out of the eruption and relocation. Here inter-
village cooperation was a far less significant factor than inter-
578 village competition, especially for use of the land. One of the
deep anxieties of the Orokaiva in the refugee camps and later in
resettlement villages such as Irihambo, Awala, Kongohambo was that
if the people did not return to their land, some others might
decide to occupy it and it might be impossible to dislodge them.
This was a very real danger because neither in 1951 nor at present
is there in existence a land register from which the ownership of
individual or village parcels may be unequivocally established.
The Orokaiva plant boundary trees round their blocks of land and
[685] there is a taboo on interfering with these. This is not merely a
supernatural taboo; interference with a boundary justifies a
killing. It is far less clear, however, just what rights a person
holds in a particular parcel. As this is a crucial issue in the
whole history of Orokaiva resettlement, I should explain this in
some detail.

Crocombe and Hogbin provide an excellent example of the
423 ambiguity of Orokaiva land rights. After wars with the Sangara,
613 both the Andiriha and the Tandai'undi clans were driven from their
villages and settled down together in a village named Sambogo.
[621] Later, some of the Andiriha set up Inonda on land to which the
Tandai'undi had superior rights. At present, this land is used by
Andiriha, and upon inquiring into the legal basis of tenure I was
given the following explanation. Two daughters of the Tandai'undi
owner's lineage married into Andiriha and were given the Inonda
[128] land to "look after." As is usual among Orokaiva, this right to

A [See Cat. 116, p. End Map 8--Analyst]

423 "look after" the land was passed on to the daughters' sons, who
613 now hold it. This arrangement is something like a perpetual,
inheritable usehold, but should the lineage of the useholders die
428 out, the land would revert to the Tandai'undi, as Crocombe and
Hogbin point out. Furthermore, should the present occupants decide
to settle elsewhere, the land would again revert to Tandai'undi.
They have residuary rights and, as Crocombe and Hogbin again point
out, they are not alone to have them, for another neighboring
group (the Urio people) likewise have residuary rights. In these
circumstances it is understandable that, for instance, the people
of Inonda would be most concerned if they were forced to settle,
even temporarily, away from their own lands.

We find the same pattern in Sivepe. First of all, the blocks
of land over which individuals had perpetual useholds contained,
in almost every case, some blocks which had not been inherited
through the patriline. Secondly, even those blocks which had been
so inherited were often held in common with others belonging to
a different village and nowadays counting themselves as belonging
to a different clan, even though agnatic links could sometimes be
731 traced. On the day of the eruption, or within the four days
following it, both Sivepe and the closely allied villages were
361 evacuated, and they were together at Ilimo. When the camp was
423 disbanded, a large resettlement village was established in Kongohambo,
on land belonging, at least in part, to Sivepe villagers of the
Seho clan. Almost 1,000 people were settled there so that garden
land in the vicinity of Kongohambo became very highly prized.
Meanwhile, the government desired to resettle the Sivepe people in
Awala. It seems that the Sivepe people did stay in Awala for
three months, after which the Jegase and Timumu clan groups
received permission to return to their land in Sivepe. The third
Sivepe clan group, Seho, stayed on in Awala, but planted gardens
in the Sivepe area.

At this point, the Seho people evidently felt reasonably secure; a year later, however, they joined the other clans in Pamba and together built the new village of Sivepe. When I asked Seho informants why they had returned they told me it was because of fear of losing their land. Now this danger did not come from the other Sivepe clans, who were mostly affines of the Seho people and whose return to their home village evidently caused no great concern to the Seho people in 1951. The danger came from Kongohambo which adjoined the Seho lands. Some Kongohambo people had residual rights over some of this land; if the Seho people did not return, they would undoubtedly have had some trouble in getting it back.

The government, though aware of this possibility, had
[657] imagined that Sivepe people would not be too concerned, seeing
that they had been offered garden land at Awala. Government reasoning
can be traced from the discussions by Belshaw and Keesing and also
from a long memorandum by Plant (see bibliography), a public servant

731 with some knowledge of anthropology. All these authors, following
F. E. Williams, had the impression that Orokaiva clans are corporate
361 groups and that the local clan groups are segments of these. Thus,
Plant and the others imagined that the Jegase of Sui (near Awala)
423 would share their land without reservations with the Jegase of
Sivepe, that the Seho of Awala would share their land with the Seho
657 of Sivepe, and so on. The Orokaiva, however, knew that their
position in the resettlement villages would be weak indeed unless
they retained their own village holdings. This weakness will
become more apparent from my discussion of the resettlement village
of Hamumi in a later chapter.

628 The closely allied villages, therefore, are not only a source
of cooperation but also competition. Seho returned and had no
423 trouble reasserting their rights; they accepted with good grace
that their neighbors had built their village partly on Seho land
and that the mission station had partly been built on it, but they
jealously guarded the rest of their holdings. Let us now consider
the specific variables listed in the previous section.

628 Transactions between members of closely allied villages
occur in kinship and friendship roles; decisions affecting the
villages as corporate groups are taken at a meeting where all adult
men of the affected villages are present, and have a right to
speak. Visits between the villages by individuals occurred almost
every day; formal meetings involving Sivepe and one of the closely
allied villages occurred, for one reason or another, about once a
month. The occasion might be a death, a bride price, a minor
dispute, some government or council or church project. Contacts
were equally close between young and old, males and females.
Meetings occurred in the villages, or, more casually, outside
[578] them. There is much affection between people of closely allied
villages and one finds that disputes between them, though giving
rise to a great deal of heated oratory, are not rashly allowed to
get out of hand. The disputes I witnessed were all resolved amicably
and serious breaches carefully avoided. On the other hand, neighboring
[574] villages were always treated with much reserve. Before the eruption,
they never ate together except under the formal conditions of a
feast; even today, when a feast is held at the mission station for
all the villages in the parish, each village sits apart in a separate
group. When people from different villages eat together in a formal
feast, each village house has its own little group of guests, who
are either kinsmen or in a partnership relation. Transactions between
such persons nonetheless have a greater fiduciary element than
[754] transactions with other outsiders. Sorcery between closely allied
villages occurs, but only, so I was told, by the employment of a
professional sorcerer from a more distant village. No Garombi man
would act as sorcerer, so I understand, to kill a Sivepe man, but
men from Isoge or Kendata could be found for such a service.

Section 3: Other Contacts Within the Sasembata District

628 As soon as we move beyond the closely allied villages,
there is a sharp distinction between the behaviour appropriate
with kinsmen or regular partners and friends resident in those
villages, and the far more cautious and formal behaviour appropriate
when dealing with all others. There are far fewer transactions
between Sivepe and Isoge or Kendata than with Garombi or Kongohambo,
and other close villages. But I believe that the frequency of such
contacts fluctuates according to contingencies. For instance,
Isoge and Sivepe are now expected to cooperate in both church and
[178] local government council activities. This is definitely a somewhat
novel experience. One clear example can be given of the changes
in attitude this has produced over the last 16 years.

797 When the Sasembata mission station was built in 1952-1953,
all the villages contained in the parish collaborated. Miss White's
794 diaries show how this cooperation was organised. Miss White, who
was in charge of the station, arranged with leaders from each of
628 the villages what tasks they would be responsible for. For instance,
the nearby Sasembata village would build the teacher's house,
Garombi and Isoge would finish the hospital ward, Sivepe and Binduta
would pull down the old pre-eruption Standard 1-3 classroom
building, Duve and Totogota would finish the standard 4 building,
Kongohambo build another schoolroom while Hamburata would cut and
saw the wood for the desks. (28 December, 1952) Evidently, each
group would work one day a week--and each group on a different
day, as I understand.

653 The hospital building was duly finished in bush materials
and in 1966, while I was in the field, the time had come to pull
628 it down and renew it. The Australian teacher in charge of the
[759] station was unable to organise this work. There was, however, a
Papuan medical assistant in charge of the hospital who was efficient
and popular. On the occasion he treated the sore leg of a Sasembata
man who was a carpenter. The man offered to build the assistant
a "house," i.e., a hospital. He collected 20 men from Isoge,
Garombi, Sivepe, Binduta, Hamburata and his own village. Together
they built the hospital in a few weeks, working together every
day. Often there were more than 20. When it was finished, he did
not think it was strong enough. It was pulled down and rebuilt
with more substantial studs.

The main difference between the building programmes of
1952 and 1966 lies in the manner in which the work was organised.
In 1952, the largest effective cooperating group was the village.
The mission was able to draw on the services of several villages,
but only if they worked separately. In 1966, an Orokaiva builder,
drawn from one village, was able to control and lead the work of
a group recruited from all the villages of the Northwestern half
of the parish acting as a coordinated team.

628 Similar cooperation occurred in other specific tasks such
as the organising of a dance at Saiho hospital, the marking off of
ward boundaries, etc. The groups cooperating in this manner had
no history of multi-village economic organisation; this was an
innovation. There was, however, a long history of military alliances,
kinship and friendship links and feasting relations between contiguous
[124] villages. I collected the kindreds, up to two degrees removed, of
51 Sivepe informants, recording the birth place of each member.
I found that the list of natal villages included 76 situated more
than one mile from the site of New Sivepe, the great majority
being situated in the area within a three mile radius. But strictly
speaking, these were not consanguineal links between villages as
the consanguineal networks of the various families differed
considerably in location. Table 9[A] shows just how individual these
networks were but it also shows that there were 10 villages where
more than 10% of Sivepe informants have consanguineal links:
these are places with which relations have always been very close
as periodic contact was maintained with all these consanguines;
meeting them less than once a year would not be quite right.
[799] Today, meetings are much more frequent, as they tend to occur at
the Sunday church services.

Section 4: Other Contacts with the Waseta "Tribe"

While contacts with people from within the Sasembata
district are far more frequent than contacts outside it, there are
only few families who do not have some kindred, with whom they can
trace connection in the patri- or matriline, resident outside the
Sasembata district. Considering that this district comprises an
area of no more than some 20-25 square miles, such connections will
occasion no surprise. I was struck, in fact, by the relatively
small number of these connections--a full statistical analysis of
the kindreds collected has not yet been completed, so that I cannot
give statistics. They were with a relatively small number of
villages, almost all from the district Williams marked as belonging
to the Waseta tribe. Even the connections with these few villages
have special explanations: incidents of warfare explain the present
links with the Isivita villages and with Togahou. The links with
Soroputa and Agenahambo are explained by the resettlement of these
two villages which previously were situated much closer to Sivepe--
their land actually adjoins Sivepe land. The close link with Awala
(three miles from Sivepe) also has a special explanation beyond
[438] common clanship: Sivepe people were dependent upon Awala clay
[323] for the manufacture of pottery, an essential commodity until after
the second world war. I have listed a few more villages which are
"Waseta" but not "Sasembata," such as Waseta, Koropata, Ilimo, but
these are mentioned only once or twice.

A [See Cat. 116, p. 214--Analyst]

628 Although these contacts were confined to relatively few
villages, their part in village life was by no means insignificant.
Some of these contacts arose out of affinal links and maternal
links; others arose out of residual land rights held in these more
distant villages. Unless an annual visit is made such rights are
[631] apt to be extinguished. Only in one specific case--the marking
out of the boundaries of the lower Sasembata local government
council ward--was the contact between these villages a direct
result of modern administrative exigencies.

628 I have already mentioned that Sivepe shared some land
423 boundaries with Soroputa and Agenahambo; these boundaries lay
North of the Sohu River and were fairly indefinite. The blocks
North of the river were used by Sivepe people of Soroputa ancestry,
men with Soroputa or Agenahambo wives resident in Sivepe, and so
on. The blocks were far away from the new Soroputa land Agenahambo
[659] villages and therefore not cultivated except by Sivepe people. It
was only in 1967 that the local government council decided that
the boundaries of wards should be properly laid out and surveyed,
as a first step to title improvement within the wards. The people
of Sivepe, Agenahambo and Soroputa therefore had to meet together
to agree upon the definition of boundaries which hitherto were
allowed to shift as expediencies (such as marriages, migrations)
arose.

It was rather interesting to compare how this boundaries problem was handled between different villages. The eastern boundary of the lower Sasembata ward was in fact the boundary between Sivepe and Kongohambo. These villages were in very close contact with each other, shared many kinship links, had mourned each other's dead and had feasted each other. When the boundaries had to be defined, the Sivepe men simply walked to Kongohambo with their bush knives, had a brief meeting with the Kongohambo men (half an hour, no more) and proceeded to cut the boundary. The principles by which they established their landmarks are irrelevant here. On the other hand, Soroputa was handled in a gingerly manner. A small delegation was sent, two men who "originally" came from Soroputa, who actually owned the land on the boundary, and who had kept in regular contact with Soroputa. It was felt that Soroputa might refuse if anyone else was sent. This choice of ambassadors was especially interesting as there had been an "election" for an organising committee to determine these boundaries. Though this committee consisted of one man each from Sivepe, G rombo, Binduta and Isoge, the delegation that sent to Soroputa and Agenahambo was sent by the Sivepe representative and did not include a single representative, elected for this task.

628 This incident provides a good example of the role of the mediator which is crucially important in all inter-village contacts except those where alliance is very close. The two men sent on this delicate mission had no special qualifications except their

628 position in the structure: they held, one might say, a dual
citizenship: effective citizenship in Sivepe where they lived,
and residual citizenship in Soroputa and Agenahambo (in the case of
one of them). Other Sivepe men held a similar kind of residual
citizenship in various Isivita villages, e.g., Kiorota, Bagevoturu
and others again in Awala, Koropata, etc. The marks of this
residual citizenship were in each case: residual land rights
(e.g., hunting and fishing rights, rights to the produce of certain
trees), regular visiting, clearly traceable kinship links in the
[621] patri- or matriline. In inter-village contacts we may therefore
distinguish two types of role: the leader and the ambassador.
The leader does not directly deal with the leader of another
village, except if he happens to have residual citizenship there.
Trust can be established only if the approach is made by a residual
citizen who, by implication, is offering tangible security (his
residual citizenship rights) for the truthfulness of his words
and the honesty of his intentions.

It is in the relations with places such as Soroputa and
Agenahambo that we can still see the traditional pattern of inter-
village relations; within the Sasembata district itself, this pattern
has become slightly obscured by the development of new forms of
organisation under the influence of mission and government.
Nonetheless, even in the type of relations I have just discussed,
the pax Australiana has had its influence. If we survey the short
list of inter-village linkages between Sivepe and the more distant
parts of the Waseta "tribe" (and "more distant" effectively means
no more here than over four miles away), we notice that in pre-
contact times, wars with Waseta and Isivita were reported. The
feast offered to Togahou by Sivepe in 1967 was an unprecendented
event; the persons who mediated between the two villages to arrange
the feast were descendants of war captives.

628 From the viewpoint of the present study, it is interesting
to inquire whether the eruption has had any effects that drew the
619 Waseta "tribe" more closely together. This question is complicated
[731] by the conflicting descriptions we have of Orokaiva "tribes." A
full discussion of the nature of Orokaiva "tribes" would be out
of place here. Rimoldi (1966: 29-37) brings forward some strong
arguments why a division into tribes, as attempted by Chinnery and
Beaver, and Williams, is a hazardous enterprise. I have already
stated my own opinion that the Orokaiva view of his social world
is a set of concentric circles of increasing radius. Thus, I would
agree with Williams that there is an area, comprising several
dozen villages, within which an Orokaiva practices what Williams
calls "intra-group morality" (1930: 311). Normally these several
dozen villages are those immediately surrounding the village of
[582] residence. Within this area, marriages are contracted, cannibalistic
[721] raids do not occur and fights tend to involve comparatively little
[266] bloodshed. The circle of "intra-group morality" varies for every

628 village. Williams, in marking out his "Waseta tribe," with Waseta at the centre, excluded the Soroputa people from this "tribe" 619 (vide Map X) A but "intra-group morality" definitely prevailed [266] between Soroputa and neighboring Sivepe. There never were cannibalistic raids between these two villages, which included each other in their "intra-group morality" circle.

It so happens that the people who were brought together at Ilimo consisted preponderantly of members of what Williams called the "Waseta tribe." The only bonds existing between the members of this tribe were the individual kinship and friendship networks and the solidarity of "intra-group morality" circles. The camp was built as a set of separate villages, each under its own village constable, eating and living separately, though more [572] closely together than formerly. I obtained from a number of Sivepe men a list of "friends" and inquired into the occasion when the [582] friendship started; in no case did it start at Ilimo. On the other hand, the camps led to a number of marriages between people from different villages. This tendency was especially pronounced at Hohorita, which is understandable as so many refugees had lost their families during the eruption. In Sivepe I found one case of a man who married an Agenehambo woman whom he met at Ilimo.

731 If "tribal" solidarity was dubious before the Ilimo camp period, (the atmosphere of an evacuation camp was certainly not 628 a suitable one for developing it. Both Belshaw and Keesing 619 emphasize the anxiety of the inhabitants, their strong desire to return to their home villages, while I have also emphasized their distrust of "others" who might wish to occupy their land; these "others" would inevitably be other members of the Waseta "tribe," although perhaps the Europeans were likewise suspected of predatory aims. (For such suspicion, I do not, however, have evidence.)

A sense of district solidarity did tend to grow up after the eruption, but it can be traced to formal organisations in which Orokaiva occupied roles which brought them into contact with people from other villages. Sometimes these were élite roles, which will be considered below; sometimes they were roles open to anyone, such as that of worker in paid employment, patient in a hospital, pupil in a secondary or advanced primary school, participant in a large-scale public celebration, such as were held in Popondetta and Saiho.

657 The government is actively attempting to create among the Orokaiva larger solidary units than existed in the past. We may 571 thus explain the various attempts that are made to bring Orokaiva people together in the local government council, at numerous sports meetings and celebrations such as at Christmas and New Year, and by any other expedient means. Without the popular acceptance of the local government council the establishing of a land boundary between Sivepe and Soroputa or Agenehambo, to stay with my previous example, would have been hard to imagine. Yet it

A [See Cat. 116, p. End Map 9--Analyst]

659 was accomplished without any European power bearer making his
appearance and any sense of compulsion being created--the people
571 clearly considered the boundaries advocated by the government to be
in the popular interest. Yet the bonds of solidarity this being
formed do not strengthen the unity of the so-called Waseta tribe
but the unity of the Higaturu council area as a whole.

628 In this section I have said little about Inonda, because
I did not have time to clarify what "tribe" Inonda really belongs.
619 Williams' tribal map shows Inonda as Sauaha; Crocombe and Hogbin
describe Sauaha, quite correctly, as a clan resident near the
[114] settlement of Dobuduru (where the people speak a different dialect,
presumably that which Williams called Dirou). Clearly, the task
of establishing "tribal" units in this district would need to be
done again, if it is worth doing at all, which I doubt, for reasons
already given.

Section 5: Contacts With Other Orokaiva

628 Generally, contacts outside the "Waseta tribe" are sparse.
During the year, only one visit was made to Sivepe, in a kinship
[582] context, by persons from another district. This was a group from
Kokoda, where a Sivepe man married 40 or more years ago, and the
[574] visit was from that man's children. Several Sivepe persons quoted
as an ancestor a woman from Ajoro, a village close to Inonda. It
turned out that all these linkages were due to one single event,
namely the capture by the Isivita people of three Ajoro women
during a raid. Two of these found their way to Garombi where they
[424] married; the third woman's son came to live in Sivepe. Descendants
of the Sivepe man continue to exercise each year their hunting
rights at Ajoro. I could not find other references to ancestors
[572] beyond the "Waseta tribe" apart from these. Some people mentioned
a friend, but rarely more than one, who came from another "tribal"
district. Often these friends were found during employment, or at
the mission school, or they were persons with special roles in
mission or government, who had come to the Sasembata district in
the course of their jobs. When women had such friends, it was more
often due to a kinship link. An interesting example of the extending
[526] of such links under modern conditions occurred when a man from
Sasembata village, employed in Kokoda, invited a number of fellow
workers to Sasembata for a football game. These men were likewise
in Kokoda for employment and came from the Aiga district.

[659] When the members of the "Waseta tribe" were accommodated at
Ilimo, they were not only the guests of the government which
[731] supplied food and other comforts, but also of the people of Ilimo
[574] village who had agreed to the camp being established. From the
little I could find out about relationships between hosts and

628 guests, it appears that they were friendly but rather formal. As
594 will be shown later, all arrangements in connection with Ilimo
camp were made between the government and the Ilimo people; the
731 Orokaiva had no forms of organisation, in 1951, through which the
refugees could have negotiated directly with Ilimo. The hosts
[659] generously supplied food, grew extra food in special plots,
provided abundant building material from their land, and a site
for the camp and helped with the preparation of the camp while
the evacuees still lived at Wairope, in return for which the
government made various gifts which Ilimo evidently regarded as
adequate payment. At no point, during the existence of the camp,
did the refugees develop an organisation which dealt directly with
the Ilimo people. Thus, the only contact between hosts and guests
was on a social level.

The camp was built at some little distance from the village.
Refugees who had friends and relations in Ilimo used to go over to
the village and visit them. There was for instance, at the time
of the eruption, one Sivepe man resident at Ilimo; thus some Sivepe
people paid visits to the village. There was an Easter celebration
at the camp to which the village people came. When the camp broke
up, the government gave a feast to the Ilimo people, on behalf of
the evacuees, in the usual Orokaiva style.

121 If we wish to answer the question to what extent contact
between different "tribal" groups (or distant groups) of Orokaiva
has become more intensive since the eruption, we cannot confine
ourselves to contacts occurring in villages such as Sivepe or
Ilimo. Here the pattern suggested in the previous pages has hardly
[178] changed. The changes have occurred by the development of new
organisations (to which I shall refer later) through labour migration
and through urban development.

464 As I am at present discussing only unorganised contacts
between villagers, I can give only one clear instance of changing
166 attitudes and this is in Popondetta itself. Popondetta, the new
administrative centre of the Northern District, has about 4,000
633 inhabitants, almost all Orokaiva; among its inhabitants all parts
of the Northern District are represented, including Sivepe. The
[162] Sivepe people had many relatives there, mostly hailing from the
Sasembata district, and employed in some regular job in the town.
These jobs are partly in personal service to Europeans, but also
in light industry, the retail trade, public works and public service,
and go far beyond the little employment that was available in pre-eruption Higaturu (with a population which, judging from aerial
photographs, can hardly have exceeded that of a large village).
484 Popondetta is preeminently the place where intelligent men from
various villages can gather informally to discuss political and other
521 public questions, and develop a wider interpretation of the situation
633 of the Orokaiva which is learnt by the men from the villages when
they pay occasional visits to Popondetta. The town generates a new

484 sophistication which is spreading to the villages. This was not
yet very evident in Sivepe, though I shall later quote a few
521 examples, but far more so in Hohorita.

633 All the Orokaiva, including the people of Sivepe, liked to
make occasional visits to Popondetta, even though they had little
business there. They saw relatives and exchanged news with people
they met around town, especially outside the Steamship Co. shop.
News filtered down about the mission, the administration, the coffee
factory and various current ideologies were communicated. The
Inonda men visited more frequently than the Sivepe men; the women
visited less frequently than the men.

I had little chance to observe relationships between Orokaiva
609 and Papuans and New Guineans from outside the Northern District,
619 except when these served in some official or mission capacity. The
only exception was the workers on European-owned plantations. I
observed one incident at Hohorita which seemed to me highly significant.
The Sangara plantation, which is very close to Hohorita, employs
many Chimbu; bad feeling between plantation workers and villagers
had been built up over some time, without any specific major issue
of conflict. This culminated in a fight on a major scale. The
Hohorita councillor went over to the plantation to make peace; the
discussion ended with an invitation to the Chimbu to come to a
feast at Hohorita. This feast was a success and was followed by a
return feast at the plantation. Thus the Chimbu were placed on
the same footing as other groups, at one time hostile, with whom
feasting relations had been established, e.g., Sivepe and Togahou.
Hohorita people whom I interviewed explained to me that when they
quarreled with the Chimbu, they did not really know them, but they
were friends now.

Section 6: Contacts With Indigenous Office-Bearers

Among the victims of the eruption were 143 Papuan administration
731 servants as well as 27 Papuan constabulary, who died at Higaturu
along with the 46 European civil servants stationed there. The
Mission was somewhat fortunate that Martyrs' School at Sangara was
still closed for the holidays; the pupils and some of the staff had
not yet returned. Even so only 11 Papuan mission teachers survived,
including the present Bishop of the Northern District Diocese,
George Amob, the priest at Sasembata, Fr. Albert McLaren, and the
now retired mission teacher at Seva, later at Inonda, Moses Kusmale.

657 At the time of the eruption, a certain number of new roles
177 had already become firmly established among Papuans: member of the
Royal Papuan Constabulary, Village Constable, Mission Teacher,
647 Medical Orderly, Clerk, Labourer. Post-war government policy aimed
at greatly increasing the number and scope of these roles, both by

[177] instituting numerous training programmes for the development of
[657] skills hitherto unknown to Papuans, and by setting up organisations
in which Papuans wield a limited amount of political and administrative
[647] responsibility. It suffices, for my present purpose, to enumerate
modern roles, performed by Papuans, with which the people of Sivepe
came into contact during the year of my field study.

[799] In the church, Papuans now play not only the role of mission teacher, but also of priest (as Fr. Albert McLaren) and Bishop (as the Most Rev. George Ambo). Fr. Albert was the priest of the local parish, while the Bishop paid one visit to the district during the year, namely for the consecration of the church at Duve, a great formal occasion attended by at least 1,000 people, from the whole of the Sasembata district.

[625] Village constables exist no longer, but their place has been taken by the Local Government Council. Two of the councillors were regular visitors at Sivepe; the sanitary inspector appointed by the council, who lived at Garombi, came even more frequently, while many Sivepe people had occasion, during the year, to visit the Council chambers at Higaturu, where all officials are Papuan, with the exception of one European who acts as Advisory Officer to the Council and also as Magistrate for Native Court cases. Locally we had an officer named "Committee," which meant that he was a member of a committee appointed by the local councillor to enforce council regulations in the villages. Each village has one committee member whose tasks are not unlike those of the village constable, though the concept of the role is rather different, and will be discussed below.

[759] While the only medical role allotted to Papuans at the time of the eruption was that of orderly, nowadays there are Papuan physicians, two of them in the Northern District. One of them is medical officer for the district and the other, a woman, is attached to the hospital at Saiho. An increasing number of Papuans are being trained as Assistant Medical Officer, a five-year course. One of the graduates was attached to the mission hospital and aid post at Sasembata. Aid posts have been established by the government in many Orokaiva villages and manned by aid post orderlies who were trained in the Saiho Aid Post Training School. Inonda village is served by an orderly trained under this scheme (stationed at Hohota, three miles away), but the training scheme has been discontinued in favour of a more efficient scheme. The training of Papuan nurses started in 1958 while nursing aide training has started more recently. In addition to general training, these nurses are given an intensive course in maternal and child health.

[875] The same movement into senior statuses was characteristic of Papuan educational personnel. First, the training given to mission teachers before the eruption was in the main ecclesiastical, while in the Northern District in 1966, 39% had been through at least one year of formal teacher training; a smaller number had obtained a

177 higher certificate after a two-year course, while various teacher
training programmes were involving a number of them. Furthermore,
657 the inspector in charge of the school and, after January, 1967, also
649 the District Inspector of Schools was a Papuan. Thus, in the Church
as well as in the Health and Education Department, Papuans were in
[895] actual administrative control over Northern District operations,
with white personnel nominally their subordinates. The term
"nominally" must be applied to the relative rank of Papuan controllers
and expatriate subordinates, because the latter are still receiving
a very much higher salary. Nonetheless, the new situation definitely
sets up a hierarchy, with Papuans at senior levels, and the village
people are in official contact with them.

[631] I shall give two further examples of contacts with Papuan
public servants. The first was with a clerk sent out by the
Department of Lands, whose task it was to organise the establishment
of boundaries between the wards. This man was an Orokaiva, from
Jegarata, who explained the purpose of the boundaries in the Orokaiva
language, at a meeting held in Garombi and supposedly attended by
all the villages in the ward. A spirited discussion took place,
the people suggested village representatives, the clerk accepted
the representatives proposed for Sivepe and Garombi, but was non-
committal over the other two, as he saw Ienge and Binduta were
[276] insufficiently represented. He chewed betelnut with the people;
the whole procedure was matter-of-fact and businesslike, and no
covering-up was attempted for the two ill-represented villages.
[191] The absence of an interpreter, the use of Orokaiva instead of the
lingua franca (Motu), the free use of betelnut, the fact that we
all sat on mats together--all this established an easy bridge
between government and people.

During the same period, a good deal of agricultural extension
242 work was in progress in the nearby village of Sasembata. Here
177 again, the day-to-day instruction was given by two Northern District
Papuans, agricultural assistants, in a rather more junior position
to the Lands Department clerk. These two young men were definitely
supervised by an expatriate officer; they were staying in Sasembata
village for awhile and came over to Sivepe one night for a small
feast and a dance. Though they were both Aiga, they mixed easily
with their Orokaiva agemates, on a basis of equality and familiarity.
They were the guests of a third agricultural assistant, who belonged
to Sasembata village but was working for the Department at Saiho.
This young man gave me a description of the scope of agricultural
development (a rubber cooperative) proceeding in Sasembata. He had
a mature and responsible understanding of the project.

Finally, Papuan government drivers had highly significant
657 though informal contacts with villagers. These men, highly skilled
647 at negotiating the difficult roads of the Northern District, have
the task of driving government personnel where they wish to go and
177 often travel unaccompanied by officers to collect personnel or cargo.

657 Employed rather widely over the last decade or so, they have a
647 responsible job, for which the qualifications include a reasonably
high standard of education. In Orokaiva eyes, these men enjoy high
177 status, as they have permanent, relatively highly paid positions
and above all, because they control one of the most coveted European
[444] resources, namely motor transport. They very often have the power
to offer transport to Orokaiva travellers; their favours are
eagerly sought; they carefully choose the men for whom they will
stop on the road: kinsmen, residents of closely related villages,
other men of high status.

Orokaiva accord high status to all Papuan employees of the
government and the missions; one of the main reasons why men become,
for instance, mission teachers is the high status they thus acquire
in the villages where they are posted. This is so in spite of their
very low pay; only recently has this low pay begun to deter recruits--
due to the greater availability of higher-paid non-manual jobs for
[875] Papuans. Mission teachers at Sasembata still regard themselves as
aristocrats, who will speak somewhat deprecatingly of "the village
people" and address them with some slight condescension. The best
of them are most valuable as educators, not only in the religious
sphere, but also through their knowledge of the outside world which
they spread through their friendships with congenial villagers in
the parish. They will also spread knowledge of elements of the
culture of their own district, e.g., dances and songs, which are
easily introduced into local repertoires. Most of the Sasembata
mission teachers came from the Motu-speaking coastal district. One
[777] problem with the mission stations has been, especially on the
larger stations, that they develop into a sort of village of their
own, a tight community with a deep conviction of its own superiority,
not only because it is a mission village, but also because it is
a Motu village and the Motu regard the Orokaiva as barbarians.

All the functionaries discussed so far are directly under
the control of Australian institutions--the government and the
church. The second category to be considered are Papuans playing
roles for which they are elected or appointed by other Papuans.
Within this category fall the members and officers of the Higaturu
Local Government Council, the directors and manager of the coffee
producers' cooperative, the local Member of the House of Assembly.
None of these roles existed at the time of the eruption; they were
created as part of the Australian policy, inaugurated in the 1950's,
of preparing Papuans for at least local self-government and limited
management of their own affairs. Though the views expressed by
these officials hardly differed from those of the Government and
Mission men, the Orokaiva received them much more warmly in their
villages. Especially the councillors had to ingratiate themselves,
their office being elective, and they handed cigarettes around.
They were trusted far more than the government officials because
the villagers felt they had some power over them; they were given
local information withheld from the others.

657 Though most of the contacts between village people and the
office-bearers arise out of official roles, the local priest, the
647 assistant medical officer in charge of the Sasembata mission
177 hospital, the mission teachers, the council's sanitary officer and
others who lived near Sivepe, or temporarily stayed near Sivepe,
tended to have at least one or two families with whom they were on
mutual visiting terms and who regarded them as personal friends.
At the same time, their relationship with many of the other Sivepe
families remained definitely formal.

Contacts occurred almost always either in Sivepe or in a
village nearby, on the initiative of the office-bearer (if the contact
was official). Formal visits by councillors, sanitary inspector,
[797] coffee factory officers occurred about once monthly. Contacts with
Church personnel occurred almost daily at the mission station,
though formal calls by the priest or a teacher to Sivepe were made
perhaps once a month, usually in connection with some quarrel that
[757] had arisen. The village was most active in its contacts with the
mission hospital, several patients presenting themselves daily with
[743] minor ailments. Serious cases were often referred to Saiho hospital
and most of the referred cases actually went to Saiho. There was a
[758] monthly visit from nurses dealing with infant health and expectant
mothers; most of the mothers took their babies to be checked and
weighed and no objections were made to preventive injections.

[582] There were no cases, in Sivepe, of inter-marriage between
local people and Papuans occupying these specialized roles, but in
Inonda one man married the mission teacher's daughter. Otherwise,
contacts of the type described in this section were sparser in
Inonda, as the mission and medical establishment was at Hohota,
[232] three miles away, and on a far smaller scale. Inonda did have some
direct contact with government over agricultural matters as one
man expressed interest in entering an experimental scheme for
growing beef cattle. He has adquate land and education, but the
scheme had not gone beyond initial discussions by the time I left.
[494] Finally, Inonda had an arrangement with a Papuan who was a distant
affine and who had a truck with which he took garden produce weekly
from Inonda to the Embi hospital. The village people paid this
man for his cartage. No comparable arrangement existed in Sivepe.
Finally, contact with the officers of the Local Government Council
seemed to me less frequent in Inonda than in Sivepe and to generate
much less interest. This was no doubt due to rivalries between the
village leader and the councillor, but also to a less keen interest
in council objectives on the part of the majority of families.

177 The contacts described in this section, unlike the ones
discussed earlier, do not characteristically occur in a kinship
context. Hence, the contacts do not necessarily occur equally with
all categories of members of the community, but when the problems
have to do with land or politics or the conduct of village affairs,
the married men are principally concerned; in educational matters

177 the children are principally concerned while some older people are still averse to contacts with medical personnel.

Section 7: Contacts With Chinese

563
439 At the time of the eruption there were, as far as I know, no Chinese in the Northern District. By 1966, five Chinese families had settled in Popondetta, all of them as traders. They had migrated from Rabaul and Lae, where they have trade connections. In the two years or so since their arrival, they developed considerable trade connections among the Papuans. I found that both at Sivepe and Inonda, people preferred to deal at the Chinese shops rather than at the two large established European concerns.

The main reason I was given for this preference was that the Chinese shops offered goods at lower prices. It was certainly true that these shops had a far greater range of low-priced clothing of the type Papuans like to buy. There were, however, other factors. When I had occasion to buy low-priced clothing of the favoured type, I found that the two European stores actually had some rather good stock and that the price was not actually higher. I even found that some lines were more expensive in some of the Chinese shops. This applied particularly to timned food which the Papuans also bought.

The two European stores were certainly full of goods well beyond the means of the Papuans; when they traded there, they would have to be very careful to pick items of the right sort of price. The main trade of the European shops was with Europeans who put through relatively large orders usually on credit. The Papuan who went there with a few shillings to spend could not help but feel his economic inferiority. In one of the shops, I occasionally saw cartoons displayed which had a racist bias. In the Chinese stores, salesmen were exclusively Papuan and by no means gave preferential treatment to Europeans who went shopping there. Papuans felt much more at ease there. Furthermore, a Papuan who had a regular income or who was known to the owner and grew coffee, could get credit at the Chinese shops.

[245]
[474] One of the Chinese stores introduced several new features in his business. He bought coffee from Orokaiva growers which he sent over to Lae for processing. His price was a little lower than that of the coffee cooperative, but people sold coffee to him nevertheless. Sometimes, the reason was that the cooperative bought only once a month during a scheduled visit to each district, and people might wish to sell at other times. In other cases, the reason was that only members of the cooperative could sell to the cooperative and many small growers were not members (the entrance fee had risen to $16 by 1966). Furthermore, the coffee could be used to pay debts incurred with the Chinese store.

563 More important was the encouragement given by the Chinese
439 store to the development of Papuan-owned trade stores in the villages.
Village trade stores have existed in the Northern District for a
443 long time but traditionally they were built by planters who sought
extra income by selling trade goods to their employees and villagers
in the vicinity. The shopkeeper was a closely-supervised Papuan
on wages. In 1966, I counted some 20 of these stores between Inonda
and Sivepe. Fourteen of these were owned by various planters, but
the other six were of the new type promoted by the Chinese trader.
Here the owner of the store was Orokaiva and the Chinese supplied
trade goods and transport, if needed, at some extra cost.

During the year I was in the field, it became the ambition
of many villages to have their own trade store. In the Sasembata
[554] area alone, at least four new ones were started. The arguments in
favour of them were: that the village store might as well have
the profits instead of these all going to the Europeans; that one
would not need to walk so far to buy goods; that the village store
would sell goods at all hours, instead of only during the day. There
was a strong ideological motive as well, to be discussed later. The
stores were an avenue, above all, to greater power. Inonda was
served by a planter-owned trade store two miles from the village.

Hence, the role of the Chinese in the Northern District was a rather interesting one. It was they who opened to the Orokaiva the opportunity of trading. The Chinese, indeed, gave wholesale discounts to all these small shops and treated the traders without condescension. Every few weeks, the Chinese truck delivered supplies to the shops in the Sasembata area. It was then, too, that it collected coffee. The storekeepers also visited Popondetta to collect the supplies when they could, occasionally with the clandestine help of a government driver.

Section 8: Contact With the "Taupa"

177 In the previous sections I have sketched the network of
contacts characteristic of Sivepe village at the time of the eruption
366 and the present, and compared these with Inonda. The comparison
cannot usefully be carried too far, as Inonda is much closer to
368 Popondetta than Sivepe, while the small size of Inonda and its
longer distance from even a minor educational, and medical centre
and from a mission station introduces ecological elements reducing
cultural contact. A general difference between the two places,
resulting from these factors, is that the locale of contact for
the people of Sivepe is most often the village, or a place only a
mile or so from the village (the mission station, or Garombi, or
Sasembata village), the locale of contact for the Inonda people is
177 more often Popondetta. Another difference is that whereas Sivepe,
795

177 in its attitude to culture contact, is somewhat homogeneous, Inonda
795 is deeply split between a Christian and a Pagan faction, and it is the Christian faction which is involved in coffee growing, the cattle project, the government sponsored women's club and wage labour whereas outside contacts for the pagan faction are truly minimal.

177 The changes which have occurred in the pattern of outside contacts in Sivepe between the eruption and the present all involved
181 changes in ideology. This is true for the pattern of inter-village cooperation and the interaction with Papuan functionaries no less
[779] than for the trade-store movement. It is an ideology referred to by the Orokaiva as "iji eha," "the new day" and it carries with it an acceptance of Christianity, the objectives of the Local Government Councils and the tenets of economic development. This ideology is as readily expressed by the Christians of Inonda as it is by the people of Sivepe.

177 Not only is this ideology of European origin, but the new types of contact that are being made among Papuans can be traced back, in almost every instance, to white men's actions. Generally, the village man or woman has but a minimal direct contact with the white man and such direct contact as does occur is liable to involve a minimal communication of ideas. Because of the language barrier, an interpreter is, at the very least, required as intermediary
[191] between white man and Orokaiva. Simple, direct communications can be effectively made in Motu which most Orokaiva understand and which many Europeans speak to some extent. Modern circumstances, however, increasingly demand the communication of more complex messages than can be transmitted by that medium, as used at present. More commonly, Papuan members of formal organisations act as middlemen for more complex messages.

It seems best to describe at the outset the pattern as I observed it in Sivepe in 1966-7--the pattern in Inonda and other villages was very similar--and then compare this to the pattern of 1951 and the rather untypical situation in the evacuation camps.
[101] All white men are known by the collective appellation and reference term taupa, but the roles in which taupa are truly familiar to the Orokaiva are few. Most taupa are government servants, traders, missionaries, soldiers. In Sivepe the white government servants most frequently encountered were: the patrol officer, the agricultural officer, the magistrate, the advisory officer of the Higaturu council; higher officials stationed in Popondetta were mostly known by rumour. The head teacher of the local mission school and his wife were both taupa; everyone was familiar with taupa planters and storekeepers. An unusual and very highly respected taupa, indeed a man to whom one never heard the term taupa applied, so well liked was he, was the superintendent of the Saiho hospital who took part in the Christmas dance at Saiho in Orokaiva costume, together with his wife, and who was invited to village feasts at which he ate with

177 the people. He was the only white man in the district (omitting
the anthropologists) who actually did this. Finally, some people
[464] of Sasembata district were familiar with *taupa* as workers and in
personal service, as cookboys, housegirls, etc. outside the village.

The only *taupa* residents in the district were the head
[875] teacher and his wife; they had daily personal contact with village
[439] people especially because they bought vegetable produce for the
mission, while people also approached them with a multitude of
minor problems, e.g., pressure lamps that did not work, troubles at
school, help needed with sports or the sewing programme of the
women's club, etc. Most Sivepe men and nearly all the women were
too shy to approach them. The head teacher used the Papuan priest
as an intermediary when he had to approach Sivepe men when help
was needed for school buildings, or when land was needed for the
gardens of the mission teachers. The other *taupa* came to the
district no more often than once or twice a year; the doctor
attended patients only at Saiho; the magistrate sat at Higaturu;
the nearest white planter was at Awala.

657 Characteristically, contact between the taupa and villagers
occurs either through the mediation of Papuan functionaries--and
177 it is thus that basic ideas are mostly communicated to Orokaiva
leaders and groups--or directly, when taupa finds it inexpedient to
[242] delegate decisions on problems affecting individuals. This tendency
to deal with individuals rather than leaders or corporate groups
is self-evident from the roles of many taupa (educational, medical,
judicial) but I noticed it also in, for instance, agricultural
extension work. Here the emphasis was on the educating of individual
growers. The administration is not in favour of cooperative cash-cropping ventures, so that dealings are of necessity mostly with
individuals. When it is desired to indoctrinate groups, the most
useful channel at the present time is the Higaturu Council, so
that the taupa's message reaches the people through an Orokaiva
intermediary. The patrol officer, when visiting a village, for
instance for census purposes, tends to deal with his audience in
three types of ways: (a) he deals directly with the "committee"
for the formal arrangements of calling the people together and to
obtain what facilities he needs for his work; (b) he makes a speech
expressing the desires of the government, to the assembled people;
(c) he addresses individually those individuals against whom he
has complaints, and he does this in front of the assembled people.
These individuals, on the occasion I witnessed, received a reprimand,
but they might also be arrested and jailed. This kind of meeting
is held yearly in every village.

Undoubtedly, the patrol officer consults both with the
councillor and the committee member in charge of the village. It
was clear from his treatment of the complaints on his list that he
had not only consulted, but also trusted these two local leaders.
The cases with which he dealt were all connected with the policy of

657 177 closing up old isolated hamlets and moving the inhabitants to the larger, more modern-looking villages. The patrol officer's speech to the assembled people was intended to encourage increased cash-cropping activity. The patrol officer was young and not very well informed; some of the suggestions he made (e.g., that the people should busy themselves selling produce at the Saiho and Popondetta markets) were based on unrealistic assumptions about the lucrativeness and volume of trade at these markets, and provoked no more than an indulgent smile. As the patrol officers usually are young men of limited experience, the government is wise in depending, in its efforts to arouse enthusiasm for economic development, not on these officers but on the structure of the local government councils. Thus the most crucial European role, from the viewpoint of development, becomes the advisory officer to the council through whom development ideology must flow to the villages. In 1967, the government acknowledged the unusual significance of the work of these advisory officers by setting up a special training course for them with the School of Pacific Administration at Sydney. I did not have the opportunity to see the work of these trained officers, as none had graduated by the time I left.

In all matters the ultimate initiators of contacts were the Europeans who, after all, had set up the institutions for which their roles were required. Some of these institutions depended, however, for their survival on the voluntary support of the Orokaiva. This is true not only for the schools and churches, but also for the courts which depended on information laid by councillors and private aggrieved individuals. Similarly, the agricultural officer depended on people freely coming to him to ask for rubber trees, coffee trees, etc.

In some respects, the pattern of these contacts differs today from what it was in the early period of colonialisation. While a local government councillor reports infractions of council rules to a Native Court voluntarily, this voluntary principle did not exist before the local government and could be punished for not reporting infractions of the law. Rubber and coffee were planted, not voluntarily by individu but compulsorily, every village having the duty to plant a certain number of trees every year. It was only after the second world war that the government began systematically to seek from the Orokaiva not forced compliance but voluntary cooperation. Even today, it is not always easy to know whether contacts with Europeans are the result of choice or compulsion.

Let us take the case of two Sivepe men whose houses were not up to the standard of the rest of the village. In the end the "committee" forced them to build according to the rules. This man was motivated far more by pride in his village and desire to demonstrate his power than by fear of the government; nonetheless, he could secure compliance only by reporting the cases to the councillor and a threat to lay a complaint with the patrol officer. The ultimate sanction to which he appealed was thus a court conviction and jail sentence (no less!) impose by Australian authority. There was also the motivation that the patrol

657 officer, observing the offending houses, might charge the "committee" with dereliction of duty. This could not be taken lightly as some
177 years earlier, in the days of the village constables, a negligent constable might find himself deposed and even jailed. (How frequently this actually happened I do not know, but the fear was still there.) The situation seems essentially ambiguous: willing cooperation and compulsion are both present.

177 As may be expected, contacts between Orokaiva and taupa are perceived totally differently by both parties. The European has two
609 kinds of concept foreign to the Orokaiva, namely the concept of a formal organisation by which long-term fiduciary relationships can be established on an affectively neutral basis; and the concept of welfare objectives pursued by these organisations on the basis of universalistic values. The Orokaiva had no difficulty in trusting a European to fulfill fiduciary obligations if he had a close personal relationship with him, and likewise he would expect such a European to have an interest in his welfare, but as I have shown, such closeness was extremely rare in Sivepe. It was just unthinkable, to the Orokaiva, that an official casually visiting the village was truly interested in their welfare, because the Orokaiva could not see any reason why such an official should have such an interest. Clearly, the official was thought to come in the pursuit of his own, or his organisation's advantage. The patrol officer came to punish people who did not obey the law. I was told by informants that it did not greatly matter what one said to him as long as it stopped him from punishing people. The same was true, in one way or another, for most taupa, except some of those one knew well.

177 All men and women of Sivepe were asked what Europeans they knew or had known; the answers to this question were especially interesting because of the omissions. None of the persons listed in this section as being in contact with Sivepe people were ever mentioned--not even the head teacher and his wife. Anthropologists who had been in the village earlier were mentioned by many men and women, past employers were mentioned if the job was in the employer's home or if both employer and employee lived on the premises (e.g., in a hospital). The other contacts were left unmentioned, not because informants were uncooperative, but because these contacts did not fall within any of their categories of social intercourse. If I had asked specifically: "Has any European ever weighed your vegetables?", predictably some vegetable-weighers would have been listed, assuming that their names were remembered.

The relationships at Ilimo camp form a striking contrast to this general picture. This was obvious at once in the interviews as the name of, for instance, Mr. Kaad, is remembered by everybody, as are also a few other names, though less widely. There was hardly an informant who had been to Ilimo and who did not report, in one context or another, the activities of Mr. Kaad. Never once was he referred to in the accounts as "the taupa" or "the officer." When I interviewed Mr. Kaad in Sydney, he likewise felt that the kind of relationships between

177 Orokaiva and whites developed at Ilimo were rather unusual. He quoted other Europeans making remarks to him such as that the experience "drew us all much closer together." A planter who was helping the organisation and staying in the camp commented that the people came to talk to him far more often than before.

177 There were altogether some 14 Europeans attached to Ilimo--two medical assistants, two nurses, two government teachers, one agricultural 657 expert and the others administration workers, mission workers, etc. Mr. Kaad, though himself a Roman Catholic, made it a rule for the whole European staff, including himself, to attend the daily religious services, "to show the people we were with them." Food distributions were made daily through the village constables, blankets and medical supplies were available as needed, adult education classes were almost daily organised for both men and women, the agricultural officer demonstrated techniques and supervised the gardening programme, the Isivita people from Oro Bay were brought over to reunite families, and Kaad himself began to speak in favour of economic development in the future. Even such a bald summary indicates a far more intensive contact with Europeans at Ilimo than the Orokaiva generally experienced either before or since.

[829] Kaad's own comments place this experience in its proper perspective. He remarked that Ilimo camp showed the government in a good light, and that people responded especially when they found that they could go back to their villages. This comment indicates that the generous gifts of the Australian government did not, by themselves, lead to a removal of the Orokaiva fears and suspicions of Orokaiva motives. One question in people's minds was whether the government, having given the food and other comforts, would now feel entitled to seize land near the volcano. It was only when this suspicion proved unfounded that relations became genuinely warm, for only then were people sure that they were not the victims of trickery.

From our own knowledge of Australian administration we can easily see that Orokaiva fears of land alienation were wholly unfounded but, on the basis of their knowledge, the Orokaiva reasoned perfectly logically. [431] First of all, it is regular Orokaiva custom, when one makes gifts, to have in mind a claim one wishes to make for a return gift. Thus, having accepted Australian gifts, the Orokaiva were naturally anxious to [423] find out what would be demanded in return. Furthermore, the fear that the Australians might demand land which was unoccupied and uncultivated was based on past experience and on provisions actually on the Statute Book (Native Plantation Ordinance 1925-1934, repealed in 1960). According to this ordinance, land could be alienated where there appears to be no owner and also for the purpose of "technical education of natives in agriculture." It is a matter of historical fact that the Australians acquired some choice land in the Orokaiva district under these provisions prior to the second world war. (Information: P. Sebire.)

177 657 423 If we analyse the reasons why the Australian government would never have used these ordinances in the circumstances of 1951, we find that these reasons lie principally in Western notions of government responsibility for victims of disasters and other values of Western Civilisation, restraining cupidity, and held more strongly that the Orokaiva, on the basis of their information, could have taken for granted. I myself found, and Mr. Sebire confirmed, that the Orokaiva even today are extremely familiar with the provisions of this old ordinance, and that they still fear it, even though it has been repealed some years ago.

177 657 731 The episode at Ilimo therefore undoubtedly did much to increase confidence in Australian intentions. Mr. Kaad stated to me that the main ultimate purpose of the camp administration was to teach new skills and a new way of life. Under camp conditions, there was a good opportunity to teach these new skills and put forward new ideas, but the real opportunity, he said, came later in the resettlement villages. The people at Ilimo had their world shattered and were still recovering from the shock. For that reason they could not absorb as much of what they were taught as they could have done normally.

177 657 After Ilimo broke up, Mr. Kaad transferred to Saiho, where the new hospital was then being built and where an administrative centre was also established. (Only the Agriculture Department still operates from there today.) He attempted to develop further the new ideology he had been putting forward by contacts with the resettlement villages of Agenahambo, Koipa, Awala, Waseta, Kongohambo and Mumuni. He continued his educational, agricultural and medical programmes for some months in these villages, but he was not able to stay long. From the viewpoint of today, these programmes cannot be seen as marking a permanent change in the pattern of Orokaiva-European contacts. It would be more correct to say that the European soon became as remote as before but that the ideas promoted at Ilimo and by Mr. Kaad were later taken up by the people in the framework of organisations where direct contact with Europeans retained only a minor role.

Section 9: Contact with Americans and Returned Ancestors

829 How did Orokaiva themselves classify white people? As we have seen, they do not classify them according to the organisational role they fulfill. I also found that ethnic origin of white people is usually not a basis upon which Orokaiva will classify them. There is, however, a more esoteric basis of classification which I encountered on a number of occasions.

829 769 It is well known that in many parts of Melanesia, there is a belief in the return of ancestors, whose skins are white, and who bring wealth and a happier dispensation to their Melanesian descendants. The Orokaiva do not appear to look upon every white man they see as a

829 returned ancestor, but have principles for distinguishing between
769 those who are and those who are not ancestors. A territorial distinction that was suggested to me was that the Northern Hemisphere is generally regarded as inhabited by spirits and ancestors. (It was an educated informant who suggested this.) Some Papuans who went to England for the Queen's coronation could not believe that the buildings, the elevators, etc., had been built by ordinary men. A parcel of clothing, taken from England by a visitor was thought of as a gift from the ancestors.

Israel, Egypt, the Red Sea and other places mentioned in the Bible are especially so regarded. One example of the sacredness ascribed to these places was evident in the reception given to a popular missionary in the Kokoda district who returned to his parish after a visit to the Holy Land. The festivities with which he was received were very much out of the ordinary, and I was told this was because the ancestors had gone to these places.

In accordance with the usual Melanesian pattern, Australia, being the country exercising political and commercial control, was excluded from the vague area to which the ancestors had supposedly gone. On the other hand, New Zealand was not necessarily regarded in the same way as Australia. A young New Zealand geographer who paid a brief visit to Mumuni (in the Sasembata district) and to myself at Sivepe had been showered with gifts and one man had pressed money upon him which he was asked to invest in New Zealand, in which case it was expected to multiply a thousandfold. The young man was prudent enough
123 to decline the offer. I do not quite know how my wife and I were regarded in Sivepe, but there was evidence that the surrounding villages
829 likewise regarded us as returned ancestors; I was once drawn into a
769 discussion with a branch of the Jegase clan group at Kiorota, four hours' walking from Sivepe, where it was known that we were living closely with the Jegase clan group. I was asked point-blank whether I belonged to the Jegase clan; later, the Sivepe people told me what the meaning of this question had been. It would seem that this identification with returned ancestors was due less to our geographical provenance than to the type of relationships we had developed with Orokaiva people; both the geographer and we were living in villages, eating with the people and sharing with them; my wife was gardening; our behaviour was not that of the taupa. To this point I shall return.

177 It must be due to reasoning of this sort that Americans were placed definitely in the category of returned ancestors. I was told
829 they were very different from other taupa (or rather, they were not really taupa at all). The American forces, it will be remembered,
769 fought the Japanese at the Kokoda Trail and drove them out of the Northern District in 1942-1943. Both they, and the Australian troops accompanying them, maintained friendly relations with the Orokaiva who helped them in various ways, supplied them with whatever food they had in return, received very generous gifts. The American soldiers ate with the Orokaiva, which Australian officials hardly ever do, and

177 fraternised with them. In fact, the friendly atmosphere created by
both the American and Australian troops during the war gave the Orokaiva
829 a different view of Europeans than they had before and must have
769 greatly assisted the acceptance of the economic development ideology
and local government council movement in the 1950's and 1960's. A
[415] great proportion of the cooking pots, adzes and other steel tools
found in the villages today were gifts from the Americans.

769 In all the villages I visited, people listened to the news
829 broadcasts in Motu and Pidgin English; hence they heard about the
Vietnam war and we discussed it a few times. The reaction was strange:
[207] it was a great pity that those American boys were being killed in
Vietnam, because they were wonderful people. There was distinct
[191] disappointment that the Americans had decided to go to Vietnam instead
of returning to Papua-New Guinea. Some jealousy was felt towards the
Vietnamese who had now been thus favoured. I tried to assuage the
disappointment felt by my informants by summarising some facts from the
Manchester Guardian Weekly, my only source of knowledge at the time,
but I could see that the convictions of the Orokaiva on this point were
unshakable; they knew some things about the Americans which I was (or
pretended to be) ignorant of.

Section 10: Self-Group Image

829 The self-group image of the Orokaiva has undergone a profound
change since the war. The question that we need to investigate here is
[198] the extent to which the eruption experience affected this long-term
change. The most useful procedure will therefore be, as in Section 8,
121 to set out first the present self-group image and its general development
over the last few decades; secondly, to place the data we have on the
128 period immediately following the disaster in the framework of this
general development.

Like other peoples I have personally studied (the New Zealand
829 Maori and the Canadian Indian), the Orokaiva have been the recipients
of a barrage of propaganda on the part of missionaries and government
officials, who were critical of Orokaiva material standards, social
customs and religious beliefs. They also supplied severe sanctions
against those who did not change their material standards and customs
while considerable inducements were held out to those who would. The
Maori and the Blood Indians, while complying on the whole with the
demands of the whites, at the same time retained a strong belief in
the greatness and, often also, the superiority of their old customs.
I was therefore surprised that the Orokaiva had nothing good to say
about their own past, representing it as a nightmare from which they
were glad to have escaped, while the teachings of the Europeans as
well as their goods, provided an opportunity--the only known opportunity--
for vast improvement.

829 173 I thought at first that this representation of Orokaiva history (from the dark ages into a great future) was put on specially for my benefit. When I found Orokaiva were talking to each other in precisely the same terms, I thought that this view was held perhaps principally by persons with a vested interest, such as councillors, committee, etc. However, as I stayed longer, and became somewhat more trusted, I could still find no trace of nostalgia for customs that had been abandoned. I did, of course, become aware of the deep attachment the Orokaiva have for those of their traditional customs which they still practise, and values which they still hold.

[124] [126] I shall quote in detail one document, a tape recorded speech made by a councillor in the Orokaiva language, which is typical of the present Christian Orokaiva self-group image. I have a number of others, consistent with this one in essence, though differing in some details to which I shall draw attention. Though Councillor Colin's speech was specially made up to be recorded by me on tape, during a session when several other recordings were made, its general tenor was no different from the speeches he interminably made at other times. The only slant that may have been unusual was the extent to which he referred to past history. I had asked, on this occasion for stories of olden times (iji matu). The councillor started with a brief sketch of the wars of his forebears; he stressed that he and his listeners were the descendants of strong fighting men who killed wayfarers as though they were dogs, and who conquered the lands of others. "Now, there is a new day, and therefore we must be united." Later, the councillor described, for my benefit, some of the traditional magic. But, he said, people did not get paid jobs, but Jesus Christ (first) gave jobs for people to take. The village constable would drag them to Kokoda in chains for having told lies, and the magicians would be put to work to stop them from being convicted. They would be fired from their jobs for idling. Such were the old days.

[177] This story stressed the most widely accepted differences between the old and the new way of life: war vs. peace, danger vs. security, division vs. unity, magic vs. Christianity, poverty vs. wealth, simplicity vs. smartness. The councillor was, in every respect, in [625] favour of the new and opposed to the old way. He was not actually criticising the government, when referring to the activities of the [769] village constables; nor was he criticising the village constables. On the contrary, the village constables of the early contact period are greatly revered; their names are remembered and recited in much the same way as those of other renowned ancestors. Those who were handcuff this is the indignity remembered above all else--were lacking in smartne they just did not know the tricks for keeping out of trouble. The village constables, as I was also told at Hohorita, were the men who brought peace, who saw that people did not continue to fight each other.

At Hohorita, I had a series of discussions, at which a number of men participated, about Orokaiva history. On a number of points, which I could check, I was given reliable information. I would therefor

173 accept, as genuinely held by the Hohorita people at the present time, a view of history according to which the Orokaiva had only small 829 gardens before the Europeans introduced axes and knives; it was only then that people started to make feasts, stopped eating wild fruit, etc. Here informants credited to Europeans innovations traditionally 342 ascribed to their own culture heroes. During the same interview, I was told the people used to build houses by making a fence and putting 177 leaves on top. The present house types, I was told, were introduced by Europeans. It so happened that this statement was substantially correct.

829 From these few examples (more data of the same kind could be quoted), it is already clear that the Orokaiva perceive some resemblance 773 between the Europeans and their own culture heroes. The Orokaiva ascribe whatever cultural goods they possess to the action of culture heroes who brought them these goods in primeval time. This applies not only to material knowledge (the making of fire, houses, clothes, the growing of crops, etc.) but also to social behaviour (institutions of warfare, marriage, feasting, etc.). The Europeans manifestly brought with them innovations of the same scope. Like the culture heroes in the myths, the Europeans have many valuable new things, but they are reluctant to give them to the Orokaiva. They prefer to keep them for themselves. Occasionally, though, they do give some of them away, or are willing to trade them, or are successfully tricked into sharing them. One of the recent gifts for which the Orokaiva are especially grateful are the Local Government Councils. I asked some of the most experienced councillors whether they were able to conduct the councils according to their own ideas or were forced to follow ideas laid down by the government. I was told that the councils came "not from ourselves but from the administration. We don't know about the council. It belongs to the administration. It was given to the village people." The council was given much in the same way as fire had been given by a culture hero.

829 Beneficial though the Europeans undoubtedly are, they are also perceived as exasperating and dangerous: exasperating because of their 177 refusal to share their goods, to set up proper relationships with the people and to adopt proper customs; dangerous because of the power of the police, the prisons, and--most of all--the Christian 731 God. It is from this viewpoint that we should regard the Orokaiva interpretation of the Mount Lamington eruption as reported by Belshaw and Keesing. Belshaw reports that most Orokaiva explanations of the eruption were religious in nature: "Some people said that this was God's visitation because they had disobeyed the Bishop's instructions to build new churches. Others said that God had punished them because they had not helped the Allies sufficiently during the war and because some of them had betrayed missionaries to the Japanese . . . This sense of guilt is a most important factor in resettlement attitudes." (1951: 242) Keesing agrees with this summary, adding that the eruption resulted in "strong feelings of insecurity and even of guilt in their

731 retrospective look at the pre-eruption way of life."

[789] Though most of the contemporary evidence tallies with the accounts of Belshaw and Keesing, I should refer to two documents both dating from 1951 which add some subtleties. The first is a short manuscript by Fred Kleekham, agricultural officer, Popondetta, in which he says that "the Lamington eruption which obliterated the government station at Higaturu was regarded by many as payback for the hangings" (of Orokaiva responsible for the murder of missionaries). I tried unsuccessfully to find Orokaiva who still hold this belief. Mr. Kaad had not heard of it and suggested that as Kleekham was mostly working in the coastal region of the Northern District, he may have heard this interpretation of the eruption in that region. In any case, the explanation is worth noting because, once a disaster has been attributed to the anger of a supernatural agency, the causes of that anger are open to many plausible surmises.

777 533 Father Albert McLaren, while at Ilimo, composed two songs one of which is still widely sung among the Orokaiva and even elsewhere, as it is included in a songbook distributed to primary schools in the Territory of Papua.

1

We were at Sangara
gathered together
With all our brothers
Living together

Chorus: Have mercy on them
Lord, we live in your hand

The mountain was made by Thee
It was not seen by us before;
Lord, when it appeared
We were wounded.

Chorus

O Heavenly Father,
Look on Thy servants
Who are in Paradise
In Thy Glory.

Chorus

When the mountain was shaken
They were watching
With their children
And were buried together

Chorus

797
533

In the land of Sangara
Are the bodies of our brothers
As though they were sleeping
But we shall see them again in the end

Our brothers on earth
Had many temptations
They went up to Heaven
In Thy Glory

The evening was bright
On the hills of Ilimo
But our thoughts
Are always with our brothers

731 784 Father Albert described to me his own experiences with the eruption. He lost his own brother who was with the mission, but he was saved because he had been sent to Isivita for the service on the day of the eruption. He was able to escape by running down from Isivita. When he came close to the village of Simbeki, the darkness closed in. When the light returned, the clouds were red with flame or fire. When people saw this, he said, they thought the end of the world had come and this cloud was the fire of the Last Judgment that had come to burn them. Nobody knew anything about Higaturu being a volcano; or even of the existence of any volcano. They noticed the trees that were blown up, the branches broken down, the little hills of ash covering the valleys and people thought: this is the end of the world.

Father Albert said the Orokaiva did not use to have an idea of the end of the world; it was taught by Christianity. After the disaster, the people discussed it a great deal; through the disaster, God had shown the people just what was meant by the idea of the end of the world. I asked Father Albert whether he regarded the disaster as God's punishment for sins the people had committed, but Father Albert dismissed this idea: he did not think God would punish the innocent along with the guilty. This conversation took place many years after the disaster and can therefore hardly serve to refute the notion that in 1951, the eruption was regarded as divine punishment.

(797) Several government officials charged that the Anglican Bishop actually encouraged people to think that the eruption was a visitation of the wrath of God, as they had not followed the laws of the Church of England. They even add a variety of anecdotes, in which the Bishop threatened that if some demand of his (different in each anecdote) was not met, he would make the mountain erupt again. After meeting Bishop Hand personally, I must confess I am rather sceptical about these stories. The Bishop felt that some Orokaiva believed the eruption was a divine punishment. He stated to me that in his own sermons he

731 did not encourage this belief but spoke of the eruption as a natural
784 disaster. Certainly this is how Orokaiva often speak of it today,
especially when they wish to give the impression of being modern and
[797] educated. Papuans close to the Mission invariably speak of it as a
natural disaster.

A group of elderly people in Sivepe, however, produced a quite
different theory when I interviewed them in 1966. They explained
the eruption by the anger of the god Sumbiripa. I was told that this
explanation was the generally accepted one at the time of the disaster.
At Hohorita, I was likewise told that the people, at the time of the
eruption, thought of the anger of Sumbiripa, though later they learned
it had been a natural disaster. My Sivepe informants, however, added
[787] a refinement. Before Sumbiripa blew up, he gave two signs. To the
Isivita people and those of the Sasembata district he made a sign of
blue fire, which meant that these people would be saved. To the
Sangara people, he gave a sign of red fire, which meant that they all
died. The reason for his anger towards the Sangara people was that
they used to throw hand bombs and shoot guns on the mountain. This
theory has the advantage of explaining the facts more closely than
the theory of the anger of the Christian God; it is easier to believe
that Sumbiripa discriminated between the two tribes than that the
Christian God should do so.

731 Before attempting to draw these rather various interpretations
together under a common theme, I shall refer briefly to F. E. Williams'
152 extremely cogent discussion on the Orokaiva's general attitude to
guilt, for which I myself collected much additional documentation.
When an Orokaiva is wronged he displays a state of mind called sisire.
[762] A person who is sisire withdraws, refuses food, destroys his own
property, may even commit suicide. By displaying his sorrow, he hopes
to shame the person who has wronged him. When a person is spoken
to roughly, he will feel sisire, "ashamed." It is the normal reaction
to being punished. The purpose is invariably to make the other party
feel sorry for what he has done. There is something of that feeling
in Father Albert's songs. The main mood is not so much contrition as
the hope that the singer will make God feel sorry. This is not quite
the same as what we understand by "guilt." All Belshaw's evidence
suggests that the Orokaiva people after the eruption felt very sisire.

Certainly, the eruption would be followed by a resolve not to
731 make the harsh power that brought the eruption angry again. Whether
784 this power was primarily identified with God or with Sumbiripa is
extremely hard to tell; it is even harder to tell whether these powers
177 were viewed as being entirely distinct. Father Albert's testimony
strongly suggests that the eruption was treated as symbolic of divine
wrath as it was presented in the Bible. I have argued earlier that
the Orokaiva look upon the Europeans as a new kind of culture heroes.
The new dispensation brought not only new wealth and new knowledge,
but also new wrath: Monckton's conquest, the world war, the eruption.
It does not seem far-fetched to assume that the disaster was taken as

731 a warning not to openly disobey the new culture heroes, to deal with
them gently and cunningly and avoid making them angry. Thus the
177 eruption led to greater circumspection if not contrition. It also led
[784] to a sense of deeper involvement with the new age. The immediate
consequence was a fashion of modern village building in 1951, as both Belshaw and Keesing have reported. After this rather brief demonstration of respect to the deity, life reverted to its previous style for some years, after which there was a further period of innovation, more soundly based on the development of the Sasembata school, the local government council, the increase of economic opportunities, both in the towns and in cash cropping, and finally on nation-wide political development. The Orokaiva of today definitely sees himself as entering upon a new age, and he views this with optimism and some excitement. The eruption undoubtedly was perceived as a potent sign of the coming of this new age and the danger of resisting it. For this reason, it might theoretically be expected that new ideas would be accepted more eagerly in the resettlement areas than in the less affected areas such as Inonda.

177 Unfortunately, I find it hard to evaluate the Inonda data. The
Christian, cash-cropping families were as concerned to view themselves
554 as living in a new age as were the people of Sivepe. The views of
the other families were hard to obtain. Crocombe and Hogbin pointed out correctly that these families explain their non-participation in the coffee scheme by difficulties in their land title. The two authors also characterised the Pagan families as being of "lower status", pointing out that the "higher status" families are (also in neighbouring villages) the most likely to plant cash crops or likely to plant most, (1963: 85) for reasons of prestige. During my own stay, the Pagan families set themselves against participation in the women's club, as they felt it violated traditional custom. I had the impression that there was a status conflict between the factions, as participation in the church, the women's club or any other European activity would have put the resistant faction in a clear position of inferiority, and increased the power of the leader of the other faction who ran all these activities.

Section 11: Acculturation

177 The contacts and the ideological changes sketched in the previous sections have not led to a basic transformation of the culture. Williams' classical account of the Orokaiva, based on fieldwork conducted in 1923, still corresponds in fundamentals to what can be seen today. In the present section, I shall draw attention to some aspects of the culture that have changed since the eruption, but it should be stressed that, in field observation, they are seen as embedded in a largely traditional culture, with a social organisation, economy,

177 political and value system modified in only such minor ways that a
withdrawal of Australian power at this stage might well lead to a
discarding of many of the innovations. Certainly, this is what many
of the villagers fear and what makes them distrust any politicians
who are pressing for immediate independence.

177 Food: The Orokaiva menu is still basically the same as in the past.
Taro forms the mainstay of the meal, with various vegetable relishes,
262 while cooking bananas, sweet potatoes and yams are eaten in significant
quantities. Sugar beet, coconut and other nuts supplement the diet.
[263] Animal foods are eaten only on special occasions. It is the festive
diet that has undergone recent changes: trade salt is almost universally
[411] used instead of the native product. Fish and game have become rare
as a result of the introduction of guns and snorkels. The government
pressure against village pig-keeping has resulted in these becoming
rarer also. On the other hand, tins of fish and meat are bought in
trade stores and may make up for the loss of fresh animal food. Rice
is another introduced food, which was first eaten by members of the
Papuan constabulary, and distributed on a small scale when the Allies
were fighting the Japanese in the Northern District. The first time
that a large group of Orokaiva ate rice as a staple diet was during
the period in the camps after the eruption. Today, it is a food
bought when there are guests or a celebration. It is then eaten as a
[272] side dish, together with taro. Tea and sugar have likewise become
favoured at festive meals. Coffee, the main cash crop of the district,
[263] is totally unknown as a beverage; cocoa is likewise unknown, except
as a plantation crop.

Clothing: At the time of the eruption, traditional clothing was
291 universally worn. European clothing was introduced to the villages
177 in the 1950's by young men returning from employment in town. Today,
young and old wear European-type clothing except when doing traditional
dances. On one occasion a man dressed in full regalia to settle a
quarrel with a neighbouring village. This, I was told, added dignity
to his embassy. Men wear shirts and shorts; women wear Mother Hubbard
type of skirts and blouses, as well as frocks for dressy occasions.
Underclothes are not worn, though the Women's Clubs, encouraged by an
Australian adviser, have been trying to introduce them. I was told
that in Hohorita masculine opposition against this innovation (underclothes for women and children) was quite violent--they ripped them
off. This story, however, came from a woman councillor who was not a
member of the Sangara tribe. The men wear shirts only when dressed
up; normally they are bare above the waist and many of the women likewise,
though some of the younger ones affect blouses a good deal of the time,
certainly on formal occasions. The causes of this change are not only
practise in the schools and mostly in the churches, but also a rather
widespread change of fashion. The Anglican Chruch does not stop women
from taking communion if they wear nothing above the waist; the pressure
is purely one of fashion.

177 Housing and village improvement: The changes in this aspect of culture
are capable of fairly precise description, which has been provided in
Table 10.[A] This table applies to Sivepe only; I shall refer to some
minor differences between Sivepe and Inonda at the end of this section.
335 The changes may be analysed into several main types. First, there is
the extent to which European materials and tools are used. Here, we note
412 that nails were a building material as early as 1951 (and therefore
177 also hammers), but a significant change has been the extent of their
use. The introduction of nails was partly a time-saving device, as
framing can be efficiently lashed together with the bark fibres
traditionally used. On the other hand, the "timber" walls might not
be easy to lash together and nails are probably necessary here. On
the other hand, the blackpalm or betelnut which is used for the floors
does not take nails at all well and the lashing is a superior technique,
177 used in almost all the houses. Secondly, there have been changes in
house design, and the use of materials. The increase in house size,
342 which was the most striking of the innovations, was general throughout
the village, according to a standard set by the leader and adhered to
by everybody. The change from betelnut to blackpalm flooring is
towards a superior, toughter material, harder to work and comparatively
rare in the Sasembata district. The change from sago to "timber"
walls was purely a matter of aesthetic fashion. I was told by Mr.
Sebire that it started in the early 1950's in the Kokoda district; in
Sasembata district it does not seem to have started until around 1965.
The new houses at the mission station had "timber" walls; so had the
new houses in several other nearby villages. Sivepe, being built on
a new site after the fashion started was wholly built in "timber"
(except for a few houses shifted from the old site and standing on the
new one and graduallyreplaced). The "timber" looks like weatherboard,
[335] which has been used on Australian houses in the Kokoda district. It
is cut from logs sawed to a length of six feet, which are then split
into shingles with a bushknife, a procedure which takes much time and
skill. The six feet long shingles are generally 3/8 inch thick and
five inches wide. The intention is to overlap them, providing better
protection against wind and rain than the sago walls have. The work of
cutting the shingles is so arduous, however, that the overlap is usually
quite small when the houses are built; as the logs are split green, the
timber shrinks until cracks appear between the boards.

177 The third type of change is that actually advocated by European
authorities. (The timber walls, according to administration officers,
[342] were a purely Orokaiva idea.) For reasons of hygiene, the administration
wanted the houses to have windows, which traditionally they did not
have. The new houses have large windows, but they are all blocked up
with boards (to keep the wind and rain out) so that they are not functional,
[364] except in warding off criticism from Australian officials. The village
improvement measures: elimination of pigs, lavatories, rubbish holes,
[351] pens for chickens; are all based on European advocacy. The neat lines
of crotons and other shrubs, which are beginning to form a standard

[A] [See Cat. 116, p. 215--Analyst]

177 part of village layouts, are a blend of Papuan tradition (the Orokaiva
have always been very fond of flowers and planted ornamental shrubs)
[351] and a new Australian-derived passion for military regularity. This
[363] is evident especially in the emphasis placed on building the houses
in a line, and equidistant; the shrubs are also rigidly in line.

The changes are to some extent due to the experience of Ilimo
177 camp which is reflected in the style of Old Sivepe. The changes found
342 in New Sivepe are due to subsequent influences, mainly that of the
Local Government Council. Once village improvement became an ideologically validated objective, the way was open to the adoption of
further innovations borrowed from the Kokoda district, such as the
use of "timber." I did not see "timber" used East of the Sasembata
district.

[182] It may well be that the increase in house size, coupled with
the present need to build a large number of houses in the same year
to form a major modern village, would rapidly have led to a critical
shortage of sago in Sivepe if people had continued to use this material
for walls. Thus, the present practice of using timber instead of
sago could well have an economic explanation. Sago roofs can be
built without destroying the plants, whereas plants have to be cut
entirely to produce sago walls. I was not, however, given an economic
explanation for the change-over to timber; I was told only that it
was better-looking and provided good protection against wind and rain.
But nobody would say anything against sago; sago walls are "also very
good."

177 Tools and skills: Traditional agriculture has undergone considerable
change, as elsewhere in New Guinea, by the introduction of steel axes,
241 bush knives, grubbers etc. Thus the preparation of the soil for
[412] gardening has been greatly facilitated. There has, however, been no
change in the operations concerned with the plants themselves, planting
and harvesting being done with wooden digging sticks. Many of the men
have had experience in rubber plantations, with operations such as
tapping; there are a few tapping chisels in the village. Training in
coffee cultivation occurred after the eruption, but it was not until
a few years ago that hulling machines were introduced. Every grower
177 at Sivepe has, as far as I know, only one coffee sack. The basic
skills needed to bring rubber and coffee to market have been mastered,
245 but up-to-date techniques for improving the yield of the trees have
249 not been mastered. The difficulty, in this respect, is not purely one
of communication, as men who have been employed as rubber tappers must
be familiar with certain rules regarding care of the trees which are
definitely not being practised. Similarly, I doubt whether one can
explain failure, on the part of Sivepe growers, to prune their coffee
trees by ignorance of pruning techniques. The true explanation would
appear to be a lack of confidence that the rules make any difference
to the yields. In Hohorita people began to prune their coffee trees
when they discovered they were then easier to harvest. But the whole
pattern of reasoning upon which Western horticultural practises are

177 based, is alien and seems dubious to Orokaiva. The Europeans claim
245 that a plant needs to be looked after even if it contains no spirit;
249 to the Orokaiva this appears absurd.

Some Orokaiva have been employed by Europeans as carpenters;
[824] these men have certain skills upon which a community draws when large
community buildings (for instance, the hospital at Sasembata mission
177 station) need to be constructed. The trained carpenter leads such
enterprises in the role of expert. There was one such man in Sasembata
335 village; he, like most others of his type, learned his skill in
European employment and not in one of the small adult education
ventures which the administration has sponsored from time to time (the
adult education classes at Ilimo camp were probably the first of this
type).

177 For the rest, the skills acquired by Orokaiva over the last 15
years are largely concerned not directly with village development but
871 rather with an increase of understanding of the world outside. While
before the war, only a small minority had school education, the
Anglican Mission spread its operations to several new stations,
including Sasembata, after the war. After the eruption, the scope of
education was again greatly extended and it could be said that the
eruption marked the beginning of universal school education in the
majority of Orokaiva villages. The Sasembata station began to draw
virtually the entire child population of the surrounding villages,
and most students now follow a five or six year course. While this
development had been planned ever since the war, it may be significant
that regular school attendance of all the villages in the district
was experienced for the first time at Ilimo, where a school was
conducted for the whole evacuee child population, and adult classes
as well. It is the objective of present school programmes, as far
as I can see, to make the population literate and the increase of
[212] literacy is a major aspect of acculturation over the period. Literacy
has certainly progressed to a point where letters written in Orokaiva
to any family in Sivepe can be read and understood with the help of
at least a junior member of the family; and can be replied to. While
177 I could see no evidence that people have acquired mathematical knowledge
of any sophistication, I was struck by a strong quantitative orientation.
802 In the Orokaiva language, there are no numerals higher than 2; hence,
it is the invariable practise to use English numerals when speaking
[192] the Orokaiva language. The numerals are, in fact, among the main
English linquistic features that have been borrowed. They are used
with remarkable frequency; the number of coffee trees, the value in
pounds of trade goods included in a bride price, the calculation of
money prices, even the number of brothers or men who together played
some role in a mythological tale (a distinctly contemporary touch,
this)--all these phenomena show that "numbers" have become an integral
part of Orokaiva culture. The Orokaiva use the English word "number"
177 for a variety of quantitative concepts, including price. Finally, one
829 must regard as an aspect of acculturation, the introduction of many

177 concepts drawn from the scene of world affairs. While among the
829 Orokaiva, I heard talk about Vietnam, Indonesia, Africa, India. The
political orientation displayed was a mild kind of nationalism, and
[203] a sense of closeness to newly independent non-white states. But the
information, derived from radio broadcasts and speeches by councillors,
introduced an acculturative kind of perspective. Its dissemination is
being actively encouraged by the Australian authorities.

465 Use of money: Before the eruption, money played a very minor role
in village life. It was earned by men who were away for limited
[464] periods working on plantations. Money wages on plantations were, and
are, extremely low; wages for agreement labour in 1962 were, for
instance, $39 per annum for the first year of which $12 is paid out
in monthly installments and the rest at the end of the year. In the
second year, the rate rose to $45.50 p.a. (Howlett, 1965) Urban wages
are a great deal higher than this; most Sivepe men who were absent
on employment worked on urban jobs. At the same time, a regular
income was derived from coffee.

464 Sivepe men were simply not interested in jobs at plantation
rates of pay, nor were they interested in "carrying" jobs for the
435 government even though wages in that case were higher. They were also
indifferent to selling their garden products on the Saiho and Popondetta
438 markets, as there were frequent gluts, prices were low and carrying
goods to market was an unduly arduous task.

Money was used largely to buy goods in the luxury rather than
436 the subsistence sphere. Money was essential for payment of taxes
511 and for a minimum of clothes, often acquired cheaply at jumble sales.
Otherwise, it was used to buy tobacco, food for feasts, kerosene
mainly used for feasting occasions, cartridges for hunting, again for
feasts. Among the larger purchases made were radios, pressure lamps,
bicycles, tools; all these, however, could never be paid for with
current income. One had to depend on special windfalls: a gift from
454 a relative in town, a bride price. Money was not only for spending,
however; it was also for saving. I shall refer to the organisation
556 of corporate saving later; in addition a number of Sivepe men had
savings, of the order of $10-$20, sometimes more, hidden away. This
money was kept for special occasions, but in addition, the very fact
of possessing it was regarded as important. I was once told that
Europeans were powerful because they had money; the Orokaiva could
get power only if they too possessed savings.

If money was definitely highly valued, it was only to a limited
436 extent regarded as a standard of value. If we accept some model such
437 as was suggested by Salisbury (1962), we may say that the Orokaiva
have three spheres of exchange: a subsistence, luxury and ritual
sphere, while bank notes are used for special, often ritual occasions.
[461] In the acquisition of luxury goods of any kind, including money, the
Orokaiva tend to weigh the benefits gained by them against their cost
in time and unpleasantness and against the benefits that can be gained
from other investments. Money is, in general, wanted only if it can

461 be acquired without too much hard labour or threat to status, and only
if its acquisition does not involve foregoing other more highly valued
[436] benefits. Thus, the market has a great elasticity of supply: when
the price seems right to the Orokaiva, supply suddenly emerges from
[437] all directions; when the price is lowered, there is suddenly no supply
[435] at all. The investment of effort is at once directed into different
avenues: subsistence gardening, house-building, a project for the
mission, or a hall for the women's club, or a hunting expedition, or
practises for a dance.

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Comparison with Inonda: In this section I have discussed a small number of acculturation variables as they apply to Sivepe. In general they apply to Inonda also, but there are a few minor differences to be mentioned. The most important of these is that whereas one can speak, in Sivepe, about a certain stage in acculturation reached by the community, it is less easy to do the same for Inonda where, at one end of the scale, we find fairly young men without cash-cropping skills, without school education, and almost entirely aloof from the money economy, while at the other end, one man has become a government driver and would need to be considered, in every respect, as more acculturated than any man of the same age group at Sivepe. It would be wrong to suggest, however, that acculturation in Sivepe was homogeneous; nor that the conservatism of part of Inonda is necessarily a long-term phenomenon.

There is no difference in food habits between the two villages, except that the government driver, having more money, eats better. In respect to clothing, it seemed that in Sivepe young women are a little more prone to cover their breasts than in Inonda; this is of course very much a matter of fashion and can change in months. With regard to housing, changes were actually occurring during the year I was in the field. Houses were being enlarged up to approximately the Sivepe size, and this programme was explained to me as due to the forthcoming feast at which the Seva people were invited and the new floor space was needed to accommodate them. The argument was thus not quite the same as at Sivepe, where the larger houses were thought of as a necessary part of "iji eha," the new age. "Timber" was not used in Inonda, all the walls being of sago. The "timber" fashion never travelled as far East as Inonda; I doubt whether Inonda had enough suitable trees and, furthermore, Inonda did not have the same shortage of sago. Though sago was rare on Inonda lands, the residents had a plentiful supply from other lands belonging to relatives. At Inonda, only some of the people used rubbish holes, whereas the others threw their refuse into the bush. On the other hand, the village was most plentifully and attractively laid out with shrubs and ornamental plants. Inonda, built a special feast house for their visitors from Seva, whereas Sivepe did not do so for their visitors from Togahou. This definitely reflected a non-traditional attitude in Sivepe.

177 In the attitude to money, and to education, Inonda was clearly
436 split between the traditionalist and the modern faction. The modern
583 faction was, in fact more money-oriented than were the Sivepe people.

177 436 583 The clearest example of this was in the computation of bride price. As I mentioned, the Sivepe people, in calculating the value of bride price, translated all gifts of trade goods (clothes, kitchen utensils, etc.) into money terms, speaking of a bride price of 72 pounds when the actual cash component was only $28. (The word "dollar" is well-known to Orokaiva but as yet imperfectly accepted in discourse as a unit of value.) Inonda, however, in calculating the value of bride price, went further and converted also the pigs, valuables and tapa cloths into money terms, as was described in Hogbin, 1966. Upon inquiring specifically whether the Inonda people calculated bride-wealth in this way, I found that Hogbin's presentation corresponded with the Inonda method of estimating. In other words, Inonda people spoke of a 100-pound brideprice, when the actual gifts were as follows:

Cash	$ 80.00
Household goods	13.00
Pig	60.00
Bark-cloth	9.75
Food	10.60
Traditional valuables	28.20
Total	$201.55

Sivepe people expressed some horror at the thought that this should be referred to as a $200 bride price; to them the gifts of pig, bark-cloth, food and traditional valuables were gifts of a special type that could not be equated with money. I asked one informant whether this was perhaps a modern trend; "not modern but silly," he replied.

177 184 This reply reminds us how hazardous it is to place a number of phenomena, found in different villages, on a unilinear kind of acculturation continuum. Nonetheless, I believe that the facts show some tendency for Sivepe to be more "acculturated" than Inonda, even though the differences are slight, and apply only to part of the Inonda population.

Section 12: Impact of External Influences on Community Organisation

184 # One of the difficulties of our research design is that Sivepe
621 and Inonda are of different population size, Sivepe having exactly
three times the population of Inonda (135: 45). Hence, the community
organisation of the two villages would naturally differ for that
[614] reason alone. A second difference lies in the clan composition of the
two villages and the changes in clan composition over the period under
consideration. Pamba contained three clans: Seho, Jegase and Timumu
and modern Sivepe still contains roughly the same family alignment
except that the members of the Timumu clan are now calling themselves

184 Jegase, thus making Sivepe basically into a two-clan village, into
which some recent Garombi immigrants remain to be integrated. Inonda,
621 in 1951, consisted of 13 houses of which nine were inhabited by
614 Andiriha, three by Jego-undi and one bachelor's house. In 1966,
there were only seven houses, only one of which was occupied by
Jego-undi. Hence, Inonda has almost ceased to be a two-clan village
today.

571 I have written at length about modern Orokaiva leadership
elsewhere (Schwimmer, 1967) and shall do little more here than summarise
the conclusions already published. The scope and range of Orokaiva
leadership has always been small, except for the heads of extended
families (okose) who had a very wide scope of authority. Each village
had a set of experts who had unquestioned authority in their sphere
of expertise. Examples are the medicine man, the hunting expert,
[554] dancing expert and some others. One of these experts, the feasting
expert, is in fact the man of highest status in the clan or village
[622] and may be called its leader. A clan leader may take responsibility
for such corporate actions as a modern clan performs, e.g., raise
[614] bride price for one of its members. Except in these circumscribed
situations, he is esteemed and respected rather than obeyed. The
village leader, in a multi-clan village, is usually the leader of
the largest clan. In dealings with other villages, he is the man to
whom most respect must be paid; it is here, and when acting as a
feasting leader, that he most closely approaches the role of power-bearer.
Even so, the Orokaiva word for "feasting leader" is pondo
kiari embo, i.e., feasting expert, and in explanation of his role
informants always stress that it is based on expertise rather than on
a more diffuse concept of status. I also found, after inquiring in
Inonda, Hohorita and seven villages in the Sasembata district, that in
fact the fathers of all these feasting leaders had occupied the same
positions. Nonetheless, informants always denied that the office
was inherited; rather, the fact of succession was explained by the
transmission of the necessary knowledge from father to son.

621 Australian domination added at once the role of village constable
to this somewhat acephalous pattern. One gathers from Monckton that
622 the village constable was chosen on the assumption that he had been
625 the traditional leader. How often that assumption was justified I
do not know. In Inonda, he certainly was the Andiriha clan leader.
614 In Sivepe, the situation was more complex. Until about 1939, Sivepe
had no village constable of its own, but an Awala man was village
constable for a wide area centred on Awala and including Sivepe. The
first and only Sivepe village constable was a man now baptised under
the name of Samuel but then called Jovareka. Jovareka appeared as
witness to prove the innocence of two Sivepe men (from the Seho clan)
who had been accused of murdering a small boy from Awala. He showed
successfully that the village constable had trumped up a charge against
the two Sivepe men and the government appointed Jovareka village
constable in his place. Later, Jovareka's area was reduced to a more

621 manageable size. Jovareka was definitely not a hereditary leader in
Sivepe; in fact, he was not even born there. On the other hand, the
622 two men he saved belonged to the leading family of the Seho clan,
625 which is the dominant clan of Sivepe. In the circumstances, the law
of reciprocity demanded that the Seho clan backed Jovareka as a suitable
614 man to be village constable. His status was accordingly greatly
enhanced.

625 The scope of his role, however, may easily be exaggerated.
According to Samuel, he was put through a course of training of one
day. He was told about how to take a case to court and how to get
and give evidence. He was told not to belt anybody, but handcuff
them. He had to check that houses were built properly, that sago
roofs were replaced and lavatories built. He also had to see that
the men cut the grass in the village and the women swept, and that
the road built by the government was properly maintained. Each
village had its own stretch of road to look after, and this was subdivided
into sections for each of the men. This summary tallies
[364] with the statements of other informants. We note that some of the
included items (such as the women sweeping the village, the replacement
of old sago roofs) are traditional activities and hardly required
police supervision. Other of the included items, such as the building
of lavatories, remained a dead letter until after the eruption, and
it was not until 1965 that all houses actually had lavatories.
[754] Furthermore, it is only now, with the fear of sorcery diminishing under
the impact of Christianity, that anyone would dare to use a lavatory.

I asked Samuel whether he had ever handcuffed anyone or had
anyone jailed. No, he had never used the handcuffs. He had never
brought anyone from Sivepe to court. He had sent people from other,
surrounding villages to court. Tax was never collected past Sangara
in his day, he said, implying that his record would not have been so
serene if he had had to collect the head tax. Two Sivepe men had
actually been taken to court during his period of office, but not by
him; it was done by a visiting patrol, for not tending the roads, but
they were let off as they had just returned from a period of plantation
work. Other Sivepe informants told me that the village constable made
little difference to the way of life of the people and this must, I
[627] think, be conceded. Nonetheless, Samuel was evidently called in as
a mediator in quarrels in other villages and due to his influence,
some cases went to court.

The evacuation camp seems to have placed a heavy burden on the
625 village constables as they were the middlemen between government and
731 the village people, responsible for the distribution of food and
supplies and the setting up of village organisation in the camp. The
camp consisted in fact of a number of villages, closely together, in
which the village constable was much more in charge than he ever had
been. Permission to go back to the home area to check whether possessions
had remained undisturbed and to collect food, also had to be
given through the village constable who was put in charge of all such

625 excursions. This was, however, an experience of short duration and,
once back in Sivepe, the village constable reverted to his former role,
731 as described above. In 1956, all village constables handed back to
the government their handcuffs, the symbol of their authority, and the
Local Government Councils took over.

[685] With regard to interpersonal relations, the evacuation set up
a mutual distrust due to the removal of certain social controls.
[571] Theft is comparatively uncommon in Orokaiva villages, but this is
because property is extremely well-guarded and everyone in the village
is constantly under observation by other villagers. The idea of
villages being left unguarded was repugnant to Orokaiva, and fear of
prowling had to be countered by strict control on the part of village
constables over anyone entering the restricted area. I could find no
evidence of a change in interpersonal relations beyond the period
of evacuation.

476 The Orokaiva are not often observed to work in groups; from
the relatively acephalous structure it may already be inferred that
571 they do not have regular work leaders controlling groups. Most
gardening is done by each extended family separately; house building
is done by the prospective occupants with the help of some individuals
who feel an obligation, mostly a brother or brother-in-law. Even at
feasts, there is a minimum of truly communal labour: the food is
supplied by individuals who deliver it to the display platform and it
is only the dancing, the ceremonial and a few minor construction tasks
that may be communal. There are in Sivepe two yam gardens where work
is communal; these are in sharp contrast to all other garden work.
Yet people readily gather for common efforts which have a festive and
ceremonial nature or enterprises which arouse an episodic enthusiasm.
Examples are the communal fishing and hunting expeditions, projects
such as the mission hospital or the marking of the ward boundary.

Even during these communal episodes, the tendency is for each
small group to perform a certain task separately, though contemporaneously.
A hunting party splits up into family groups who do not meet again
until the hunt is over. In fishing each group has its own spot.
Similarly in the building of new Sivepe, there was little that was
overtly communal, as each small group was working on a house for
themselves or a close kinsman. Nonetheless, one would be wrong to
[342] describe this pattern as individualistic. After all, every house was
in the same style and of the same size--and this was not wholly a
[177] "traditional" style; it was a style introducing new materials and an
increase in size of about 50%. When such a change is made by everybody
who builds a new house, this indicates that the group is strongly
bound by collective decisions.

177 Unwittingly, the Australian government has tended to make the
Orokaiva more oriented towards group work than he was before. Road
654 work, the compulsory planting of rubber trees, compulsory resettlement
571 in larger villages--all these added to the volume of group work while
the volume of individual work remained constant within the villages.

654 The rubber plantings followed a quota established for each village;
177 in practise, a village man would make one of his garden plots available
to the community at large and all the village trees would be planted
571 there. This would be a communal work project. In accordance with
476 Orokaiva tradition, however, the product of these rubber trees would
be individually appropriated, each man being allowed to collect a
limited quantity of rubber for himself and market it. The tasks of
building the mission station and maintaining it further added to the
amount of group work required. Men who took jobs on plantations once
more found themselves in a group work situation which formed a contrast
with the earlier tradition of individual effort.

474 It is paradoxical that the Australians, after first encouraging
this group orientation, soon found themselves fighting against it, in
177 the belief that they were face to face with that dangerous phenomenon
"communism." The immediate post-war period, up to the time of the
241 eruption, was the time when an ideologically based cooperative movement
took root in the Northern District. This movement, which was centred
on Gona, has been well described in general terms by Dakeyne (1966).
[777] It was the direct result of the work of two Anglican clergymen, Revs.
Benson and Clint, who preached the virtues of cooperatives, and encouraged
the cultivation of a great many village plots of rice and peanuts
between the years 1947-1951. Dakeyne reports: "Rev. Flint was
insistent that Christian ritual be associated with co-operative
action. Educational and committee meetings always closed with a special
prayer, there were church services at which tools were blessed and
newly planted seed was blessed in the gardens. This aspect of the
cooperative movement was regarded with some apprehension by Administration
officers who felt it could be misunderstood by the Papuans and possibly
lead to the development of a cargo cult. There was some evidence to
suggest that a cult did in fact begin." (1966: 60)

The evidence, which Dakeyne does not cite, is interesting enough to be worth a brief mention. Kleekham, the agricultural officer for the coastal area at that time, reports in a memorandum (Kleekham, n.d.) that leaders of the movement were collecting taxes secretly and that "some mystical element was involved" in rice marketing. Kleekham had a huller and was willing to hull rice for growers" consumption or buy it for cash, but the people withheld their produce. He thought that this aloofness was due to the growers' belief "that the formation of and participation in cooperatives would--magically or mystically--in short time raise the native to the status of the European in all respects."

In some form, this movement reached both Sivepe and Inonda. At Sivepe, one man made a plot available where people could "cooperatively" grow rice. A deacon stationed at Sasembata, but a member of the Yega tribe where the movement had its origin, blessed the seeds and (according to my informant, allocated a section of the field to different individuals. The rice was hulled by the Administration's agriculture officer at Waseta and each man took his own rice back home, giving a

474 share to the owner of the land. This activity started some time after
177 1947 and ceased with the eruption of Mount Lamington. It involved
"everybody" at Pamba. At Inonda, both rice and peanuts were tried
241 out. The rice was planted in one block, without subdivisions; it
was hulled and sold at Higaturu government station, the money was
distributed. There were two harvests between the time people started
to grow rice and the time of the eruption, when rice was abandoned.
Proceeds were 18 pounds and nine pounds; people's shares were two to
three pounds each. The mission had nothing to do with the activity,
but only the government, so I was told.

The evidence, limited as it is, leads one to wonder whether the rice produced by the cooperatives was really unsaleable, as Dakeyne suggests (1966: 61-62). On the other hand, there is no doubt that the mission lacked any marketing facilities and I would strongly agree with Dakeyne that the cooperative movement could never have succeeded except on the basis of cash sales for good prices. Sivepe, acting under mission influence, ate their own rice and did not attempt to sell it. When the people came back after the eruption, the rice was "spoiled," the deacon had been transferred to another station. In Inonda, the crop had likewise been "spoiled." Dakeyne reports that in 1951, the rice was attached by a species of "army worm;" the District Agricultural Officer ordered all crops destroyed.

The pattern of production of the Sivepe rice resembles that
474 of the communal yam gardens. There also, several men may plant
241 together in the garden of one of them; the users are then expected
to make a gift of yams to the owner before taking away their own. If
[427] we put this strictly in contractual terms, a man leases land to others
for one year for a fee. The lessees, together with the owner (who
retains one section for himself), club together as a kind of working
bee for the planting and harvesting (and perhaps some other operations).
This traditional pattern was revived after the eruption in the establishment of coffee and rubber stands. Its significance, however, is somewhat
changed if such common cultivations are carried on not for the sake
of growing food for feasts (such as the yams), but for cash (as in the
case of rubber and coffee and perhaps rice). When a common plot is
established for cash crops (but not yams), the Sasembata district
people call this a "company;" they speak of "company land"--the word
"company" being a borrowed English word incorporated in Orokaiva
vocabulary. This word has mildly millennial overtones: a "company"
is the means by which the Orokaiva may acquire wealth equal to that of
[827] the Europeans. It would be unfair to say, with Kleekham, that the
"company" of the Orokaiva is a mystical and magical device; it is in
fact a representation of what Orokaiva believe European business to
be like.

Today, Sivepe has three forms of economic organisation. The
471 dominant one is that where the factors of production are entirely
[596] provided by the extended family and where the product is appropriated
by the extended family also. This sytem applies to subsistence as

471 well as cash crops. The clan or village has overriding rights to the
product only when a feast is being held; at such a time, people are
encouraged to make extra plantings and are expected to donate what
has been grown in excess to their own requirements. Such donations
are represented as "voluntary" by informants.

471 The second type of organisation is that brought about by the
Australian government's insistence on the planting of village quota's
241 of rubber and coconut. Here, as I explained, an undivided area was
621 planted by "all" members of the community, and the product appropriated
by individuals on a sort of roster system. The land remains owned
by the individual who made it available and it will revert to him
when the trees die off. It is only the trees that are "communally"
owned. There is no traditional precedent for this kind of arrangement.

The third type is that described on the preceding page. For
471 this system, the selected plot of land is divided into sections called
241 tane. This is common procedure also when subsistence crops are planted.
Each tane is then lent to a person who will plant coffee or rubber
427 there. This lending of tane is likewise traditional; a man described
how his sister, after a quarrel, came back to Sivepe (she had married
out) and he at once gave her a taue from his new garden to look after.
The only difference, in the case of tree crops, is that the tane
is lent out for a longer period, in fact as long as the borrower
continues to harvest the trees (regularly). No new "communal" coffee
plots of this sort have been established in Sivepe for many years;
there was, however, such a plot allocated to rubber around 1964, as
I have described. It was called a "company" and the agricultural
officer told me that the government did not like supporting these
"companies," preferring development of "individual holdings."

474 In the neighbouring village of Sasembata, where a rubber cooper-
ative was set up, a new variant developed in 1967. This was also called
245 a "company;" its main asset was a small factory for processing the
rubber. The "company" was also allocated a plot of land, owned by
a village man, where trees were planted by a work group, with the
intention of tapping and selling the rubber for the benefit of the
company--there was some talk of saving up for a truck to cart the
rubber and other village products. In addition, villagers planted
trees on their individual land and rubber harvested from that land
would be processed at the factory and proceeds would go to the grower.
This scheme met with some sturdy opposition from the agricultural
officer. The fear of the administration was always: cargo cults,
communism, fraudulent accounting. Four Sivepe men were actively
occupied for some weeks on helping to build the rubber factory. They
also contributed $10 membership fee. Members were drawn from all
villages closely related to Sasembata.

474 Cooperative principles were also not infrequently followed
in the setting up of trade stores. Rimoldi (1963) reported one such
443 venture, involving 11 villages and centred on the Sasembata mission
station. The savings seem to have totalled $60 from each of 12 clans,

474 plus other amounts of unknown size--enough for the projected establish-
443 ment of a trade store. Rimoldi's report suggests that cooperation between the villages for this project was difficult to attain; the mission teacher who was to coordinate the project withdrew. (1963: 107-108) After Rimoldi left, one of the Sivepe clans (Jegase) evidently went ahead with some scheme to open a trade store at Sivepe and lost all its money. There was some dishonesty on the part of someone, but I did not try to explore this. When I arrived, the plan to open a trade store was still alive, but people did not like the idea of its being operated by a clan; one of the families of the Jegase clan was playing with the idea of raising some money and starting one. It seems likely that the savings accumulated by the Timumu clan, to which Rimoldi refers, were lost along with the Jegase savings.

454 In 1966, two group savings accounts were in operation. People had no project in mind for which these savings were intended, but
621 it was felt to be salutary to have savings because there would be no chance otherwise, as I was told, to reach equal status with Europeans. One of these savings accounts was for the whole village, and this is probably the one opened in 1961, referred to by Rimoldi. In 1966, when these bonds matured, the Seho clan leader brought all the money home in two-dollar bills and handed these to each contributor at a meeting. Most of the contributors handed their money back for later investment. The second savings account was operated by one clan, for the purpose of its own bride price and similar payments; as it was clan money, the facts about it were secret. The village fund contained $158.

474 The only cooperative effort known to me at Inonda was a regular arrangement by which vegetables grown at Inonda were carted to the
439 Embi Hospital and sold there, in 1967. Towards the end of 1966, some vegetables were sold in the same way to the government in Popondetta. In this case, the proceeds were shared between individual growers. The arrangement was the result of contact between the man who had become a government driver and the appropriate authorities. The carrier was an affine.

571 Finally, a notable aspect of social organisation in the post-eruption period is the emergence of leaders whose authority rests on
[554] two sources: status in traditional terms and status conferred by Australian-sponsored organisations. The village constables could
[177] sometimes be so classified, at least superficially. Only on rare instances, however, were they champions of Western values who sought to influence the minds of the people towards acceptance of these values. They did not ask their people to accept Australian organisations as a source of authority (if Weber's definition of this term be accepted)
654 but only to recognise them as an effective source of compulsion. The people of Sivepe, as well as Hohorita werevery much aware that the
571 position of the councillors and committees, successors of the village
623 constables, was very different. The councillor's job was to preach the doctrine of the "new way;" people would tell me how bored they

659 were to hear this message all the time; yet they came to listen and
speakers managed to introduce enough news and good oratory to hold
571 general attention. Furthermore, both in discussion after the speeches
623 and later in private, they agreed with a good deal of it. There was
no compulsion about this; if they were bored or disagreed, they were
apt to slip away, either with an excuse or without one. If they became
really tired of a councillor, they need not re-elect him after his
two-year term was over. The councillors were the first, I was told,
to change the people's thinking. The "committee" were not given to
such oratory; people would never have tolerated it; their job was
a humbler, purely executive one. But their actions were always in
pursuance of the general principles enunciated by councillors; they
were made "legitimate" by what the councillors said. "Committee"
was definitely not the mouthpiece of Australian authority, but of the
council. This was an ambiguous position, as I already pointed out,
because the courts on which the councillor depended as ultimate sanction,
was Australian-controlled. Nonetheless, at the level of face-to-face
relationships, which mattered most, the "committee" had to rely on
his own authority.

Some were not very successful; in Sivepe, the "committee" was at the same time clan-leader and feast-leader; it was therefore very hard indeed to ignore him. In villages where the feast-leader stood aloof from the Council structure, the malcontents could gather round him and defy Council authority until the patrol officer intervened. This is what happened in Garombi, a neighbour-village to Sivepe. Here traditional and modern authority were vested in different persons, whereas in Sivepe both were vested in the same person.

The pattern of religious leadership was much more subtle. First,
797 at Sivepe and Inonda, as in many other places, cooperation with the
mission began long before anyone was baptised or even a catechist.
[871] At Sasembata, the first phase started after the war. The Orokaiva
were glad to have the mission because it provided education for
their children (this was the advantage always cited) and no doubt also
because of some benefits in the form of European goods. In return for
these benefits, the local people helped with land and with labour for
buildings, carrying, etc. The man on whose property the rice was
grown before the eruption was not, and never became a Christian but
[789] died a Pagan in 1963. It was consistent with Orokaiva religious
concepts to ask a deacon to bless the seeds of a European crop--the
Orokaiva do not know the magic appropriate to this crop, whereas the
deacon could be presumed to know.

None of the people now living at Sivepe were baptised before the eruption. After the post-eruption Sasembata station was established a large number of people were soon accepted as catechists and on 6 March, 1963, 1165 people from all parts of the Sasembata district were baptised, including some from Sivepe; there was a second mass baptism in September, 1955, and by this time at least one lineage (or plant emblem group) in Sivepe was wholly Christian. The most senior man in

797 this lineage was the village constable. Though the records are by no means satisfactory, it is clear that between 1955 and 1963, virtually the whole of the Jegase clan became baptised while in 1963--but only then--the majority of the Seho clan became Christian. The time lag between the clans was not insignificant, as the head of the Seho clan, who refused to be baptised, died in 1963, and it was after his death that the new leader, his son, joined the Church, together with his clansmen. It would be wrong, however, to suggest that it was only the death of the old leader which delayed conversion, because the records for the Sasembata district as a whole show 1962 and 1963 as the years that Christianity became the dominant religion in these villages. Before 1963, the pattern seems to have been similar to the present one in Inonda: one clan or faction was baptised, while the [754] other held out. I was told that it was the old men with a reputation for black magic who felt most disinclined to abandon Paganism, as they feared it would harm their powers.

731 I shall delay a general discussion on the Church until a later Chapter and confine myself here to a discussion of the impact on 797 community organisation. Undoubtedly, the eruption accelerated the development of some of the Anglican mission stations. While before 1951, the mission in that district was centralised in Sangara, the new centre was in Popondetta, well away from the populous area around the mountain. The major station still operating in the Mount Lamington area was the one at Waseta. In 1951, major stations were established at Sasembata, Agenahambo and Irihambo, while the Hohorita and Isivita stations which followed later completed the coverage. One impetus to the support given to the Sasembata station by the people was undoubtedly the active programme of the church during the evacuation period, when there were daily church services as well as church participation in the education and health field.

871 One feature that became established during the evacuation period was regular schooling for the young. The extent to which the people 731 recognised this as a momentous change in community life is shown by 797 a ritual introduced about that time and still observed at the present. In 1967, the head teacher announced that school would start on a Thursday but no pupils came. The people told him the children were not [852] "ready." The following Sunday, all the children--and only the children--gathered for a "feast"--a common evening meal at which they were obsequiously served by the adults. This was a feast to farewell them, I was told, for the next day they would go away to the school. The measured distance between the village ground and the school ground was six chains. The children were home every night and every lunch hour. Nonetheless, in a more essential sense they were leaving the village to submit to the influence of strangers.

794 When Sasembata station was reopened in 1951, no community organisation was associated with the church so that the mission teachers had to make contact with villages for any work they wanted done and this was arranged on an ad-hoc basis. Nowadays, there are two forms of

794 organised contact. After each Sunday service, a meeting of the church
council is held at the church, presided over by the pastor, at which
the needs of the parish are discussed. The pastor may also call
[431] meetings during the week. No payment is ever made for work done for
the church, but the pastor has on occasion made a small distribution
of tobacco, at which the people were very pleased. Much of the burden
falls on the member of the church council for each of the villages.
[623] While the after-service meetings at the church are open to all church
members, the council has its own meetings and the member for the village
has an especially close relationship with the church. It is he who
calls together the people in the morning when building work is to be
done, or who makes other announcements, in the usual way by standing
in front of his house in the evening and speaking in the dark, heard
by everyone in the houses.

614 This man belongs to the plant emblem group baptised in the early
1950's, but interestingly enough he did not, like most of the early
613 converts belong to the Jegase clan. Plant emblem groups (or lineages)
794 are not necessarily segments of a clan and in this case the *sasaha*
plant emblem group includes a few Seho people, who were baptised with
the rest of their lineage. It was one of these Seho men who was
chosen as church councillor, the choice being reportedly made by the
[224] pastor himself. Shortly before my arrival in Sivepe, this man was
given the office of hunting expert. Previous to this, every clan had
had its own hunting expert, but now this church council member was the
only one. The task of the hunting expert is the performance of magic
prior to a collective hunt, decision of the time and place and the
privilege of being the first man who enters the bush, together with
his wife, for hunting. "What kind of magic does Dunstan perform?"
I inquired. He invites the pastor down to the village and the pastor
blesses the guns and other appurtenances of the hunt, while the old
magic is no longer performed. In the neighbouring village of Sasembata,
I found that this innovation had not been adopted.

794 In Inonda, all religious organisation was in the hands of the
transport driver and one-time councillor, who played the role of lay-
184 preacher on Sundays, using as a chapel a building originally intended
for the storage of coffee. Church was attended by the Christian half
of the village but I saw no Christian activities apart from the weekly
service. The mission teachers and the Anglican school were located
at Hohota, three miles away from Inonda. Most of the modern organisation
roles noted for Sivepe were, in fact, found at Inonda but every one of
them was allocated to the same man, the transport driver. He acted as
"committee;" he made the kind of speeches that were made in Sivepe by
the councillor and the sanitary inspector (these functionaries very
rarely came to Inonda); he was middleman for the mission; he was
agricultural entrepreneur and his father was the feasting leader,
leaving to him the day-to-day organisation of the feast given in June,
1967. The price for this far-reaching centralisation was a lack of
participation in most of the activities by at least half the population,
whereas participation was far more general at Sivepe.

CHAPTER IV: Contacts with Congeners

Section 1: Kind and Frequency of Contact

731 628 Because of the circumstances of relocation of the Orokaiva, one cannot generally study relationships between persons who were resettled and persons who stayed in their old locations; the old locations were in general restricted areas which remained uninhabited. For a short period, the population of Sivepe was split into one half resettled on their old lands and one half resettled at Awala. If Awala had offered a viable alternative to residence at Sivepe, an interesting interrelation between the two groups might have developed. As it was, the Seho people who stayed with their clansmen at Awala, established gardens at Sivepe and soon preferred to return. Likewise the Sewa people who escaped to Inonda chose the return to their own lands, even though there was no shortage of land at Inonda. While the Seho clan group stayed at Awala, they made frequent visits to Sivepe, but their children went to school at Awala. Once Old Sivepe was built and gardens were established, the Sivepe people made a large feast for Awala, to express gratitude for the hospitality received. (1954)

Section 2: Encouragement of Contacts

731 654 From the first week of evacuation, both government officers and village constables and other community leaders were well aware of the homesickness of the people and their desire to return as often as possible to the villages they had left behind. The camp authorities at Ilimo were only too well aware of the profound shock and despondency of the people and were ready to allow brief expeditions to home villages as long as this could be done without creating fresh conflicts. Hence a policy was developed of permitting return for short visits under supervision of village constables and involving only a limited number of people. Men only were allowed to go home, as the authorities were afraid (not without reason) that if families went back to the villages it would be hard to get them to return to camp out of the restricted areas. In case of further eruptions, the administration of the camps would naturally be blamed. It seems very likely that the initiative for the organising of these expeditions came from the community leaders. Village constables would request permission from Mr. Kaad, mostly because people put pressure on the village constables.

654 After resettlement in Awala and other villages, the government
made no attempt to discourage the resettled people from making contact
731 with other villages, as long as they did not begin to reside within
the area that was still restricted in May, 1951.

Section 3: Morale of the Relocated Community

731 In earlier chapters, I have already drawn attention to the
widespread homesickness of the evacuees and their insistence upon
823 maintaining identification with the homeland. Undoubtedly, separation
from this land compels the Orokaiva to abandon many of his customs and
traditions of the past, because so many of these customs and traditions
[852] arise out of association with the land. To give only one example, a
ceremony thought to be necessary for the survival of a new-born child
is, even now, performed in a family garden. Separation from the family
[794] land makes such a ritual impossible. At Ilimo, traditional rituals
were replaced to some extent by the unaccustomed frequency of Christian
religious services which were always well-attended. This, however, was
at no time accepted as a substitute for the old way of life.

731 Naturally, in the circumstances, people did not feel any pride
or satisfaction in their situation in the evacuation camps. Once they
177 were resettled in new villages on their own land, they felt pride in
the new villages and in the "new way of life" they had adopted. Sivepe
[438] was proud, for instance, of having discarded its pigs. On one occasion
they were bargaining to buy a pig from neighbouring Garombi which still
[628] had its pigs. During the bargaining, a Garombi man taunted Sivepe about
its lack of this kind of treasure. The Sivepe people haughtily called
off the sale. Such pride and interest in innovation was associated
with a sense of security regarding land tenure and Sivepe's status
in relation to other villages. If Sivepe had not felt secure in its
ideology of the "new way," there would have been dismay at Garombi's
taunt about the lack of pigs. But nobody in Sivepe doubted the rightness
of the choice that had been made.

CHAPTER V: Disease

Section 1: The Community as a Carrier of Disease

164 Data on Orokaiva health are sparse due to the absence of medical
research. Some of the picture may be seen from the table of 1966
hospital admissions of St. Margaret's Hospital, Eroro (Table 11).[A]
The figures for serious illness over the whole of the Northern District,
are of course far higher than these figures indicate as only a fraction
of cases of illness come to the notice of the hospital. It is estimated
at 90% of the population is infected with malaria while filiariasis,
gastro-enteritis, influenza, scabies and other skin diseases are also
[146] extremely common. Some rough studies of Orokaiva diet, carried out
under the auspices of Saiho hospital, seem to indicate that mal-
nutrition plays only a minor role as the cause of Orokaiva disease,
and patients admitted to hospital rarely have diseases caused by
[165] malnutrition. Malaria causes many deaths among children, including
one in Sivepe during the time of my stay. People are extremely anxious
[753] about disease, even mild attacks of influenza or of malarial fever.
The cause was always thought to be sorcery.
[754]

Section 2: The Community as the Victim of Unfamiliar Disease

164 No unusual incidence of disease was noticed in the evacuation
camps, except for infections due to bad water supply at Cape Killerton
731 camp which was evacuated after a week. Dr. Gunther noted some spinal
meningitis and paratyphoid as "the result of close living together in
camp." Some old people died, as informants told me, due to grief and
loss of the will to live after the disaster.

Section 3: Community's Perception of New Location as Healthy or Unhealt

753 The inhabitants of Ilimo camp were not particularly concerned
about health dangers in their new location. Ilimo was not far away
731 from their own territory; villages such as Sivepe had had at least
some friendly contact there and their fears were concentrated more on
the safety of some of their kinsmen and the threat to the land and
possessions they had left behind. It was different for the Sangara
and Isivita people who were encamped in the Oro Bay area, in the midst

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[A] [See Cat. 116, p. 216--Analyst]

753 of traditional enemies, in territory which had always been regarded as hostile and dangerous. Keesing furthermore reports that "these
731 mountain people apparently could not conquer a fear of the sea, and this was reinforced by a rumour that a supernatural "tidal wave" was
[821] to occur along the coast. The camp director told how every night the more timid scattered on to the higher ground rather than sleep in the camp on the foreshore."

There is no record that any fears continued after the people were resettled on their own lands. For instance, they ate the products of their land without regard to the fact that they had been scattered by volcanic ash.

164 The abrupt change in diet which occurred in the evacuation camp seems to have had no injurious effects and aroused no great
262 concern. The people liked the rice and meat rations they were given.
731 After awhile they began to long for their own food. Their expeditions to their home villages enabled them to collect at least some taro for themselves.

128 I shall discuss the general health problems of the Orokaiva and government and mission health measure in subsequent chapters.

CHAPTER VI: Government Welfare Efforts

Section 1: Relocation Plans and Their Implementation

657 After the second world war, the Australian government became strongly oriented towards economic development of the indigenous population in its Territories. While before the war, the policy emphasis was perhaps more on the maintenance of law and order and the development of expatriate industry, it is after 1946 that we begin to find the active encouragement on a wide scale of co-operative societies, agricultural extension projects, marketing projects, rural progress societies, and later Native Local Government Councils, as well as other political and economic programmes. Even after 1946, progress was slow and in a recent survey, R. S. Parker suggested that "relative inattention to economic development up to 1960 have left a great leeway to be caught up under insistent pressures of time and external change." (1966: 189)

In 1951, shortly after the first eruption of Mount Lamington, the Hon. Paul Hasluck became Minister for Territories in the Australian Cabinet, and Sir Donald Cleland became Administrator of the Territories. One of the chief concerns of the new administration was to increase the scale, the level of technical competence and the concentration of effort in the departments concerned with indigenous development. (Parker. ibid. 195) The relocation policy in the Northern District is more easily understood if it is remembered that in 1951 a new central administration was eager to make rapid strides in economic and social development while the staff establishment and the "basic craftsmanship of the service" (Hasluck quoted in Parker, 1966) was not yet adjusted to these new objectives.

In considering Australian relocation policy, we must therefore keep in mind that there was a disparity between the more sanguine development objectives and the available resources. Furthermore, there was no real consensus in the administration on the scope that [121] should be given to the development objectives. When I interviewed persons concerned with the events of 1951, everyone told me that the establishment of the camps and the resettlement villages was principally a rescue operation, and that wider development objectives were only [731] incidental. On the other hand, it was possible, from published statements by Belshaw, 1951; Keesing, 1953; Plant n.d.; and interviews with Bishop Hand, Mr. F. Kaad and others, to piece together a quite different attitude to the disaster that must have been current in 1951 among high-level development-minded officials. According to this approach, the disaster offered a unique opportunity to try out some

657 731 ideas concerning socio-economic development. It looked in early 1951 as though the evacuees would not be able to go back to their homes for a long time. The vulcanologist had recommended a large restricted area (see Map II)[A] and was doubtful when (if ever) it would be safe again for human habitation. It looked as though thousands would have to be resettled in altogether new surroundings. Such resettlement could only occur under strict government supervision; in these villages, it looked as though the government might have the opportunity to introduce a new way of life: model village layouts, cash cropping, improved land tenure, better education, health services, everything in fact that developers still aim at today, except that no plans existed for the setting up of new political institutions.

[177] To what extent were the evacuees involved in plans of this kind? Mr. Kaad often spoke to the evacuees of Ilimo about his ideas concerning development. Belshaw's evidence shows that a number of Orokaiva to whom he talked were eager to embrace a new way of life and, especially, that they were anxious to get better educational facilities. He also detects a strong motive for the Orokaiva to agree to any propositions Mr. Kaad put to them: they hoped that thus they would be allowed to leave the evacuation camp earlier than if they argued back (1951: 246). Mr. Kaad himself expressed to me the view that the evacuation camps were too stressful an environment to be propitious for the teaching of development ideas.

During the time when large-scale development was envisaged, at least three persons of authority and scholarly qualifications were asked the Territory administration for their opinions. Belshaw (1951) advocated a general broadly-based socio-economic development programme, in line with modern theory of applied anthropology, but far beyond the resources and administrative skills of the Territory at that time. Keesing (1953) recognised that the resettlement had been "remarkably effective" as a means of reducing "cultural trauma" caused by the eruption. He further commented: "Any attempt by Government and Mission to use the emergency to manipulate such a people and culture arbitrarily in drastically new economic and socio-political directions would seem foredoomed to failure, and would generate unwanted tensions." Plant, an anthropologically trained administration officer, studied some of the practical consequences a wholesale resettlement policy would have. He worked out an elaborate scheme whereby groups would be resettled in villages where there were local groups with the same clan name--a procedure which the thought would be in line with traditional social organisation--but he also showed that resettlement outside the restricted area, as defined in early 1951, would probably lead to land shortages.

Shortly after these three studies were made, an unexpected event changed the situation. The vulcanologist found that the active, paroxysmal stage of volcanic activity of Mount Lamington had ceased after less than two months and hence, a large part of the restricted area could be resettled long before he had earlier been led to expect.

A [See Cat. 116, pp. End Map 2(A)-End Map 2(B)--Analyst]

657 731 In March, 1953, he was able to reduce the restricted area still further, to a circle of two miles' radius around the crater. Thus, all areas that had ever been used for the growing of taro and for village sites, became available to the Orokaiva once more. In these circumstances, it was inevitable that the fertile slopes of Mount Lamington were again occupied in much the same way as before the eruption.

As the first chapter of this report deals adequately with the planning and establishment of the evacuation camps themselves, I shall confine myself in this section to resettlement after the period in the camps. The number of places in which groups were settled between the day of the eruption and the present varies somewhat. The Sivepe people all went to Wairopi for a few weeks, then to Ilimo until end May, 1951, then to Awala, where some stayed briefly, others for a year. Since then the present families all stayed at Sivepe. On the other hand, the present population of Hohorita went to Cape Killerton (one week), Oro Bay (about ten weeks), Popondetta (a short period), Irihambo (almost five years), until they were able to reach their present site. The resettlement history of other villages close to the mountain, such as Kiorota and Bagevaturu was about equally long.

We may generally distinguish two phases of resettlement, following the evacuation camp period. The first phase, occurring around May, 1951, was the transfer of groups from the camps to a number of chosen "resettlement" villages, mostly along the main road from Waseta to Popondetta, but also on sideroads, e.g., Sairope and Kongohambo. This is the phase when an attempt was made to set up model villages of largish size under close government supervision, following discussions at Ilimo when the people concerned had agreed to live together, and to make the innovations. It was no doubt the intention of Mr. Kaad to continue in these villages the educational effort started at Ilimo camp; and this will be discussed in subsequent sections.

The basic problem, however, was to ensure satisfactory garden lands for the resettled groups. The weakness of the locations chosen by the government was that they were mostly placed along one main road and thus within walking distance of only part of the available garden land. As Plant and Keesing foresaw, it was inevitable that the settlements would split up so as to bring people closer to their garden land. It is mainly for this reason that the Sivepe people did not stay at Awala. Furthermore, the resettlement was based on an analysis by Plant according to which a local clan group could be resettled in any village where there was a group with the same clan name. I shall give only one example of this sort of analysis, to show its effect. There are Jegase clan groups in Sivepe, Binduta, Sui (near Awala) and Isivita. Plant therefore suggested that in the resettlement of Isivita, the Jegase clan group could be shifted to Kongohambo and be given the use of land at Sivepe, Binduta or Sui. Some Isivita evacuees therefore [423] went to Kongohambo while others went to Koipa. The Jegase of Isivita were thus made to join groups which were themselves already fairly short of land and, in the case of the Jegase of Sivepe, dependent on

657 maternal relatives. Moreover, the fact that these groups have a clan
731 name in common implies very much less than that they have rights in
each other's land. They have rights to be protected and succoured as
423 brothers in times of war, starvation or other emergencies, but rights
in land cannot be established on that basis.

The government sometimes went to considerable trouble to give
supposedly secure land tenure to those who agreed to stay in the
resettlement villages. I have already stressed that in such cases one
cannot speak of "clan land" being made available to the immigrants,
because all Orokaiva land is owned by individual extended families.
[426] In such cases, individuals lend pieces of land to immigrants who are
allowed to cultivate them on a year-to-year basis. Their usehold
lapses when they leave the community. It goes without saying that
where this land is used by the techniques of shifting agriculture, a
man cannot depend on the land resources of his new village unless he
gets enough land to make about eight gardens in eight successive years.
Plant estimated immigrants' needs at five acres per person and this
is a good deal of land. I know of several cases where land was lent
to people who needed some. The pieces transferred usually measured
at the most one or two acres--enough, to be sure, for subsistence over
a short term but no more. The effect of this is not to make life
in the new village impossible but to hold the immigrant in a position
of dependence on landholders. Understandable, the immigrants make
every effort, after resettlement, to cultivate their own land, even
if it is situated some distance away. Once they begin to do this,
the temptation to build a village near their home gardens is very
strong. According to Orokaiva ideas, the immigrants lose all rights
over land which has been lent to them by their hosts as soon as they
stop residing in the village where the land is. Thus, as soon as
people decide to leave a resettlement village, they lose any rights
in it that their hosts may have given them, if Orokaiva legal principles
are followed.

I shall illustrate these principles in one concrete instance,
the resettlement village of Mumuni, situated between Sasembata and
Waseta, and I shall show how the government attempted to improve the
land tenure position of resettled groups. After the eruption, the
people of Dapari were persuaded to settle in Mumuni, which was intended
[425] as one of the new style resettlement villages. They were given some
land to cultivate and stayed for several years. When the government
[245] began to encourage the planting of coffee trees, the Dapari immigrants
planted coffee gardens at Mumuni. Under Orokaiva law, it is permissible
[426] to plant trees on borrowed land provided the owner consents and the
produce from that tree will then always belong to the planter, even
[422] when the land as such reverts to the owner. One frequently sees a
betelnut palm or a breadfruit tree which is owned by a person who at
one time borrowed the land and which is harvested by the planter and
left undisturbed by the owner of the land.

657 731 423 245 It is a ticklish question whether this rule similarly applies to coffee trees which differ from the traditional kind of trees in two ways: first, in that they occupy the whole of a piece of land and not just a few square feet of it and secondly, in that they are a source of cash income. The government was aware, from the beginning of the coffee scheme, that traditional Orokaiva law might be inadequate to protect coffee growers but balked before the huge task of giving all Orokaiva a legally registered title to their land. If this were to be done according to the principles of Australian law, it would involve expensive surveys, endless litigation and cost many times the value of the land, even if qualified personnel could be found to do the work. The Northern District administration therefore hit upon an ingenious dodge, by which the Higaturu Local Government Council, after summary investigation, issued declarations allotting land to persons who wished to plant cash crops. These declarations, made and witnessed by the clan elders, allotted the land to the grower in perpetuity. (For details see Crocombe and Hogbin, 1963: 89 f.) The practise of issuing these declarations was soon stopped by the authorities in Port Moresby who ruled that they have no legal validity, but Mumuni is one place where they were issued.

657 731 423 578 628 After planting their coffee at Mumuni, the Dapari people began to depend for their subsistence gardens on land they owned in their own natal district, which was an hour or so from Mumuni. All the Dapari people, except for the Jegase clan group of Dapari, went back to their natal district to build a new village; the Jegase clan group was the only one to stay behind at Mumuni. Their position was more favourable, as they owned land near Mumuni; hence they had no reason to go back to Dapari. I met these Jegase people when they visited Sivepe to receive brideprice. They told me then that one Mumuni man had made a large gift of land on which all the Dapari people grew their coffee. The Jegase group was growing coffee there without being disturbed by anyone, nor were they ever asked for payment. On the other hand, the owner wanted his land back from those Dapari people who had left to build their own village. But this group insisted on holding on to their coffee plantation; they stayed at Dapari and had subsistence gardens there, but they returned to Mumuni from time to time to look after their coffee. They claimed they were entitled to do this because they had been registered as owners in the Higaturu Council declarations. Thus a conflict developed, in which Mumuni relied on traditional custom whereas Dapari relied on a (legally invalid) kind of certificate of title. In this quarrel, the government could do little except hope it would blow over.

A New Zealand geographer, Mr. Peter Aitkins, who made a study of this area (unpublished), told me that the Mumuni people had begun harvesting coffee from the Dapari-planted plots. My own investigation showed that nothing was ever stolen from the Jegase clan group (who had not left Mumuni) and that Dapari had offered to sell the coffee stands to the Mumuni owner of the land, and that the owner was prepared

657 to buy, but there was no agreement on the price. Thus the thefts
731 seem to be a stratagem to get Dapari to agree to a lower price.

The first lesson we may draw from this example is that evidently,
423 resettlement villages are liable to be unstable unless the resettled
group has solid land rights close to the village. Thus, the resettle-
[578] ment of a group of Garombi people in Sivepe in 1966 may well be stable
because these people own land within a one-mile radius from Sivepe.
[628] But the resettlement of Dapari people in Mumuni was unstable because
the Dapari land was more than one mile away. In fact, the distance between Mumuni and the Dapari lands could not have been much above two miles, but this is still too far for subsistence gardeners. It is therefore clear why Sivepe people did not agree to stay at Awala after 1951: their land was between two and four miles away from Awala, and this was regarded as an excessive distance. In the light of the events at Mumuni, we would be wrong to regard this attitude as "traditional" and "opposed to modernisation;" it was a shrewd assessment of the drawbacks of resettlement villages.

657 In the first phase of resettlement, the government took a
predominant part. Before evacuees could leave Ilimo, they had to
731 agree to resettlement in one of a number of villages which were to be
developed according to modern principles. The government took pains, however, to work out the details of resettlement in consultation with local Orokaiva leaders. Nonetheless, arrangements such as the sending of the Jegase of Isivita to Kongohambo, in the hope that they would be helped by local Jegase clan groups, were not based on a realistic assessment of the possibilities. This agreement was easy to get as it was seen to be a necessary condition for leaving Ilimo camp. Resettlement plans were thus imperfectly adapted to the traditional relationships between the groups concerned.

621 In the second phase of resettlement, many of the groups allocated
to the scheduled list of resettlement villages branched off to villages
731 of their own. This process started almost at once and continued for
657 more than five years. I have already stated that in Sivepe this phase--
the withdrawal from Awala--took place in the years 1951-1952, while at Hohorita, Bagevaturu, Kiorota, Seva, Dapari it happened a good deal later. In this second phase, the participation of the government was much less active. In Sivepe, a patrol officer made a decision as to the site of the village and the groups to be contained in it but this was only after half the people had already lived in Pamba for some time and a quarrel with neighbouring Kongohambo had broken out, and when the Seho people were returning to the area.

The history of the settlement of Kiorota and Bagevaturu may be traced from a file of the Department of District Administration, Popondetta (12-3-2A). As already mentioned, the Isivita evacuees, numbering 1,869, were "re-established" in the resettlement villages of Kongohambo and Koipa. Soon disputes began to arise owing to the insufficiency of land--villages such as Sivepe could give only limited help in the way of lending gardening lands and marauding pigs were

621 another source of annoyance. Some village groups requested permission
to move from Koipa and this was granted. A report on the file refers
657 to the clearing of new gardens South of Koipa (end 1956), but in
731 May, 1959, we read that these persons who left Koipa had "over the
last 18 months split into two groups one of which settled at Bagevaturu
and the other at Kiorota." The villages had been laid out (according
to "modern" principles, as I myself observed), gardens and garden
houses established, coffee planted. Government supervision over these
movements was much less strict than it had been in 1951, though
strictly the village sites ought to have been approved before the
villages were built.

This second phase of resettlement became possible because the
657 first phase was not accompanied by any renunciation of land rights,
731 or foreclosure of the possibility of return. At no time did the
resettled groups give to anyone else a permission to occupy vacated
423 lands nor accept payment for any of their land or its products. After
245 this second resettlement, however, one substantial land tenure problem
remained. The nature of this problem is the second lesson to be
drawn from the example of Dapari tenure described above. The traditional
Orokaiva land tenure system is not well-adapted to cash cropping.
The Dapari people are likely to lose their coffee plantations as a
result of tenure difficulties. Likewise, Crocombe and Hogbin believe
that the failure of several Inonda families to plant coffee is due to
tenure difficulties. The Inonda families who did plant coffee were
careful not to do so on the extensive land holdings which they inherited
from maternal relatives because they feared claims that might otherwise
[428] be made by maternal kin. The fact is that a large proportion of
Orokaiva land is held on a legal basis much more complex than patrilineal
inheritance. When an Orokaiva holds land he has inherited
from his father, both he and his father having continuously resided
on the land, that man is indisputably the owner and he can grow coffee
or rubber on that land without fear of interference. We have already
seen that no Inonda land is held in this way. In Sivepe, most men
have some land of which they are indisputably the owners, but at the
same time most of them also have useholds over many pieces owned by
maternal kin or affines or absent agnates. They are "looking after"
this land, and the true owners never trouble them as they either have
their own usehold lands in the villages where they live or are working
in towns or on plantations.

These circumstances change as soon as cash-producing trees begin to be grown. It is then that claims begin to be asserted and Orokaiva customary law has no way of dealing with such claims. The owner is certainly entitled to a share of the proceeds, and the size of that share is dangerously indefinite.

Inquiry in Sivepe showed that the people were well aware of the danger. All but two coffee growers had planted on land inherited from their fathers, preferring to use their other lands for subsistence crops. One of these two exceptions was the Seho clan chief who had

657 planted coffee on his mother's brother's land. He explained to me
731 that this mother's brother was dead and nobody except himself had
any claims on the land. The second man, who had planted on his wife's
423 land, was not so fortunate. His wife's relatives live in Sivepe and
245 lost no time asking for the return of "their" land as soon as the
coffee was harvestable. He settled for a compromise: he planted
coffee on some of his other land and promised his affines they could
have their land back as soon as his new trees began to bear. As far
as I could discover, this was agreed to.

423 It has been argued by several students, especially Crocombe and Hogbin, that title improvement is a necessary requirement for the success of cash cropping in the Northern District. My own findings suggest that the importance of title improvement varies a good deal between villages. Where, as in Sivepe, a fair amount of land is held under an undisputed title, no great gain in productivity can be expected from the formal registration of these good titles. In other places, such as Inonda, it is of course essential.

Crocombe and Hogbin (1963: 89-93) have described some early attempts to register Orokaiva titles under some scheme administered by the Higaturu Local Government Council; after describing several rules passed by the council for this purpose, each of which was in operation for a short period and then rejected by Port Moresby officials, the authors conclude: "Registration is of doubtful validity, but to the extent that the Orokaiva accept it as binding (and they appear to do so unreservedly at present) it functions in practice." The example I have given of the dispute at Mumuni shows clearly the disadvantage of all such informal registration procedures. If the Dapari people were to lay an information with the police that Mumuni is stealing their coffee, could any judicial officer convict any person from Mumuni of theft and send him to prison? I cannot imagine that Crocombe and Hogbin would applaud such action.

The government made a fresh approach to the problems of indigenous
657 land tenure with the passing of the Land Titles Commission Ordinance
423 1962, the Land (Tenure Conversion) Ordinance 1964, and their amendments.
Under these provisions a Land Titles Commissioner has been appointed at Popondetta whose task it is to determine the land titles in specifically designated "adjudication areas." The Commission prepares an adjudication record showing what land in the adjudication area is native land and the ownership of each piece of that land. A native may then apply for registration in his name of any native land included in the record by agreement, but no titles can be reigstered in a piece of land which is less in either area of frontage than the standard prescribed for the purpose for which the land is likely to be used. In practice, this has meant that every individual holding registered by the Commission should have a minimum area of 20 acres.

The operation of this system, and its difficulties, may be instanced from my observation of an attempt to apply it in Hohorita in 1966. Hohorita is a resettlement village harbouring some 12 clans;

657 it has a substantial area of land but holdings are very fragmented. As this village is very interested in growing coffee, its leader 423 suggested in 1962 that all Hohorita land should be consolidated and partitioned among the owners and titles registered. (Crocombe and Hogbin, 1963: 93) When I visited the community in 1966, an officer of the Land Titles Commission was busy measuring the ring boundaries. He found that the Hohorita people owned a total of 2,240 acres of land, enough for 112 unit holdings. I was impressed with the ease with which the people could be induced to accept the scheme in spite of its far-reaching repercussions. If the scheme was accepted, all boundaries would be redefined by the commission; people would often need to exchange their ancestral blocks with others in accordance with the map prepared by the commission. Moreover, the usual pattern of shifting cultivation would need to be carried on within the boundaries of the single 20-acre block which, in addition, would need to accommodate cash crops. The fluidity of traditional land transactions, the opportunity to revive old claims and residual and reversionary rights would be past, as the registration abolished them all, including the rights to planted trees. All this was explained but did not deter the people.

The scheme was killed in spite of its popular support, because it was soon bruited abroad that Hohorita was to be cut up. I witnessed myself that letters were written to men who had been living away from Hohorita for years and were never likely to return. These letters, written by relatives, warned the men to come to Hohorita to assert their rights. It had initially seemed that 112 holdings was quite adequate, in fact ample, for Hohorita's population, but as all the absentees came swarming to the Commission, a total of 126 men had been able to assert their rights successfully. In none of the Ordinances was residence specified as a necessary qualification for participation in a consolidation scheme; hence the Hohorita scheme had to be dropped and hopes dimmed that major schemes could ever be completed on a significant scale.

In 1967, a remedy to this problem was devised. According to this scheme, each ward of the Higaturu Local Government Council district was formed into an "adjudication area." The people were asked to determine the boundaries of their wards; as I have already described, the lower Sasembata ward did so with alacrity. The effect of this operation was that no person resident outside the ward would henceforth have rights to land inside it. Residence could easily be determined from the village census lists. These lists did not wholly represent actual residence, but a non-resident would be obliged to be present at every village census until he transferred himself to another village list. The main point was that every person can be on only one census list and thus have land rights in only one ward. The establishment of the boundaries would probably daunt any surveyor as numerous men have rights in the land of other wards, but I found that the work was swiftly done by the Orokaiva by the expedient of effecting some exchanges along the boundary line so that, for instance, Soroputa and Kongohambo

657 423 retained as much land as they had before, after the boundary was cut. They had received some Sivepe land and they had lost an approximately equal amount of their own.

Thus, the lower Sasembata ward is now declared an adjudication area of which the owners are about 600 people listed in the census records. Between them, these 600 people are now the undisputed owners of perhaps 2,400 acres of gardening land. The government would now like to see this area subdivided into some 120 economic holdings registered in the name of a single owner, but this is recognised as being extremely difficult. In one respect, however, this latest government approach is vastly superior to the previous ones. In treating residence as the basis of Orokaiva land rights, the new policy comes much closer to Orokaiva conceptions than earlier schemes which treated the patrilineal clan as the basic unit. The choice of the ward (rather than the village) as the adjudication area was fortunate in that it was much less disruptive of residual rights held by agnatic and at times affinal kin residing in nearby villages. On the other hand, the assumption that the ward territory can be profitably subdivided into 20-acre family holdings may not conform with Orokaiva expectations and conceptions. The administration is in danger, in this respect, [591] of being misled by its own ideological bias. The enthusiasm people felt about the establishment of ward boundaries was based on the hope that thus the people of the constituent villages could form a big "company," as cooperating group which would function as a cooperative. I have already mentioned the paradox that the Orokaiva is an individualist but at the same time has a deep belief in the power that can be gained from corporate action. Ward producers' cooperatives, if they can be organised, may provide an excellent incentive to productivity while at the same time enabling some mechanisation to be introduced, both in transport and cultivation. The model I have in mind here is that of the incorporations established among the New Zealand Maori in the Native Land Act 1909, and developed since until their annual income today is in the range of several million dollars, earned largely by sizeable units often with an ownership running into several hundreds. (See Hunn, 1961; Schwimmer, 1968: 26-28.)

[731] The problem of adapting Orokaiva land tenure to conditions of a cash economy, though not yet solved, has some promise of being successfully tackled. If all Orokaiva land were held under secure tenure, many new areas would undoubtedly be planted in coffee and other crops. The resettlement programme following the eruption of Mount Lamington has not, as I have shown, contributed anything to the establishment of persons on secure land holdings but the present policy of consolidation, perhaps followed by partitioning into economic family lots, is more likely to achieve this objective.

Section 2: Economic Assistance

177 **Subsistence:** Undoubtedly, European contact had a profound influence
on the subsistence economy, both through the introduction of steel
433 tools and of the pax Australiana. The government did not, however,
intervene directly in the operation of the Orokaiva subsistence
economy; it was a very simple economy, but it provided, in general,
adequate nutrition and housing. The first time the Orokaiva subsistence
731 economy broke down seriously in the post-contact period was immediately
657 after the eruption of Mount Lamington. The government therefore decided
to offer some limited assistance towards the re-establishment of the
subsistence economy in the resettlement villages built when the
refugees left the evacuation camps. One requirement of the new villages
was a food supply until new gardens had been made and harvested. This
[241] requirement was met by the planting of a quick-growing variety of sweet
potato in villages in the vicinity of Ilimo camp. The government also
bought up any root crops the Orokaiva could supply and distributed
these in the resettlement villages throughout 1951, as needed.

The opportunity offered by the evacuation camps was also taken
731 to introduce a few innovations which, it was thought, would improve
242 subsistence gardening in the resettlement villages. People were taught
the cultivation of the variety of sweet potatoes mentioned above, as
well as of corn, tomatoes and beans. Seeds and plants were supplied.
An agricultural officer demonstrated on a large scale the growing of
[412] sweet potatoes and peanuts. In order to facilitate the rapid establishment
of gardens--which the government hoped would be bigger and better
than the pre-eruption ones--small spades were distributed to villages.
These small spades were not a familiar implement to the Orokaiva, but
the agricultural officers thought they would be more efficient than
the wooden implements and large shovels hitherto used in villages.
These small spades cannot have taken on very well; I saw none in Sivepe
or Inonda. I myself had brought a spade for the garden I established
in Sivepe, but my neighbour, upon seeing it, at once supplied me with a
grubber (ex-American army stock). A very brief acquaintance with the
root structure of the garden weeds convinced me that a spade was indeed
[227] of limited utility. Finally, in order to add to the supply of protein
in the resettlement villages, the camp superintendent distributed some
snorkels for catching fish.

Keesing reports there were fears in the camp that the eruption
731 would have destroyed taro seed stock, but this fear proved unfounded.
134 The taro plants remained perfectly healthy and the volcanic ash made
the soil amazingly fertile for awhile, so that food shortages were
quickly relieved.

Issue of Food: In the camps, rice, tinned meat, tobacco were distributed
731 according to a ration scheme based on the census figures. Each village
657 constable was issued with rations for the number of people resident in
the villages under his control. These distributions were continued in

731 the resettlement villages as needed, but soon replaced by issues of
657 the sweet potatoes and later, village-grown crops. Distributions
tapered off after May, 1951, and ceased at the end of that year.

Commercial Enterprises: Agricultural activities are the only kind of enterprise which are encouraged or assisted by government. These activities are mostly conducted by individual entrepreneurs. No rewards are never given for land clearing, nor are any labour costs ever paid. The government assists by providing coffee, rubber and cocoa seeds to growers. Initially these were free; nowadays, growers are charged the cost of seed.

Although there is provision in the Territory for credit assistance
452 for economic development, small growers of cash crops such as are
657 found in Sivepe and Inonda are not eligible for this credit. A short
time before I left, one man from Inonda (again the government driver)
was encouraged to apply for a loan under a new experimental scheme
for beef cattle farming, but the arrangements were not complete when
I left.

The government provides marketing assistance to New Guinea
245 growers of coffee (mainly indigenous) by a remission of duty on raw
652 coffee imported into Australia from sources other than Papua and New
Guinea to each importer who obtains a certain percentage of his total
requirements from the Territory. The government does not itself
245 purchasecoffee but when the Higaturu Local Government Council was
474 formed one of its initial functions was to operate a cooperative for
the purchase, processing and exporting of locally grown coffee. Later
[651] (in 1962), the Council withdrew from this activity and an independent
Orokaiva Coffee Growers Society was formed. The reason for the Council's
withdrawal was advice from the government which felt uneasy about local
bodies engaging in commerical activities. The effect of the setting
up of the cooperative has been that service is now no longer given to
all growers but to all who have bought shares as an entrance fee and
become members of the cooperative. This fee was initially $4 but is
constantly rising until in 1966 it reached $20. Some non-members sold
[439] their coffee to the Chinese for a lower price; others sold through
kinsmen who were members, and did not always receive the full proceeds.
The government keeps an eye on the operations of the cooperative; in
any case, it seemed well enough conducted. Until end 1966, the cooperat
depended on the government for transport: the buyer who visited villag
each month to collect and pay for the coffee travelled on a government
truck. It is now buying trucks of its own. The nearest pick-up
point for Sivepe coffee was Garombi, one mile away; the nearest pick-up
point for Inonda coffee was likewise one mile away, at Ajoro.

The government also assists agriculture through its research
654 activities conducted in various experimental stations in the Territory
242 which specialise in rubber, coffee and other relevant crops. A
resources survey has been made of large parts of the Northern District,
including the Oro-Bay--Kumusi River region with which we are concerned
here. A programme for the improvement of Robusta coffee is on the way,

654 and local field trials are being carried out on the volcanic soils
of the Northern District.
242 Agricultural extension work was being carried on by Australian
officers stationed in Popondetta, with the help of Papuan agricultural
242 assistants some of whom were stationed in a sub-office in Saiho. It
is this staff which has been responsible for the gradual increase in
coffee plantings and the spreading of basic knowledge about coffee
cultivation. We should not, however, minimise the extent of knowledge
and stimulus that spread not through the activities of officials but
was passed on from experienced Orokaiva growers to beginners. Furthermore,
many persons trained as agricultural assistants have returned to their
villages and became a fund of knowledge to those around them. The
assistants are trained in a course of between nine and twelve
[874] months' duration, given at Popondetta. Papuans may also receive a full
agricultural diploma course at a school near Keravat, New Britain, or
a two-year sub-diploma course at a school near Keravat, New Britain,
or a two-year sub-diploma certificate course given at Popondetta.
Graduates from these schools were not yet working in the Northern
District at the time of my visit.

No stabilisation fund for coffee exists in the Territory. The
435 violent fluctuations in price for this product do have a somewhat
unsettling effect on growers, though I could not observe very much of
245 this as 1966-67 was a good year. I heard that in bad years in the near
past people had been very disappointed. The problem of price fluctuations affects other tropical crops as well, and New Guinea has few
sources of income which are significantly stabler than coffee. Therefore,
no easy solution to this problem is possible. The Orokaiva Coffee
Growers Society has been following a wise policy of withholding a
substantial part of the proceeds in good years for capital improvement,
thus providing a kind of cushion against fluctuations. Thus, in
1966-67, a substantial proportion of proceeds was withheld for improvements to the factory and trucks. Growers are paid an initial sum
per pound substantially lower than the expected total proceeds, and
the balance is in part distributed to shareholders at the end of the
season, in part withheld. By this procedure, a substantial drop in
export prices can be suffered without corresponding lowering of the
initial cash payment. In 1966, the cash payment was $26 for a 150-pound sack.

A good deal of development work has been left for the Higaturu
657 Council to deal with. I have already mentioned that government officers
423 attempted to have the council deal with matters of land tenure improvement (though Port Moresby authorities overruled this) and that the
coffee factory was planned as a council operation though again plans
were changed later. In 1966, the main activities of the council were
653 in the building of roads, the improvement of water supplies, the building
of medical aid posts, the maintaining of the produce markets at
Popondetta and Saiho and some minor social services. (For details,
see Table 12.)[A] Thus, a sizeable area of local development had become

[A] [See Cat. 116, p. 217--Analyst]

653 a council responsibility. While the rebuilding of the arterial road
from Popondetta and Kokoda was an expensive (and seemingly interminable)
[491] responsibility of the government, the side roads became the council's
responsibility. Similarly, the government built the major hospitals
while the council looked after the village aid posts.

652 The council's revenue mainly came from taxes--a head tax of
$8 for men and $1 for women. This is the only personal tax directly
levied among Orokaiva village people and has replaced the government
[687] head tax. Its collection was not a government but a council responsibility,
although defaulters could, of course, be brought before a
magistrate and sentenced to a term in a government jail. Councillors
explained to the villagers that the taxes they paid went to pay for
their roads, aid posts, water supplies, etc. The government hoped
that villagers would be more ready to pay their taxes if they could
see tangible local benefits to justify them. One effect of the system
was that villagers became very interested to see that as much as
possible of the tax money should be spent in their own locality. They
rapidly developed a strong propensity for parish-pump politics. When
I visited Sasembata district first, there was little evidence of any
council projects in the Sasembata wards. People objected to paying
[664] their taxes: they were not getting anything for them. Pressure
resulted in roading improvements and plans for a comprehensive water
supply for the area. Councillors who did not fight successfully for
such causes were liable to miss re-election.

The head tax manifestly acted as a significant economic incentive.
[461] A man who grew no coffee and earned no money could not pay his tax.
Even if a man could not be bothered harvesting all his coffee, he
would certainly harvest enough to pay his tax. Some men who had no
coffee took plantation jobs a month or two before the tax was due. I
noticed this in two cases at Inonda; most of the Sivepe men had coffee
gardens and did not need to work outside. For the first time, tax
[687] defaulters in 1966 were actually jailed for two months. In one village,
Kendata, there were as many as 50 defaulters who fought the police
and ran into the bush; in Sivepe there were four, all without coffee
gardens.

In spite of this tension, people generally supported the ideology
177 of the council: they wanted the "new age" and they wanted the kind
623 of services that were supplied by the council. At the same time it
was never forgotten that behind the tax-gathering councillors stood
the government police, armed and ready to make arrests if the councillors
were resisted or attached, as sometimes happened. Those who did not
pay and tried to escape arrests were judged by the conformists to be
ignorant men, unwisely looking for trouble. On the other hand, people
deeply sympathised with them. People wanted the "new age," but they
did not like the element of compulsion that went with it. They re-elected
the councillors who compelled them because they held the
Australian authorities, not the councillors, to be directly responsible.

Section 5: Social Services: Health Assistance

657 Social services were provided partly by the government, partly
by the council and partly by the mission. The services provided by
the different organisations were so tightly interlinked and so system-
atically complemented one another that it will be convenient to present,
in the present chapter, the overall system that was operating. This
system was a product of government planning, while council and mission
made specific contributions in their special areas of competence. In
the next chapter, I shall look at these services again, from the
viewpoint of general mission objectives.

In this interlocking of services, it was the government which
657 met the bulk of the expenditure, as Table 13 clearly shows.[A] On the
743 other hand, over Papua as a whole 60% of the hospitals were conducted
by the missions and over one quarter of the aid posts. In the year
1964-1965, in the Northern District, the three administration hospitals
had 3,671 admissions and 13,176 out-patients while the corresponding
number for mission institutions was 3,286 admissions, 255,460 out-
patients. It is therefore clear that the mission contribution to
health services in the Territory is, in terms of patients treated, far
greater than its budgetary contribution (2% of total expenditure on
public health) would suggest. This disproportion is only slightly
lessened if we consider the value of grants-in-aid and drugs supplied
by the government to mission hospitals. Clearly, it costs a great
deal less to treat a patient in a mission than in a government hospital.

The Saiho Hospital, which served all Orokaiva territory, was
743 a sprawling settlement of a great many buildings, almost all made of
native materials. Only one building, as far as I remember, was in
[344] Australian style, with weatherboard walls; this contained the doctor's
office, some other administrative offices, and was used for the few
non-Papuan out-patients who occasionally called. The wards were all
built of bush materials. Although the statistics show 2,500 admissions
and 5,000 out-patients per year, there was only one physician at the
hospital who at the same time functioned as superintendent and had a
heavy administrative burden. He had a small expatriate administrative
staff, and a few expatriate nurses. In the beginning of 1967, a second
physician, a Papuan woman, joined the staff. The superintendent was
also in charge of the training of aid post orderlies. Increasingly,
Papuan nurses, trained in a three-year course at Port Moresby, are
being used. A substantial number of hospital orderlies are employed.

It is not the policy of the hospital to offer ambulance services,
758 so that the village people are expected to make stretchers out of bush
743 materials and carry in their sick. In practise, hospital and
administration vehicles will frequently carry sick people to hospital
and I have never actually seen the stretchers made. People would
certainly know how to do it. Upon arrival, the sick person is inter-
viewed by a hospital orderly; usually he is accompanied by a number of

A [See Cat. 116, p. 218--Analyst]

758 743 relatives who answer questions if he is too sick. The orderly speaks the Orokaiva language; the interview gives most of the information an examining physician would require, so that the language barrier between the patient and the Australian physician poses no essential problem. Orderlies can, in any case, act as interpreters. This interview is conducted without much delay and the physician is usually able to see patients fairly promptly. The relatives meanwhile stay around to hear the news; sometimes they leave the patient and go back to their village, but often they stay around the hospital as long as the patient is there.

The hospital does not normally supply patients' food. This simplifies the operation; the patients' diet will in any case consist almost solely of taro. There is usually a relative around Saiho who will cook and take food to a patient. While this may seem an unduly casual procedure, it is valuable in relieving the tension of the patient as well as the relatives. If the complaint diagnosed by the physician requires major surgery or the attention of a specialist, the patient is flown to Port Moresby at government expense. I have seen this done several times and always rather promptly. The Port Moresby hospital is a modern well-equipped institution. Admission to hospital is free to Papuans.

A minor racial upset resulted from the circumstance that the medical officer in charge of the Northern District was a Papuan whereas the superintendent of the hospital was an Australian. It arose because the expatriates, objecting to being treated by a Papuan physician, insisted upon being attended by the superintendent. The latter, placing professional esprit de corps above expatriate solidarity, would not allow the medical officer to be bypassed much to the chagrin of the planters (the public servants and missionaries did not seem to be too troubled). In an earlier chapter, I have commented on the unusually good relations between the superintendent and the Papuans.

Though Sivepe depended on the Saiho hospital for serious illness, minor accidents, malaria, dysentery, various other stomach ailments, skin troubles, etc. were treated at the small mission hospital in Sasembata. This hospital was lucky to have a competent assistant medical officer in charge in 1966. In earlier days, just after the eruption, the hospital was conducted by an Australian nurse and it was only since 1965 that Papuan assistant medical officers began to graduate and to be available for work in places such as Sasembata. I have already mentioned that the people were genuinely pleased at the improvement in service and expressed their pleasure by building a new hospital. This was constructed out of bush materials, contained about 12 beds also made of bush materials, and was equipped with a small selection of basic drugs supplied by Saiho hospital.

Whereas Saiho hospital was conducted by the government, Sasembata hospital was a mission responsibility. The Sasembata staff was paid at mission rates, far lower than the government rates. For instance, the assistant medical officer received $11 per month, whereas the

756 government scale in 1965 was $1000-$1800, per annum. The orderlies
assisting the AMD received $1 per month. This did not necessarily
743 mean that the AMD lacked the qualifications to get a government job;
he could easily have obtained one.

Every day some dozens of people would present themselves with
minor and sometimes major ailments. They would be bandaged, given
a pill or some other simple treatment. Very sick cases were referred
to the hospital; most days, a car would come to the mission station
and the AMD could get transport for his patients. The beds were
occupied for the more serious cases who could not well go home but
who did not need the more specialised treatment of Saiho. The nursing
aid never stayed in the hospital overnight but one or two relatives
of the patient usually did; if the patient's condition deteriorated,
the AMD could always be called over as he lived on the mission station.
(See Map XI.)^A

Inonda was served by one of the medical aid posts which are
743 being built all over the district. This was at Hohota, next to the
mission school. Such aid posts are built of milled timber and paid
[344] for by the Ngaturu Council; the government may subsidise these posts.
The salary of the aid post orderlies, who work on a part time basis,
is paid by the Council also, but in 1966, the government paid a 50%
subsidy on these. Most of the large resettlement villages (Hohorita,
Koipa, Kiorota, etc.) had them, or were getting them, three posts
being added in the year 1966. The smaller villages had to share aid
posts; thus, there were no plans to build one at Inonda, and people
were expected to walk the three miles to Hohota for treatment.

The standard of aid was not always as high at these posts as
758 it was in Sasembata. Hohorita had much trouble replacing an orderly
who had left. Inonda found it difficult to get service; on one occasion
743 when we went to the aid post, we heard, upon arrival that the orderly
had just gone to town for the day. On another occasion, he was in
his house; he had been hunting, was tired and would not see anybody.
This would have been a rare occurrence indeed at Sasembata. The
orderlies regarded themselves as part-time employees who chose their
own working hours. This would have been reasonable (for average cases)
were it not for the distance between Inonda and Hohota. How often will
a man walk six miles to collect a single malaria pill? A more serious
problem is that the orderlies are not nearly as well trained as the
AMD; hence, they can hardly be expected to carry out diagnosis.

People were greatly taken with the medical services available;
755 they were not a replacement but an addition to traditional magical
practises. When my interpreter was sick he was very pleased to
swallow the pills I gave him, but his house was full nonetheless with
numerous herbs collected for his complaint and these were being boiled
in a pot or otherwise ingested simultaneously with my medicine. The
Orokaiva view is that medicine, given for the purpose of curing, will
be effective if it is stronger than the sorcerer causing the illness.
It has been noticed that this is sometimes the case with Western

A [See Cat. 116, p. End Map 10--Analyst]

755 medicine, though by no means always. Bandages were especially popular;
they were worn as status symbols and as dancing ornaments. Nurses and
752 physicians are regarded with affection; any person who obviously wants
to be helpful would be treated thus, and it has of course been noticed
554 that they relieve a great deal of discomfort even though Western
theories of the causation of disease are treated sceptically and mostly
753 explained away because the nurses and physicians usually do not understand the fine points of sorcery; only the Orokaiva have this knowledge.

Data on the eruption period do not suggest that the attitude
731 to medicine was different then to what it is today. There were,
743 however, fewer facilities: the hospitals were smaller, there was
less available transport to reach them with, the chain of aid posts
built by the Higaturu Council did not yet exist, so that outside the
government hospital, the only facilities were the mission stations.

The evacuation camps provided a good opportunity to put a
744 public health programme into operation, and this opportunity was taken.
No regular anti-malarial preventive treatment was given because this
clearly could not have been continued after the camps were closed--
and it was feared that anti-malarials might lower natural resistance.
On the other hand, everyone at Ilimo was given prophylactic treatment
against hookworm. Unfortunately, this medicine had the effect of
"making people feel a little drunk." One man, the sole male survivor
of a large family killed during the eruption, went berserk through the
medicine and caused a near riot. Mr. Kand then abandoned his campaign
against hookworm at Ilimo, reviving it later, in the Saiho period.
Prophylactic treatment against hookworm has not been continued because
reinfection constantly occurs. The camps provided a practical object
lesson on the Western ideas of treating waste matters, sanitation and
water supplies, a lesson which no doubt bore fruit some years later,
when the Higaturu Council had money and an ideological base for bringing
about such innovations. Finally, the introduction of sweet potatoes
[242] at Ilimo, by means of distribution of sample tubers and seeds and the
[146] teaching of methods of cultivation, had a definite public health
objective: it was done because the yellow and red varieties of sweet
potato are particularly rich in vitamins in which Orokaiva diet is
supposed to be often deficient. Today, some of this sweet potato is
grown in Sivepe, though on a small scale, while plantings in Inonda
are somewhat more extensive. (The sweet potatoes resist drought better
than taro.)

The most active public health programmes I saw in 1966-67
were directed at: malaria control, infant health, village hygiene.
The key figure in public health improvement at Sivepe was the health
inspector employed by the Higaturu Coincil. This man was expected to
cover the whole of the Council area, and spent much of his time
touring villages. As his home was at Garombi and he had many relatives
in Sivepe, he made frequent visits. Sivepe caused him little trouble,
he told me, as waste matter was thrown into deep holes, everyone had
a lavatory and the place was kept clean in the prescribed way. On

744 one occasion he did complain about weeds growing in one part of the village; he was also involved in a complaint against two men who were living in condemned houses. The first time I saw him in the village he gave an illustrated lecture on the causes of malaria and methods of malaria control. This was received in much the same spirit as any other metaphysical speculations, which people are not yet ready to share.

There is in progress in the Territory a malaria eradication campaign, for which numerous Papuan technicians have been trained and which involves, i.e., the indoors spraying of villages with DDT. While I did not see any such teams in action, I did notice that anti-malarial injections were standard treatment at the infant health clinic that was held close to Sivepe once a month. Attendance at these clinics was general for all mothers with children of pre-school age. Apart from anti-malarial injections, the nurses offered treatment for sores and other minor ailments; they weighed babies and they took seriously ill young children with them to the hospital. While it was easy to induce mothers to come, it was harder to gain acceptance for Western ideas when these conflicted with Orokaiva ones. This applied especially to child nutrition.

[853] The health authorities had successfully campaigned against the Orokaiva custom of premasticating food given to babies; mothers had stopped doing this, as it was considered uncivilised. On the other hand, nobody obeyed the instruction to mash taro before it was given
[824] to babies. The mashing of taro offended the spirit of the taro; it was considered out of the question. An alternative suggestion was to give babies pawpaw, considered by nutritionists to be an excellent
[262] baby food. But this food was also avoided by Orokaiva, as it was thought to cause scabies. The result was that Orokaiva babies tended to go through a period of critical malnutrition after weaning and before solid taro can be digested. Our own suggestion to Orokaiva mothers--to go back to premastication--was naturally considered to be no more than a bad joke.

Section 4: Social Services: Education

871 The education system, like the public health system consists of a government sector which is responsible for the bulk of education
797 expenditure and a mission sector which is responsible for the majority of children. In 1965, the mission educated some 65% of the primary school pupils of Papua and over 60% of all pupils. Mission expenditure from its own funds was given in the Territory of Papua Report (1966: 99) as 8.6% of total expenditure on education. In the Northern District, there were four administration primary schools for Papuans (2,403 pupils in 1967) and 54 mission primary schools (8,547 pupils in 1967). The breakdown (see Table 14)[A] shows that schooling generally continues

A [See Cat. 116, p. 219--Analyst]

871 until the end of Standard 4, but that schooling beyond that level
is taken by a far smaller number. A great many mission schools teach
777 only up to Standard 4, so that those who wish to proceed further have
to attend a boarding establishment.

Sivepe was fortunate in that the nearby Sasembata mission
872 school conducted classes to the end of Standard 6. This was a compara-
877 tively recent development; when the school was reopened after the
eruption, it still went no further than Standard 4. Most pupils will
stay at the local school for the full programme, but some who fail
the examinations at the end of Standard 5 drop out. Sasembata School
has boarding facilities for students from other mission schools who
have to leave home to get education after Standard 4. These are
accommodated in dormitories built of bush materials on the mission
station.

Inonda was less favourably placed. A school opened at Sivepe
872 in 1952 by a Seva mission teacher displaced by the eruption, was closed
down in 1959. Today, the nearest school, at Hohota, three miles away,
teaches only up to Standard 2. Anyone proceeding beyond that level
had to board at Popondetta for further schooling. In 1967, there was
one Inonda boy receiving education in Standard 4 at the Popondetta
primary school. There were no children at Inonda who had left school
at Standard 2 and were hanging about at home; it will be interesting
to know how many of the seven children at present in Standard 2 will
go to Popondetta next year.

Post-primary schooling is available at four institutions in the
873 Northern District (two government, two mission) with a total attendance
of 719, but neither Sivepe nor Inonda had students there in 1966-67.
At levels above Standard 4, the education system tends to become
increasingly selective, with tough examinations to reduce the number
of those who take up boarding places at secondary school facilities.
External examinations are set for students completing Form II (i.e.,
Standard 9), Form III and Form IV. For the most successful, university
and other advanced training is available; those who have completed
[874] Standard 7 or higher can enter teacher training schools. Two of the
post-primary schools in the Northern District are technical schools
which train apprentices. Training for nurses is not yet available in
the district, except with the mission, which issues no diplomas.

Education in most of the Northern District is not yet compulsory,
871 even though legislation exists to enable the government to declare
school attendance compulsory in specified areas. Popondetta has been
declared an area of compulsory education. It is true, as the government
claims, that even where schooling is voluntary, virtually all children
enroll and attend from the age of five. The length of attendance
depends on the type of education available in various areas; thus, it
would generally be longer in Sivepe than in Inonda.

The curriculum, both in the government and mission schools, is very highly standardised and mission education is of necessity dominated by the need to prepare students for government examinations.

871 According to the Papua Report, "The core of the curriculum is training in the basic skills of communication and mathematics." (1966: 100) Of these two subject areas, mathematics is taught by a syllabus which will probably be widely applauded by educationalists. Australia has for some years made important research contributions to mathematical education. One of the most outstanding of Australian educators, Dr. Z. P. Dienes, was invited in 1964 to prepare a mathematics syllabus for Territory schools, introducing the "new mathematics approach." In 1966, this syllabus became officially accepted and the basis of the government examinations. Short courses for practising teachers were held, in the Northern District, during the summer holidays of 1966-67. [895] The Australian mission teacher in charge of Sasembata school also went and came back with a tale which will not surprise connoisseurs of the "new mathematics": he found that the Papuan teachers grasped the principles more quickly than those, like himself, who had been well educated in "traditional" mathematics.

871 191 In the language field, the Australians have taken the fateful decision to make English the language of instruction in schools and the "universal language in the Territory." This is not the place to discuss this strange decision to which S. A. Wurm has recently devoted a clear and authoritative critique which seems to me unanswerable. (1966: 135-148) The key sentence of this critique is that the English language "constitutes a reference system to a culture whose very essence is completely alient to the natives, and it abounds in concepts they cannot even begin to understand on first being confronted by them." The textbooks used in the primary school attempt to overcome this difficulty by an emphasis on formal English, using the structural method, and devoting much attention to the memorising and to some extent the manipulation and transformation of pattern sentences. There is heavy reliance on memory work and very much less reliance on conversational English and creative expression. The teachers explained to me that this bias was inevitable in view of examination pressures. It was amazing, nonetheless, to hear Standard 6 students learning very simple pattern sentences by rote by the whole class saying 20 times or more in unison: "We are going to Paris" (wherever that is). I am not critical at all of the teachers at the Sasembata school, who achieved an impressively high percentage of passes (far above the average) in the government examinations. It is not difficult to understand, however, that these students could not communicate anything very useful in English to, for instance, myself and my wife. The system is, of necessity, a great waste of the children's intelligence. The small minority who later go to Port Moresby or enter European employment will find their knowledge of English useful but the great majority, who need to be equipped for a life in Sivepe and surrounding villages, do not benefit so much from the content of their lessons as from literacy (in their own vernacular), from their experience of the school situation, its relationships and values, and many incidental observations of white customs and attitudes which are most influential acculturative

191 experiences. The problem remains how ideas bearing on social and
economic development can be systematically communicated. When I
[871] asked Orokaiva people what language they thought ought to be made
official after independence is granted, English was hardly ever
suggested. Some said Motu, others Pidgin. I was impressed, however,
with the meticulous care the Orokaiva bestow upon their own vernacular.
212 Most of my informants could help me to get Orokaiva texts spelled
correctly (and their advice hardly ever conflicted); they were most
124 precise about correcting my grammar and would laugh irrepressibly when
a man made a grammatical slip in a speech recorded on tape--this was
a joke for days. I would therefore agree with Wurm that a language
121 such as Orokaiva (spoken by at least 25,000) should be used for literacy
work and for elementary education.

Teachers are trained both in the mission and the government
797 system, but the mission system is primarily aimed at training in
875 Bible knowledge, religious doctrine and Christian values. In the early
years of the mission any promising pupil, with two or more years of
elementary schooling, might be chosen for training as a mission teacher.
Certainly he would get some coaching in how to teach school, but the
emphasis was above all religious. More recently, a number of courses
were set up by government and mission teachers were encouraged to enter
for such courses. The A course is open to men with a Standard 6
education and takes one year. The B course is open to men with a
Form 2 education and takes two years. The administration insists
on an A certificate as a minimum qualification; in the Northern
District, new appointees were usually expected to have a B certificate.
The mission is less fortunate; in 1966 in the Northern District, only
97 out of 274 mission teachers had either an A or a B certificate. Out
of the Sasembata staff of 12, five were trained; out of the Hohota
staff of four, one was trained.

The educational qualifications of the teachers are one more
875 reason why it is hard to teach with English as the language of instruction;
191 most of these teachers speak little English themselves. English is
their third-best language (next to vernacular and lingua franca)
and most of them, even if they come from other districts, will still
have more command of Orokaiva and Motu than of English. Many of those
at Sasembata came from the Coastal district so that their vernacular
was not Orokaiva, but a tongue closely akin to Orokaiva. Those who
meet their pupils outside school would not speak English to them
then, this being the least effective way they would have of communicating
with each other.

Teachers' salaries are a subject that has continued to puzzle
875 me. Government teachers are paid according to a scale the bottom of
465 which, in 1965, was $480 per annum. The mission pays $4 per month to
Papuan teachers and $12 per month to expatriate teachers. In addition
all mission teachers receive free housing, some gardening land to grow
taro, occasional distribution of fringe benefits, such as Christmas
gifts of used clothing from Australian supporters of the mission. In

875 spite of this vast differential, the mission continues to recruit
certificated teachers who are qualified for government jobs. These
[465] men live on the mission stations with their families. The mysterious
aspect of the salary question was the payment by the government of a
654 grant-in-aid to the mission in respect of all mission teachers who
held A course certificates or better. The amount payable ranged from
797 $240 per annum to $1000 per annum according to qualifications and skin
colour, but in all cases the government paid the mission in subsidy
875 far more than the mission paid the teachers. The only explanation of
the disparity I could get was that the Bishop had suggested and the
teachers had agreed that all mission teachers work equally hard and
well and should be paid the same. Thus, the money received from the
government was supposedly shared among all teachers--certificated or
not--and the government is apparently not concerned how the mission
spends the grants-in-aid.

Mission schools are inspected by departmental officers and
871 receive classroom materials on the same basis as Administration schools.
Grants-in-aid are paid to missions for the maintenance of students
[877] at a boarding school. There is provision for Local Government Councils
to provide school facilities over and above the government minimum
standard, and receive government subsidy for these, but this provision
was little used in the Northern District. Though a few of the school
texts have been prepared by the mission, most materials have been
supplied by the Department of Education. These materials tend to be
class sets of graded school text books in the basic subjects, English,
Mathematics and Social Studies. Little reading material is available
[207] over and above basic texts. Such curriculum enrichment as there is
comes mostly from the educational broadcasts which are frequent and
produced with great care. In view of the limited training of most
teachers, the value of these radio lessons is considerable. In 1965,
38 broadcasts per week were available to school children.

In 1967, the government brought in an education tax which was
652 expected to be levied by school principals. The various missions of
871 the Territory were disturbed about this demand, as it would turn them
into collection agents for the government. Furthermore, the missions
knew the fallacy of the argument on which the government relied for
the defence of this tax. It was not true, as the government alleged,
that Papuans passively accept education as a handout and feel no
obligation to contribute to their children's school education. Orokaiva
parents, and notably those of Sivepe, are constantly making substantial
contributions. The head teacher at Sasembata told me that in 1966-67
he had received $300 in financial contributions as well as a great
deal of labour assistance for the building of new classrooms, new
teacher's residences, the hospital, etc. and the building materials
necessary for these projects including sago, thatch and blackpalm flooring--
both of them scarce materials requiring a good deal of labour as well.
These contributions if calculated in financial terms would come to a
good deal more than the tax of $1 per child the head teacher was

652 expected to levy. He wrote his Bishop that he would not collect the
tax. His letter seems to have been only one trickle in a river of
871 non-cooperation and I never found out whether the government prevailed
over the missions.

871 This controversy casts some light on Orokaiva attitudes to
education. By standards of Orokaiva wealth, parents are making a
[431] major voluntary contribution in money, labour and materials, not with
the idea of "paying for their children's eduction," but in order to
make appropriate return gifts for the services rendered by the mission.
The principle governing this transaction is reciprocity, but not
contract. Thus, the Orokaiva contribution to their children's education
differs from a tax in three crucial ways:

(a) It is specifically given to the mission, towards whom the people feel an obligation and not to the government, to which they do not feel beholden for their children's education. (This obstacle could be overcome only if the government succeeded in explaining the Department of Education budget in the villages.)

(b) It is regarded as voluntary, according to the principle
[558] of reciprocity. People contribute from goodwill and generosity, the
only possible sanction for a non-contributor being a diminution of
social status. (If an education tax is levied, the sanction is refusal
to admit children to schools. This rule already applies in administration schools.)

(c) Contributions are made only partly in cash, but consist mainly of labour and materials which are not readily marketable in the villages. (If the payment is entirely in cash, this cash has to be earned outside the village or by cash-cropping. Resources such as sago and blackpalm cannot be used as a contribution to education.)

I have shown at various points in this report that Orokaiva
value their children's school education highly. In Sasembata district,
the men worked for the mission long before anyone was baptised and
their motive was, as they told me, to see that their children could
[829] go to school. When I asked why they wished this, they answered that
this was the only chance for the children to be able to obtain the
same wealth as the Europeans and become equally powerful. It is
consistent with this reasoning that the Orokaiva have never been very
disturbed by what may seem to us the strange policy of conducting
lessons in the English language. It has so far been enough for the
Orokaiva to see that the only Papuans who have obtained wealth and
power have been those who were educated in the school and who have
[191] gained some knowledge of English. It is only among the educated
Orokaiva that one hears arguments for the Papuans and New Guineans
being educated in a language of their own.

Section 5: Attitudes Towards Government

Orokaiva attitudes towards the government have three aspects
829 that must be carefully distinguished: attitudes to individual government
servants, to the power structure and to the values represented by the
563 government. As for attitudes to individual public servants, I have
no evidence for any change in attitudes. In a subtle way every white
man with whom Orokaiva come into contact is tested according to various
criteria: fairness, courtesy, willingness to reciprocate gifts and
services, willingness to eat with the people (a rare phenomenon,
this) and above all, his behaviour in the constant battle of wits
and inner strength in which Orokaiva delight. A man such as Mr. Kaad
who was a good man by all these tests, was remembered with much affection;
others, though excellent by the criteria of the Australian public
service, would be resented or soon forgotten.

The Orokaiva attitude to the power structure is determined by
657 a rather harsh history of earlier contacts, beginning with the murderous
177 régime of Monckton and culminating in the 1940's in the Japanese
conquest, the Allied re-conquest and the public execution of a small
band of Orokaiva who had sided with the Japanese. The welfare
orientation of the Australian government was perhaps never massively
demonstrated before the eruption of Mount Lamington. At the present
time this welfare orientation is well understood but the Orokaiva fear
the Australian power to compel their compliance. They use what
resources they have to keep this power within limits. They have found
that it is usually fruitless to disobey Australian commands openly,
but power can often be made ineffective if orders are misunderstood
or forgotten or evaded. Furthermore, it is a general rule among
Orokaiva to withhold information systematically from the taupa. It
took me some months to learn that even the simplest information I
had about the Orokaiva was often unknown to Europeans, not because
they were not interested but because nobody would tell them. On a
few occasions when an official asked me a question I would say that
any of his "driver-boys" (that was how they referred to their drivers)
could answer it and the official would answer: "Nobody will tell me.
They all say they don't know." This is indeed a potent weapon against
colonial administrators.

It would be wrong to assume that this attitude is directed
657 against Europeans in general, because there was great variation in
177 the treatment of individuals, and also, it is not directed against
the values Australians are trying to introduce. The avoidance of
communication is largely, I think, a device in the power struggle
between the colonial government and its subjects. The Orokaiva do
what they can to avoid being dominated. In this context, the setting
[623] up of local government councils was a great step forwards. The councillors
do not meet with the same communication bar because the people know
that they can control them through the electoral machinery. Hence it

657 is the councillors who are most effective at communicating whatever
they understand of European values and the Australians have been happy
623 to reduce direct contact with the people to formal dealings in which
177 intermediaries can definitely not be used. The Orokaiva say that it
is only since the council was set up that their thinking began to change.
While this is not to be believed, it would be correct to say that an
ideology of change developed only through the mediation of the councillors.
The humanitarian work done immediately after the eruption did not lead
to ideological change because it did not set up effective mediating
institutions.

CHAPTER VII: Mission Welfare Efforts

Section 1: Mission and Community

797 The mission at Sasembata formed a kind of community of its own.
From the ground plan of the mission station (Map XI)[A] it will be seen
361 that it differs somewhat from a village layout. In order to grasp
its essentially Orokaiva nature, I shall have to compare the station
with others I saw at Hohorita, at Waseta, Isivita, etc. The Church
and cross always occupy a central position. The houses at Hohorita
and most other stations are in two facing rows, just as in an Orokaiva
village, but at Sasembata the central field is so wide that this did
not develop. The position of the church in the centre rather reminded
me of the position in which Orokaiva build their feast houses; these
are always in the central space facing away from Mount Lamington with
a sizeable open area in front. The houses tend to be a little bigger
than those in the villages. Since the craze for timber houses started,
the mission lost no time in replacing its own teachers' houses with
timber ones. Materials for these were always supplied by villagers.

It was traditional for villagers also to supply teachers with
875 land for growing taro. At Sasembata, the mission found it hard to
425 get this land; it would be lent from year to year, but never, as the
head teacher would have liked, on a permanent basis. The Papuan
797 priest was rather put out over this and talked about leaving, for that
reason. This difficulty over land was not, as the head teacher
supposed, a sign of meanness, but rather of the continuing power
struggle between people and mission.

This power struggle is best understood as a variant of the kind
797 of rivalry that exists between any two villages, except that the mission
station was a village of a special kind. Between the time it was
first founded (in 1945) and the eruption, the staff was entirely
[731] Papuan. The eruption led to no defection but to a strengthening of
the bonds between church and people, partly because of the Orokaiva
[784] interpretation of the disaster (which emphasized the powers of the
Christian God) and partly because of the interpretation of mission
operations in the affected areas. After 1951, the station and the
school were much enlarged, and a European head teacher and a European
nurse were assigned to Sasembata. These white missionaries would
negotiate directly with the village men and obtain what help they
needed--labour, materials, land--in exchange for their educational,
medical and religious services. In 1955, a Papuan priest was
attached to Sasembata. He gradually gathered round him a number of
teachers from his own language area (the coastal Motu language) and

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[A] [See Cat. 116, p. End Map 10--Analyst]

797 this became the core of a new community. At the time of my arrival
the European mission sister had been replaced by a Papuan assistant
medical officer who, though from another tribal area, strengthened
the Papuan missionary group. There were ten teachers, a priest, a
deacon and the medical officer, together with their mostly large
[877] families--a population that must have been close to 100. Also on the
mission station were the boarding school students, adolescents from
various districts (their number was around 60), some of them related
[597] to the mission teachers. It was customary for the teachers to adopt
the children of relatives to be educated on the station under their
care. This further added to the Papuan mission station strength.

In this atmosphere the European staff, though indisputably in
797 command, were severely handicapped, as usual, by their lack of
177 information about what was really happening on the station. Not
infrequently, I was better informed about this than the head teacher,
because the station gossip would flow very easily into Sivepe whereas
the mission staff were careful not to tell the head, for fear of
inviting instructions they might not wish to obey. The big building
projects, such as the hospital, were organised without his knowledge;
the workers suddenly appeared and started work; after a few weeks
pulled down the building, not being satisfied with it, and started
again. They only approached the head when they wanted nails.

To the Orokaiva of the district, the real power struggle was not with the head but with the mission staff. This does not reflect on the head personally; indeed, shortly before my departure, he became a candidate in the Higaturu Council elections and was elected councillor for the ward which includes the mission station, on the votes of surrounding villagers. This very fact, however, indicates that he was not involved in the power rivalries surrounding the station; it was expected that he would be effective in negotiating with the council for water supplies, roading improvements and such like and that, being virtually a stranger, he would not upset existing power relations.

The power rivalries arose because the mission station Papuans regarded themselves as definitely superior to the villagers. The Hotu-speakers especially thought of themselves as carriers of a higher culture than that of the Orokaiva--better dances, better loincloths, better headdresses, better pots, and above all, a long association with the mission during which their district had become altogether more civilised than the inland people. It was because the Orokaiva were ignorant that they had to depend on Hotu mission teachers.

This boasting troubled the Orokaiva especially because it had some factual basis. Much present-day Orokaiva culture is borrowed from the coast and coastal art and technology is superior in sophistication. Gona was the birthplace of the Anglican mission of the Northern District; hence, the coast has produced a disproportionate number of priests and mission teachers, the most prominent of whom is the Bishop who is himself a Gona man. In these circumstances owners of land surrounding the mission station saw some risks in making

797 177 permanent gifts of land: the populous mission village, if granted a permanent landed foothold, might well become excessively powerful and even oppressive. As long as the missionaries had only temporary tenure, their dependence on the villagers would always remain manifest.

No Orokaiva begrudged the mission teachers their special and high status derived from their office as teachers and preachers. While their duties were mostly with the school, they all gave occasional religious lessons in the villages. One teacher made such a visit to Sivepe nominally once a month, and always after there had been a serious village fight, thus helping the reconciliation of the combatants. There was an even more marked respect for the priest, deacon and AMO. This respect was expressed, for instance, when the village trade store at Sasembata villages, which usually operated on a fairly strict cash basis, was willing to give credit to mission teachers. (Regrettably, some proved slow payers.) There was also a convention whereby fights were promptly stopped when a mission teacher appeared and asked the combatants to stop. (The same taboo exists against fighting in the presence of cross-cousins of the category known as simbo.)

[535] The coastal immigrants, however, aspired in addition to a general cultural ascendance. As one example of this, they liked to introduce among the Orokaiva their coastal dances and songs. The Orokaiva were avid pupils (as their culture history suggests they have been long before the days of Christianity). At the big dance held at the mission station in June, 1967, at least two entirely new dances, both of coastal origin, were introduced, one by the women of Sivepe and Kongohambo, and one by men and women from Waseta. In both cases, the teachers were missionaries from the coast. In both cases, the dance had never previously been seen in Orokaiva territory.

A significant source of power for the mission settlement was its indispensable role in the containment of quarrels not only within but also between villages. Sports matches tended to lead to fights, but they tended to be far more peaceful if they were held on the mission station. This was a place where people had to repress their anger. During my stay at Sivepe, several attempts were made to play matches in the village, but after two serious fights, people agreed with the priest's suggestion to play on the station in future.

Section 2: A Case History: Women's Organisations and the Mission

575 [593] [626] The following brief description of women's organisations in the Sasembata area, and especially Sivepe, will illustrate the general propositions concerning mission-village relationships set out in the previous section. There are no traditional women's organisations among the Orokaiva, though the women do certainly at times act as a solidary group in village affairs, especially when a husband is seen maltreating his wife. The other women will then club together with the wronged

575 [593] [626] [657] wife, effectively shaming the husband. Today's organisations are sponsored by the government as well as the mission. The government employs a female "welfare officer," attached to the Department of District Administration at Popondetta, who is charged with the organising and supervising of what are called women's clubs. These clubs, set up in villages, are expected to follow a set programme, designed by the welfare officer, aimed at improving village hygiene, housekeeping and craft work. The women are also encouraged to play basketball at club meetings. They learn to sew, bake scones, etc., make bark cloth for sale, are given talks on infant welfare and generally learn Australian ideas about home care. Clubs are encouraged to buy sewing machines, instructed in their use and care, shown how to cut patterns, how to launder, and so forth. Courses lasting two weeks are given periodically at the Higaturu Council building, to which a number of selected officers of local women's clubs are invited. Usually these are presidents and secretaries of clubs. They are taught the various skills to be inculcated and expected to pass on their knowledge in the village. The women are expected to persuade the men to build a meeting hall for the club. Money for the club is raised by regular dues, by the sale of bark cloth, and by the sale of cakes, scones and the like on club days. (The buying of ovens is also encouraged.) Inonda had such a club, built a club house in 1967 and had the use of a sewing machine. Kiorota had a club house, used not only by the women but also by the men when there were important visitors.

794 575 In the Sasembata district, the women's clubs became fused with their mission counterpart, the mother's union. The latter had existed from the early 1950's, and were accustomed to have prayer meetings, clean the church and the cemetery, sew for the hospital and carry out other church work usually allotted to women. The president of the mother's union was the pastor's wife, a woman of some ambition. For the convenience of the members of the mother's union, many of whom lived too faraway to attend regularly at the mission station, several branches were formed, in places such as Kendata and Puri, while the villages within easy reach (Sasembata, Sivepe, Garombi, Binduta, Kongohambo, Torogota) mostly attended the central branch. When the government founded the women's clubs, the territorial units covered by the clubs soon became identical with the areas covered by the branches of the mother's union. Furthermore, the club which included Sivepe and the mission station chose as its president the pastor's wife, as well as the same secretary, a young Sivepe women. The two organisations thus became identical in territorial boundaries, largely identical in personnel and rather similar in some of their activities. To mention but one instance, it was natural for the club to use the mother's union sewing machine for the club sewing programme.

The membership of the mother's union, in Sivepe at least, was somewhat larger than the membership of the women's club. The younger women were all active in both. Once a month they went to mother's union, did the necessary church work, cooked a common meal, prayed

794 and sang hymns and gossiped. Once a week, or at least as many weeks
as there was no obstacle to holding a meeting, they went to women's
575 club, did some sewing, discussed club affairs and played basketball. The older women did not like the basketball and were not interested in the innovations that were talked about in the club. They only attended women's club on special occasions. There was a contribution of 2/- per month which was generally paid only by the younger women.

Shortly after our arrival, a conflict developed between the club and the school. The head teacher objected to the noise made by the women, who spent the mornings sewing in the clubhouse which was on the station and then played basketball on the school ground in the afternoon. He could not get the students to pay attention to the lessons on the women's club day--which at that time was regularly every Tuesday. He suggested the women should build a club house away from the station. The pastor agreed with this suggestion, much to the rage of his wife, who was club president.

The effect of this altercation was a plan to build the club
[554] house in Sivepe, the nearest village, and play basketball there. The Sivepe women were delighted, as this greatly increased their status in the club, not only vis-à-vis the other villages, but also vis-à-vis the mission women, hitherto the aristocrats. For the next two weeks after this, the women met very frequently, as the decision to build in Sivepe, though wholly agreeable to the pastor, was mortifying to his wife and jealously regarded by the women from the other villages. At these meetings it was less important what was discussed than by whom they were boycotted. The mission women continued to argue against the decision for a further fortnight, with several meetings failing through lack of attendance. Meanwhile, school boys carried the materials of the old club house from the station down to their village, and Sivepe men cleared a handsome site for the club-house and erected the posts.

794 The mission women now withdrew from the club and asked for their
membership fees back, which they were given. It appeared that their
575 quarrel was not so much with Sivepe but with the Sasembata village
578 women. Most of the land used by mission teachers belonged to that
village; the Sasembata women thought, with some justice, that the
628 mission women were not sufficiently diligent in their garden work. It was customary for all school children to bring one taro to school each week and also each family brought some taro to Sunday service. This food was in part distributed among the mission teachers. The Sasembata women took the view that these gifts to teachers were necessitated only by the laziness of the teachers' wives. The latter countered this abuse with the argument I have already mentioned, viz. that it was necessary for coastal people to teach among the Orokaiva because the Orokaiva were too barbaric and ignorant to have teachers of their own.

The men soon lost interest in the building of the clubhouse. It was not easy to understand why they lost interest; when I asked them they pointed out that some of the houses in the New Sivepe had not

794 yet been completed (which was true) and that these ought to have
priority. The women then became impatient; after which they explained
575 to me that the women had talked to them insolently and they had told
578 them to build the house themselves (which was a male task; it would
have been unthinkable that women would have dared to do it). The
628 same men devoted most of the following two months on building the
mission hospital, so that their explanation did not hold water. The
[462] most likely explanation is that the men felt disinclined to build a
clubhouse that was clearly going to be a source of conflict between
themselves, the mission and other villages, such as Sasembata. They
probably stopped work mainly in order to see whether the conflict would
blow over and when their own women started to importune them, lost no
time in withdrawing. I base this explanation more on attitudes observed
at the time than on explicit informants' statements which were very
guarded at this early stage of my research. (All this happened in
our first month in Sivepe.) Basketball and meetings meanwhile continued
at Sivepe, and sewing continued quietly at the pastor's house. The
club was busy making uniforms for the basketball team. The next stage
of the transactions between the station and Sivepe was much more
subtle.

About three months before our departure from Sivepe, a mission
535 teacher told me that his wife intended to teach Sivepe women a coastal
[123] women's initiation dance called the kere. This, he suggested,
would be in our honour. My wife at once expressed much interest in
[177] joining in this dance. Nothing happened, of course, during lent but
on April 1, the first week after Easter, the village fell dead silent
early in the evening, everyone pretended to go to bed, the women slunk
away somewhere and late at night all the women appeared dressed in
white tapa cloths and tarpaulins, clearly impersonating spirits and
performing a vigorous but most eerie dance, while all the men at first
stayed indoors and the village remained otherwise in total silence.
[534] I even heard a flute, a highly sacred instrument which everybody
continued to pretend was never played. The next evening the same
performance was repeated; I then heard in conversations not intended
for my ears that these dancers were the embahi (spirits). On the third
day it was intimated to my wife that she might join. The "practises"
(as they were now called) continued, though my wife never actually
heard the flutes when she was dancing. After more than two months of
almost daily practise, the kere was performed in public at the mission
station, its character having been gradually transformed from a rite
into a dramatic representation. Nonetheless, a careful observer could
see elements of initiation ritual at all stages.

At all these practises, the mission teacher sat and watched
794 at the centre of the stage. His wife played the role of the teacher;
575 later, she asked an older woman, an expert from her natal village, to
take over the leadership. The clearest sign of the continuing status
578 battle was in the unending arguments on where the practises were to
be held. Sivepe insisted they should be in the village but the station

794 women who had joined the group favoured another site: a small settlement
very close to Sivepe and the mission station and affiliated with
575 Sasembata village. They never suggested the "practises" should be
578 held in the station. Indeed, although they proceeded night after
night, usually from about 10:00 p.m. until well after midnight, the
head teacher did not know about them almost until the end, until he
drove home late one night and heard something (he did not know what)
from the road. Some nights there was no practise because the two
sides could not agree on a site. The men seemed to be somewhat
irritated by the constant presence of a mission teacher in the village,
in a conspicuous role of authority, over their own women. They countered
by complaints about the "noise" which made it impossible for them to
sleep. This made it easier for the Sivepe women to agree to practise
in the next settlement, though they also practised near the house of
one of the village dancing leaders who lived away from the complaintants
and was sympathetic to the kere. In the end, the usual split did occur:
the mission women did not actually dance with the group from Sivepe
and Sasembata village, but pulled out and formed a second kere party
together with Kongohambo women, under the leadership of the deacon's
wife, who also knew this dance. Both parties performed in the final
performance at the mission station.

These events definitely show the mission station as a cultural force, quite independently of the mission teachers' ecclesiastical or schoolmasterly role. Sivepe was willing to offer the mission station a certain amount of compliance, in return for the valued knowledge that was being supplied, but fought--with success--against the mission station's attempt to use to the occasion to place the village in a position of socio-political subservience.

Section 3: The Mission and Traditional Religion

The Orokaiva attitude to Christianity is a complex subject
771 which I intend to treat more fully elsewhere and falls somewhat outside
776 the concern of our present project. It is very clear that some basic
notion of Christian montheism have not been accepted by the Orokaiva,
177 such as for instance the notion of God's omnipotence. Orokaiva
Christians believe in the existence of God and in His infinite power,
but He is viewed as an addition to other powers, Who is hostile to some
of these other powers, but not necessarily to others. I was told that
a person ought to give up black magic after baptism, but informants
dismissed my suggestion that Christianity was also opposed to curing
magic. No curing magician ever ceased practising when he was baptised.

I have referred several times to the tendency to place ancient
177 ritual under the protection, so to speak, of the new God. Rituals
[788] connected with the taro cycle were performed at Christmas and Eastertime,
perferably on the mission station. While the beliefs about the ghosts
[775]

177 of the dead remained basically unchanged, Christian burial rites
[775] and cemeteries are generally used in the belief that they are
efficacious in controlling ghosts. Girls were "shown to the people"
[769] after initiation, preferably on the mission station during the Easter
dances. The kere which was a women's initiation dance, was also
[881] performed on a mission occasion (the celebration of St. Barnabas Day,
in honour of the patron saint of this station).

What was the motive of mission teachers introducing a new form
881 of initiation ritual to the Orokaiva? This extramural activity,
177 performed in the dead of night, signified a little more than the
intertribal status rivalry analysed earlier in this chapter. The
[533] text of the songs gives no obvious clues to their significance at the
present time. Though it was made up of at least four or five languages,
due to diffusion of the cycle through the Northern District, I managed
to collect a translation of most of it during a tour of Port Moresby
when we visited knowledgeable members of various Musa River tribes.
The songs evoke a series of phases in a woman's life, stating symbolically
her role in initiation, courtship, marriage, childbearing and feasting.
They are very rich in symbolic content which is not relevant here. But
they contain no message that can be related to any modern millennial
or cargo cult. During a visit to Uiaku, in the Collingwood Bay district,
my wife found that the old women in that village knew the songs but
not the younger ones. This points to diffusion from the Musa to the
Collingwood Bay district some decades ago. All this evidence confirms
the mission teacher's own explanation given to me that he introduced
this cycle in order to keep old traditions alive, in order to give more
strength to the younger generation which had not been properly initiated.

I was impressed by the strong religious sentiment displayed by
881 the performers especially in the very first dances. They might at that
177 time be doubtful about dance movements and words but not about the
781 demeanour appropriate to the impersonation of spirits. At the very
first practise, even the young girls knew the right bearing, intonation
and rhythm. This was not truly the introduction of an alien ritual;
the purpose and the strategy could not have been more familiar.

The involvement of my wife in this initiatory ritual helped to
771 lend it the ambiguity that was evidently intended. It was not the
177 purpose of the mission teacher to set up this pagan ritual in opposition
to Christianity but rather to bring about its continuity in a Christian
797 order. I have already shown in earlier chapters that the Christian
dispensation is conceived as not only a religious but also and importantly
a socio-economic one--that Christianity, wealth and wage labour are
perceived as part of the same complex. If it can be made to accommodate
women's initiation ceremonies (after jettisoning, of course, those
aspects to which the clergy takes exception) future generations will
have the strength of the forefathers. This desire for greater
strength, in a physical and numerical as well as spiritual sense,
was often expressed to me.

Section 4: Social Services

797 The mission contribution to health and education has been set out in the previous chapter. It is of course the mission rather than the government which has pioneered the social services in the Territory. The first contact the Orokaiva had with Western medicine and education was through the mission sisters and the teachers trained, however inadequately, [illegible] the mission. The scholarly inadequacies of the mission teachers, though regretted, had not marred the primary aim of the church which was to inculcate Christian values and introduce some acquaintance with the arts of civilisation. If before the second world war, education was not viewed by the mission as a weapon in the struggle for economic development, it must be remembered that economic development of the Papuans was not deliberately pursued as an objective by the government or any other influential group in the Territory.

797 871 875 At the present time, mission education poses a dilemma. The government school inspectors express their concern over the generally low academic standard of the smaller mission schools. It has now been established as a rough rule that schools, in order to receive government approval (and therefore financial assistance and examination facilities), should have a ratio of trained teachers of at least one in three. The term trained is defined, for the benefit of the mission schools, as meaning the possession of an A certificate. Over the whole of the Northern District, one in three is approximately the average.

797 871 There has been no case where the government has actually caused a school to close down. Such action would certainly greatly anger the Anglican authorities, who argue with some force that the government has no practical means to replace the educational service of the missions. It lacks trained personnel, just as much as the mission does. Moreover, it is far more expensive to conduct a government school than a mission school and the government cannot afford this extra expense. Finally the mission argues that for the Papuan, as an essentially religious person, education ought not to be divorced from religion.

875 657 Meanwhile, the government is rapidly upgrading its own standards of training. It restricts to the utmost the intake of teachers with A certificates and encourages, by means of salary and other incentives, the obtaining of B and C certificates. It is gradually widening the scale of its operations. At the same time, the government is performing a most valuable service by giving refresher courses to practising mission teachers, thus improving their knowledge and giving them a more professional attitude to their teaching tasks. I watched Sasembata teachers who went to these courses which certainly provided much stimulus. In Hohorita, the mission conducted special classes for adults who lacked a standard 6 education. These were mostly attended by mission teachers who thus became qualified to do further study toward a teacher's certificate. The mission conducted some teachers

875 training schools which prepared students for examinations for these
certificates.

657 Though many men with teacher's certificates and advanced
medical training take up positions with the government, where salaries
875 are far higher, there is still a considerable inflow of qualified
Papuans into the mission ranks. One reason for this may perhaps be
797 found in the sketch I gave earlier in this chapter of a typical mission
station settlement. The educated man who takes up a job with the
mission receives his reward, not only in the satisfaction of religious
service and the approbation of the mission towards which he is usually
obliged for his education, but also an assured social status in a
community in which he can feel thoroughly at home and can set up the
type of social relationships to which he is accustomed. A government
position on the other hand tends to isolate and detribablise teachers
and hospital workers and thus be less satisfying socially.

Finally, it should be stressed that the mission is responsible
872 for the education of Papua's educational élite. Martyrs School, once
873 built at Sangara where it was destroyed by the eruption, and now
established just outside Agenahambo, prides itself on a higher academic
standard than any of the other secondary schools of the Northern
District. It is able to choose the most proficient of the products
of the primary school system, not only in the Northern District, but
in the whole of Papua. One man in Sivepe and one in Inonda had been
to this school but neither had continued to the secondary Forms. But
the church-educated élite will dominate the Northern District for
some years to come, until the graudates from the new University of
Papua New Guinea will take over this status.

CHAPTER VIII: Selection of Emigrants

At the time of the eruption, the whole of the population fled
731 from the volcano; those who wished to stay behind were persuaded to
leave by village constables when the area surrounding the mountain was
declared "restricted" by regulation. The whole of this population, of
the affected villages was placed in evacuation camps and, in general,
it was again the total population of the pre-eruption villages that
was transferred to the resettlement villages established in and after
May, 1951.

Recruitment to these villages was therefore non-selective and
621 by government order. The amount of land available at the new location
and the clan affiliation of the groups relocated were the main criterion
657 in allocating particular groups to specific resettlement villages. The
allocation was done by a government officer who took into account the
preferences expressed by community leaders as between the alternative
resettlement villages available. It is hard to say at this stage just
how much self-selection occurred, but the evidence suggests that in
1951 there was a very limited amount of self-selection. The situation
in the camps was a very disturbed one. Undoubtedly, when two groups
joined together and told Mr. Kaad that they wished to form a village
together, Mr. Kaad would agree to this, but a heavy burden of decision
fell on the government. After 1951, a good number of relocated groups
founded new resettlement villages, mostly with prior government permission.
In these later settlements, self-selection played an important part.

When self-selection of resettlement sites occurred, the following
361 were among the reasons for choice, as is demonstrated from evidence at
[628] Sivepe and Hohorita: proximity to land to which the group has good
title; greatest possible distance from hostile groups from which
aggression and sorcery may be feared; closeness to groups with which
a historical connection exists. The Hohorita people, though from a
wide range of clans, all have their origin in a fairly compact cluster
of Sangara villages. This has kept them together as a reasonably
solidary village. In Sivepe, we witnessed the exodus from Awala,
because of land problems; the exodus from Pamba, because of troubles
with neighbouring Kongohambo, to a place one mile removed; and more
recently, the exodus of small groups from Binduta and Garombi, in
both cases on the basis of historical affiliation. In the case of the
Binduta families, this was an agnatic or clan linkage; in the case of
Garombi, the links are far more complex and will be discussed under
the heading of "Internal Influences."

The village group was the organisational unit of settlement.
621 No larger cohesive group exists among the Orokaiva, though some
resettlement village groups were much larger than pre-eruption ones.

621
657
Groups smaller than a village were rarely resettled because the government placed almost total reliance on village constables for leadership roles. Piecemeal removal would have left some people without the leadership of a village constable. While the people would probably have managed quite well without him, the government could not have controlled such a group. In any case, the close cohesion of Orokaiva village groups was almost the one element of stability that was left immediately after the eruption and evacuation. The simplest administrative policy was the one actually followed, namely to leave the village groups undivided.

The factual data on emigrant allocation have been given in previous chapters.

PART II: INTERNAL INFLUENCES

CHAPTER I: Size and Distribution of Relocated Community

Section 1: Statement of the Problem

121 This report is intended to answer one general problem: what has been the effect of collective evacuation and resettlement upon one Orokaiva community ((Sivepe) directly affected by the eruption of Mount Lamington. In order to establish this effect, we are studying Sivepe as well as a control community (Inonda) that was not evacuated and resettled. In the first part we have made one assumption which obviously can never be accepted without question and which, in fact, we shall find to be partly false: namely, that the two communities can be regarded as homogeneous. We have tended to speak of "Sivepe" and "Inonda" as though internal variability could be ignored. At the same time, I did stress at various points that I thought one of the differences between Sivepe and Inonda might be that in Sivepe acculturation had proceeded relatively homogeneously whereas in Inonda the range of variation was wider.

A hypothesis of this sort can be tested only by a systematic study of internal variation in the two communities. In this and the following chapters I shall introduce a number of classificatory principles, commonly used in social anthropology. After classifying individuals in Sivepe and Inonda by these principles, I shall be able to compare the two communities in respect of internal patterns. The first principle to be chosen is that of spatial arrangement. Closely associated with this are the principles by which the Orokaiva themselves view their communities as subdivided into bounded social groupings. My procedure will be, first, to state what are the Orokaiva principles of classification, which apply to both communities alike. Secondly, I shall set out how the two communities under consideration can be classified according to these principles and in what respects they exhibit similar or dissimilar patterns. Where patterns are dissimilar, an explanation for the differences will be attempted and I shall consider whether the post-eruption experiences may have been a factor.

Section 2: Spatial Arrangement

621
361 The Orokaiva concepts connoting residence units that may be found in a village are mainly three: _da_--village, _bande_--house and

361 *bende*--"side" of a village. The term *da* is applied to the total set
of houses built in a single jungle clearing. The layout of a *da*
621 usually resembles that given in Maps V-VIII.[A] There is an empty space
in the centre, which is faced by houses, usually arranged in something
[364] like parallel rows. The centre is called *araha*.. In the traditional
village there is an area, immediately surrounding the *da* which is
given over to sorcery and where the rubbish is thrown. This is called
isapa, a word also meaning "small" and it is indeed only a narrow
strip, outside which the village gardens begin. The word *da* is applied
equally to a large village and to a settlement of two or three houses,
as long as it has the features mentioned. The house or *banda*, if it
is a permanent dwelling, is part of a *da* and mostly is placed on one
of the two sides or rows (*bende*), though as the village plans show,
houses are also built to complete the rectangle.

The ridgepole of a house tends to be erected along the line
361 made by the row or *bende*. The floor plan is rectangular, as shown in
342 Diagram XII.[B] The long side of the rectangle faces the *araha* and the
door is usually in front in the centre. The house tends to be divided
into two halves, a front half and a back half, the division being a
wall built directly below the ridgepole. The front half tends to be
a space where people sit and talk and where visitors come in the
evenings, while the back half, containing the sleeping rooms, is
rather more private and not usually for visitors. The back portion is
often divided into two separate rooms. I have already referred briefly
to some buildings that are not residences: the small ceremonial meeting
places that are called arara in Sivepe, jataka in Hohorita or by either
name in Inonda; the lavatories, the chickencoops (very often, indeed,
the same structure); the feasthouses and visitors' sun shelters, which
are temporary; and the women's club houses which are a novelty. None
of these are usually placed in the regular rows, though sometimes
meeting places are built next to the house of the owner.

Villages are rather compact, the houses being built at a
361 distance of nine yards, and this distance is precisely measured in the
[177] Australian spirit of military regularity. Everyone is always within
easy shouting distance of everyone else; nothing in the village goes
unheard, unobserved. The two "sides" are under constant observation
of one another. Movement between the houses of one side is much less
conspicuous, however, than the act of crossing the *araha* to go to
the other side. One never does this unless one has a serious reason.
Movement between houses of the same side occurs continuously for
ordinary gossip.

Inonda formed one *da* after some battles early in the century
361 (Crocombe and Hogbin, 1963: 14-15); at the time of the eruption there
731 was one *da* with 48 people and the village stayed together, with a slight
decline in population (to 45 in 1962 and 41 in 1967) and a decline in
628 the number of houses from 12 in 1950 to eight in 1962 and seven in
1967. When the Sewa people joined Inonda after the eruption, they did
not actually, according to informants, live in the same *village* as the

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[A] [See Cat. 116, pp. End Map 5-End Map 7--Analyst]

[B] [See Cat. 116, pp. End Map 11(A)-End Map 11(B)--Analyst]

361 Inonda people. They built a da of their own at a very short distance
731 from Inonda; both these da were very close to the airstrip and
abandoned now. Although these two da were less than a hundred yeards
628 apart, they were still two socially distinct units. It sometimes
happens, as in the case of Hohorita, to which I shall return, that
two such contiguous villages are later joined together into a single
one, but this is a deliberate act, involving the slashing down of the
intervening brushwood and, ideally, also the removal of houses which
would run through the centre of the combined village. If Sewa people
had taken up permanent residence in Inonda, such fusion would have
occurred, no doubt, but instead they went back to their own land.

621 Sivepe, with its present composition, goes back in time no
further than about 1948 when the village Pambe was built, combining
361 an older Sive and a now defunct village Pusahambo. The census list
current at the time of the eruption still shows the population of the
[162] two villages seperately, though in fact they had already fused.
(Sive 58, Pusahambo 41) I do not know how many residential units there
were then, but in Old Sivepe, in 1962, 23 were counted, plus one
belonging to the anthropologist. At that time, the population was
120. When I arrived in Sivepe, the new village was only partly
completed. Some people lived in new houses; some had not yet built
or finished their new houses, but had shifted their old houses from
the old to the new village. Others again were still domiciled in the
old village, but had declared their intention to start building in the
new one "soon." At the time of my arrival, six of the houses in the
old village were still inhabited; nine months later, this number had
dropped to three, two of the houses being inhabited by widows living
alone, while the head of the sole remaining family had almost completed
[231] his house in the new village. At the time of my arrival, a good number
of the village pigs were still being kept in the old village (these
animals being rigorously barred from the new one) but by the end of
my stay, these pigs had all gone to the bush. New Sivepe, at that
time, had 25 dwelling units, plus the one rapidly nearing completion.
The total number of dwelling units included in the study (28) accommodated
137 people. There was occasional discussion of further increments in
the population, as families from Garombi were considering moving in
and would have been welcomed.

361 At no time since the eruption did Sivepe exhibit rigorously the
village plan that was regarded as ideal. In Old Sivepe 18 out of 23
houses were arranged around the araha in standard fashion, while another
five houses had been built outside the village proper, along the old
[426] jeep road, separated from the rest of the village by a gully. The
land on which Old Sivepe was built was lent by three individuals from
different kinship groups; residents chose their house site irrespective
[423] of their possible ownership of land on the village site. On the other
hand, the five houses built outside the village proper were all on
land owned by the residents. Though some of these houses were as
much as four chains away from the village proper, they were still

361 conceived as part of it. (People spoke of the residents as living "in Sivep," not "in Orinasusu.")

In the new village, the number of houses built outside the regular rectangular plan was even larger. Of the 25 houses, only 14 were strictly where they were supposed to be; a further three dwelling units might be considered "in line" if the term were used very broadly, but eight formed a line of their own, roughly parallel to the two planned rows, with doors facing towards the *arsha*. This line was on more elevated ground than the rest of the village, and about [182] two chains behind the nearest planned row. The decision of all these householders to build outside the regular rows is in part explainable by features of the kinship structure, to which I shall refer later. We should not ignore, however, certain historically and psychologically determined attitudes which resisted the regular village pattern. In this connection it is significant that in only five out of 11 cases the irregularly placed houses were built on land to which the occupants had some special claim. Houses that were out of line were at first all of much lower standard in size and construction.

Because of the very close scrutiny the inhabitants of a village give to one another, as well as the numerous regulations that are now being enforced in villages, Orokaiva feel the threat of regimentation implicit in the large resettlement villages. Even the small distance of two chains provides a valuable measure of detachment for people many of whom used to live in much smaller villages and managed to evade most of the modern regulations. One man ceded to pressure and built a house in the "line" in which he placed his daughters-in law and their offspring but he stayed in the old house on the hill. There was much criticism too of the unwillingness of one man on the hill and the owner of the detached house No. 8 to clear the tall weeds between their houses and the rest of the village. I feel sure they let these weeds grow with the specific purpose of emphasising the distance. It was generally agreed (and confirmed by Mr. Waddell's data) that these two men were among the most diligent gardeners in the village, so that "laziness" provides no explanation.

[342] A further dimension of freedom is always available to Orokaiva by the institution of the "garden house." A garden house is a rough shelter where people can sleep in the heat of the day while they are at their gardens. Some garden houses, however, are good, sound structures suitable for semi-permanent residence. Sometimes people stay at them overnight, sometimes for several nights in succession. This is done at times when there is a great deal of garden work urgently needed; by staying at their garden houses people save time and avoid distractions. It is also done when there has been a quarrel and people like to stay out of sight for awhile; finally, it may be done simply for reasons of privacy. Some men stay at garden houses far more frequently than others. One Sivepe man is staying there constantly and has no village house at all, nor did he have one in Old Sivepe. Generally, stays of more than one week at one time are most unusual. Most people never stay away for longer than one night.

361 Comparing Inonda and Sivepe, we notice that Inonda follows
more closely the spatial arrangements that are considered ideal for
modern villages, but that Inonda has remained static in size for a
number of decades. Sivepe shows irregularities in spatial arrangement,
but has rapidly increased in size in accordance with Australian ideas
of village development. The fusion of 1948 doubled its traditional
size, while a lineage and a local clan group were added since. These
increments have as yet been imperfectly absorbed.

Section 3: Social Groups

Within a village, two kinds of kinship group larger than the
621 elementary family may be distinguished, namely the javo wahai (clan)
592 and the hae (lineage, or plant emblem group). We may also distinguish
two kinds of residential group, the occupants of a bende or side and
616 of a bande or house. On the nature of the clan I shall be brief here,
reserving detailed documentation for my doctoral dissertation. It
614 seems to me mainly a political unit, held together by--in some but not
all cases--belief in common descent from a single patrilineal ancestor,
by the common name (javo) by which they call themselves and which they
call out when slaying an enemy or a pig or in other moments of great
stress, by the recognition of obligations towards and claims upon
others who bear the same clan name. Rimoldi (1966: 33) is right when
he calls the Orokaiva clan "only a social category."

The word hae means "plant emblem," but the word is also used
613 to denote collectively all persons sharing the same plant emblem.
The clan name (javo wahai) is transmitted only patrilineally, but the
transmission of the hae is more complex. A person regards his hae,
which may be any plant or part of a plant, or another natural substance,
as a part of his own identity. He may respect it in the manner of a
totem but such avoidances seem always to have been to some extent a
matter of personal choice. (Williams, 1930: 127-218) The hae is
used in a number of social contexts as a mark of identity. Williams
seemed to believe that a hae was the distinguishing mark of a clan,
but later investigators (Crocombe and Hogbin, Rimoldi) take it to be
the distinguishing mark of a lineage.

It is indeed true that when a man has a certain hae his children will also use it. The children will also, on occasion, use the hae of their mother, especially when they are on the land of their maternal kinsfolk. There are other, more idiosyncratic forms of inheritance: one man uses the hae of a hereditary friend when he is on the land which passed into the possession of his family through that friend. Normally, maternal hae are not inherited further; no person uses the hae of his mother's mother, or of his father's mother. In these circumstances it is reasonable to assume that a man who has the same hae as oneself is of the same blood. This is not to be understood

613 in terms of a rigorous genealogical model, which is unfamiliar to
Orokaiva, but in the sense that both are identified with the same
plant or substance and thus very closely akin.

While clan affiliation is, in practise, determined by political
[614] considerations, and a person may decide, upon calculations of family
advantage, to assume a new clan name, the hae is utterly unpolitical and hae affiliation is a better indication of true blood relationship than membership of the same clan. In the hae, but not the clan, a kind of hierarchical classificatory principle may be found. To explain this, I should first point out that most informants I interviewed had at least four hae, two paternal and two maternal ones, and not infrequently I recorded as many as three paternal hae, and a total of five. Many people, when using a hae as a mark of identity, for instance on the road, to show they had been there, would actually use two hae plants. For instance, almost everyone in the district used the hae called sasaha (a grass), but if another hae, tandere, was added, a person finding these signs would be able to identify the owner as one of a quite limited group of people. For the purpose of this discussion, I shall use the word hae as meaning such a combination of emblems which sufficiently define identity. Such a combination of hae never defines an individual or even an extended family as usually several extended families share the same combination. But the patrilineal units thus defined are always smaller than a clan. To this extent, earlier authors are thus justified in calling them "lineages." It would be wrong to suppose, however, that the same combination of hae cannot be shared by fellow villagers belonging to different clans, for this is often found. Thus, those translating the word hae as "lineage" should be careful to avoid the implication that such "lineages" are segments of clans.

The population of Sivepe is very hard to classify into hae
because I noted 42 hae in use, only 11 of which were shared by at
least four adults. Nonetheless, the fact that two persons share a
hae is often a valuable clue pointing to a close relationship that
is of considerable social significance, but that might otherwise be
[621] ignored as idiosyncratic. By far the closest bond that can exist
between the members of different extended families is that they share
[582] both a clan name and common hae. When such a bond exists, rules of
exogamy are stringently enforced. These rules also apply, but less
stringently, if two persons share the same clan name, but no hae, or
if they share a hae but no clan name.

614 For our present purpose, it will be most convenient if we
classify Sivepe households according to the clanname of that person in
621 the household who is what Fischer (1958) has called the "sponsor,"
i.e., the person by whose presence in the household the residence of
the family in Sivepe can be explained. On that basis, 13 households
and the bachelors' house may be classified as Jegase, eight households
as Seho and six as Sorovi, as in the first half of 1967. It is
desirable, however, to observe how rapidly this pattern of clan

614 affiliations has changed. In 1962, when Rimoldi did his survey of the
community, not a single Sorovi family had arrived. Moreover, he
621 showed four residences and one bachelor's house as attached to the
Timumu clan, a clan name that was not quoted to me. The same families
still inhabit Sivepe (except for one old man who died) but they now
call themselves Jegase. (This fusion between Jegase and Timumu
occurred, to my knowledge, only between the Sivepe local clan groups.)
In 1962, Jegase had eight residences and one bachelor's house, so that
the overall pattern in these four years has remained much the same
except for the fusion of the clans. Bachelors of the enlarged Jegase
clan shared one bachelors' house in 1967, seeing that the clans had
[731] been joined. The major change between the time of the eruption and
1962 was the migration of three families from Binduta to Sivepe, all
classified as Jegase in 1962. Just as it was possible to change the
clan name of the entire Timumu group by a simple decision of the two
local clan groups, so also it was possible to change the clan name
of individuals simply as a way of emphasising common loyalties which
developed out of a combination of cognatic links and contingent
circumstances. (This pattern is characteristic of New Guinea patrilineal clans in many areas and has been discussed recently in an
excellent paper by J. A. Barnes, 1967.)

One striking characteristic of the village layout of New Sivepe
361 is that all the Seho houses are grouped together on the same bande
614 while the other bande of the main village is entirely made up of
Jegase houses. Sorovi, the clan which migrated to Sivepe from Garombi
616 shortly before my arrival, has mainly settled along the brow of the
hill behind the village, probably partly because that area happens to
be owned by a Sorovi man (who continued to live in Garombi), so that
in case of a quarrel, nobody could question their right to build on
that land. The other houses on the brow of the hill were built by
Jegase people who preferred to keep out of the regular two-line
system. People often talked about their intention to build all the
houses along the two regular lines eventually.

The basic structural feature of New Sivepe was this dualism,
expressed in the division between two "sides" each comprising one clan.
This kind of village plan has been studied in much detail by Lévi-Strauss
[582] under the term "diametric structure" (1958: 150). An essential part
of this structure is that each side is exogamous but that the two
[601] sides intermarry with one another. It is thus in Sivepe where people
living along the same side address each other always by consanguineal
kin terms whereas people living on the opposite side tend to be addressed
by affinal terms, with the obvious exceptions. The reserve and
formality observed when people cross the araha to go to the other side
is easily explained when it is remembered that on the other side they
will meet affines.

It will be noted that this pattern is very much less clearly discernible in Old Sivepe where the two-clan system was not yet worked out. On the other hand, I have found it in several other resettlement

361 villages (Garombi, Soroputa, Hohorita). When New Sivepe was built it
had become a familiar procedure and was simply copied from other villages.
614 It is an interesting adaptive institution, and the Orokaiva answer to
616 Australian pressure towards the building of multi-clan villages.

Belshaw clearly stated the problem that was involved: "How far
[177] was the earlier hamlet system the result of tendencies towards
violence and strife in the society, and to what extent will such
tendencies be overcome or intensified by the new arrangements?"
(1951: 246) It can now be seen that diametric structure was the
Orokaiva answer to this danger of violence and strife. While affines
were separated by the _araha_, the _araha_ was widened so it could be
used as a playing field, as happened at Sivepe but by no means in all
the villages.

614 -- .. Rimoldi classified the Jegase clan into four lineages (Berekipa,
Sesevopa, Arehu, Bebehupa) and one extinct lineage (Hambai). He
613 further distinguished two Timmu lineages (Hajejopa, Pekuma), which
should now be added to the Jegase list. Certainly, each of these
six groups have common plant emblems not shared by the others; the
lineages are therefore each part of a distinctive plant emblem group.
Families of the same plant emblem group make no particular efforts
to reside close together; the social functions of "lineage" are mutual
assistance and close solidarity. The importance of the concept of
"lineage" varies from clan to clan; while Jegase has this relatively
long list of lineage names, Seho has no such list. Conversely, while
Jegase has no common ancestor upon which all members of the clan are
agreed, Seho has a human eponymous ancestor about whom a myth is told.
Seho also has a totem animal (_Garo_ = wallaby) while Jegase is actually
the name of the totem animal recognised by all its members. It is a
small flying insect present in great numbers around the taro leaves.
It is possible, however, to classify Seho according to groups which
share plant emblems and investigation shows that both clans equally
are the result of fairly recent fusions; the lineages or plant emblem
groups, however, are of somewhat greater antiquity. I saw evidence
of the creation of new plant emblems and of the dying off of old plant
emblems, so that even the plant emblems do not survive indefinitely.
But Orokaiva rightly regard the plant emblem as sign of a relationship
of greater antiquity, for clan allegiance can be changed in a day
whereas the plant emblem group can always be traced back beyond human
memory, i.e., beyond 50 years or so.

Inonda, in the same period, has developed in the direction of
621 a one-clan village. In 1951, out of 12 households, eight were of the
614 Andiriha clan and three of Jego'undi. In 1966, the wife in this
remaining household had died and the widower, with his four children,
moved into an Andiriha household. As in Sivepe, many of the people
now calling themselves Andiriha were not born with that clan name, but
took it after settling in Inonda. Crocombe and Hogbin divided the
Andiriha local clan group of Inonda into four "lineages," for which
they quoted, in each case, a single plant emblem (1963: 17). They

621 also reported that there is one plant emblem which all Inonda members
of the Andiriha clan have in common, a feature not found in Sivepe.
614 In discussing household composition patterns, I shall simplify
the picture somewhat, as for the purpose of this study it is irrelevant
592 whether children are natural or adopted, legitimate or not, children
of both parents or one and whether clan membership is "primary" or
"permissive." All these questions would be highly relevant, of course,
if we were dealing with a village such as Hohorita, where many people
died during the eruption so that many remarriages and adoptions can
[114] be traced to that cause. One of the strange gaps in Williams'
ethnography is that he omits any reference as to household composition;
in his notebooks, he records household composition for two villages,
Burugata and Wasida, showing that in every case in those villages, a
household was made up by a husband, wife and children. In one case of
a polygamous family, the man had two houses, one for the family of one
of his wives and one for the families of the other two.

592 Informants told me of one rule regarding household composition
which is likely to be quite ancient. This is that a man and his wife
606 may not quarrel in the presence of the husband's father (and, needless
to say, in the presence of the wife's father). For this reason, the
people of Sivepe certainly do not like three-generation households when
the middle generation is represented by a married couple. It is normal
for a married woman to stay with her parents or her husband's parents
while her own husband is away working for wages--as is frequent among
younger couples. In that case, the household will have three generations,
but the middle generation is represented by a woman only, with the
husband only an infrequent guest. When I came to Sivepe, and the
village was still only half-built, I found three households in which
the middle generation was represented by a husband and wife plus,
sometimes, a few others. In all these three cases, a change had
occurred before I left: the husband and wife had built themselves one
house, leaving another for the old people and perhaps some other adults,
not including couples. This rule seems to be regarded as less important
in Inonda. (See Table 15.)[A]

My own impression is that the normal household is composed of
592 a nuclear family, as appears from the Sivepe (but not the Inonda)
[594] statistics. Widowers and sometimes also widows live in houses by
themselves, even if they have no young children living with them and
[589] do not like staying with their children after they are married. A
widower usually has his meals cooked for him by a daughter or other
close relative who brings the food to this house. Though occasionally,
two married brothers (or other close relatives) live in the same
house, this is likely to be a temporary arrangement. I do not think
that useful sociological conclusions can be drawn from comparison
between Inonda and Sivepe in respect of household compositions, as
there are in Inonda only two households of the type I have shown to be
highly untypical and these may well be accounted for by idiosyncratic
circumstances.

A [See Cat. 116, p. 220--Analyst]

CHAPTER II: Socio-Economic Factors

Section 1: Age, Sex and Marital Status

121 In this chapter, the study of internal variations will be
continued, by a consideration of the human resources available to the
villages and their economic productivity. A statistical analysis of
162 the population by age, sex and marital status (see Table 16)[A] shows that
464 the labour force lacks a proportionate number of young men in early
adulthood; the number of men in the vigour of life is somewhat smaller,
in Sivepe, than the number of women. The reason for this change is
166 that young men leave the village to earn money elsewhere. They often
167 do this before marriage, so that the bachelors' houses tend to be
occupied by a much smaller number than formerly; but after they are
464 married they usually do not at once settle down in the village. It is
583 unusual nowadays for a brideprice to be paid in full at the time of
the wedding. Usually this payment is delayed; the young husband goes
out to work for it and after one or two years he sends back money and
it is paid. At the one brideprice payment I observed in Sivepe, the
groom was not even present. He was at his job in Port Moresby and the
role of groom was taken over by another man from the same lineage--
a married man with six children, as it happened, who duly cut the
firewood and carried the water required for the entertainment of his
[484] affines. Even after the bridewealth is paid, then, the husband
continues to work at his job, rarely seeing his wife as travel is
expensive and leave infrequently granted.

Because of these infrequent visits, young wives have few
593 children, but they receive regular gifts of money from their husband.
592 Eventually, the husband returns home; it is hard to say just what
makes him decide. Before the age of 30 he usually starts to establish
a family, and he then stays home continuously, to look after his garden
[464] and his coffee. He may occasionally go back to town for a few months
to earn money, but judging by the few examples I saw, he is not always
successful at finding a job and even if he does so, he takes an early
opportunity or uses an early excuse, to return home, carrying home
some presents for his family and perhaps a little money. The family
does not seem to be too troubled about the loss of earnings that
result from his return. Some men manage to find accommodation for
their families in town, in which case they all migrate.

This generalised picture needs qualifying. There were six
Sivepe women (out of nine married women with absent husbands) who
received regular gifts; three of these women were living in the household
of a single man while another family head had under his control two

A [See Cat. 116, pp. 221-222--Analyst]

593 further such lucrative young females. Of the six, two were Sivepe
women while the other four were women from other villages residing
592 virilocally. A great many other families did not derive income in
this way. Some of these, however, had daughters living in other
villages, and their husbands too were sources of institutionalised
gifts.

Though Waddell showed that the loss of adult male workers
464 through migration is already serious (37.8% in Sivepe and 25% in
433 Inonda), the point had not been reached when the loss of manpower
led to a decline in the production from garden lands. Waddell may,
however, be right in ascribing the increasing consumption of the
inferior Xantosoma taro (see page 35 above)[A] to the deflection of the
adult male labour force which had to support old people whose vigour
887 had declined. The older men did not stop work abruptly at a certain
age; they would continue to go to their gardens, but the areas cultivated
would become smaller; their children or young affines would help them.
If an old man became widowed his daughter or daughter-in-law would
cook food for him; in the case of a widow, uncooked food might be
given, but most widows tend to live in a house where there are male
relatives, the only two exceptions in the sample being the two widows
[463] who stayed in the old village of Sivepe. There are also activities
which are a specialty of the old: they tend to be the village artists
and also the village sorcerers. When we wanted to buy artifacts,
it was the old men who made the ornaments, the old women who made the
best pots and painted the best bark-cloth. Similarly, the most active
curers in the village were two old men and one old woman.

595 I saw no evidence of polygamy currently practised. Marriages
were always consecrated at the time the couple was baptised. Several
585 people had at one time been divorced, but this was prior to the time
586 of baptism.

In Inonda, as I wrote earlier, no absent husbands sent money
home. The only woman at Inonda whose husband was away from the village
464 was in jail, after breaking into a trade store with a hammer belonging
to another man from Inonda. On the other hand, one man earned a living
as a government driver, thus becoming more or less removed from the
work in his subsistence and coffee gardens. Some other men took over
his work, in return for appropriate counter gifts and services. In
both villages, therefore, a pattern existed of outside earnings
derived by a limited number of people whose garden work was taken over
by other members of the village labour pool, while the money earnings
were in one way or another widely shared among villagers.

Section 2: Division of Labour

The division of labour was the special subject of a study
114 carried out in Sivepe by my predecessor, Mr. Waddell. As he has been

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464 [A] [See Cat. 116--Analyst]

114 kind enough to show me this study in manuscript, I shall utilise it
here. The general question with which Mr. Waddell is concerned is
464 whether earlier students of societies depending on shifting agriculture
are right in saying that such societies, at least in fertile regions,
[166] have a considerable potential labour surplus. He proceeds to argue
that, in the light of detailed data on the use of time in Sivepe, what
[167] potential labour surplus there might once have been has already been
taken up by labour migration of male adults (which, for his sample, he
puts at 37.8%). Waddell takes issue with Fisk (1962: 465) who defines
economic activity as comprising only the production of food, clothing
and shelter, and argues that, given the existing socio-economic matrix,
all the other activities listed on his time charts (see Table 5)[A]
should be regarded as economic because they buy status and security.
[412] He also takes issue with Salisbury (1962: 216-20) who proposes that
[461] the change from a stone-to-steel technology in the New Guinea Highlands
has resulted in a saving of two-thirds in the time allocated to specified
axe-using tasks and who concludes from this that a vast potential labour
surplus is thus created. Waddell shows, by a quantitative study of
the allocation of time within activities, that only 38.5% of the time
allocated to an activity is actually given over to the main task, and
even if one includes ancilliear, and other productive tasks, this
raises the proportion to less than 50% of the total time devoted to
that activity. (See Table 17.)[B] As steel implements are used for only
a portion of productive tasks, they did not, Waddell argues, make a
crucial difference to Orokaiva work patterns.

114 If at the time of Mr. Waddell's study (1964), the potential
labour surplus in Sivepe was small, how was it possible to fit in such
464 new additional activities as the growing of coffee? Mr. Waddell was
in an excellent position to discover this as at the time of his survey
461 seven of 15 households surveyed engaged in cash-cropping; he was therefore
241 able to inquire how this affected the time spent on subsistence food
production. As it happened, the median time spent on subsistence
gardening by the whole sample equalled precisely the median time
spent by the cash-cropping households. (12.6 hours per week, vide
his Table 5:5) It appears from the table I derived from Mr. Waddell
(my Table 17) how the cash-cropping families fit in this extra work:
they spend a great deal less time having rests and meals. While non-
cash croppers allocate only 28.4% of the time within activities to
their main task, the cash-croppers allocate 50.6%. Though Mr. Waddell
gives interesting explanations which account for part of this discrepancy,
even if full allowance is made for these, the fact remains uncontestably
that the cash-croppers simply work harder.

114 Mr. Waddell proceeds to show, by a detailed psychological
assessment of the cash-cropping individuals, that they are indeed the
241 most acculturated and industrious members of the community. This
seems to suggest a considerable heterogeneity in working habits as
177 between the members of the community. The author clearly shows this
heterogeneity to exist as between the sexes and between different age

A,B [See Cat. 116, pp. 209-210, 223-224, respectively--Analyst]

114 groups, and I shall return to this aspect. In addition, however, a
considerable weight is placed upon the difference between individual
177 dispositions. I would suggest that in this respect, Mr. Waddell may
have put too much confidence in the results of a synchronic study and
241 it is fortunate that another investigator (myself) was able to observe
the community at a time when coffee growing had become a general
activity. Regrettably, I did not collect quantitative data of the
same scope as Mr. Waddell.

177 I shall anticipate later chapters by suggesting here, that
differences in level of acculturation in Sivepe never go very deep.
Certainly, it is always the same minority of relatively acculturated
people who are willing to risk making innovations. This applies to
the introduction of European styles of clothing, of radios, kerosene
lamps, sending children to school regularly, being baptised, building
lavatories and also to the growing of coffee and the planting of the
improved Malayan rubber trees. All these things are always done first
by a few pioneers, and usually the same pioneers. The basis upon which
these people become pioneers is usually a relatively shallow contact
with western civilisation. Mostly, the new skills, activities and
other introductions they sponsor are not so far ahead of the rest of
the community that a swing of local fashion cannot make them universal
or almost universal properties. There was no evidence of a widening
social and economic gap between acculturated and unacculturated
families; there was a gap, but it always remained small (at least,
so far). The pioneers tried innovations; the conservatives held back
until they saw the innovations succeed, as happened by no means always.
Then, one, two or five years later, the conservatives followed the
[461] progressives. Thus, the activity pattern Waddell observed among the
progressives is now much closer to the general norm. The people
themselves feel sure that today they work harder and rest less than
they used to do. The rest periods I observed were shorter than those
measured by Waddell in 1964.

433 Nonetheless, I would support his main contention that the work
day of the cash-croppers of Sivepe today cannot be greatly lengthened,
461 nor productivity greatly increased, unless ways can be found to make
work more efficient by technological and other innovations. I have
241 already suggested that a degree of collectivisation would permit the
introduction of some labour-saving machinery and better transport
114 facilities. Mr. Waddell makes two further suggestions which need
brief discussion.

The first of these is interesting because it questions an assumption that has been almost universally accepted in the literature on shifting cultivation. He argues that the shift from Old to New Sivepe did not actually reduce travelling time from village to garden but in fact lengthened it. He quotes detailed figures to prove this. Village locations, therefore, are not actually being chosen by Orokaiva by criteria of economic rationality, but on wholly non-economic grounds. If this were true, we would need to re-examine whether other societies

433 of shifting cultivators actually do shift their villages to save time
as previous investigators have believed: perhaps, we need to look
461 for entirely different motivations.

The question is an interesting one, but Sivepe does not
241 provide a clinching counter-instance. Mr. Waddell's sample was taken
114 entirely from the Jegase and Timumu clans, while he did not collect
data on travelling time from the Seho clan. Now it is the latter clan
[489] which owns most of the land around New Sivepe, so that their travelling
time is (at least for most families) substantially reduced by the shift.
[423] Furthermore, five of the Jegase households (some of which were formerly
called Timumu) now have gardens very close to New Sivepe. The main
sufferers appear to be two families who migrated from Binduta recently,
whose land is mainly close to Binduta, and against whom feeling has
been building up over the last few years. Mr. Waddell is right,
however, in stressing that the major reason for the shift (as given by
informants) was the closeness of the new village to the road and the
mission station. As such the basis of the shift was practical and
ideological but I believe that overall travelling time was reduced
if both Seho and Jegase clans are taken into account. Certainly the
new village is very close to the land of most of the Sorovi people
who settled in Sivepe in 1966.

The second suggestion made by Waddell is that travelling time could be reduced, and thus working efficiency increased by land tenure conversion. He has in mind, I think, the arrangement already found in Papuan returned servicemen's settlements established by the government where each individual family is settled on its own 20-acre block and grows cocoa and subsistence crops there. Conceivably, when tenure conversion is completed, the Orokaiva might be encouraged to live on individual farm holdings rather than in compact villages. Some planners in the Territory are actually playing with this idea. It has many drawbacks, however: distance from roads, from schools, collapse of social control institutions, abandonment of useful social development projects such as the provision of good water supplies in the resettlement villages.

Comparison with Inonda suggests that as the proportion of adult males lost through migration from Inonda is smaller, and none of these males have left dependents in the village, and furthermore, as the amount of cash cropping work is relatively smaller, the Inonda people are less pressed for time than those of Sivepe. This is borne out by the fact that they are away from the village more frequently as Waddell's statistics show.

An interesting discovery made by Waddell concerns the time
114 allocation of the elderly. He shows that in adulthood the amount of
887 productive work done decreases with age, as does also the amount of
time spent on productive work, but the amount of time devoted to social
activities and contacts outside the village declines even more steeply
after middle age. The Orokaiva has no leisurely old age. Unlike the
[888] Polynesian elder he does not become a sage, remote from economic

114 affairs, but gives all his declining energies to his garden, keeping
as close as possible to the productive level of his better years. He
887 draws closer and closer to his garden where his spirit will dwell after
death. Apart from the garden, he becomes remote from most things;
[888] his days of household duties, hunting, fishing, building are over. He
[775] will, however, make dancing ornaments and weapons and headdresses which
again lie close to the spirit realm. (I have quoted Waddell's statistical
evidence for these tendencies in Table 18.)[A]

How did culture change influence the division of labour between
462 the sexes? For the traditional productive activities, there has
241 probably been hardly any change. I have quoted a table of exclusively
masculine and feminine activities collected by Williams in 1923, and
[199] hitherto unpublished (Table 19).[B] Certain tasks of importance were
omitted from this list, which may explain why Williams did not publish
it. Sago making was probably always a male activity; so was the use of
the digging stick preparatory to planting taro and yam. The harvesting
of taro was probably always a specifically feminine task; there is
clearly a taboo on men against harvesting taro. Even bachelors never
do it but must leave it to his mother, his sister or his brother's
wife. If men did it, I was told, they would not "know how" and they
would never manage to eke out the crop until the next harvest. This
did not apply to the harvesting of other crops. When Williams classified
"planting" as a feminine task, he was probably thinking of the actual
placing of the cuttings in the ground, though I have seen men as well
as women do this.

In the Orokaiva view both man and woman are repositories of
462 capacities and resources specific to themselves; the relationship
562 between man and woman is the giving of exchange (mine ari) of the
contributions of each. Man views woman as an equal exchange partner
and this equality is real even though the care over legal and political
matters is a distinctively masculine contribution. In the new activities
[177] introduced since European contact the same balance is preserved. Some
new duties (e.g., the washing of clothes) were added to the specifically
feminine preserve, church work and the purchasing of goods became a
predominantly masculine preserve (as is attested by Waddell's statistics).
The harvesting of rubber, taught exclusively to men on the plantations,
became an exclusively male activity. On the other hand, the bulk of
cash producing activities (working for pay, maintaining, harvesting and
processing of coffee) were shared.

One interesting observation made by Waddell and confirmed by
462 me is that most marketing of subsistence crops is done by the women
[241] whereas marketing of coffee is done by the men. The handling of
harvested crops is normally a woman's prerogative. These are normally
[415] carried in large string bags which only married women can own and hang
over their heads. While the casual European observer supposes that the
[482] women carrying these large bags are reduced to the status of beasts of
burden, these bags signify the women's exlusive power over the crop;
the fuller they are, the prouder the women are of them. Thus, only

A,B [See Cat. 116, pp. 225, 226, respectively--Analyst]

462 women can carry produce to market. Coffee, however, is in a different
[562] category because the bags are of a special type, supplied by the coffee
[422] factory and a specifically male property.

Section 3: Education, Occupational Skills, Money Income

241 In the last section, dealing with the division of labour, I
did not introduce the question whether there were differences in this
613 respect between the various social groups--lineages and clans. The
614 main differentiation noted by earlier authors was that between cash-croppers and those engaging only in subsistence gardening. Now in this
respect there was no noticeable difference between clans in Sivepe:
out of 1,100 coffee trees growing in Sivepe in 1962, 503 belonged to
Jegase and Timumu and the rest to Seho, while in Inonda the coffee
growers belonged to two Andiriha lineages. In Sivepe today most men
grow coffee, and this applies equally to the Jegase, Seho and Sorovi
clans; the exceptions are elderly people. There are, however, very
significant differences in other respects between socio-economic
patterns in the Jegase and Seho clans--differences which are obvious
even on very superficial inquiry.

614 A minor imbalance in the age distribution of the two clans is
noticed at once from the statistics: the Jegase householders are
561 predominantly in the 35-45 year age group whereas Seho is predominantly
a little older (45-55 years). Hence the dance group formed in Sivepe
[535] is at present almost wholly composed of men of the Jegase clan. The
[177] age difference happens to be very significant in various indices of
acculturation, as the first school was established at Sasembata in
[871] 1945, and the custom of looking for wage labour outside the district
did not become widespread until about the same time. While some Jegase
[167] people know some English, none of the Seho people over 35 speak any
at all. Furthermore, the first village constable and the first councillor
[191] in Sivepe were both Jegase men who had taken up employment well before
the second world war. During the years they held these posts (1939-1965), Seho had much less contact with government.

The statistics (Table 20)[A] show that Jegase male adults have
614 slightly more school education than Seho adults but a great deal more
463 occupational experience. This experience, for both clans, did not
include work requiring much formal training; it was labour on rubber
and cocoa plantations, on the roads, assistance with land surveys,
[177] laundry work, service as a "houseboy," and in the A.P.C. Nonetheless,
an intelligent man thrown into these kinds of situation can find out
a good deal about the outside world; in later dealings with external
agencies, he is able to make more informed judgments. A further
opportunity for such experience was offered the Jegase clan when the
Australian National University, which made Sivepe into a sample village
for several studies (see below, Chapter VII), decided to concentrate

[A] [See Cat. 116, p. 227--Analyst]

614 its efforts upon what were then the Jegase and Timumu clans, to the
463 exclusion of Seho. When my wife and I came to Sivepe, Jegase at once
claimed us, built our house for us and was ready to perpetuate the
177 familiar "special relationship" before I had a chance to assess the
123 situation.

In terms of economic development, this extra experience of
614 Jegase did not actually make much difference. Seho grew just as much
coffee; the Seho clan leader was always in the vanguard for innovations
177 such as the Malayan rubber trees; Seho had about as much money income
as Jegase, except that Jegase received more cheques from town workers
184 married to locally resident women. It must be remembered that the
educational background of the Jegase men was still rather limited and
insufficient to open up the more remunerative avenues of employment.
The younger generation of Seho was just as well educated as the younger
generation of Jegase; in fact, the only person to have reached Form II
was a Seho boy whose father had no schooling but a few years' work
experience before marriage.

Finally, the leader of the Seho clan (without schooling, but
614 with brief experience in the A.P.C. before the eruption) made up in
157 shrewdness what he lacked in facility. Europeans who had dealings
with Sivepe over land and other issues found him atough and calculating
negotiator who knew as well as anyone how to safeguard the interests
of his village and press for whatever blessings of the modern age might
become available. As "committee" for Sivepe, he was a stern champion
of village decorum. I have seen several other villages which vowed
to eliminate pigs, but in these villages one could usually still find
a very tiny piglet, so small you could hardly see it, which signified
the hardiness of the old dispensation; in Sivepe, one only saw dead
pigs. He would have no weeds, no houses out of alignment, no late
noise; whatever the Australians chose to define as the spirit of
progress, was strictly enforced by this leader.

The younger people are mostly going as far as they can (up to
871 Standard 6) at Sasembata School; so far only one has gone further.
614 One young man, who had finished Standard 6 and a young woman who had
done Standard 4, but was intellectually brilliant were regarded in the
184 village as the educated élite; both were just above 20 years of age.
They were both from Jegase households; they both helped us considerably
as interpreters. It is likely that the Sasembata school produced
others as competent, but they would have left for jobs elsewhere.

184 I have already pointed out that in Inonda there was less homogeneity.
One man was markedly more educated than anyone in Sivepe; nearly all
had been away on paid employment for long periods (longer than at
Sivepe). The educated leader, attracting to himself other men with
some education, was able to act as a kind of entrepreneur and thus two
different patterns of life became established, emphasised by the
persisting neglect of cash-cropping by one section. Two young and
vigorous men who might well have grown coffee prefer to depend for
cash on temporary plantation jobs.

184 The difference in pattern between the two villages may well be
explainable by the influence of the improved schooling and the close
177 contact with the mission station found in Sivepe, in common with many
of the other resettlement villages. These improved facilities may to
some extent be regarded as social consequences of the eruption, as they
were developed in the resettlement villages in the wake of resettlement
to replace the earlier facilities at Sangara.

Money income has risen rapidly since the war. About the time
434 of the eruption, six of the present inhabitants of Sivepe were away
184 on jobs outside the village. Not only are far more Sivepe people
absent today on wage work, but the village itself has a steady income.
At the time of Rimoldi's study, his sample was said to have spent
annually $410 while its income for 1962 totalled $328 or $28 per
household. Today this has risen greatly; the 14 coffee gardens, with
over 4,000 trees, produced some 6,000 pounds of coffee, worth in all
about $1,000; gifts from absent wage-earners over the year totalled
at least $500 and other income (paid work, sale of products, etc.)
at least $200. This makes up a minimal total of $1,700 or an average
of $60 per household. I would not be surprised if actual total income
was as high as $2,000 but it is very hard to obtain reliable facts.
There is no doubt, however, that the coffee gardens have made Sivepe
substantially wealthier, while in Inonda only the government driver
has substantially improved his position since 1962, when Inonda's
average household income from paid work, produce and gifts was
[965] 833 p.a. (Crocombe and Hogbin, p. 53). The government driver's regular
salary of about $700 p.a. stands out in both villages.

CHAPTER III: Degree of Homogeneity of the Community

621 To what extent do we find ethnic diversity in this population?
The answer to this question depends very much on our concept of
homogeneity. If we look merely at the diversity of clans and of places
of birth of present community members, as stated by themselves, a
remarkably homogeneous picture may be presented for Sivepe: out of 28
male adults actually resident in Sivepe, 26 were born within two miles
of the present village site; the other two were born in Soroputa, which
[591] is hardly more than four miles away. Both the Soroputa men had married
Sivepe women; they were the only two families that were overtly
[582] uxorilocal. Although the rest of the families were all overtly
virilocal, only seven out of 33 adult Sivepe females came from a
village more than two miles away from the present village site. None
of these seven were over 45 years of age; all but two were under 35
years old. Furthermore, six of these seven women married into the
Jegase clan. Only one of them married into Seho; in this case, the
woman had married a Jegase man, become divorced, and then remarried
into Seho.

621 The traditional pattern was for a man to marry a woman from
a nearby village; the present generation of Seho householders had all
582 followed this tradition. The more modern pattern is to choose women
from further afield; this had become a frequent practise for the younger
Jegase men who tended to choose wives from villages two to four (but
never more) miles from Sivepe. Sorovi had followed the traditional
pattern, without one exception. From this viewpoint, homogeneity was
extreme.

In Inonda, two of the nine adult male inhabitants were born
563 outside the district: one came from Arafa, in the Managalasi district
169 and was captured by Inonda people in war as an infant. This fact was
at first concealed from me and only elicited when inconsistencies
arose. If one asks his clan name, he answers it is Andiriha. He
has two sons living in the village, both married. The other immigrant
is a Sangara man who was a mission teacher at Sewa before the eruption,
came to Inonda with the other Sewa people, and did not return to Sewa
when the others went back to their old village. His two daughters both
married Inonda men.

621 Of the ten adult women living at Inonda, four came from the
Sangara tribe, one from Kendata in the Sasembata district and the others
628 from villages in the vicinity of Inonda. The term "vicinity" has a
slightly different meaning in the Inonda district than in the far more
[582] densely populated area around Sivepe. The villages from which Inonda
women tended to come were three or four miles away rather than just one
mile. To this greater geographical distance corresponded a greater

621 social distance also. Relations between Inonda and Ureo or Hohota,
from which Inonda recruited wives, were distinctly less friendly than
628 those prevailing between, say, Sivepe, Garombi and Binduta. (See
my doctoral dissertation and also Hogbin, 1966.)

If we seek an explanation for the far greater heterogeneity
563 of Inonda, we find two historical causes in this sample: a war and
621 a disaster. The link with Kendata came through the Managalasi man;
the links with Sangara came as a result of the eruption of Mt.
167 Lamington. Admittedly, this Sangara link was of a modern type, the
central figure being a mission teacher. The residential pattern however
is ancient: due to some vicissitude, a man settled with his affines;
this led to further marriages between his village of origin and his
village of residence. He was given enough land to cultivate for
subsistence. In this case, the Sangara immigrant still quoted his own
clan name when asked; the Managalasi man did not.

If we go back a little further in the history of Sivepe, even
only one generation beyond the present residents, we find much the
[727] same pattern as still survives in Inonda. The capturing of young
orphans was a commonplace event among the Orokaiva, as were also
[423] migrations to escape from enemies. Sometimes the fugitives or the
orphans returned eventually to their village of origin, looking for a
friendly relative who was willing to meet their claims to the land of
their fathers. In going back a few generations into the past, one
never knows for certain who is a new immigrant and who is a claimant
for ancient rights.

The tendency is always to obliterate the traces of alien
origin, to drop alien phonetical habits and alien use of grammar and
[773] vocabulary as soon as possible. On the other hand, myths of the place
of origin will still be transmitted to the children, so that anyone
collecting tales among the Orokaiva will be presented with a variety
of versions of different local origin. Many of the best ones I collected
were of Kiorota origin because the father of old man who told
the stories came from that district about 45 years ago. Furthermore,
the links with the place of origin are rarely broken off, not even in
the case of women or babies who were abducted as war captives. The
immigrant wishes to keep alive his land rights in his place of origin.
The people of his native village in return wish to exploit any advantages
there may be in the connection between their absent clansman and his
hosts. This connection will be kept alive by further intermarriages.

Immigrants and their descendants therefore retain multiple
167 loyalties. As these loyalties are kept alive over the generations
563 by intermarriage, use of trees in the other village, fishing and
hunting rights, and as migration used to be very common before the
pax Australiana, such multiple loyalites are extremely common. I am
not quite sure how these loyalties fared in time of war, but I understand
that if two men who were linked by such relationships found
themselves on opposite sides in a war, they were unlikely to fight
each other though stories are told of unfortunate accidents. I have

167 already pointed out the usefulness to a village of such men of multiple
loyalties because they were the natural ambassadors if something
563 needed to be negotiated between the two groups.

It will be seen that the effect of the eruption on the homo-
geneity of Sivepe has been minimal: one stranger came into the community
621 through marriage. The ideology engendered by the resettlement villages
167 did lead to some accretions in Sivepe population over the last decade
before my visit, but these accretions (from Binduta and Garombi)
would hardly make the population heterogeneous. These migrations were
over a very short distance, short enough to allow migrants to maintain
gardens on their own land, and were facilitated by existing agnatic
and cognatic links.

CHAPTER IV: Acculturation at the Time of Resettlement

177 My concern in this chapter is not to discuss acculturation in general, which has been done already in earlier chapters, but to consider the variations in degree of acculturation that existed between individuals and groups in the sample villages. This is an issue of some importance as the main line of change has not been so much that wholly new culture elements were introduced between 1951 and the present (though there were some of these, too) but that culture elements accepted by an élite in 1951 have become generally accepted today, while other elements again are now in the stage of being accessible to an élite of the younger generation.

There are many innovations which can be adopted by Orokaiva only on a village basis. I have already referred to the changes in house design; such changes were never made individually, though less conspicuous changes (the use of nails rather than bark twine) may be [881] made by an individual. The abandonment of initiation ceremonies can likewise occur only on the basis of a corporate decision. At Sivepe they were abandoned after the war; on the other hand, girls' puberty seclusion and the subsequent ostentatious "coming out party" continued. Also, male initiation was widely replaced by a custom called a "birthday party" which was given to every boy of the age of nine or ten. [583] Similarly, the inclusion of money in bridewealth is an innovation which, once made in a homogeneous community, is bound to become standard [436] practise. In Sivepe the first such payment was amassed in 1950 and the median payment has been $24 since, without much upward trend, while in Inonda the leading family raised the rate well above this.

On the other hand, much change was the result of individual decisions which were gradually followed by enough individuals to make them into a change of general norm. Thus, girls' puberty seclusion used to last from three to six months; today, it often lasts no longer than three weeks while in Inonda, I was told, it is still shorter. In Sivepe, girls are usually still at school when the first menses begin. The Australian school teacher was most disturbed about the mysterious disappearance of his senior girls at this time and their dubious excuses when they returned to school, which however they did not always do. Until I told him, he did not fully realise that puberty seclusion was still practised in the villages; nobody had told him as they feared he might try to stamp out this custom. Some individuals keep their daughters secluded for months, even today.

At the time of the eruption no baptisms had yet occurred at 797 Inonda, and only one, as far as I can find out, in Sivepe--and this 788 man settled at Agenahambo later after a failed marriage. For the Inonda people, the nearest school was at Seva, and one boy (now the

871

871 government driver) had gone there and continued at Martyr's school at
Sangara. He survived because the mountain erupted during the school
holidays. At Sivepe, some children had started going to the Jasembata
school, opened in 1945, but attendance was irregular. Nonetheless,
there were few people under 30 in 1966, who had not had some schooling.

177 Goods such as meat, sugar, tobacco were known in Sivepe at the
time of the eruption, and bought in trade stores; some people used
[262] European pots and others used clay pots. By 1966, all regular production
of clay pots in Sivepe had ended; they were not even included ceremonially
[263] in bridewealth. It was always the young men, away on labouring jobs,
[276] who introduced the innovations in material culture, who brought their
mothers and new wives European pots, who came home flaunting European
[415] clothes, who first used nails in building their houses. In Inonda, at
the time of the eruption, the young men were already wearing "trousers";
[291] in Sivepe, this came later, at the time of the local government council.
In both villages, this same association was stressed: the European
cloths were accepted for village wear at the time the council started
and the example was set not only by the bachelors returning from town but
also by the councillors themselves. There was a councillor resident
in both villages in the years immediately following 1956; it was their
influence that tipped the balance in dress innovation.

At the time of the eruption, cash cropping had not yet started
245 at all in Sivepe, but at Inonda, one man (the father of the present
177 government driver) was already selling coffee for which he was paid
$3 per bag by the government. The government also bought copra from
him which he prepared by breaking up coconuts and drying them in a
fire. He stopped this trade at the time of the eruption but resumed
in 1954. In Sivepe, coffee growing started in 1956 on two "company"
plots. It was in other words a community activity rather than a case
of individual entrepreneurship. Rimoldi (1966: 84) reports that
individual coffee gardens started in 1957 only after patrol officers
advised against having jointly operated ones.

191 It is not easy to say just how much linguistic knowledge had
been absorbed before the eruption, or even now. If one asks a man
what languages he knows, he lists all those he has had contact with
on his travels; always Motu, not infrequently Pidgin, and also often
an assortment of New Guinea languages marking the spots where he has
worked. Wherever a man works, he learns some of the language, but
his knowledge rarely passes exacting tests. Orokaiva men who said
they knew Aiga could not actually translate the Aiga texts I taped
into Orokaiva. It would be most interesting to do research on the
actual knowledge of these Papuan polyglots. In a country where so
many languages are spoken, communication between persons with different
177 vernacular is a crucial process. There is no doubt that travelling
Orokaiva make a great effort to adapt themselves to the regions they
visit. If they have personal contact with their employers, they learn
a great deal from them too. From the data I have presented it is plain
that travel has been the major acculturative influence among the Orokaiva.

177 It is always the individuals who have travelled who are responsible
for innovations either by setting a personal example or by persuading
the community.

I have not yet referred to the deepest acculturative influence
657 that was absorbed before the time of the eruption, namely the abolition
177 of inter-village warfare. Pacification had effects in all aspects of
culture: the kinship system, economic, religion, politics. It would
take a full monograph to trace these manifold effects satisfactorily.
The other major change of the early colonisation period, the introduction
of steel tools, was the subject of a recent book by Salisbury. I
have already pointed out that Waddell does not accept for the Orokaiva
Salisbury's thesis that the introduction of steel tools liberated a
vast amount of leisure time thus bringing many luxuries within reach
of the people. Waddell points out that the time now spent on cash
cropping is about equal to the time gained by the use of steel tools.

It is useful, however, to consider more broadly what have been
the effects of, not only the technological changes, but also the
political and ideological ones. By 1951, the Orokaiva had learned
and--in the ward of the 40's--rediscovered the magnitude of white power
and the need to respect it. They had also learned how vast were the
resources of white power and to what extent some of these resources
could suddenly become available to the Orokaiva, as happened during
the American army operations. They had seen that congenial relations
with white people were possible in certain circumstances, as during the
[556] war. The acquisition of wealth and power comparable to that of the
white people had become a generally recognised objective. Only the
[484] means by which this end could be achieved were still obscure. The
Orokaiva therefore began to value highly any opportunity to travel,
to observe the white man and his ways and those who had travelled
were accepted in the village as persons knowledgeable as to the means
of pursuing wealth and power.

Developments since 1951 provided increasing opportunities for
[731] gathering this knowledge. The evacuation camps and resettlement
villages provided precisely the kind of experience for which the
Orokaiva had been searching. If the eruption had occurred two decades
earlier, the response to European relief measure would not have been
so prompt and cooperative. Somehow the experiences of the 1940's,
with the rapid influx of foreign goods, the opening up of employment
opportunities after the war, the establishment of numerous village
schools had made the Australian rulers appear less threatening and
stimulated a desire for further contact which was apparent in Orokaiva
reactions to Australian post-eruption policies.

CHAPTER V: Familiarity with New Homeland

648 In spite of the pax Australiana, Orokaiva still view with some apprehension visits to villages of traditional enemies, if friendship has not been explicitly established between visitors and host village. In 1951, this feeling of apprehension was even stronger than today. I [609] was told that in pre-contact times a man would be extremely rash to visit a village where he was unknown as he might well be killed. Even then, however, it was sufficient protection if a visitor was able to ask by name for a kinsman or friend resident in that village. This person would then take the visitor under his protection and he would come to no harm in the host village.

A story about a football match held in Sangara shortly before 648 the eruption demonstrates the dangers that existed even then. A 721 Sangara team had visited a village in the Gona district and had defeated its hosts at football. On the way back home, a member of the team fell ill and died from blood poisoning. The Sangara people attributed the death to sorcery by the defeated village. When shortly afterwards this village visited Sangara to play the return match, the Sangara came to the football field armed with hidden knives, guns and pineapple clubs, intending to kill their guests. A bloodbath was avoided only by a thunderstorm during which the match was cancelled.

In these circumstances, it is understandable that the Sangara 731 and Isivita people were unhappy about their evacuation to camps in the 609 coastal region after the eruption. It was not, of course, the specific instance just quoted that made them uneasy but a general apprehension of danger. Certainly, deaths and illness occurring in these camps were very liable to be ascribed to sorcery. This is no doubt one reason why the government lost no time in closing the coastal camps down and bringing the inhabitants back inland, placing them in temporary accommodation in Popondetta end April, even before permanent resettlement villages for Sangara could be planned.

648 The camp at Ilimo did not create the same kind of worry, as Orokaiva has no reason to fear sorcery on the part of the Ilimo people. The Sivepe people feared no harm from Ilimo because two Sivepe families had friendly and kinship relations there, while there was no history of hostility between the two places. Ilimo, furthermore, was near some European plantations where people of Sasembata district at times found employment. While the Sivepe people were in the camp, they were on visiting terms with the village people. It is important to realise that the pivot of the friendly relations between these two villages were a small number of individuals who were linked by formal bonds. Of the two bonds, one was affinal while the other was a friendship bond based on contact between a Sivepe plantation worker and Ilimo village people.

CHAPTER VI: Addition and Loss of Community Members

161 Though the population of Sivepe has increased between the years
1951 and 1967, this increase is less than might have been expected
after the settling in Sivepe of two additional Jegase families and
[166] six Sorovi households. An analysis of Table 16[A] will show that the net
population increase in 16 years corresponds very closely to the increase
due to the immigration of 15 Jegase and 26 Sorovi people into Sivepe.
The 1951 figures showed 40 children who, today, should range between
the ages of 17 to 35; 15 of these were boys. Looking at the present
Sivepe population, we find only six men of that age group and only
three of these were children in Sivepe in 1951 (the other three are
immigrants). This depletion of the 17-35 year age group is one of the
most strking features of the present population structure.

The second striking change is in the number of children--there
are almost twice as many of them in Sivepe today as there were in 1951.
[758] It seems likely that this increase should in part at least be due to
the improved health services: the monthly clinics, with the possibility
[165] of immediate referral of young children to the Saiho hospital, do save
167 a number of lives, even if the mortality rate is still high.

The migration of young women into and out of Sivepe is a
166 continuous process due to virilocal residence; a far more significant
[591] demographic process is the outflow of men as a result of labour migration.
Rimoldi reported that ten male siblings and sons of householders of
[464] his (Jegase-Timumu) sample were employed outside Sivepe in 1962; in
1966, I found that this figure had risen to 12. I have only included
men who had been residents of Sivepe and who had left, as adults, to
find work. By this criterion, it would not be possible to class
absent brothers and sons of Sorovi men as "labour migrants from
Sivepe," as these men had never lived in Sivepe at any time but had
[619] been residents of Garombi before they became labour migrants. There
were, at the time of the survey, no labour migrants of the Seho clan.
[177] The fact that Jegase had many labour migrants while Seho had not even
one certainly accentuated the relative dearth of contact with the
outside world that characterised Seho. On the other hand, we should
not read too much significance into it. It so happened that the Seho
men came from very small families; most of them actually had no adult
brothers living, and though they had many children, the only adult
children they had happened to be girls. Thus they collected a disproportionate
amount of bridewealth but could not contribute much to the
external labour market. The Seho men were not actually as cut off
from the world as these statistics might suggest: all had sisters'
sons and sisters' husbands, real or classificatory, who were labour
migrants; two had themselves been labour migrants earlier in life. In

A [See Cat. 116, p. 225--Analyst]

167 a village as small as Sivepe, statistical samples will sometimes show freakish features of which the sociological significance should not
166 be overestimated.

Nine of the 12 labour migrants came from two of the families,
[468] namely the family of the village constable and that of the man who was councillor for Sivepe over the years following 1956. The other migrants came from three further Jegase families. The reason for all these movements was, of course, the absence of employment opportunities
[873] close to Sivepe. One absentee from Sivepe was a boy of the Seho clan who was at a secondary boarding school (Martyr's school, at Agenehambo).

Dissension was the reason for both the major migratory movements into Sivepe. The two Jegase families who came to Sivepe around 1956 were originally residents of a hamlet near Bindute called Korinasusu. All the other families of Korinasusu belonged to a different clan (Usohu). Conflicts between the groups arose; one Jegase man felt sure that deaths in his family were caused by Usohu sorcery and left. Another Jegase man was then accused of sorcery against Usohu and
[621] decided it would be wiser if he left too. At one time, such families might have set up a seperate hamlet, but the government pressure
[657] towards consolidated villages led to their settlement at Sivepe, where there were a number of other Jegase families.

I was not able to reconstruct precisely what led to the Sorovi migration. Two of the men who settled in Sivepe were brothers of the Garombi feast leader and the other men were linked with these two by affinity or close friendship, as well as common clan membership.
[593] It is a general principle of Orokaiva family structure that the oldest brother in any family has absolute control over the family land and other family assets; he takes the place of the father. There is no sort of appeal against his decisions. He has the duty to "look after" his younger brothers and see that they prosper. If he fails in this task, the younger brothers have only one recourse; namely, to leave. In practise, the oldest brother is often compelled to divide up the patri-mony when such a split-up occurs. Certainly this is what happened in the present case. The younger brothers renounced their elder's protection and started out on their own. Again, due to government pressure, they joined an existing village rather than starting a new one, as they might once have preferred.

Sivepe was chosen for several reasons. One of them undoubtedly was the link that existed through the three women from Ajoro who had been captured and taken to wives by men from Garombi and Sivepe. The descendants of these men regarded themselves as bound by common ancestry, because the three Ajoro women were regarded as being closely related (nobody could say how, but the fact that they came from the same village was said to be sufficient). This was a link between Sorovi and one lineage of Jegase; there were also specific links with a Seho lineage. Furthermore, as was often emphsised to me, there were links of hereditary friendship. Also, the families had land very close to Sivepe.

657 Garombi was a somewhat delapidated settlement. The government
and the council were said to favour its dissolution and incorporation
621 into Sivepe and Binduta. This project was favoured by Sivepe which
was keen to enlarge its size. Sivepe could see that under the modern
166 dispensation, the greatest favours always went to the largest villages.
167 The large villages had shops, water supplies, a club house; the coffee
truck stopped there, and so on. There was also a prize for the most
improved village; here, too, size was thought an asset. In council
elections and many other contemporary situations, size meant power.
Sivepe was therefore eager to absorb these families, hoping that more
would follow. During the year of my visit, there were several meetings
about this with Garombi people; rumours of further migration were
hopefully spread around.

161 In contrast, Inonda slightly dropped in population in the period
under consideration. There was the same rise in the number of children;
[464] there was little loss through labour migration (only one man in 1962;
as Crocombe and Hogbin report; and still only one today). The decline
[166] in the number of households was due to dissensions; the households
shifted to neighbouring Ureo and Hohota. Perhaps this decline may be
[621] explained by the strong leadership exercised by one family--socially,
economically and ritually--so that anyone who fell out with that family
more or less had to leave. In contrast, Sivepe has several strong
personalities who had to make compromises with one another. Sivepe's
post-eruption development was shaped not by one dominant figure but
by several, each making a specific kind of contribution. Certainly,
there was factionism, but there was also balance between the rivals.
In the next two chapters, I shall deal with these two kinds of
internal pressure: the character of the key personalities and of their
rivalry.

CHAPTER VII: The Role of Mediators in Development

Section 1: Expatriates

I have referred, right through this report, to certain individuals 121 who seemed to play a key role in development. The study of these key (128) individuals can be adequately carried out only if there is some team work, preferably in the field, with the cooperation of a psychologist. My own approach in this chapter is wholly impressionistic and probably of little scientific utility. Nonetheless, the phenomenon of the mediator, who often appears in a crucial role in situations where values of a newly dominant culture are being transmitted to the newly dominated, is an important object of study in a sociologically oriented 177 analysis of culture change. In an earlier work (Schwimmer, 1956) I developed the thesis that between the two interacting cultures there stand a number of people whose position is best described as one of double opposition: they find themselves in opposition to their culture of origin and also, inevitably, to the strange culture they are seeking to influence and adapt, or to borrow from.

This thesis presented an oversimplified picture. An Australian expatriate, when in contact with Papuans, certainly, almost inevitably, sets up as a champion of his culture of origin and, consciously or unconsciously, pressures the Papuan to adopt it. On the other hand, my definition of the mediator also implied that this expatriate, in contact with his own people, sets up as a champion of Papuan culture. On the surface, this is very far off the mark. I have attended a number of expatriates' social gatherings and found that there was an almost compulsive tendency at these gatherings to devote the time to bemoaning the supposedly grave and irreparable faults in the Orokaiva character. If we are to cast these expatriates in the role of champions of Papuan culture, we are forced to go beyond the conscious level and thus trespass dangerously on the preserve of the psychologists.

177 One of the most fruitful sources for such an exercise (in this report I shall confine myself to the barest outline) is found in the 657 writings of C.A.W. Monckton, resident magistrate of the Northern District in the first decade of the present century. Though Australian administrators of today regard Monckton's methods with some horror, I would still regard him as, in a deeper sense, a prototype of the Territories administrator; he is more ruthless than those I met, but also more candid and more deeply involved in Papuan culture. He was extraordinarily influential: the Orokaiva fear of the white man, their unremitting vigilance when a white man comes close, the cat-like caution with which the white man is often evaded, can all be traced back to a

177 large extent to the bloodbath of these early days. It was he to whom,
657 above all others, the compulsive show of obedience Orokaiva make to
white men can be attributed. It is therefore interesting to inquire
what was the influence of Papuan culture on Monckton.

In order to show the atmosphere in which Monckton operated I shall quote a minor example (bypassing some cruder and more obvious passages of his books in which he describes shootings, floggings, tortures, etc.) where a sorcerer is brought before Monckton's court, accused of such crimes as causing a virgin of a distant tribe to produce still-born twins and causing the moon to alter its course and colour. Monckton advised the accused, so we are told, to plead "not guilty." "But I am guilty. I should not be much of a sorcerer if I could not do a little thing like that." In such cases, says Monckton (1922: 98). "The sorcerer would get a fine or a few months' imprisonment," Monckton explains that the New Guinea administration made witchcraft a crime punishable by law as a means of establishing respect for white man's law in the eyes of the Papuans.

[431] Monckton was very well aware that he was thus lending himself to a reciprocal transaction in which each side proffered the other a certain measure of prestige. The white man was most graciously given by the sorcerer a demonstration of his respect for the white man's law; in return Monckton (quite consciously, by his own admission) helped the sorcerer to "establish his reputation as a man capable of marvelous things, a man to be feared and conciliated with gifts" (ibid.: 99). On what basis, then, was the white man's law respected? It was on the principle of exchange which dominates and has always dominated Orokaiva social relations. (On this topic, see my doctoral dissertation.)

Monckton always bought his loyalties in this precise fashion. On one occasion (1934: Chapter 1) he invoked Papuan help to kill off a few troublesome marauders on the tacit understanding that the captors would be allowed to eat them. He appointed as his constabulary persons of high rank from various districts so that the Papuans would be afraid to kill the constables: their death might induce their own people to start a tribal war against the killers. In return the constables knew that their own villages would be quite safe from Monckton's bloodthirsty attentions. Furthermore, Monckton tells us that he was in the habit of making presents to his constables, paid for out of his own pocket, over and above whatever was supplied by the government. With these presents, he bought a kind of personal loyalty which was over and above that owed by the constables to their employing government. On one occasion his constabulary marched into Government House to protect Monckton while he was the guest of the governor.

Monckton admits that he made himself rather unpopular with the officials of Port Moresby. Neither the crudity of his methods nor the means by which he procured the special attachment of his praetorian guard were regarded as proper in a British officer. Some of his exploits, 657 177 such as his threat to chain some recalcitants to corpses they had refused to bury, never entered his official despatches; other exploits led to a series of inquiries and finally to his being edged out of the service.

While Monckton's methods were never practised again by senior officers in the Northern District, the tendency for the field men to become involved with Orokaiva ways of thought and thus incur the displeasure of Port Moresby has persisted. The Higaturu Council's land registration scheme, dreamed up by Popondetta public servants, is a case of that tendency. In this case land title deeds were issued which had no validity in law but which the district commissioner would protect with his strong right arm, much as Monckton would have done most efficiently. The arrangement was repudiated by higher authority in Port Moresby. Very often relationships between white employers and Orokaiva exist on two levels: an official level where wages are paid for work done and an unofficial level where the Orokaiva receives some small extra gifts and rewards his employer with some special loyalty. These "buckshees" are a regular pattern for which some allowance is made when calculating labour costs.

657 731 [466] A second and completely different type of expatriate was Mr. Kaad, who was in charge of the Ilimo evacuation camp. He neither relied on threats of dire punishment nor on the Orokaiva system of exchange bargaining. He came to the Territory in 1942 with the Army and stayed to become a patrol officer. He was soon seconded with the Department of Labour. It became his task to educate expatriate employers whose methods of treating their labour conflicted with the government's plan of improving relations between Australia and the Papuans. In particular his task was to advocate better methods of labour control than corporal punishment which had been extremely prevalent. Orokaiva informants told me that in fact corporal punishment on plantations ceased after the second world war. Mr. Kaad later became an Assistant District Officer. At the time of the eruption he had just come back from leave to move to a new post, when he was chosen for the delicate job of looking after the evacuation camp.

His task at Ilimo, as he saw it, was to help the recovery of people who "had their world shattered." He was greatly in sympathy with the new policy of promoting Papuan economic development and tried hard to make the resettlement villages he set up into foci for development. At the same time he was always flexible and ready to place the interests of recovery from shock above the interests of reorganisation. Shortly after, he was crippled in an accident. In 1967, he was teaching at the School for Pacific Administration in Sydney, training future generations of patrol officers in techniques of social and economic development which he practised before he knew them theoretically.

657 177 Most of the other expatriates who had dealings with Sivepe and Inonda moved quickly into anonymity. The roles played by a succession of government and mission servants were undoubtedly key roles, but their contact with the particular villages was too casual for their

177 individual names to become part of village history. The anthropologists
who had been in the two villages, under the auspices of A.N.U., were
[657] all very well remembered by name. When we included in a questionnaire
a request for the names of Europeans our informants knew well, we were
[125] given a list including all the anthropologists, by their first names,
and nobody else. This was almost a standard reaction. I am not at
all sure that this close acquaintance made the anthropologists into
key figures in development or that they were more influential in socio-
economic development than the mission and government servants who,
though anonymous, may have achieved more in this direction. A.N.U.
personnel have made presents of coffee hullers, both in Sivepe and
Inonda; one anthropologist taught his key informant in Inonda to drive
a car, as a result of which this man found a permanent job with the
administration. These certainly were tangible moves in the direction
of economic progress.

177 I found that among the Orokaiva, unlike the New Zealand Maori,
I was never asked my opinion when some community decision was to be
123 made nor was any greater interest displayed in the views of my predecessors.
I was usually told when something had been decided (and decisions
almost always seemed to be reached in my absence) and naturally I
always expressed pleasure at receiving the information. The pattern
was different only when I myself was directly involved. On the other
hand my participation in community activities was sought and much
appreciated. Our behaviour was closely observed and some minor
innovations in housekeeping (the making of washing lines, airing of
blankets, etc.) may be due to my wife. Everybody seemed concerned
that our presence should not disturb the precarious balance of power--
and that we should be given no power. This suited my own purpose.

If the anthropologists may nonetheless perhaps be classed as key personalities, it is because Orokaiva attach special importance on the kind of relationships that are thus established with whites. I have already mentioned some hints we received that we might be returned ancestors; even if imagination does not go so far, the daily relationship established with the anthropologists comes close to what Orokaiva would regard as tolerable and human. It is in the texture of life that grows up between the population and the anthropologist rather than specific innovations that the importance of his visit lies; perhaps without realising it, he nurtures an ideology.

875 One of the significant mediators during my time in Sivepe was
the head teacher of Sasembata school. His case will provide an example
657 of the dangers of generalising about expatriates who are in fact an
extremely complex group very imperfectly known. This man, aged about
28, had led a somewhat bohemian life in Australia, as a photographer,
broadcaster and advertising agent. His decision to join the New Guinea
mission was in part a conversion, in part a search for identity, in
part a search for an assured place in the world. He married a mission
teacher met in New Guinea. He found, in fact, that none of the fixed
expatriate categories quite fitted him: he had absorbed, while in

875 657 Australia, enough of contemporary thought in literature, art and allied subjects and enough general sophistication to fit only with difficulty in the society of missionaries, planters and officials. At the same time he was drawn to these groups because of his feeling that by coming to New Guinea he had joined the "have's" and left the "have-nots" behind. Though his bohemian background made him critical towards the colonial attitude to Papuans, he faced a difficult problem in working out his own. Both his own ambition and his wife's background (closer to the mission norm) predisposed him to avoid identification with the Papuans. On the other hand, when I met him, he still felt a little uneasy at playing the pukka sahib role which was certainly a betrayal of earlier principles. He was beginning to run into some difficulties with Papuans on the mission station and in the villages. During the year of our presence in Sivepe, he found what seemed an excellent solution by being elected a member of the Higaturu Local Government Council.

647 666 Though membership is open to persons of any ethnic group, it seemed at first as though Orokaiva would not vote for an Australian candidate. After all, they are well aware of the dangers of having their local affairs controlled by foreigners. But as the election [123] approached, attitudes changed. Quite early, they had asked me to stand, but I excused myself as I would not be staying long enough. A little later, the mission teacher heard that if he offered himself, he would get some support. He went to the villages of his ward on an electioneering tour and defeated the sitting member with a comfortable majority. [829] The motive of the electors, as I was told, was that this energetic young white man would be a good champion for Sasembata causes in a council which, in pragmatic terms, was still largely dominated by an Australian advisor. Furthermore, Orokaiva were well aware that their own power over the mission teacher had increased considerably since he depended on them for elective office. He and his wife could no longer treat any callers in an offhand fashion, for were they not also voters?

Section 2: Papuans from Other Districts

177 In our discussion of expatriates, we have shown that some kind of identification with Papuan values occurred in many of the most influential; this identification could either be positive, when the expatriate identified himself with the interests of the Orokaiva, or negative, when the expatriate used procedures not acceptable in his country of origin but effective in furthering his own interests in opposition to Orokaiva. For the Papuans, employed as pastors or in similar roles, and therefore resident among a strange tribe, the position was more complicated. Such a Papuan was not principally a mediator between his own indigenous culture and that of his new

177 environment, though he fulfills that role as well, as we have seen in the case of the introduction of the *kere*. The cultural values he has the duty to transmit belong to the expatriate culture of which his own knowledge is bound to be somewhat superficial. He therefore has three cultures to manipulate, not merely two.

777 The most senior, and by far the most influential of these mission people was the pastor. Unlike the others, he did not permit 177 himself to gloat over the superiority of coastal culture; in my own interviews with him I found his attitude towards Orokaiva culture to be consistently one of respect. He would point out differences between Orokaiva and his own people, but unlike the deacon and the teachers, he would do so with objective detachment. He felt very much the burden of his role as the local representative of God.

At the time of the eruption, he was a mission teacher, but shortly afterwards, he was sent back to Dogura for some years' training for the priesthood. Upon his ordination, he was sent to Sasembata in 1955. At that time only a small minority in Sivepe and the other villages had been baptised. By 1963, he had drawn almost everyone of his parish area into the church. He told me that this was not a trend peculiar to his parish; in 1963, there had been a great many baptisms throughout Orokaiva territory, and pagans had become quite a small minority.

A paradox in his position, to which I have already referred, was that though people were very cooperative in church work, attended his services, his special meetings, provided labour and materials, accepted his adjudication in quarrels, had him bless their guns and always showed him the highest respect, they would not give him land even on a semi-permanent basis. I have explained what I think to be the reason for this, but it was hard for the pastor to accept. He was threatening to leave and go to another parish where he could get some land. To him this was as symbolic as to the Orokaiva: it seemed unjust that after doing so much and being so familiar with the language and culture, they should insist on treating him as a stranger. Indeed, if he had settled as a private person, it would have been very harsh.

In Inonda, there were currently no key personalities of this category. Religious services were conducted by a local man. The 177 retired Sangara mission teacher, however, had definitely been a key 777 personality from the time of the eruption until his retirement in 1959. Though he was an Orokaiva, he belonged to a tribe which had been the most dangerous hereditary enemy of the Inonda people and before whom they had had to flee from their traditional territory around 1910.

The teacher, whose baptised name is Moses, was called Kusmale at birth, his namesake being his father's father. The latter, so I was told, was named in "the old way": it was the name of an enemy who had been recently killed. Moses went to school, was trained as a mission teacher in Dogura, and took up teaching in 1922 or 1923. He taught in his native district (Sangara) until the Japanese invasion, after which he closed school and went into the bush with the rest of

177 797 the people. When the Japanese were gone he went back to his old village; around 1946 he took over a school at Sewa, established after the war in a hitherto heathen area. Moses told people to build school rooms, houses for the teachers and a church. The people worked hard on these projects because they wanted to send their children to school. The school served a number of mountain villages in the vicinity of Sewa.

After the eruption, Moses, who had fled to Inonda, was transferred by the Bishop, first to the mission station at Gona, later to Togahou. About 15 months later, he was posted to Inonda, following an appeal from the Sewa people to the Bishop. This group had not had schooling since the eruption. At Inonda, Moses asked for a house to be built for him as well as a school. His pupils included children not only from Sewa, but also Hohota, Hiriju, Ureo, Mosou, Ajoro and Dobuduru. [582] Two of his daughters married Inonda men, one married an Ajoro man. When the Sewa people returned home, Moses stayed with his affines. With regard to gardening land, he is essentially no better off than the pastor at Sasembata. His Inonda affines lend him gardens from year to year. He also plants gardens at Hohota, owned by affines and a deacon. (See Crocombe and Hogbin, 1963: 33-35.) After he retired from teaching in 1959, his status soon dwindled. Crocombe (1966) has published an account of an initiation feast he held for his daughter's son. In keeping with his former role, this was given a highly acculturated flavour. It was on a larger scale than most of such feasts; Crocombe thought this was "to reaffirm his prestige and reinforce his stake in the village of his residence." (Ibid.: 78)

This was the man who brought Christianity to Inonda and the surrounding villages and who thus, in the context of culture change, must certainly be ranked a one-time "key personality." Yet his present status is demonstrably marginal. It is better than the Sasembata pastor's because he has affines to call upon, but the obligations of affines are strictly circumscribed: marriage gifts, help, if necessary sustenance. All these have been well provided; the affines have been good, even generous. Nor need the pastor fear for his descendants: they will be helped, in the usual Orokaiva way, by their paternal [423] relatives if they stay in Inonda or Hohota. But gifts of land are not regarded as an appropriate reward for missionary services rendered [431] by individuals.

Section 3: Residents of the Community

177 Among the key personalities in Sivepe over the period under consideration there were resisters as well as promoters of change. Among the resisters was undoubtedly Isemba, leader of the Seho clan, who died (unbaptised) in 1963. While this man was alive none of his clan joined the church; he did, however, agree with school education. [797] I was not able to learn much about him except that he was most knowledgeable about the holding of feasts and their magic and that he feared
[754]

177 his powers of black magic would be undermined by the church if he
joined it. It seems likely that it was in part his influence which
[777] made Seho less inclined than Jegase to make outside contacts.

One of his sons, however, did leave the village to join the
[754] A. P. C., returning at the time of the eruption. It was this son (the
second in seniority) who was chosen by Isemba as his successor to
the leadership, as he had fallen out with the oldest one.

177 This son, baptised under the name of Lawrence in 1963, is now
about 50 years of age, proud and withdrawn, and is both the feast-
623 leader and the "committee" of Sivepe. His land holdings are relatively
extensive; he has lent some of them on a year-to-year basis to mission
personnel. He refuses to sell any of this land to the mission nor
[420] will he lend gardens to the mission as organisation. He may help an
individual teacher; when that teacher leaves, the land reverts to him.
At one time a teacher left just before the taro was ready for harvest;
Lawrence took the land and the taro; if the successor of the departed
teacher felt upset, he regarded this as a problem for the mission.
For Lawrence, this was a grave political issue: if one such land
transfer was agreed to, he felt this would effectively mean permanent
occupation by the mission of all areas loaned by him.

In spite of appearances, this implied no anti-mission attitude.
Lawrence was most interested in the benefits the mission could bring
and supported the move of Sivepe to a location on Seho land, six
chains from the mission, partly because he liked to be close. But
he pursued a careful policy of balance of power. The same pragmatic
approach marked his relations with government. He was among the first
to acquire coffee trees and Malayan rubber trees; he was, as I have
already said, a staunch advocate of the government's village improvement
policies, but when the patrol officer called his one concern, as
"committee" was to see him happily and speedily on his way again,
preferably without incident.

During the year, the women's club wanted some land for their
club house. He was on friendly terms with the secretary, who was
his elder sister's grandchild and offered an ideal elevated site,
between village and mission station which would have made the village
entrance most impressive. He was a man who thought of things like that.

Lawrence has nine children, three married and three single
[665] daughters and three young sons. One of the daughters, rather against
his will, married the most acculturated of the younger Jegase men; if
such a thing as factionism existed at all in Sivepe, he and this younger
man were clearly cast in the roles of opposing leaders. The second
daughter married into Kongohambo, a mile from Sivepe. The third married
a Samara man employed at Ilimo, but this man was said to maltreat his
wife. Lawrence went to Ilimo and brought her home; this was regarded
as quite proper even though bridewealth had been paid.

623 Lawrence was comparatively well off, largely because he was a
good coffee producer, but also because he received bridewealth from
177 three daughters, continuing gifts from his sons in law and from the
471

177 husbands of his sisters' daughters, as is customary. Most of all, he
was a careful man who put whatever he accumulated to the most prudent
623 use. In his capacity of clan leader and village leader, he controlled
471 two corporate savings accounts, one of $158, the other smaller and
secret; people had full confidence that deposits were entirely safe
in his care. Though he would never express himself in such terms, he
was actually leading his people into a state of solid and (hopefully)
economically viable peasantry.

[illegible] asked him what he thought were the qualifications of a leader.
177 A leader, he said, must be very smart and understanding, have a lot
623 of garden and make a feast; then the people will join him. They don't
appoint him but he stands out by his farming, gardening, feasts. He
[157] is usually an elderly man.

Not only Lawrence, but also all other informants insisted that
leadership was not hereditary, even though a leader may desire a certain
son to succeed him. After the old leader is dead, the living are free
to make their own decision. Lawrence rejected the idea that the
councillors are the present leaders of the community. The ancestors,
he said, decided what people ought to do. They had talked all this
over. Then the "two-bob councillors" came; all they care about is to
carry out the government's orders. They don't really direct the people.
All the same, Lawrence was well aware of the influence of the councillors.
It was when they were established, he said, that the old way of thinking
was upset. The village constable did not make impatant changes, though
sometimes people went to jail for some trouble. In spite of these
views, Lawrence went to no particular trouble to keep old customs
alive; when he entertained Togahou village, there were far fewer
ceremonial features than I saw at a feast at Inonda.

As an informant I found him entertaining but of limited useful-
115 ness. He was at first very reluctant, and later allowed himself to
be interviewed, using the occasion as a battle of wits. Never once
did he tell a direct lie, but his answers were cunningly planned with
the intent to mislead. My part of the game was to get at the truth
and in this game he was a most ingenious opponent. Sometimes he tried
to conceal what seemed to me a most innocuous piece of information;
thus, he alerted me to institutions I might otherwise have overlooked.
No statement he made could be accepted on its face value. In this he
differed from other informants less in intent than in ingenuity.

The other key personalities at the time of my visit were all
123 Jegase. As I had been apportioned to my clan, they were much more
159 helpful with information. They adopted me as a sort of fictional
clansman whereas to Lawrence I must have been a fictional affine. My
closest associate in the village was actually the son-in-law Lawrence
[559] disliked, Robert, my neighbour. He was a man of about 32 who had most
of the qualities admired by the Orokaiva: a fine dancer, with charm,
modest bearing, wisdom and foresight in handling social situations and
conflicts; he was generous with his possessions and did not importune
others for gifts; he was a good gardener, builder and worker, ready

123 to help others; he spoke softly and gently but when necessary could be
firm and tough; furthermore, he had a relatively wide experience of
554 the outside world. He had been a hunting leader before this task
was transferred to the representative of the church council; he was
159 also a leader in football. He came of a lineage with small land
holdings in the Sivepe area, but his father had bought rights to
additional holdings (with money Robert had earned) and his mother's
brother had given him the use of other blocks Robert will eventually
inherit.

159 When we came to the district he had just started his new house and was living, like many others in a small older one he had brought from Old Sivepe. He sold us his new house and stayed in the smaller one until we had gone. Though his house was thus among the most primitive in the village, it attracted more village visitors than any other; Robert and his rather attractive wife were popular. When the woman's club house was to be built, and when Lawrence had given the land, it was Robert to whom the women turned as a work leader. It was also Robert who decided that the work on the village houses and the mission hospital had more urgency (and that the clubhouse had better wait until it had ceased being a pawn in female factionism). Robert went to Port Moresby for a few months after a violent episode in his tumultuous marriage, hoping he would earn enough money to open a trade store.

He had about four years of working experience outside the village,
as a houseboy, with the A.P.C. and on road work. Since then it was
his ambition to start in business; in the early sixties, Jegase seems
to have made some attempt at a trade store with disastrous results.
He hoped to do better the next time, but a trade store opened up in
an offshoot of Sasembata village just next to Sivepe, so that this is
destined to remain a dream. Robert composed several songs over the
year, and was constantly practising his drum. People usually waited
for him before a dance practise could start, though he was not formally
the dance leader. He also managed all the diplomatic maneuvers
necessitated by our presence. He did this with great honesty; I
[123] could always rely on all he said. Indeed, if it had not been for him
and his father, I wonder whether I could have come to grips with Sivepe
[115] at all. He also piloted us through the maze of the Orokaiva exchange
system. He was the only person who never imposed on us, never asked
for gifts. There was perhaps some calculation in this, as we were
more disposed to respond to generosity than to the sharp trading
engaged in by some others.

He had stood as a candidate for the council two years earlier but had been defeated, partly due to opposition from his affines. His first formal leadership role (apart from hunting and football) was as representative for Sivepe on the land adjudication committee. His father-in-law would have been better qualified, as he knew the land boundaries better, but he could not hold both committee posts simultaneously. It was interesting to see that in this situation, where the

159 external representation of Sivepe was at stake, the two men worked together admirably as a team. Lawrence solved the tricky problems of partitioning blocks shared between villages with a speed which would make any surveyor envious, and got agreement from the other parties because the solutions he proposed seemed fair. Robert carried out his own function of seeing that the working parties came together, that the clearing work was done for the survey posts, and so on. However, when I took them both to Popondetta in my car, they had very little to say to each other. When I told Lawrence who his companion was to be, he gave me a look of mock despair. (He had a different look of mock despair for my use of the Orokaiva language.)

[829] Robert was more deeply involved with mission values than any
of the others. He was the only one to have recognised that our
civilisation actually does have some moral values. I recorded stories
[126] from a great many informants on tape--the subjects being usually
[129] selected by the informant for these longer texts. Robert was the only
one to have chosen themes overtly showing a mission influence: one story was about a Father Holland who was betrayed to the Japanese by Orokaiva during the war; the other story was his own version of Adam and Eve and the Fall, to which he gave a splendid Orokaiva twist: God, dismissing the couple from the Garden of Eden, said: "For a long time you will have sorrowful days and be sad, but also you will have happy days and be happy. Thus he spoke and all of us today live in this manner."

571 To conclude these impressionistic sketches, I shall suggest a
contrast between the leadership of Sivepe and Inonda. When we consider
157 the two men just described, or Samuel, the village constable, Robert's
father and the councillor, an immigrant from Binduta, we notice that none of them stood out from the rest of the village by superior wealth. Certainly, Robert's father once gave a big feast in Sivepe; he had some savings and gave another small feast while I was in the village, but he stood out mainly in virtue of his role and his personality. The councillor was a consummate actor who exuded a great air of authority while he was in the council. But in Inonda, the village constable, Oriri, was at the same time an entrepreneur, the first cash cropper. He was also the occupier of a strikingly larger area of land than anyone else had. His son, Stephen, the driver, likewise was very much an entrepreneur, both in his cash-cropping ventures and in his attempt at a trade store, at trading in coffee, in vegetables and lately, his application for a loan to start a cattle farm. He is not intending to do the farming himself, but wants to have a younger brother-in-law trained, and he is to work under Stephen's supervision.

Both Stephen and Oriri still continue their interest in traditional observances. The father, who lives on a returned servicemen's section where he grows cocoa, came back to his home village to act as feast leader in 1967. This was very much a traditional affair, with a proper feast house, a ceremony to call down the spirits, chants and dances for the spirits for several weeks, something Sivepe would

571 not care to do with the mission quite so close. On this occasion the village looked more harmonious than I saw it at other times; the pagan
157 half was fully able to join in.

The main difference in leadership--the premise of equality in Sivepe, the "big man" complex (see Sahlins, 1963, etc.) in Inonda--is probably attributable to an organisational difference between the mountain and coastal villages. In all my contacts with coastal people I have noticed the same posture of the "big man" among the persons of high rank. In the Sasembata district, however, it is not so easily tolerated if a man tries to stand above his fellows. There was a talented entrepreneur in Hamburata village, but this man was more interested in heading a cooperative than in purely private or family aggrandisement. There are, however, cooperatives on the coast also, and the case of Inonda may not be a typical one.

Section 4: Marginal Individuals

157 In this section the attempt at comparing the two villages broke down. This was because Inonda had as far as I know only one outstandingly marginal individual and shortly after I arrived they put him in
[685] jail. He had broken into a store with a hammer belonging to another villager; the other villager was apprehended by the police and successfully proved he had been framed.

124 In Sivepe, there were several marginal individuals some of whom became key personalities, I think, mainly because of our presence.
157 Both our interpreters fell into that category. One of them was an unmarried mother and therefore already marginal. She was also
123 extremely intelligent, knew English rather well, was the secretary of the woman's club. Her position was weakened because her father and mother were both dead; the father of her child came from her father's village; she therefore had been sent to her mother's village. Here she reached prominence in the affairs of the women's club and as our interpreter (she always translated holding or feeding the baby, but most reliably) but her position in her mother's brother's house was a delicate one and she had to leave her mother's father's house where she lived earlier. Although she was attractive, and only 22 years of age, her chances of marriage were thought extremely dim. She exploited to the full the chances of power provided by her association with us, especially in the earlier period when I understood no Orokaiva at all.

The other interpreter, also about 22, was Robert's younger brother. While Patricia, the women's club secretary, was extremely gregarious and adept at handling people, Leon, with a Standard 6 education, and the leading male expert in the English language and other school knowledge, was unusually shy. He was hardly ever seen talking spontaneously to any of the married men. He heartily disliked the interview situation and other duties that would draw him into the public. This tendency

124 was much less marked when I took him with me to Inonda. He was a
bachelor who had a penchant for courting girls he was, for some reason,
123 unable to marry. While we were in Sivepe, his girl friend, though
belonging to the Seho clan was rather too closely related to him on
157 her mother's side. Her father was Lawrence's elder brother and the
Seho clan generally was strongly opposed to the union; they therefore
[582] treated the affair as incestuous. The mission had wanted to send
Leon for training in hospital work. He had been doing some of this
at Sasembata, and it would have suited him. His father opposed the
idea, considering that his knowledge of English, etc. would be too
useful to lose. When I came, his calculation proved right, for Leon's
presence and employment drew me, for some months, into a position of
much dependence on that family. Leon was the only young man who did
not join in the drum dances, and who never sat with the other men.
Perhaps, his bachelor status partly explains this, but another bachelor
of the same age did not keep away to nearly the same extent.

177 One difference between Inonda and Sivepe was that in the former
place there was only one family through which adaptive ideas and
184 decisions were transmitted to the community, and in practise only one
man, whereas in Sivepe, there was a variety of influences: the Seho
leader, the two older, and in many ways totally different older Jegase
leaders, and several younger people each with their own fund of experience
which helped them to interpret a changing social situation. This
difference results not only from a different organisational pattern
(based respectively on the "big man" and the equality ideology) but
also from the mere difference of size. It may be argued that some at
least of the multitude of avenues through which the modern world was
made accessible to Sivepe was due to post-eruption measures in the
resettlement villages. Of the leaders discussed here, however, not a
single one (except the two young interpreters who were scarcely leaders)
was educated in the post-eruption period. They may have been influenced
[797] by their close association with the mission; if so, it is hard to say
to what extent this association explains their present attitudes. One
may safely say that the association with the mission at the present
time reinforces the change-directed ideology of Sivepe leadership.

CHAPTER VIII: Factionalism

In the preceding chapters I have invoked a number of principles
121 of classification with the aid of which I have divided the sample
621 communities into a number of what are in the last resort arbitrary
categories: religious categories (pagan-Christian), political categories
(clans and lineages), ethnic categories (Orokaiva villagers and
non-Orokaiva mission teachers), generational categories (age groups),
acculturational categories (which sometimes coincided with the other
categories already mentioned in personnel). It became apparent that
all these categories were to some extent socially significant: we
found, for instance, that the Inonda pagans are distinguishable from
the Inonda Christians by having different economic objectives, a
different level of Western education, smaller access to economic
resources (land, etc) while they also belong to different lineages from
the Christians. We also found, however, that the line of religious
division by no means coincides with a generational division, nor do
pagans necessarily have less experience at work outside the community.

621 In Sivepe we found political membership groups (clans) which
showed marked differences in certain acculturational indices (work
665 outside the community, knowledge of other languages, exogamy, etc.)
but little difference in other, probably more crucial ones (land
resources and cash cropping activities). We found ethnic differences
between mission teachers and villagers to be mainly significant in the
context of political and status rivalry between the station and the
villages. At various points we found differences in customs as between
generations, but we also found that at Sivepe, the category of male
adults under 35 is almost absent; and also, that when these younger
people do return to the villages, their elders are apt to imitate them
in certain respects. They thus become channels of acculturation.

I should perhaps have added that in this respect, as in most
others, the Orokaiva practise a subtle bargaining of customs. The
younger men come back with money and assets which they find are soon
distributed, under one pretext or another, among the less affluent
villagers. They have to "help" when called upon; they have to respect
the existing system of social obligations. This is a pattern the younger
generation has never successfully challenged in Sivepe, though perhaps
it was easier to challenge in Inonda, where there is a "big man" as
665 leader. Another classification, namely between male and female,
should also perhaps be briefly considered as, under the impact of the
562 women's clubs, men and women could occasionally be seen to behave as
political membership groups.

This political division between men and women was, of course,
on a rather superficial level. It was not seen in Inonda at all, as

665 the women's club there was a concern of the acculturated faction and
562 arguments about it were on factional lines. But in Sivepe, it was quite a novelty for the women to have a political cause of their own (they had to inveigle the men into building them a clubhouse) and they discussed the various ways in which they could exert pressure (refuse to sleep with them, etc.). All this was on a rather unserious level, although the secretary of the club, whose circumstances I have described, depended rather heavily on the club for a secure status in her new village. Later, when all the women were practising the kere every night, the same tug of war re-established itself. Traditionally, married women do not dance much or at all; some husbands grumbled because the wives did not stay home in the evening, came home very late, left them with the babies, made a "lot of noise." In all this, there was a feeling that the status of women was rising--and the mission encouraged this as well as the government. More important, the women were acting as a group, under a leader, which may not have been common at an earlier time.

To what extent can one speak, in these villages, of factionalism?
121 This term is used in a bewildering number of ways. Ralph Nicholas has recently tried to clarify it by five nominal propositions: according to him, factions are (1) conflict groups, (2) political groups, (3) not corporate groups. Faction members are recruited (4) by a leader and (5) on diverse principles. (1965: 27-29) Nicholas stresses that factions, in his sense of the term, lack the permanence of corporate groups, and that they may, in fact, arise in just one conflict situation, to evaporate again soon after. Alternatively,
665 they may last for a very long time. I noticed a profound difference between the working of factions among the New Zealand Maori and the
[171] Orokaiva. When a conflict situation arises among the Maori, including any disagreement at all between two persons of different families, familiar alignments at once reassert themselves. The lines of cleavage tend to be predictable; furthermore, a large number of people are apt
[578] to take sides along this predictable lines of division. Among the Orokaiva, each side tended to have only a small number of predictable protagonists. The rest would remain indifferent, and if the conflict became serious enough for them to participate, the alliances, at least in Sivepe, were hardly ever repeated from one occasion to the next. Factionalism in Sivepe was therefore, to a large extent, fugitive.

There were, of course, disputes that would divide the whole of a village along clan lines, or that would divide a larger body of contestants along village lines. I would tend, with Nicholas, to speak here of conflicts between corporate groups rather than factionalism.

Yet there are confusions here that still need to be cleared up. What Nicholas calls a "corporate group" is corporate only in respect of certain functions, even though these may be very diffuse, as in the case of kinship groups. But if conflict occurs over matters arising

665 out of acculturation, such conflict falls outside the charter of the corporation, so that I think one may still speak of a Christian and a pagan faction, even though the membership of these factions happens, for the time being, to coincide with the membership of lineages. Another problem is whether factions can exist only where there is leadership. One of the interests expressed in Dr. Barnett's list of variables is in "latent factions"--and these may exist where one side (or perhaps even both sides) have no leader. Thus, I think one can speak of factions in Inonda, even though the pagan faction had no leader; this deficiency did, however, stop factionalism in that village from becoming more manifest. Nonetheless, even though the pagans had no leadership comparable to that of the ruling family, they had their own informal ranking system and were able to formulate common opposition, e.g., against the women's club. This informal leader was an elderly woman who terrified my wife but whom I later found to be an intelligent informant. Even in Inonda, factionalism did not go nearly as deep as among the modern Maori: the feast at Inonda rallied all the families and the factions became submerged, in a cause with which everyone agreed.

Perhaps, the main reason why Orokaiva conflict groups do not qualify as "factions" by Nicholas' definition is that they are not structurally diverse. I mean by this that conflict groups tend to rally on one particular issue, but that on any other issue the personnel are bound to be different. An interesting example is furnished by
[623] the elections for the Local Government Council. A respectable Sivepe
[666] man entered as candidate and collected six votes. These were from his own extended family who felt bound to vote for him. The others did not support him on that occasion, but on another occasion, when he attempted to rape the wife of a clansman when drunk, he had a great number of supporters and the family who had almost suffered this grievous misfortune had hardly any supporters at all.

CHAPTER IX: Adherence to Tradition

Section 1: Conflicts Between Two Conceptual Systems

181 The Orokaiva of today has to act in conformity with two
conceptual systems, one attributed to the ancestors and the other
177 imposed by the mission and, to some extent, by the government.
Essentially the system followed today is that attributed to the ancestors,
but changes have been very numerous. These changes have mostly been
conceptualised as substitutions and additions of the old system,
leaving its essentials intact. At the same time, these substitutions
have been calculated to ward off criticism from mission and government,
and to cope with changed conditions.

551 There is, for instance, a taboo on using the names of affines.
When the government pressed for the amalgamation of villages, affines
178 frequently found themselves residents of the same village, which
made the name taboo very awkward. The custom now is that the taboo
is greatly relaxed for Christians; the baptismal name has only a
mild taboo attached to it, while the severe taboo on the Orokaiva
name bestowed at birth has remained unchanged. In dealings with
Europeans, who do not respect the taboo (even though affines of a
person are present), only the baptismal name is used. In the village,
the Orokaiva names are now heard very rarely indeed.

464 The temporary labour migration of young men (who sometimes
leave wives behind in the village) continues a traditional pattern of
167 behaviour as young men used to go out in the same circumstances to
178 hunt heads, but it is money they now bring back before they settle
down. Bridewealth gifts have remained conceptually as they were
before: there must be a pig or pigs, bark cloth, ritual valuables
178 such as shell necklaces and feathers, cooking pots, but in addition
583 new wealth is necessary: store clothes, "knives and forks" (i.e.,
kitchenware) and money. Here again, a change in detail has not changed
the basic conception of the gift but rather has updated the details.

There used to be a ceremony to which a boy was subjected at
852 or just before adolescence. This was the time when the boy formally
178 assumed clothing. The boy used to be given his perineal band (bo)
by some adult male cognate, often the man by whom the boy had been
named. (Williams, 1930: 98) Nowadays, boys wear clothing much earlier
in life, but the ceremony is still held as an occasion for honouring
the child. It is now called a "birthday party"; as such it has the
blessing of the mission while at the same time an essential part of
a boy's life cycle is preserved.

796 The same pattern is found in the dancing which occurs nightly
177 before a major feast is held or before certain initiatory rites (like
the *kere*) are concluded. These are now referred to as "practises,"
[535] even though they are undoubtedly ritual acts in their own right. It
is also significant that the Orokaiva seasonal rites have been fitted
in as part of the Christmas and Easter observances, apparently as an
exotic appanedage, but in fact as a means of preserving traditional
religious obligations, even though in a changed form.

657 The same service of two masters is sometimes seen in the secular
sphere. People built lavatories, on official instructions, long before
[514] they dared to use them (for fear of sorcery). At Kendata, an hour's
[754] walk from Sivepe, I saw a village with new houses, built on the govern-
ment's instructions, but I was told nobody lived there except when
[361] there was a visit from the patrol officer. There are many such villages
in the Managalasi district. Here, government instructions are being
complied with but customary patterns have persisted. In Sivepe, not
very much show needed to be put on for the patrol officer. The place
was cleaned before he arrived, of course, but not significantly more
so than happened every week.

123 It is true that certain things were concealed from me in Sivepe,
but these fell largely into some simple and reasonable categories:
secrets known only to initiated men, secrets known only to members
of a family or of the Seho clan. It was not a practise of the people
to pretend to adhere to a custom they had abandoned or to pretend to
881 have abandoned what they were still practising. In the early days of
our stay, this did happen; it took some months before we discovered
that girls were secluded upon their first menstruation and then ceremoni-
ally exhibited. We were told this custom no longer existed. But then,
we had referred to the custom with reference to what Williams said
about it; and in that form, perhaps, it was not or no longer practised
[841] in Sivepe. Later, I was told that if the ceremony was not performed
girls could not control their menses; there would be no way of stemming
[783] the flow of blood and everything would be polluted. Thus, the ritual
has persisted. Whether full-grown girls, completely naked, are carried
through villages at the present time I very much doubt (vis Williams,
1930: 207). I was told that these customs lasted until the second
534 world war and then were abandoned. But I found the word "abandoned"
always a dangerous one; the calling down of spirits with bullroarers
782 in preparation for a feast (viz. Williams) was also, according to
Sivepe informants, an "abandoned" custom; yet it happened in both
178 Inonda and Urariture (a mile from Sasembata mission station) in 1967.
It was true that it had not been done in Sivepe for some time--not
since the middle fifties--and that there was no immediate intention
of doing it again. On the other hand, Sivepe knew the use of bull-
roarers as a means of calling down spirits which would then be
present at a feast and give this feast magical potency. For the time
being, Sivepe people evidently feel that this procedure is unnecessary
for the achievement of their immediate ends but it is still part of the
store of available possibilities should a need appear to arise.

121 Much depends on the success of the policies now being advocated
by the government. If these are successful in raising living standards
and hold promise of yielding the wealth and power expected of them
(that is, a gradual increase of wealth and power), then the direction
of change observed since the war will continue to be followed. People
will then be willing to make ever more drastic modifications of old
ritual and finally, perhaps, the traditional conceptual system will
break down in favour of a different system. On the other hand,
Orokaiva are not unprepared if these promises remain unfulfilled and
if living standards should actually drop again, a possibility by no
means to be ruled out as the economic future of New Guinea export
products is very uncertain. In that case, millennial movements, relying
on traditional magical procedures, are an ever-open possibility.

177 At the present time, Orokaiva are not taking a defensive
position about their abandonment of old customs, as they regard this
a reasonable consequence of accepting the "new day." Nor do they
act defensively when they observe traditional custom. They reinterpret
such observance by means of the kind of ambiguities I have outlined.
[154] In fact I cannot conceive of any situation in which an Orokaiva will
behave defensively. I would not call their ambiguities rationalisations
either: when they use terms like "birthday party" or "practise,"
they are not rationalising their ceremonies as part of a new Christian
way of life but they are merely saying that these ceremonies are
capable of bearing a second meaning, in the context of a Christian
system. Upon further inquiry, the anthropologist finds that his
informants can explain the original system in much detail whereas a
concept such as that of a "birthday party" in the Western sense is
left in a total vacuum, as the day and even the year of birth of a
child is hardly noted.

Section 2: Controls Operating for and Against Continuance of Tradition

In an earlier chapter I described a ceremony for children
852 about to start their new school year. It was a kind of farewell feast,
177 which certainly made the children feel that they were off to an
important assignment to an alien world. But it also carried a second
kind of message: that the world of the school begins outside the
857 village boundaries. When the children came back to the village (which
177 was every night) they resumed their ordinary roles in the Orokaiva
scheme. The children felt no conflict of loyalties inside the village;
village life had been sufficiently adapted to remove glaring inconsistencies
between the rules of village and mission station. It was a little
124 different for my interpreter who had been to Martyr's School and who
therefore knew various Christian concepts unfamiliar to other villagers.
177 This made him feel a little superior when he talked to me; he would
tell me what "the others" believed, adding that he knew how matters

124 really stood. In this, there may have been a certain hollowness;
I never saw among all the Orokaiva a young man who was as scared of
177 his affines as this one. One reason why I employed the young woman as
second interpreter was that nothing would induce him to open his mouth
when I wanted to talk to his classificatory father-in-laws. In all
significant respects, then, he offered little challenge to accepted
tradition.

Children were trained by their parents in the prevalent system
867 of custom and belief, as modified by recent changes; they maintained
869 their traditional regard for their elders, not regarding their school
knowledge as giving them any claims to superiority. Their elders did,
177 as far as I know, make no use of the knowledge their children gained
at school; my two interpreters were the technicians when letters had
to be written or other newfangled problems solved. Everyone in the
621 village, including ourselves, were expected to fulfill reciprocal
obligations in the community; the acculturated young were certainly
571 expected to help their kinsfolk, especially if their knowledge had
602 yielded cash. Even those absent on jobs in town were always asked
(and occasionally expected) to help. There was only one partial
escape from community obligations and that was to live outside the
village. Migrants knew that whatever possessions they had amassed
away from home would soon have to be shared out if they returned to
Sivepe. While they were away, they could more often refuse demands
with impunity. But they knew that unsatisfied claims tended to be
stacked up against their return. Some claims were purely try-ons.
I have myself been the communicator of such claims from a Kongohambo
man to his kinsmen in Port Moresby; I could see that the response
to some of them was merely hearty laughter. But others,
communicated at the same time, were taken seriously; some gift had
to be made.

The penalty threatening an absentee who neglected his kin had
[626] to be paid when that absentee returned; especially when that absentee
[423] wanted to resume possession of his land holdings. Little would it
benefit him that certain lands had been left to him by his father, for
during his absence, other men had been "looking after" them. If he
had neglected these men, his rights would be hard to reassert; the
community would give him little sympathy. If he had been generous
during his absence, he could be strong in his claims; his relations
would then show him benevolence. Rights could be kept warm only by
constant exchanges; a moratorium of more than one year begins to be
risky. While a man is in town, the exchanges seem unequal; money or
clothes go to the village; some taro are sent to town (when I went to
Port Moresby I was given a sack of these to carry, to be distributed
by a knowing relative in town).

For those who remain in the village, the sanctioning mechanisms
626 are mostly informal. Failure in one's obligations means loss of
status, leads to gossip, derogatory remarks to one's face, perhaps
even a harangue at night by a man at the other end in the village.

693 The councillor, the court and the police are only a last resort in
serious quarrels. I saw a councillor enter a dispute once, playing a
627 mediating role between disputants from two villages, but without
playing more than an advisory role. One quarrel was taken to court,
but this was not a case where traditional mechanisms of social control
683 had failed. A woman accused her husband of adultery with one of the
new Garombi arrivals. She and the husband fought and had to be
626 separated as the lady had an axe; the domestic dispute soon died down
but the Garombi woman laid a complaint for slander with the police.
Before this came to court, the wife had been roundly condemned by
almost everyone in the village; she had repented, had gone round the
village to signify her regrets, and been as contrite as her pride
could possibly allow her to be. The court let her off with a reprimand.
The episode, far from suggesting a flagging of Orokaiva traditional
social control, had demonstrated to me that it was still effective.
177 Nonetheless, the Orokaiva, as so many other peoples in contact with
627 Western civilisation, have been quick to see the advantages of a
judicial system providing an impartial arbiter in disputes, to whose
decisions both parties will defer. At the moment, this western
judicial system is an additional resource of Orokaiva law, without
undermining its existing institutions.

CHAPTER X: Esprit de Corps

621 The problem of developing group consciousness in a new village,
created by aggregating the population from several villages in one
731 place, is a very considerable one under Orokaiva conditions. Each
village group tends to be a tight unit and it is a long time before a
feeling of unity will develop between the groups thus thrown together.
In a place such as Hohorita, which consists of the remnants of about
12 villages, the creation of an esprit de crops (in Linton's sense,
1936: 92-94) is a lengthy and hazardous business.

I was able to observe the same situation in Sivepe in 1966,
though on a much smaller scale. Sivepe, as I mentioned before, consisted
of a core of people who lived in Pamba before the eruption and two
groups who arrived since, one from Binduta in 1956 and one from Garombi
in 1966. The extent to which these groups have been "integrated"
into the village will appear at once if one looks at the spatial
[361] arrangement of the village. As I pointed out, the ideal plan of this
village was an arrangement of two parallel facing rows. Now all the
long-established families, with one exception, followed this plan,
but none of the new arrivals did. The Garombi arrivals built on a
piece of land just above the village, on land owned by a Sorovi man
who stayed behind in Garombi. The Binduta arrivals built next to the
Garombi ones, on attractive sites overlooking the rest of the village.
None of them followed the house plan decided upon by the rest. Thus
they gave all the appearance of a group apart, and the symbolic
significance of such behaviour would never be lost upon the Orokaiva.
When asked about this arrangement, people would describe it to me as
temporary.

621 In the daily presentations of food between residences, these
families would most often send food to one another, rather than to
[431] other families in the village, but this was natural, as their own
mutual ties were closest. At the same time, I recorded a reasonable
number of gifts travelling from the top of the hill down to the village
and conversely; there was certainly no rigid separation there. A
number of kinship and friendship ties existed between the new arrivals
and the older families; these ties were fostered by regular exchange
[578] presentations of one sort or another. I have referred to one conflict
between a Garombi arrival and a woman from the centre of the village.
This was an isolated case, as there was no sign of conflict between
the groups, nor did this flare-up lead to continued bad relations.
One could say that an esprit de crops was gradually forming, and that
the merger looked satisfactory.

621 On the other hand, the hazards were obvious when one looked
at the settlers from Binduta. When conflict developed, as in the
684 attempted rape case, the man from Binduta was in a weak position.

621 Naturally he was angry that his wife had been molested; his younger
brother who was rather fiery and quick to fight, was angrier still.
684 They both found themselves isolated as the kinsmen of the assaulter
took the opportunity of expressing their heart-felt views about the
two brothers, especially the pugnacious one who had successfully raped
a young Seho woman earlier that year. Both brothers said they would
go back to Binduta and the younger man actually did so. This shows that
their position in Sivepe was still somewhat unstable.

One of the objectives Sivepe had during the year 1966-7 was
657 to win a prize for the most improved village. This prize was awarded
621 by a committee of councillors and paid out of government funds. The
eagerness to align all the houses in two rows was partly due to this
361 desire to win the prize, though this was not the only motive. In
these circumstances, it was certainly evidence of esprit de corps to
fit in with the village plan and the objective of winning the prize;
it was also evidence of a lack of esprit de corps to ignore the village
plan altogether and build houses of inferior design in places where
they were extremely conspicuous. Yet this is what the immigrants from
Garoubi and Binduta did. Lawrence, and the others who were keen about
village improvement, accepted this situation with much tolerance,
though Lawrence did go up to the Garoubi houses one morning to talk it
over. No doubt he received assurances that something would be done;
the discussion was amicable enough. Yet this instance shows that the
amalgamating of villages poses organisational problems which place a
burden upon everybody: upon the old residents who must be tactful
and upon the new arrivals who will long continue to feel insecure.

CHAPTER XI: Epilogue--The Case of Hohorita

Section 1: Comparison Between Resettlement of Sivepe and Hohorita

731 My subject of study obliged me, both in Sivepe and Inonda, to
inquire repeatedly into the state of affairs in 1951. My informants
123 showed only limited interest in this line of inquiry. Robert, in
Sivepe, even began to tease me by composing a song about what he
considered to be an oddity of mine; every second line in this song
(which he improvised as we walked along the road) began with the words
"iji tiri pejetei" (the time when the volcano blew up)--I knew that
from that time onwards I could never use this phrase without looking
a little ridiculous. Such levity would have been unthinkable in
Hohorita. For most Hohorita people, the time of the eruption marked
the death of some, or many, of their closest relatives.

In the files of the Department of District Administration I
731 saw the official estimate of indigenous casualties in the eruption
(Table 1).A The toll of the dead from the Sangara tribe was evidently
[165] established by taking the total resident population of the Sangara
group of villages (1964) and subtracting from that total, 170 known
Sangara survivors. To these figures, 800 "Andemba dead" must be added
as these were also Sangara. According to these figures, 94% of all
Sangara died in the eruption. I have already pointed out that most of
the survivors either came from villages lying at the boundary of the
devastation area or happened to be away from home when the disaster
occurred. They escaped to Cape Killerton, were placed in an evacuation
camp at Oro Bay, shifted to Popondetta and in May, 1951, were able to
settle at the Northern edge of Sangara territory, in a village called
Irihambo where they found themselves under the close personal care of
Bishop Hand who encouraged them to build a fine new church. The
Bishop's purpose, as he explained to me, was to give this minute remnant
of the powerful Sangara tribe a sense of community, some hope in life.
[621] It was the people who chose the site for the village; the Bishop hoped
that later on, it could become a centre for cocoa production as climate
[361] and soil suits this crop very well. At that time, neither the people
nor the government seemed aware that the land occupied by the Sangara
[425] was no longer in law their property.

The whole block North of Irihambo as well as East of it had
been bought by the Crown around 1910, with the intention of encouraging
425 sugar plantations there, but this plan was stopped by sugar interests
in Australia. In the middle 1950's, a new plan arose to use this
657 extremely fertile area for cocoa plantations. Most of it was settled
in 1959 by Australian ex-servicemen, financed by a Credit Board
(Howlett, 1965). As this plan was in its initial stages, it was
discovered that the Sangara people were on the land and, in law, were

A [See Cat. 116, p. 205--Analyst]

425 trespassing there. Bishop David recalled, in my interview with him,
how amazed the people were that the land was no longer theirs: "What
657 is this business of our land being *sold*? Our *fathers* sold it; *we*
should be able to get it back." In spite of the Bishop's protests,
the people had to leave their new village. They then moved about two
[361] miles closer to the mountain and to the centre of their traditional
land holdings and chose the site of Hohorita. (The Irihambo village
used not only Crown land but also the land of a planter, Mr. C. E.
Searle, who tells me he never objected to the presence of the village.
The situation is illustrated on Map XIII.)[A]

The shift from Irihambo was a gradual process, during which
361 several groups set up new villages independently. Today, the population
657 of Irihambo is dispersed over six locations: first, two large villages,
one behind the other, which have now virtually fused into one and
together are known as Hohorita; immediately to the side of this, a
mission station, with a church built of bush materials, similar to the
one at Sasembata, but not of the superior standard achieved at Irihambo;
finally three smaller breakaway villages, called Sombou, Kakita and--
again--Irihambo. Though Hohorita people today are not ready to admit
it, they must have been very angry when they were told their Irihambo
land was to be occupied by white ex-servicemen. They pulled down the
beautiful church at Irihambo, much to the Bishop's chagrin.

Under the impact of the Higaturu Local Government Council,
Hohorita nonetheless gradually assumed the character of the other
modern resettlement villages; by June, 1967, the biggest of the breakaway
groups had joined the main village, which no longer looked like two
separate units but had been spatially integrated; the houses were
being aligned and modernised; in other more fundamental respects the
[177] Sangara people had become rather rapidly acculturated. By the criteria
used in the present study, acculturation had progressed rather more
[731] rapidly than at Sivepe, though also more unevenly. In many respects,
Hohorita had more difficult problems to surmount than Sivepe: the
death toll had left the tribe virtually leaderless; the resettlement
village was made up of the survivors of a dozen villages or more, which
made it rather heterogeneous; land titles were far more confused than
before the eruption; the establishment of an *esprit de corps* required
the forgetting of deep traditional intervillage antagonisms; a deep
sense of insecurity had been caused, first by the disaster and the
deaths and later, probably, to some extent by the failure of settlement
at Irihambo.

It was the general hypothesis of this comparative study of ten
731 displaced communities in the Pacific that displacement would lead to
accelerated culture change in some directions. This hypothesis was
177 tested by using, in each case, a control community, similar to the
relocated community but lacking the experience of relocation. In the
[121] case analysed in the present report, the experience of displacement at
Sivepe was comparatively mild in that the people soon returned to their
traditional land holdings and formed a village identical in personnel

[A] [See Cat. 116, p. End Map 12--Analyst]

731 177 to the pre-eruption village. Furthermore, the control community differed in minor ways from Sivepe both in ecology and in traditional social structure. Certainly this report has pinpointed a number of differences in the acculturation history of Inonda and Sivepe; it has probably been rather less successful in determining whether these differences are due to the displacement experience (and subsequent government and mission initiatives) or to the ecological and cultural differences which existed between the two communities at the time of the eruption, and which were further accentuated when Popondetta became the administrative centre, thus placing Inonda appreciably closer to the centre than Sivepe.

121 I made a study of Hohorita because I felt it would perhaps provide more cogent evidence. Here resettlement followed a cataclysm during which over 90% of the population died; furthermore, the ecology and culture of Sangara was very close indeed to that of Sivepe. I was struck, during my study of Hohorita, by the evidence of far more rapid acculturational changes than I found at Sivepe. Hohorita, to put it briefly, produced more intellectuals and also more coffee than other communities that had been less afflicted. This seems to suggest I might have done better to take Sivepe and Hohorita as my sample communities, as I would have been able to show more striking differences in spite of greater ecological and cultural similarities. I rejected this idea because my study would then have been methodologically anomalous in the framework of the total project in which the nine other investigators had used a different research strategy.

Nonetheless, the study of Hohorita is of very special anthropological importance as it shows strikingly how a primitive community reacts and adjusts to a cataclysm. The fact that the presence of the Australian government and mission provided the community with some additional adjustment opportunities hardly detracts from the interest of the case. It is impossible to do justice to the subject in this epilogue. Not only would this take too much space, but the time pressure under which this report is compiled also makes it impossible. As Hohorita has a population of 348, the genealogies, lists of educational, occupational, residential data, the statistical evidence of the inter-village relationships are all most complex and will need to be analysed out of 650 pages of field notes. These notes are at present no more than lists of names related to individual families. All I can do here is to give my own preliminary impressions of the material, coupled with general descriptive data. Nonetheless, I hope that I can thus show some of my findings from Sivepe in a broader setting and draw attention to a few basic issues.

Section 2: Physical Environment

The present territory of Hohorita stretches from near Mount
131 Lamington (an elevation about equal to that of Sivepe) down to Double
133 Crossing, which is about 600 feet above sea level. Rainfall at the
top of the territory may be close to that of Sivepe, but further down
132 it decreases--though I doubt whether it would fall much below 150 inches
per year anywhere on Sangara territory. The land yielded much the same
wild and cultivated crops as in Sivepe. Before the eruption, the
361 concentration of population was entirely at the higher reaches of this
territory, while the lower parts were used for hunting and other
subsidiary activities. Those who survived the eruption because they
were away from their villages were often hunting on this lower land.
Today, the pattern of occupation has shifted. The lower part of the
territory, near the new villages, is intensively used while the more
elevated land is used a little less and often for coffee rather than
subsistence crops.

731 The eruption has made minor changes to land contours: due to
the floods, the watershed of the Ambogo River was gouged out forming a
number of pools of stagnant water which formed a breeding ground
for mosquitoes and leeches. These pests are blamed on the eruption by
the local people. On the credit side, certain varieties of bananas
and pumpkins, planted before the eruption, had the opportunity to
grow wild during the year the land was unoccupied and are now thought
of as having been brought to the district by the eruption.

162 The total Sangara population today would be about 472--of which
350 live in Hohorita and the rest in the three other villages. The
161 total land holdings of this population extend over 3.5 square miles--
an average of about 135 per square mile. This places the Sangara in
a somewhat superior economic position to Sivepe, which has to support
at least 180 persons per square mile on land of the same quality. It
must be remembered that prior to the eruption, the Sangara population
was six times as large as it is today--so that Sangara must have
suffered a chronic land shortage. All the neighbours of the Sangara
are agreed that they were very warlike and dangerous enemies; they
probably were in frequent need of extra gardening land. Today, they
have enough land not only for subsistence gardening but also for a
somewhat larger cash-cropping programme than is generally found in the
Sasembata district.

621 The present site of Hohorita (see Map XIV)[A] developed in several
stages. First the Horeopa clan, which had the greatest number of
361 survivors and therefore achieved dominance, shifted to the front part
of Hohorita village in 1956. The mission station was established
next to the village, separated from the village by a small stream.
By 1958, all the Horeopa were settled in houses in the new village,
together with the Oripa clan whom they had asked to join them while
all the other inhabitants of Irihambo had shifted to the new mission

[A] [See Cat. 116, p. End Map 13--Analyst]

621 station. The Horeopa leader, who was the owner of this land, then
invited these other clans to come over and make Hohorita into one
361 united big village. When the clans came over in 1959, they followed
the same pattern as the Sorovi immigrants followed in Sivepe: they
arranged their houses so as to maintain, in a subtle but unmistakable
way, their own identity. They formed in effect a second rectangle
which formed a harmonious continuation of the first rectangle but which
was separated by just half a chain. In 1966, the front and the back
half of Hohorita held separate feasts, each inviting a different
village. In 1967, the councillor made plans to clear the gap between
the two halves, remove the two old houses which emphasised the separation
and build new houses in the cleared area to join the rows together.

Around this time, the Sombou people began to establish themselves
in Hohorita, leaving their old village behind. I think it was they
[764] who filled the gap between the rows. The councillor had long been at
pains to close down the small villages of Sombou and Kakita and Sombou
[775] was finally persuaded after the death of an old migrant who had remained
a pagan. As he could not be buried in the Christian cemetery, and
people did not feel disposed to carry out the full involved ritual to
placate the ghost, they preferred to shift their village. (They thought
that pagan ghosts are far more dangerous than Christian ones.)

361 Hohorita, like most resettlement villages, lies along the main
road to Popondetta, 11 miles from Popondetta, seven miles from Saiho
368 hospital, three miles from the Higaturu Council chambers. The school,
conducted by the mission on Hohorita station, offers an education to
the end of Standard 3.

621 The two feasts held in 1966 were intended to introduce into
Hohorita the pigless era advocated by all councillors. I arrived a
433 month or two after the feasts and by that time two very small pigs had
434 appeared which were there for a special reason I have forgotten.
Sombou and Kakita still had a normal complement of pigs. Coffee was
[231] a somewhat bigger enterprise in Hohorita than at Sivepe. The trees
were much better looked after, and there were far more of them. Every
[245] man had his coffee garden and an income of $100 per annum from coffee
was normal. Young trees were also being planted at a much faster rate.
[166] Compared to Sivepe, there were very few wives whose husbands were
permanently away working. The reason for this was that there are a
number of plantations quite close to Hohorita and those who needed
to work to pay off bridewealth, etc., could do so without going too
far afield. Money to pay taxes and other regular outgoing expenses
464 would come from coffee. Men who were able to find skilled jobs,
clerical or professional work usually had their wives with them. An
167 important resource of Hohorita, not shared by Sivepe, is the availability of good jobs within a reasonable distance; the fact that Hohorita
families do not break up in the same way as Sivepe ones indicates that
such separation is probably economically motivated. It is necessary
for a young man to earn his trophies, so to speak, which in the modern
world means money, but if he can do it without a prolonged absence
from home, he prefers staying home.

Section 3: Social Environment

619 In discussing the Waseta "tribe" I suggested that its boundaries
would be hard to establish and that it gave little evidence of any
sense of unity. The case of Sangara is somewhat different; first of
[199] all, Sangara speaks a dialect of its own that is easily distinguishable
from that of other areas. Secondly, a Sangara man is able, if he is
knowledgeable enough, to list some 27 villages which formed a loose
military alliance, and between which raids and organised ward did not
[582] occur. These 27 villages formed at the same time an area within which
intermarriage would regularly occur. The present population of Hohorita
and the adjunct villages is drawn entirely from this alliance. (The
number 27 is probably an underestimate.)

621 Since the government made Sangara the centre of the Northern
District immediately after the war, patrols were active in the Sangara
[659] district to amalgamate villages. A number of the people now living in
Hohorita report that they came from such consolidated villages, such
as Tunana, which absorbed three neighbouring villages just before the
eruption. Informants say that the clusters of villages joined together
in this way had always been closely related. The population of Hohorita
is more diverse. I was at first told that it was composed of households
of four clans (Horeopa, Oripa, Besupa and Sehopa), the first two clans
being in the front village and the last two in the back village. A
house-to-house census revealed representatives of a further eight
clans, sometimes survivors of clans that had otherwise died out,
sometimes a clan more fully represented in Kakita or Sombou while two
clan names came from the Sasembata district, under circumstances to be
discussed later. Furthermore, when a number of families came from the
same clan, they were not always from the same village. While Sombou
was inhabited by the remnants of one cluster of four villages, and
Kakita by the remnants of one village, Hohorita offered a more general
hospitality to all Sangara.

621 Because of their history, the four Sangara villages built since
628 the eruption form a rather tight cluster, quite different from the
intersecting circle pattern I described for the Sasembata district.
When a person in Sombou died, the whole of Hohorita rushes to join the
wake. All four villages in the cluster do this for each other, but
[731] not for any other village. Because of the sharp drop in population,
and the way the survivors were thrown together after the disaster,
people who were previously bound together only by a very loose alliance
now behave in the same way as a small neighbourhood cluster of closely
related villages.

Meanwhile, the Sangara people are rapidly developing friendships
and affinal links outside the tribe. In 1966, the front half of
Hohorita gave a feast for Koipa (a large Isivita resettlement village),
the back half gave a feast for Asigi, Irihambo gave a feast for Hohorita
while Sombou, with the assistance of Kakita, entertained the Uhuru'undi

621 of Hamburata. The Asigi people and the Uhuru'undi, both from lowland Northwest of Hohorita, were traditional enemies of Sangara but a number 628 of marriages took place joining the two places. I was told that before the war, Sangara girls would marry Asigi men but no Sangara man would take an Asigi woman. At the present time, at least three Hohorita men are married to Asigi women. On the other hand, the linkage between Hohorita and Koipa was less one of affinity than of inherited friendships, or feasting partnerships existing between individuals in both villages. I did not observe occasions when Sangara needed to cooperate at all closely with these surrounding population groups, in a common objective comparable to the building of the Sasembata mission station. The relationship seemed confined to traditional ceremonialism. Whatever modern institutions Sangara developed were kept within their [731] own tribal group. The evacuation camps did not throw Sangara together with other tribes, as they were kept separate in Oro Bay camp. Their warlike past made a mixed camp undesirable; the Isivita people who were also evacuated to the coast were placed a few miles away so that the groups would not fight or bewitch each other. But through feasts such as that in 1966, bonds are gradually being forged.

On the other hand, the evacuation camp did a good deal to lay 731 the foundation for the Sangara tribal unity we find today; it was in 619 the camp that the survivors came to know each other and to make plans for their future. Sombou village, I was told, arose out of talks in 182 the evacuation camp. Other bonds could be traced back to Martyrs' School where boys, both from the Sangara and other tribes, met together. Some met again at Cape Killerton, after the eruption and so friendships were consolidated which are developing now through inter-village feasts and similar functions. Sangara informants were always insistent on the "modern" nature of such friendship bonds, and on their rarity in pre-war times.

I did not observe contacts between Sangara and indigenous office 628 bearers from other districts and other parts of Papua. There were mission teachers and a medical orderly, but these men mostly came from the Sangara district themselves; this was partly because the Sangara district had produced a good supply of such trained people; because Sangara people did not take kindly to accepting the authority of people from other districts; because other Orokaiva were still too scared of the Sangara to be willing to live amongst them and attempt to exert authority over them. The Bishop would always decide, after a few unsuccessful experiments, to send a Sangara teacher or medical to go back from wherever he was and "lead his own people"--an idea which hardly ever appealed to the mission servant concerned. In fact, Hohorita village contains an amazing number of "retired" teachers and medicals who were posted back in this way and who decided the village [871] was more comfortable than the mission station. Thus the village contained a disproportionately high number of people with some education. While this gave the village a rather stimulating atmosphere and made nocturnal conversations far more interesting and entertaining than

628 I found them elsewhere among the Orokaiva, it naturally became no
easier for the mission station to lead the village.

During the time I was at Hohorita, there was no local medical
758 service because the officer appointed by the Health Department was a
759 Sangara who insisted that a house should be built for him before he
arrived. (Orokaiva are bound by law to do such work, in payment for
[653] government services rendered.) His kinsmen at Hohorita thought that
if he wanted a house, he should build it himself. The medical, however,
was in no hurry at all to go home; he stayed at his previous post for
almost a year after he should have been transferred. Hohorita
complained to the Health authorities that they had no medical; they
found that unless they built the house, no medical would be provided
but they would have to go to Saiho for service. Finally they yielded.
This was far from being a case of anomie: it was a battle about the
status to be granted to public officials at Hohorita.

653 In Sivepe, nobody would have questioned this status; they would
have built a house at once for any public official who would have
wanted to live there. But then, such a person would be bound to be a
stranger, not a person "like themselves." When a village has produced
a dozen or so public officials of one sort or another, the question
begins to look different: what is so special about these people that
we have to build houses for them? Furthermore, once upon a time, the
Sangara working timetable was rather flexible, but with cashcropping
on the Hohorita scale, and long walking distances between home and
work, the Hohorita people were rather busy earning money from coffee.
Time had become an economic resource.

This was a frequent subject of mild argument between me and the
other expatriates. The expatriates used to complain that the Orokaiva
were no longer willing to do any work (i.e., perform free services
such as I am now discussing). They thought that if the Orokaiva were
to advance economically, they would need to work much harder. I
used to tease the other expatriates by saying that this growing reluctance
to do free work for the government (roads, houses for officials, etc.)
was evidence for the success of the economic development policy the
expatriates claimed to be promoting. They thought this to be a sick
joke.

In an earlier chapter, I already referred to an unusual fore-
173 shortening of Orokaiva history practised by Sangara informants of today.
It is certainly remarkable that, according to Sangara, the Orokaiva
only began to make feasts _after_ the time of European contact, because
earlier they could not grow enough food to hold them. Statements of
this sort were made in two places (Sombou, Hohorita) by elders sitting
together in groups and instructing me. I have already explained how
such statements fit the traditional _structure_ of Orokaiva history:
original time / culture established by culture heroes / present day.
As the coming of the Europeans occurred more than two generations ago,
this event would seem to have been confused with the coming of the
[731] culture heroes. When I did, in a very innocent way, express my

173 astonishment about this kind of story, I was told in explanation that
at the time of the eruption, the old people could not run away and the
731 old people all died. For this reason, old customs and old knowledge
died also; those who were left behind--the children who could run
fast enough to escape--were forced to accept the new way of life as
they knew no other.

This suggestion of an abrupt break in cultural tradition is of
course in itself mythology. The continuity was obvious enough to
the observer. Nonetheless, the belief in discontinuity was an
178 important aspect of the modern Sangara self-group image. In the eruption,
Sangara lost the people who used to make the decisions, who used to
731 set patterns of behaviour. The survivors were forced to put the pieces
[595] together as best they could. Many customs vanished on the day of the
eruption, e.g., polygyny; those customs which survive in Sivepe, however,
mostly survived to some extent in Hohorita too. But when I asked my
Hohorita informants whether father-in-law still chased his son-in-law
with a firebrand this definitely appeared to be out of fashion. For
traditional knowledge as well as custom, Sivepe was the repository of
much that Hohorita had left behind. Almost all the mythologyhad
been lost; the dancing was much inferior because the people were so
much busier with their coffee; on the other hand, feasting ceremonial
[769] had remained mostly intact. Burial rites were no longer as Williams
described them but very much the same as in Sivepe, i.e., the essentials
were intact but a great deal of restraint had been introduced, the body
was no longer dressed and laid out in the traditional manner and, most
important of all, the widow was no longer expected to stay with the
dead man after burial.

184 In matters of food, clothing, housing and village improvement,
tools and skills I found most of the same features as in Sivepe. The
differences I found were, to some extent, in the greater availability
of money, in the larger number of educated people, the larger number
of persons who had migrated to towns where they held skilled jobs, the
intensive contact between this educated élite outside the village and
the educated élite inside it, and as a result, as far greater awareness
of ideological and political issues than could be found in Sivepe.
Stephen, the government driver at Inonda, had a sophistication comparable
to this educated group at Hohorita, but he was alone and exchanged
ideas only when he was in Popondetta, away from the village where
wider political and ideological ideas would have aroused little interest.

Section 4: Leadership in Hohorita

622 At the time of my arrival at Hohorita, the traditional leader,
a man called Amos, had recently died. After his death, he was revered
with much ceremony. Thus, during my stay, a naterari (Williams:
1930: 226) was set up, i.e., a post to taboo the coconuts and betelnuts

622 growing in the village and these were consumed in a big feast 18 months or so after his death. There was much discussion, during these 18 months, as to who should follow Amos as leader; when I left, no decision had been made. He had himself designated the son of his elder brother who died during the eruption, but this man is a government driver, living in Popondetta. The people would prefer a local man for leader, but there is no suitable resident member of Amos' own *hae*. and in practise it seems that the question of leadership was debated not so much by the people at large but by the men of Amos' *hae* and Amos' wife's *hae*--the latter also coming from a prominent Horeopa family. Some leadership roles were meanwhile being carried on by an adoptive half-brother of Amos' wife. This man, a mission teacher who was head of the Hohorita school, and one of my best informants (Harold Heru), was in charge of the preparations for the coconut feast commemorating Amos' death, but he deferred to Amos' brother's son (Michael) on the day of the feast itself, when Michael came over from Popondetta.

622 623 While these problems over ceremonial leadership were being pondered, it was obvious that for most ordinary day-to-day decisions, the most powerful man in the village was the councillor (Brian Aruha). Brian, though without any formal schooling, was employed by the government as an interpreter in the fifties. His employers formed a high opinion of him and it was probably not without their encouragement that he stood as a candidate for the Higaturu Council and was subsequently chosen by councillors as their chairman. In the view of senior government officials in Popondetta, Brian's knowledge of the history, activities and purposes of the council was unequalled in the district. He did not earn this reputation by craven conformity; indeed, I observed him at council meetings as a doughty opponent of the views of the government's advisory officer, even though he sometimes found himself arguing a strong case in a minority of one, for the other councillors tended to be rather deferential to the advisory officer.

622 554 Brian's power in Hohorita was much less absolute than Stephen's at Inonda because Hohorita has a far greater number of leading figures. On the other hand, in the judging of disputes and in arranging the land conversion scheme described in earlier chapters, he wielded more power than any single person in Sivepe. In contrast with the Inonda and Sivepe leaders, Brian did not belong to the leading clan (Horeopa) nor to either of the other three well-represented clan groups. His real home was Sombou; at Amos' coconut feast he appeared as the leader of the dominant Sombou clan and in that capacity received gifts in recognition of services which this village had rendered after Amos' death--the traditional services expected from a neighbouring, closely-related village. Thus the power he wielded at Hohorita had the effect of spreading power beyond the dominant Horeopa clan, thus helping in the integration of the different clan groups.

622 624 Brian was assisted by a "committee" man who also came from one of the smaller clan groups and who had at one time been a medical

622 orderly. This man, like the "committee" in Sivepe, was responsible
for the disciplinary aspects of local government--law and order,
624 hygiene, organisation of working parties. The giving of such orders
was not considered "fitting" for the councillor who kept aloof and
worked through the "committee" as intermediary while still making
the basic decisions. This dual control was convenient when, for instance,
the councillor wanted old houses rebuilt and set along a straight
line determined by him, while the people were not very enthusiastic.
It never became clear just whose authority was treated lightly; no
doubt the leaders are waiting for some excuse, such as a feast, for
pressing the urgency of renovation. The councillor was, above all,
the ideologist for the New Day.

794 Two other formal organisations in Hohorita pursued ends likewise
related to development. One of them was a church committee similar
474 to the one at Sasembata; the second was a cooperative known as
"Village Improvement" (in English) which was raising money for a
purpose yet to be determined. It might be a trade store or a truck.
454 By the time I left, this committee had accumulated almost $1,000, and
the purpose then had again been changed: the intention became to
452 invest the money under a government-sponsored scheme for village
"Savings and Loan" societies which follow the principle of credit
unions.

The composition of this committee was interesting: it did not
474 include the councillor, but consisted of the head teacher at Hohorita,
and a priest and a public servant both resident in Popondetta. All
452 three belonged to the Hwreopa clan but all three were, by residence and
profession, somewhat remote from the village way of life. A number
of the villagers who contributed expressed for this scheme the kind
of romantic enthusiasm characteristic of many Papuan cooperative
movements; it was seen as a means to raise the Papuan to the same
level of power as the European. I was told that loans would be granted
only for equipment of permanent value--sewing machines, house building
materials, lawnmowers, coffee machines and a vague and ominous category
described as "special things." There were 66 members.

It struck me that at Hohorita, in contrast to other places,
521 individuals and groups were keen to engage me in protracted discussions
on ideological and economic matters. It was evident that this was
not a mere show and that discussions of the same sort were frequent
also in my absence. It was at Hohorita that I first learned, and in
the clearest terms, Orokaiva views on race relations, on the significance
of the councils and cash cropping, on Africa, on the Americans.
Participants in the discussion were often the educated minority which
seemed to set the tone for social thought: the ex-mission teachers,
ex-medical orderlies, ex-drivers, ex-shopkeepers, etc.--a total of
20 men who had to some extent mastered some Western skilled occupation,
and who had chosen to return to their own village. Very often it was
the chance of cash cropping that had brought them back home, for they
knew that they could thus get financial security and a good life. Some

521 of them made frequent visits to Popondetta and there met urbanised
Sangara. A group used to meet in the hotel for what were often
political discussions arising out of current events and rumours. This
emphasis on the political and ideological reminded me of what I had
seen among the Maori, the Indonesians and what is reflected in recent
African studies: the kinship universe is crosscut by other ideas
presupposing a political centre, centralised power, fundamental social
and economic changes. The presence of Papuan public servants made
[474] much difference here. For instance, nobody in Sivepe, discussing
savings accounts, would have thought of telling me that there are
54 cooperative societies in the district only four of which are
Savings and Loan Societies. This group knew the pulse of the Northern
District in concrete factual terms while Sivepe relied on disconnected
phenomena that happened to drift into their ken and from which their
suspicions and hopes shaped an image sustained by the stories of their
councillor.

Section 5: Internal Influences of the Eruption

361 Compared to the two sample villages, Hohorita is a more densely
concentrated settlement, with 348 inhabitants in 41 houses. When I
621 was there, there were still two clearly separated araha; the dominant
clans of the front village section were Horeopa and Oripa; in the back,
[161] Besupa and Sehopa. But within each section, there was no striking
separation of the clans into "sides" as in villages in the Saesmbata
district. House distances were as at Sivepe.

614 In contrast to Sivepe, there is no tendency for clan groups to
fuse, 12 independent names being given to me. This number can be
621 somewhat reduced if we ignore those clan names represented by a single
family where the wife belongs to one of the major Hohorita clans--the
wife is then the "sponsor," in Fischer's sense, of the household.
Thus, two of the clan names given to me belonged to immigrants from
the Saesmbata district who had married into Sangara. For all practical
purposes their allegiance lay with the clan of their wives. The other
clan names were all Sangara, representing survivors from numerous
pre-eruption villages.

592 In household composition, the smaller settlements of Sombou and
Kakita rather resembled Sivepe, but in Hohorita three-generation
households were more common and bachelor's houses were not found.
[597] Furthermore, many children were left parentless through the eruption
and these were adopted by Hohorita households, especially by childless
ones. As a result, childless households in Hohorita are far rarer
than in Sivepe. A considerable number of marriages and remarriages
[423] occurred immediately after the eruption. The sharp drop in population,
furthermore, left Sangara with plenty of land for the survivors, so
that 25-35 year age group is far better represented in Horotia than in
Sivepe.

731 Immediately after the eruption, the Sangara people decided to
waive all bridewealth, so that a large percentage of the women in
[583] Hohorita were married without one. At the present time, bridewealth
is reinstated, and young men go to neighbouring plantations, which are
[464] plentiful--or else further abroad--to earn them. While many husbands
worked outside Hohorita, most of them were able to return home at
[595] weekends. Polygamy was pronounced before the eruption, but it seems
that the polygamists became victims of the eruption and polygamy no
longer exists as a recognised institution.

If the average educational standard at Hohorita is slightly
871 above that of Sivepe, the reasons are: better facilities during the
years 1945-1951, loss of many members of the older age groups in the
eruption, special efforts made by Bishop Hand at Irihambo to draw
Sangara into mission teaching. This higher standard is reflected in
the statistics of persons who at one time or another have been in
skilled occupations. (Table 21).[A] The persons who returned to Hohorita
434 did so with the express idea of making some money out of coffee; the
average income from coffee in Hohorita is certainly far in excess of
that in Sivepe (about $100 per annum).

Hohorita does feel that it is held back by the present educational
871 provisions which are little better than those in Inonda and much
inferior to those at Sasembata. (At Hohorita, there is no schooling
beyond Standard 3, whereas Sasembata goes up to Standard 6.) Hohorita
people compare the school unfavourably with the government school at
the Sangara resettlement block which offers Standard 6, and which,
furthermore, has more highly qualified teachers on the staff. My
own impression was that the head teacher at Hohorita is a very good
man; some of the criticism of him is no doubt due to spite, for he is
of local origin. Still, the general criticism of facilities at
Hohorita is not unjust.

621 Hohorita is less homogeneous in ethnic origin than the other
villages discussed, as the population is drawn from different parts
563 of the Sangara tribe and intermarriage with other tribes has been
582 frequent. The explanation may be found in the pressure, after the
disaster, to find mates when most preferred potential marriage partners
had died in the eruption. This breaking down of the endogamous emphasis
after wars and disasters is, as I pointed out earlier, traditional
among the Orokaiva.

Heterogeneity was countered to some extent by an arrangement
423 which was, according to informants, made by a popular meeting shortly
591 after the eruption. According to this arrangement women who married
outside Sangara, would be allowed the same land rights as though
582 they had been sons. This was done in an effort, so I was told, to add men
to the depleted Sangara population. Men would thus be encouraged to
settle on Sangara land rather than take their Sangara wives home with
them. Two men from the Sasembata district are now living in Hohorita
under this arrangement. They keep up normal exchange relations with
their home district, e.g., I know one of them lent hambo for the kere

[A] (See Cat. 116, p. 228--Analyst)

423 dance in Sasembata. But they enjoy very much better conditions than
are usual for men who marry uxorilocally.

591 The mortality among the elderly at the time of the eruption was
582 so great that many traditional customs and myths were lost among the
Sangara with the elders who knew them. For instance, rituals carried
on at birth in Sivepe are no longer practised in Hohorita. For the
731 rest, I did not see many differences between the villages in level
165 of acculturation. Housing conditions in Sivepe were better; money
was more plentiful at Hohorita. Dances were far more carefully
practised and more expertly performed at Sivepe. Clearly, the Hohorita
177 people spent more time at their coffee; this was given as the reason
184 for neglect in other matters. It may well be that cash-cropping above
the level noted at Sivepe has necessary consequences of this sort
unless technological changes occur. Ideologically, Hohorita is--as
I demonstrated--more deeply involved with the concepts of the New
Day than Sivepe.

Though no groups have left Hohorita since it was founded, the
621 co-residence of these many clans does make for a certain instability.
The leaders of the Oripa clan group told me that just after the
614 eruption very few Oripa were left, but as the clan was becoming more
numerous, it was beginning to think to establishing its own village.
Besupa was harbouring similar thoughts. Both these clans were minority
clans in their part of the village and this inevitably implied some
subordination. In Sivepe, the fusion of Jegase and Timumu had established
a fairly equal balance with Seho, as both clan groups were about equal
in strength if the greater resources of Seho are taken into account.
In Hohorita, however, the supremacy of Horeopa (and Sehopa in the back
section of the village) could hardly be challenged. The councillor
and the government are opposed to such fission and overcapping organisations such as the credit union, the women's club, the church, the
school, etc. may gradually set up a firm esprit de corps. The importance
of tree-crops (as opposed to shifting cultivation) in the Hohorita
economy might be a further disincentive to the migration of groups to
another village, but Oripa has in mind a new village site which would
actually be closer to their coffee gardens.

Section 6: Conclusion

In this study, we have found three complex forces, acting as
177 causes of changes, to be intertwined: forces acting throughout Papua
and New Guinea to promote socio-economic development, the effect of
the relocation of certain communities near Mount Lamington after the
eruption, and the physical and cognitive effects of the eruption itself.
The last-mentioned of these forces was far more disastrous for Sangara
731 than for the rest of the Northern District of Papua. In tracing the
causes of culture change in Hohorita, we have to give especial emphasis

177

[797]

177 to the helplessness of the survivors, the extraordinarily strong
influence that was exerted upon them immediately after the disaster
731 by Bishop Hand (resulting in many becoming mission teachers, the
building of a church of especially high quality, scrupulous school-
[797] going by the children and other signs of compliance), stronger pressure
than usual to succeed in skilled occupations, a more profound reappraisal
of ideology under the impact of disaster as well as church influence,
and finally the availability of more cash-cropping land than at
Sasembata, as a result of depletion of the population.

In Sivepe, where little loss of life occurred, the pattern of changes differs from that in Inonda, but the difference may well be largely explainable by the superior facilities introduced, especially by the mission, into the Sasembata area as a response by the Anglican authorities to the disaster.

177 The paradox of Papuan culture change is its dependence on
migration out of the rural areas. The striking changes of ideology
369 seem to result always from travel and contact between the men who have
been away and those who have stayed at home. In the district itself,
the progressives are always those with outside experience. In Hohorita,
these progressives had more varied and deeper experiences (perhaps
because the home base was destroyed) and those who were urbanised
continued constant contact with the village. Rural development has
opened up some new economic opportunities, and the improvement of
school services is opening up further opportunities, but it is only
the returning traveller who understands these opportunities and leads
his people in realising them. Relocation provides opportunities for
village renewal and these opportunities are seized upon by the natural
innovators within the villages (the returned migrants) to hasten the
coming of the New Day.

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TABLE 1

CASUALTIES OF THE MOUNT LAMINGTON DISASTER

731 (Source: Department of District Administration, Popondetta, file 7.3.2)

[162] Total residential population, "Sangara" group (2195 - 195)	1964
Known East Side "Ifainembo" casualties	480
Wairope Camp, list of reported casualties	92
Commonwealth Royal Territorial Service, casualty list	90
Prisoners held at Higaturu	16
Royal Papuan Constabulary and dependents IHG	80
Andemba dead (ex Andemba, other villages and Higaturu)	800
Known Isivita dead	14
Est. dead Sangara mission station personnel	100
	3636
Less: Known Sangara survivors	170
Total Estimated Dead	3466

TABLE 2

ADULT POPULATION OF MULTI-CLAN VILLAGES IN THE SAIHO CENSUS DIVISION, 1966

According to census records in the Department of District Administration, Popondetta. Adult = over 16 approximately.

Village Name	Male	Female
Agenahambo	49	64
Awala	101	136
Garombi	76	56
Hamburata	55	36
Hohorita	193	155
Isoge	66	55
Kendata	196	158
Kiorota	225	204
Mumuni	138	125
Sasembata	77	70
Singi	70	66
Sivepe	69	55
Torogota	95	51
Total adult population of division	2573	2065

Notes:

1. The total population of the division, including children, was 8,211.
2. Many persons normally resident in hamlets attended the census enumerations in the main villages, which were not as populous as these figures might suggest. My own data for Sivepe adults show: 28 males, 35 females.

TABLE 3

MONTHLY RAINFALL FOR AWALA, 1955-62 (INCHES)*

Source: Rimoldi, 1966: 109

Year	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Total
1955	21.48	12.15	17.71	5.51	11.47	2.55	7.17	7.26	16.91	5.50	18.33	19.03	145.07
1956	14.16	13.85	6.22	12.76	3.92	2.41	10.27	4.76	11.45	8.42	16.17	20.61	125.00
1957	9.08	11.36	34.80	19.05	10.55	8.29	4.85	11.55	12.12	8.88	24.03	27.14	181.70
1958	24.90	18.27	23.11	17.59	6.51	13.06	4.14	8.53	22.30	15.86	8.52	23.45	186.24
1959	11.32	24.58	8.17	23.30	15.11	14.22	11.96	2.63	11.60	5.64	12.21	21.65	161.99
1960	25.67	22.70	11.41	17.10	11.29	13.62	4.29	8.69	11.67	15.26	19.35	18.64	179.69
1961	23.06	9.46	9.84	10.02	10.94	12.72	10.14	11.80	11.66	11.21	13.78	10.20	144.83
1962	4.54	23.89	13.60	11.72	17.51	9.65	10.92	10.20	8.29	13.84	9.35	26.33	159.84
Av.	16.77	17.03	15.61	14.63	10.91	9.97	7.92	8.18	13.25	10.58	15.22	20.88	160.55

DAYS WHEN RAIN FELL

Year	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Total
1955	24	19	19	19	19	8	18	17	17	12	24	23	219
1956	19	23	20	23	11	11	15	19	21	21	18	20	221
1957	20	17	26	21	13	9	21	18	18	17	18	21	219
1958	22	19	27	25	13	22	13	13	21	19	18	28	240
1959	21	25	22	25	20	24	18	12	18	14	21	23	243
1960	25	25	23	23	14	18	8	18	11	22	21	23	231
1961	25	16	22	21	22	17	11	17	13	18	20	24	226
1962	12	21	19	20	16	11	8	10	8	16	10	25	176
Av.	21	21	22	22	16	15	14	15	16	17	19	24	222

*Figures supplied by Mr. C. E. Searle. Awala lies three miles northeast of Sivepe.

TABLE 4

MONTHLY RAINFALL FOR POPONDETTA 1955-61 (INCHES)

Source: Crocombe and Hogbin 1963; 100

	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Year
1955	7.58	12.05	2.11	7.88	12.65	6.13	2.67	1.85	6.55	4.90	19.78	10.26	94.41
1956	8.31	8.15	5.56	6.70	1.16	2.08	2.10	3.23	5.74	5.94	9.23	14.42	72.02
1957	7.41	4.04	17.40	7.60	4.33	2.95	1.91	3.90	5.50	10.60	7.14	16.82	89.60
1958	18.99	4.24	14.04	11.79	4.77	6.46	2.11	1.98	5.86	10.10	10.62	12.57	103.53
1959	8.98	16.32	9.82	17.09	8.29	6.61	3.84	0.78	8.08	4.64	9.89	12.98	102.32
1960	13.01	10.63	11.57	12.30	3.41	4.87	2.61	8.70	3.26	8.79	12.76	10.66	102.51
1961	20.34	7.20	7.04	14.80	7.12	8.25	3.50	2.27	5.93	11.79	6.30	14.64	109.18
Av.	12.09	8.95	9.64	11.17	5.96	5.34	2.68	3.24	5.85	8.11	10.82	13.19	96.22

NUMBER OF WET DAYS PER MONTH FOR POPONDETTA 1955-61

	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Year
1955	14	14	10	16	15	19	10	4	13	8	21	17	163
1956	18	18	13	27	8	22	12	12	9	10	12	11	172
1957	11	13	21	25	13	16	7	12	14	13	17	21	183
1958	21	16	24	21	16	16	12	9	13	20	22	26	216
1959	16	24	16	24	16	18	13	6	13	10	25	21	202
1960	27	22	21	19	16	10	7	15	10	24	21	18	210
1961	29	17	20	18	22	8	18	14	15	16	16	18	211
Av.	19.4	17.7	17.9	21.4	15.1	15.6	11.3	10.3	12.4	14.4	19.1	18.9	193

Note: Popondetta lies 11 miles west of Inonda.

132

TABLE 5

MEAN TIME SPENT PER MAN-WEEK ON SUBSISTENCE ACTIVITIES IN SEASONAL VARIATIONS IN SIVEPE, 1964

Source: Eric Waddell, manuscript

Activity		Periods			
		I: 3 Feb - 3 May	II: 20 Jul - 6 Sept	III: 9 Nov - 3 Jan 1965	Total
Clearing		4.4	2.4	3.3	3.7
Taro:	Planting	1.9	2.8	3.0	2.4
	Maintenance	3.0	3.9	4.5	3.6
	Harvesting	3.4	1.9	3.0	3.0
	Marketing	0.1	-	-	0.1
Sweet Potato:	Planting	-	-	0.1	-
	Harvesting	0.7	1.1	2.4	1.3
	Marketing	0.1	-	-	0.1
Yam:	Planting	0.6	-	-	0.3
	Maintenance	-	-	0.2	0.1
	Harvesting	0.8	0.1	0.6	0.6

TABLE 5
(Continued)

Minor Crops:	Planting	-	0.1	0.1	0.1
	Maintenance	-	-	0.1	-
	Harvesting	1.0	3.4	1.1	1.6
	Marketing	0.1	-	0.3	0.1
Fencing		-	-	0.2	0.1
Fishing		0.2	-	0.5	0.2
Hunting		0.7	0.8	4.8	1.8
Sago-making		-	1.5	0.4	0.4
Preparation of Tools and Equipment		0.3	-	0.5	0.3
Construction		2.2	1.6	0.6	1.6
TOTAL		19.7	19.8	25.8	21.3

461
221

TABLE 6

NORTHERN DISTRICT: POPULATION 1966

162

Source: Department of District Administration, Popondetta

POPONDETTA SUB DISTRICT

APORE

Musa	2509		
Managalasa	5550	8059	

IOMA

Aiga	2384		
Binandere	3693		
Waria	1717	7794	

POPONDETTA

North Coast	4660		
Sohe - Popondetta	3588		
Popondetta	3533		
Oro Bay	5181		
Saiho	8211	25173	

TOWN

Locals	900 (approx)		
Europeans	300		

RURAL

Locals	800 (approx)		
Europeans	260	2260	
TOTAL			43,286

TUFI SUB DISTRICT

Cape Nelson	3642		
Collingwood Bay	2936		
Dyke Ackland Bay	1724		
Europeans	20	8322	

KOKODA SUB DISTRICT

Kokoda	2018		
Bujara	3195		
Wasonga	1227		
Europeans	30	6470	
TOTAL			58,078

TABLE 7

FOOD PLANTS PER HOUSEHOLD: INONDA AND SIVEPE COMPARED

Sources: Crocombe and Hogbin, 1963: 8; Rimoldi, 1966: 17

Crop	Inonda		Sivepe	
	Average	Range	Average	Range
Taro (Colocasia sp.)	1.3 acs.	2.6 - 0.4 acs.	0.97 acs.	0.39 - 2.30 acs.
Sweet Potato	0.2 acs.	0.4 - 0 acs.	0.07 acs.	0 - 0.20 acs.
Corn	72 plants	140 - 0 plants	223 plants	0 - 442 plants
Bananas	81 trees	145 - 12 trees	71 trees	35 - 126 trees.
Pitpit (*ins*)	56 clumps	181 - 4 clumps	88 clumps	0 - 400 clumps
Sugar	71 clumps	167 - 34 clumps	34 stools	11-54 stools
Yams	24 vines	61 - 0 vines	65 vines	0 - 136 vines
Manioc	10 plants	27 - 4 plants	a few	
Taro (Xantosoma sp.)	5 plants	25 - 0 plants	28 plants	0 - 91 plants
Native Cabbage	---	---	22 plants	0 - 100 plants
Pawpaw	---	---	17 trees	5 - 32 trees
Beans	a few		17 plants	0 - 110 plants
Cucurbits	2 vines	10 - 0 vines	13 vines	9 - 28 vines
Saallots	a few		a few	
Ginger	---	---	a few	
Tobacco	---	---	18 plants	0 - 59 plants
Pineapples	1 plant	7 - 0 plants	no data	
Tomatoes	a few	---	no data	

461
512

TABLE 8

ACTIVITY PATTERNS OF HOUSEHOLDS IN SIVEPE AND INONDA (In Hours Per Man-Week)

Source: Waddell and Krinks, 1968: 97 and 132

Note: As virtually all Sivepe households were involved in cash-cropping by 1966-1967, the figures quoted here for Sivepe show the mean activity pattern for cash-cropping households.

Activity	Mean Number of Hours Per Adult Per Week	
	Sivepe	Inonda
Clearing	3.3	2.9
Subsistence Gardening	13.2	11.7
Other Subsistence Food Production	3.0	7.5
Other Subsistence Activities	1.4	3.4
Cash Cropping	2.3	1.0
Paid Work	1.0	2.7
Household	6.1	3.8
Social Obligations	3.3	4.2
Sick	1.0	1.6
External Agencies	7.0	3.2
Other	0.9	1.5
TOTAL	42.3	43.5

TABLE 9

CONSANGUINEAL LINKAGES BETWEEN 51 SIVEPE INFORMANTS AND OTHER VILLAGES, CLASSIFIED BY DEGREE OF NETWORK DENSITY

Principle of Classification: Villages are classified according to the number of informants who have kindred (no more than two degrees removed) originating there. Thus Class A comprises those villages mentioned by one (and no more than one) informant as the birthplace of members of his/her kindred. Class B comprises villages so mentioned by two (and no more than two) informants, Class C between 3 and 5, Class D between 6 and 10. Class E comprises those villages mentioned by more than 10 informants as the birthplace of members of their kindreds. When I speak of "one consanguineal linkage between one informant and another village," I leave out of account how many of my informant's consanguines were born in that other village--it might be one or several dozen.

Density of Network By Classes	Number of Villages In Each Class	Number of Consanguineal Linkages Between Informants and Other Villages
Class A	36	36
Class B	11	22
Class C	19	74
Class D	5	40
Class E	5	61
TOTAL	76	233

TABLE 10

CHANGES IN HOUSE DESIGN, HOUSE CONSTRUCTION AND DOMESTIC AMENITIES IN SIVEPE, 1936-1966

(Comparison between standards reportedly applied on four successive village sites)

Elements	1. Pusahambo (pre-war)	2. Pamba (between war and eruption)	3. Old Sivepe (after eruption, until 1965)	4. New Sivepe (1966)
Floor level	Raised on posts	Raised on posts	Raised on posts	Raised on posts
Flooring material	Betelnut, wide gaps	Betelnut: no gaps	Some betelnut, some blackpalm	Some betelnut, some blackpalm
Windows	No windows	No windows	Small windows	Large windows
No. of rooms	Three	Three	Three	Three
Walling material	Split sago	Split sago	Split sago	"Timber"
Nails: framing	Nil	Younger people	General	General
Nails: walls	Nil	Nil	Nil	General
Shrubs	Beside houses	Beside houses	Beside houses	To mark paths
Betelnut	Planted	Planted	Planted	Planted
Coconut	Few	More	More	More
Waste disposal	In gully	In gully	In gully	Rubbish holes
Pigs	Present	Present	Present	Absent
Hen houses	Absent	Absent	Absent	Pens built
Lavatories	Absent	Absent	A few	General
Floor area	"Very small"	"Bigger"	"Much bigger again" (200 sq. ft.)	"Big" (375 sq. ft.)

342
351
364
514
343
178

TABLE 11

164 HOSPITAL ADMISSIONS IN ST. MARGARET'S (ANGLICAN) HOSPITAL AT EROBO; NORTHERN DISTRICT, OVER 1966

Tropical Ulcer	21
Infected Wounds	949
Yaws	4
Injuries	129
Malaria	427
Asthma	24
Bronchitis	437
Influenza	3
Dental Caries	10
Intestinal Infections	73
Eyes	26
Ears	111
Filiariasis	40
Pyrexia Unknown Origin	759
TOTAL	2,941

TABLE 12

REVISED ESTIMATES OF HIGATURU LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCIL FOR JULY 1966--JUNE 1967 (ABRIDGED)

Revenues	
Tax: 2000 males	$16,000
1000 females	1,000
Truck hire	13,000
Aid Post Orderlies Subsidy	1,250
Water Supply Subsidy	3,320
Aid Post Subsidy	240
Adult Education Subsidy	780
Miscellaneous	2,900
TOTAL	$38,490

Expenditure	
A. Personal Emolument	
Council President	$ 156
Council Vice-President	108
Councillors	1,560
Exec., Fin. Ctee	108
Council Clerk	1,170
Messenger	390
Landrover Driver	500
Truck Drivers	1,450
Agric. Fieldworker	234
Market Manager	260
Aid Post Orderlies	2,500
Health Worker	256
TOTAL	$ 8,692
B. Revenue Expenditure	
Council Administration	$ 1,000
Transport	5,000
Drugs	720
Adult Education	780
Other Items	1,685
TOTAL	$ 9,186
C. Capital Expenditure	
Drivers' houses (2)	$ 2,200
Council Staff House	800
Council House Furniture	500
Market Building	1,500
Staff, House, Health Personnel	800
Water Supplies (16 villages)	6,565
Clinics (3 Villages)	900
Roading (3 Projects)	6,070
Other Items	2,099
TOTAL	$21,434
GRAND TOTAL	$39,212

465
657
652
434
651

744

TABLE 13

TOTAL EXPENDITURE ON PUBLIC HEALTH IN THE TERRITORY OF PAPUA DURING THE YEAR ENDED 30TH JUNE 1965

(Source: Territory of Papua Report for 1964-1965: 235)

[364]

Administration	$	$
Public Health - General	2,902,012	
Medical Aid to Missions	94,698	
Maintenance of Hospitals, Engineering, Water Supply and Sewerage	320,988	
Construction of Water Supply, Sewerage, Hospitals and Ancillary Buildings	1,098,416	
Building Grants-in-Aid to Missions	31,220	
Purchase of Hospital and Medical Equipment	81,730	
	---------	4,529,064
Missions (Ascertainable Expenditure from their Own Funds)		90,012
Local Government Councils (From their Own Funds)		44,108
TOTAL		4,663,194

TABLE 14

ENROLLMENT IN PRIMARY SCHOOLS OF THE ANGLICAN MISSION IN THE NORTHERN DISTRICT

871
872

Source: Department of Education, Popondetta

	1966	1967 (Est.)
Preparatory Classes	1,775	1,845
Standard 1	1,290	1,307
Standard 2	1,563	1,581
Standard 3	1,278	1,298
Standard 4	1,275	1,310
Standard 5	693	708
Standard 6	488	498
TOTAL	8,362	8,547

Note: Some schools offered classes up to Standard 2, some up to Standard 3, some up to Standard 4, while only a few schools offered classes beyond that level. Children unable to obtain transfers to schools offering classes at a higher level might stay at school for a year or more after finishing the highest available grade. This explains the unusual statistical pattern.

TABLE 15

HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION; SIVEPE AND INONDA COMPARED

592
594
596

Note: The term "augmented," applied to a household, denotes that the household includes adults outside the nuclear (or extended) family, but that these adults are living without a spouse.

Household Type	Inonda	Sivepe
1 Generation	1	3
Nuclear	2	12
Augmented Nuclear	-	2
Double Nuclear	2	-
Simple 3-Generation	1	4
Augmented 3-Generation	1	3
TOTAL	7	24

TABLE 16

POPULATION BY AGE, SEX, MARITAL STATUS AND CLAN

(a) Comparison Between Inonda and Sivepe, 1951 and 1966

	Inonda		Sivepe				
	1966	1951	1966				1951
			Sorovi	Seho	Jegase	Total	
Male Adults (Total)	10	5	6	8	14	28	15
Widowers	2		1	-	2	3	
Married, residing with wife	7		5	7	8	20	
Single	1		-	1	4	5	
Female Adults	10	8	5	11	18	34	25
Widows	2		-	1	3	4	
Married, residing with husband	7		5	7	8	20	
Single or living without husband	1		-	3	7	10	
Children	22	35	15	27	33	75	59
TOTAL	42	48	26	46		137	99

(b) Sivepe male adults, by clans and age groups

Age Groups	Sorovi	Seho	Jegase	Total
16 - 25	-	1	3	4
26 - 35	2	-	2	4

162

TABLE 16
(Continued)

Age Groups (Continued)	Sorovi	Seho	Jegase	Total
36 - 45	2	2	4	8
46 - 55	1	5	1	7
Over 55	1	-	4	5
TOTAL	6	8	14	28

Note: For the purpose of this table, I have included entire households with the clan of the household heads. The breakdown of female population into clans must be understood as meaning: "Attached to a household of Sorovi, Seho or Jegase clan.:

46

TABLE 17

SIVEPE: THE ALLOCATION OF TIME WITHIN ACTIVITIES
A DETAILED ANALYSIS OF 28 OCCASIONS COVERING 19 INDIVIDUALS AND A BREAKDOWN ACCORDING TO AGE; SEX AND CASH CROPPING STATUS
(In minutes)

Source: Waddell and Krinks 1968: 113

		Travel	Rest and Meals	Main Task	Ancillary Tasks	Other Tasks	Cooking	Washing	Total
Whole Sample	Mean Duration	42	72	102	15	14	17	3	264
(28)*	%	15.8	27.4	38.5	5.7	5.1	6.3	1.2	100
Males	Mean Duration	41	74	118	26	12	-	-	272
(14)	%	15.1	27.4	43.5	9.5	4.3	-	0.1	99.9
Females	Mean Duration	42	70	85	4	15	33	6	257
(14)	%	16.5	27.4	33.2	1.6	5.9	13.0	2.4	100
Cash Cropper	Mean Duration	32	36	106	14	16	5	2	210
(16)	%	15.1	17.0	50.6	6.5	7.8	2.3	0.8	100.1
Non Cash Cropper	Mean Duration	55	121	96	17	10	33	6	336
(12)	%	16.4	36.0	28.4	5.0	2.9	9.7	1.6	100
15-24	Mean Duration	21	181	49	12	-	126	28	418
(2)	%	5.0	43.5	11.7	2.9	-	30.2	6.8	100.1
25-34	Mean Duration	24	29	101	1	12	.10	3	179
(8)	%	13.4	16.1	56.3	0.6	6.6	5.3	1.7	100

TABLE 17
(Continued)

		Travel	Rest and Meals	Main Task	Ancillary Tasks	Other Tasks	Cooking	Washing	Total
35-44	Mean Duration	33	53	132	36	1	6	-	259
(8)	%	12.6	20.3	50.7	13.8	-	2.2	-	99.6
45-54	Mean Duration	72	69	99	10	31	10	1	292
(9)	%	24.5	23.6	34.0	3.5	10.6	3.6	-	99.8
55+	Mean Duration	30	390	-	10	-	-	-	430
(1)	%	7.0	96.7	-	2.3	-	---	-	100

* Indicates number of man-instances observed.

461
561
512

TABLE 18

SIVEPE: THE DIVISION OF LABOUR BY AGE
(In Hours Per Week)

Source: Waddell and Krinks 1968: 104

Age Group	15-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55+
No. of Individuals	2M, 5F	4M, 7F	4M, 1F	5M, 5F	2M
Total Weeks Present	105.9	138.0	115.3	252.6	51.1
SUBSISTENCE					
Productive:					
Clearing	2.3	2.7	5.2	3.8	5.8
Subsistence gardening	7.9	13.8	13.5	14.9	12.3
Other subsistence food production	1.8	2.6	5.4	1.6	1.4
Other subsistence activities	1.1	0.8	4.1	2.1	1.6
Household	3.7	8.7	2.9	5.6	0.4
Non-productive:					
Social obligations	4.1	3.2	4.7	2.9	1.8
EXTERNAL					
Productive:					
Cash cropping	0.4	1.7	3.1	1.5	0.1
Paid work	6.5	0.5	0.9	0.9	-
Non-productive:					
External agencies	5.7	6.9	6.9	5.1	2.6
Sickness	1.8	1.2	0.8	0.3	0.7
Miscellaneous	2.4	1.0	0.8	0.2	-
TOTAL	37.7	43.1	48.5	39.3	26.6
Productive time*	62.9	71.5	72.7	78.1	80.9
Subsistence time*	55.4	73.8	74.1	78.4	87.3
Days temporarily absent*	10.3	1.3	8.5	6.5	5.3

* As a percentage of total survey time.

TABLE 19

462

DIVISION OF LABOUR BETWEEN THE SEXES AMONG THE OROKAIVA IN 1923

Source: F. E. Williams Papers W.5, dated Wasida 5.10.23

Women

- Planting and small cleaning in Garden
- Fishing for small fish
- Cooking
- Cleaning house and surroundings
- Pottery
- Bark cloth and painting of same
- Look after pigs and dogs
- String bags
- Mourning vests of Job's tears
- Mourning neck ornaments, of Job's tears
- Armlets of Job's tears
- Make shell and string belts

Men

- Clearing of gardens
- Hunting
- Large fishing
- Building
- Make spears
- Make clubs
- Make cane belts
- Make woven armlets and leglets
- Make shell and string belts
- Make wooden bowls

462
512 Day's work of woman

(Ejiro of Borugata)

Sometimes in garden . . . sometimes in village . . . but more often than not goes to the garden

Going in the morning she will clean . . . plant. . . dig up taro . . .

In afternoon she collects firewood . . . water (in a gourd, scooping it in with a folded leaf), . . . taro etc. in her string bag (eti) and return "at four o'clock".

Then she cooks for husband and children . . . after that kaikais betel and stops nothing

TABLE 20

871
463

EDUCATION AND OCCUPATIONAL EXPERIENCE OF THE JEGASE AND SEHO CLANS OF SIVEPE COMPARED--ADULT MALES ONLY

Approximate Period	Education		Occupational Experience	
	Seho	Jegase	Seho	Jegase
Nil	6	6	4	5
1 year	-	1	1	2
2 years	-	2	1	-
3 years	-	1	-	-
4 years	-	2	-	2
5 years	-	-	-	1
6 years	-	1	-	-
7 years			-	-
8 years			-	-
Over 8 years			-	4
Data vague	2	1	2	-
TOTAL	8	14	8	14

TABLE 21

463

HOHORITA MALE ADULTS IN SKILLED OCCUPATIONS

Occupation	Resident	Non-Resident	Total
Teacher	9	1	10
"Medical"	3	-	3
Driver	2	2	4
Shopkeeper	4	-	4
Other	2	2	4
TOTAL	20	5	25

Appendix

121 Outline of variables influencing change and stability.

I. External influences

A. Circumstances contributing to the decision to relocate.

1. Initiating conditions--land shortage, volcanic eruption, drought, factionalism, isolation, economic depression (as in 1930's and post-war), etc.

2. Source of suggestion to relocate--government, native leaders, example of other communities which have been relocated, etc.

3. The decision to relocate.

a. The participants--total community, native council, individual families, etc.

b. The procedure--presentation of the argument for removal, advance inspection of new location, voting, emergency evacuation, etc.

c. Attitudes toward the necessity of relocating--differences, if any, between individuals or classes such as men, women, young, old, leaders, government officials, educated, prosperous, differences at time of removal and later, between early and later emigrants, etc.

B. Physical environments

1. Climate-effects of temperature, storms, seasonal fluctuations, etc. on clothing, housing, subsistence activities, outside contacts, etc.

2. Topography--effects of size, relief, beach area, streams, water table, reefs, etc. on village ground plan, paths, roads, location of farm land, groves, internal communication, subsistence activities, etc.

3. Resources--availability and exploitation of local products for food, construction or commercial purposes.

4. Location with respect to other islands--effects on visiting, wage labor, canoe construction, commercial development, acculturation, etc.

121 C. Social environments.

1. Opportunity for contacts (both before and after relocation) with individuals who do not belong to the community.
    - a. Identity of the outsiders--Australians, Americans, British, French.
    - b. Status and role of outsiders--administrators, missionaries, other natives, ships' crews, armed forces, tourists, employers, traders, guests at celebrations, etc.
    - c. Differential opportunities--young, old, men, women, chiefs, officials, spokesmen, etc. (e.g., do women of the community have opportunity to meet British women or British men; do only leaders of the community have appreciable contact with outsiders, etc.?)
2. Actual amount and kind of contact by young, old, women, etc.--daily, periodically, planned, casual, incidental, impersonal, commercial, social, etc.
    - a. Intermarriage--rights and obligations with respect to affinal kinsmen, economic cooperation, etc.
    - b. Friendships with outsiders.
3. Locale of contacts--within the village or outside it.
4. The initiators of contacts--village members or outsiders.
5. Differential reactions to categories of outsiders--Americans vs. British, Europeans vs. indigenous neighbors, traders vs. guests, etc.
6. Attitudes toward neighbors--superior, suspicious, hostile, aloof, critical.
7. Attitudes of neighbors toward them--hospitable, indifferent, resentful, contemptuous, etc.
8. Self-group image--misunderstood, mistreated, unlucky, indomitable, leaders, pioneers, representatives of their people, failures, etc.

[p.230]

121 9. Acculturation--learning new skills from contacts, adopting outsiders' customs, accepting alien foods, becoming involved socially or ceremonially with outsiders through intermarriage, employment, entertainment, accepting favors, etc.

10. Impact on community organization with respect to:

   a. Leadership.

   b. Interpersonal relations, including those among kinsmen.

   c. Work groups, including labor for village benefit.

   d. Social and recreational groups, and the occasions when they function.

   e. Religious activities.

   f. Cooperatives and other commercial enterprises.

   g. Individualism and independence of primary kinship groups.

   h. Expedients and temporary procedures and patterns of behavior.

D. Contacts with congeners, of which there are three categories: 1. Contacts before relocation (such as Gilbertese and Ellice Islanders living and working together on Ocean Island, Tarawa, and Canton). 2. The relocated community maintaining contact with homeland (such as the Kioans and their friends and relatives on Vaitupu). 3. Two relocated communities in communication (such as Sydney and Gardner or Kioa and Rambi).

1. Kind and frequency of contact--visiting, correspondence, returnees to homeland, new immigrants, joining relocated community, celebrations, reciprocal exchanges, schooling of children, etc.

2. Encouragement of contacts or the lack of it.

   a. Government policy.

   b. By community leaders at home and in relocated community.

[p.231]

121

3. Congener contact and morale of relocated community--homesickness, insistence upon maintaining identification with homeland and its customs, severance with traditions of the past, pride as pioneers, dissatisfaction or self justification resulting from comparison with others, fear of losing land and other rights and privileges at home, etc.

E. Disease

1. The community as a carrier of disease.

2. The community as a victim of unfamiliar disease.

3. The community's perception of new location as healthy or unhealthy.

F. Government welfare efforts. In all instances attempt to determine extent of government efforts to a) adapt measures to traditions of community, b) plan measures in consultation with community leaders and c) whether an action, a procedure, or an innovation was proposed by a government official or by a member of the community.

1. Relocation plans and their implementation.

   a. Reasons for choosing the site for relocation.

   b. Relocation procedure--reconnaissance party, resettlement officer, advance work party, "waves" of immigrants, assistance in construction of village, initial living arrangement for settlers, etc.

   c. Relation of settlers to homeland--renounce land rights, foreclosure of possibility of return, other persons or groups permitted to occupy vacated lands, payment for expropriated homeland, income from produce of homeland (e.g., phosphate), etc.

   d. Traditional value placed on land ownership--basis of social control and prestige, secondary to use rights, fishing rights, and other forms of property, etc.

   e. Land tenure in new location--government policy, communal lands, individual ownership, system of allocation (e.g., by drawing lots, by priorities, by individual choice), size of plots, the unit of allocation (e.g., individual, family, or clan), land survey, temporary or permanent assignment, use right or ownership, etc.

[p.232]

121 f. Duration of relocation (i.e., does this variable affect adjustment?)

g. Number of relocations.

h. Actual or alleged governmental encouragement of hopes to 1) return to homeland or 2) relocate a second or third time.

2. Health measures.

a. Provision of dispensaries, hospital service, medical aides, drugs, etc.

b. Public health programs--mosquito control, innoculations, latrines, sanitation regulations, etc.

3. Economic assistance.

a. Subsistence--issue of cuttings and seeds, advice and demonstration by government agricultural and fishing experts, etc.

b. Issues of food in initial or other stages of the community's development.

c. Advice and assistance in commercial enterprises--rewards for land clearing, subsidy of cooperatives, provision of transportation for copra, logs, purchase of products, price stabilization funds, abeyance or imposition of land or head tax, import or export duties, etc.

4. Education.

a. Extent available--in or out of village, boarding schools, both sexes, etc.

b. Extent required--e.g., compulsory, age requirements, standardization of curriculum, etc.

c. Sponsorship--government or church.

d. Teachers--source of pay, training of, ethnic affiliation of, family status of, language of instruction, etc.

[p.233]

e. Provision of school buildings, educational materials.

f. Attitudes toward government.

G. Mission welfare efforts--consider all items above (under "Government welfare efforts") that are relevant.

1. Others--including recreation, community projects (e.g., house improvement, health campaigns), teacher-preacher combination, ethnic identity of pastors, religious affiliation of pastor, change in religious affiliation with relocation, pastor's identification with community, community support (material and otherwise) of the pastor.

H. Selection of emigrants.

1. Non-selection, i.e., all members of the community relocated.

2. By government--regulation of removal by establishment of quotas and priorities by such criteria as age, family connections, status, skills, labor potential, health, amount of land available at new location, poverty at home, etc.

3. Self-selection, i.e., community members individually or collectively decide who is to relocate (Examples: Kiosns, Catholic families on Gizo moved to Loga).

a. Reasons--join kinsmen, support aged family members, join co-religionists, factionalism, etc.

4. Piecemeal vs. total removal at one time--effect on family and community solidarity, cooperation, leadership, morale, mutual assistance, subsistence potential, manpower available, etc.

II. Internal influences

A. Size and distribution of relocated community--concentrated in one village, segmented in two or more hamlets or villages, dispersed on individual homesteads.

1. Attitudes toward maintaining (a) concentration, (b) separation from neighbors.

121 B. Socio-economic factors--age, sex, marital status, divisions of labor, money income, occupational skills, available manpower, eligible mates, dependents, education, etc. of community members.

C. Homogeneity or heterogeneity in background of community members--all from one village originally, or from one island, or from one region (e.g., Kioa and Kili vs. Sydney and Gizo communities). Differences with respect to dialect, traditional histories, affiliation with groups not represented in community, etc.

D. Degree of acculturation at time of relocation--missionization, government regulation, abandonment of indigenous customs (i.e., those antedating contact with Europeans and Americans), adoption of foreign dress, foods, house types, etc., wage labor, use of money, formal education, bilingualism, etc.

E. Familiarily with new homeland at time of relocation--limited to reconnaissance by community representatives (e.g., Kili, Sydney, Gizo), known from visits prior to time issue of removal arises (e.g., Fauma and Epi), known by tradition or hearsay (e.g., Rongerik).

F. Addition and loss of members--births, deaths, intermarriages, adoptions, friendships, repatriations, continuing immigration, community segmentation, residence in urban centers or on plantations, etc.

1. Reasons, when relevant, e.g., desire to reunite divided families, securing heirs, joining adherents of same religious faith, government policy and regulation, land shortage, labor opportunities elsewhere, schooling outside of village, etc.

G. Key personalities within the community; i.e., individuals who have had a significant influence on the course of events in the community's history.

1. Non-native as well as native residents of the community--resettlement officers, advisors (e.g., Kennedy, Laxton)

2. Other native residents as well as community members--teachers, pastors, policemen, spouses, etc.

3. Social isolates, marginal individuals, "loners", "trouble makers", etc.

[p.235]

121 H. Factionalism--religious, political, ethnic, generational, acculturational, etc.

I. Adherence to tradition.

1. Actual vs. alleged--optional observance of customary patterns of behavior, informants' description vs. anthropologist's observations, rationalizations for deviations from traditional norms (e.g., "it is temporary," "we can't get what we need," "young people don't care," "it is too much trouble").

2. Controls operating for and against continuance of tradition--training of young people, regard for elders, fulfillment of reciprocal obligations to kinsmen and community, sensitivity to opinions of friends and relatives at home, ease of escape from community obligations, formal mechanisms for reward and penalization (councils, police, courts, committees).

J. Esprit de corps.

For what is intended under this caption refer to Ralph Linton's Study of Man, pages 92-94.

[p. 236]

102
131
133
731

MAP II Mount Lamington Volcanic


River
MT LAMINGTON
3
2

Source: Taylor 1958, Fig. 52

[End Map 2(A)]

MAP II Mount Lamington Volcanic Area



102
131
133
751

[End Map 2(B)]

102
423
491
133
361

MAP IV


SKETCH MAP
OF
INONDA LANDS
HOHOTA LAND
URIO LAND
URIO LAND
JEGERATAPEMA
INOTA
ATORO LAND
ATORO LAND
KEY
Land originally acquired by Inonda people from ... clan (Ajero)
Land in which Inonda people have retained some rights
Land in which Inonda people have acquired rights since initial settlement
Land held by people of other villages indicated thus: ATORO LAND
Land names within the Inonda area indicated thus: TOPOHAMBO
Vehicle track
Scale

Source: Crocombe & Hogbin 1963 : 105

FC. I M. 17

Map V

361
621
487
102
133
491


SIVEPE
VILLAGE LAYOUT
1964
CLAN
LINEAGE.
SYMBOL
JEGASE
AREHU
BEBEHUPA
BEREKIPA
"SINGLE MEN"
TIMUMU
HAJEJOPA
PEKUMA
"SINGLE MEN"
URAPA (FROM AGENAHAMBO; TEMPORARILY LINKED TO TIMUMU (PEKUMA) BY MARRIAGE)
SEHO
ADJOINING HOUSEHOLDS OF KINSMEN OF FIRST-DEGREE RELATIONSHIP (E.G. PARENT-OFFSPRING)
"GAGA" (PLATFORMS FOR ENTERTAINING GUESTS)
BOUNDARY OF VILLAGE AREA
FOOTPATH
TO AWALA
TO GARDENS AT SHIRITUMO
INTERMITTENT CREEK
CREEK
TO CREEK AND AGENAHAMBO
TO SASEMBATA
Approx scale
0
50
100
FEET
J.H.

Source: Waddell & Krinks 1968: 38

[End Map 5]

Map VI
Plan of New Sivepe

102
361
621
487
133


N
to old Sivepe
village boundary
hill 20°
Houses
Seho Clan
Jegase Clan
Sorori Clan
Patios
Paths
Scale: 2 chains/inch
village boundary
steep bank
steep bank

[End Map 6]

Maps VII and VIII


OLD SITE
JANUARY 1964
0 50 100
FEET
TO AIRSTRIP, SAMBOGO RIVER AND ORO BAY
TO SAMBOGO RIVER AND EUMO GARDENS
TO NEW VILLAGE
N
Scale approximate
NEW SITE
JANUARY 1965
0 50 100
FEET
TO OLD VILLAGE
TO CREEK AND MAMEMO GARDENS
TO SAMBOGO RIVER
TO FEIN GARDENS
TO LIIKA AND POPONDETTA
N
Scale approximate
INONDA
VILLAGE LAYOUT
CLAN
LINEAGE
SYMBOL
ANDIRIHA
DARAFA'EMBO
JEGOTUMO
JOREMBO'EMBO
DARAFA'EMBO WITH CO-RESIDENT HOUSEHOLD OF HOREMBO'UNDI CLAN FROM HOHORITA
JOREMBO'EMBO WITH CO-RESIDENT HOUSEHOLD OF HOREMBO'UNDI CLAN
JOREMBO'EMBO WITH CO-RESIDENT HOUSEHOLD OF JANGORA'UNDI CLAN FROM URIO
JEGO'UNDI
JANGORA'UNDI WITH CO-RESIDENT HOUSEHOLD OF JOREMBO'EMBO LINEAGE
HOREMBO'UNDI (UNDER CONSTRUCTION)
A.N.U./GOVT. REST HOUSE
CHAPEL
COPRA DRIER
TRADE STORE
LATRINE
ADJOINING HOUSEHOLDS OF PARENT AND OFFSPRING
ALL-WEATHER ROAD
FOOTPATH
BOUNDARY OF VILLAGE AREA
J.H.

102
361
621
491
487
364

Source: Waddell & Krinks 1968: 54

[End Map 7]

Map IX


SIVEPE
AND ITS NEIGHBOURHOOD
0 1 2
MILES
N
Koropata
Waseta
Awala
Saiho
Soroputa
Uhita
Agenehambo
"Martyrs' Memorial School"
Kaipa
Higaturu Council Office
Kebita
Hururuta
Isoga
Nehinta
Sinduta
SIVEPE
Garombi
Sasembata
Kongahambo
Duve
Hamburata
Perotambari
Kendata
Kiorota
Barewaturu
Ombisusu
Ajeka
Ambala River
Ambogo R.
Kumusi R.
MOUNT LAMINGTON
VILLAGES
TRADE STORE, INDIGENOUS
" " EXPATRIATE
CASH-CROP BUYING CENTRE
PLANTATION
MISSION STATION
HOSPITAL
AGRICULTURAL EXT. CENTRE
SIVEPE FOOD GARDENS (1964)
HIGHWAY
OTHER ROAD
RIVER

Source: Waddell & Krinks 1968: 34

[End Map 8]

102
131
133
366
368
491
489

Map X

619
102
133
131


Map of
part of the
NORTHERN DIVISION
OF PAPUA
showing tribal divisions of the
OROKAIVA
SANGARA
DIROU
BIAGI
CHIRIMA
NORTH-EASTERN DIVISION

Source: Williams 1930

[End Map 9]

368
797
491
102

Map XI

SASEMBATA MISSION STATION


CLASSROOMS AND SCHOOL BUILDINGS
HEAD TEACHER'S HOUSE
TEACHERS HOUSES
HOUSES OF MISSION TEACHERS
CHURCH
ROAD TO KENDATA
LAWN AND PLAYING FIELD
HOSPITAL
CLASSROOM
HILL
ROAD TO SIVEPE
ROAD TO GAROMBI

[End Map 10]

XII
House Plan


FRONT ELEVATION
OREKA (BRACE)
ANSOVE (STUDS)
TOP PLATES:HENEMBA
OTONO
PEE
HENEMBA (DWANGS)
FLOOR (BLACK PALM)
FLOOR JOISTS (HENEMBA)
SLEEPERS:URE
TUTUWI:PILES
STEPS
POST:TUTUWI


SIDE ELEVATION
RIDGE POLE
OREKA
HENEMBA
HENEMBA
URE

[End Map 11(A)]

[End Map 1]


EASTERN NEW GUINEA REGION
SCALE
80 MILES
REFERENCE
Volcanoes with recorded eruption
Volcanoes with no recorded eruption
Solfatara areas
NEW BRITAIN
NEW GUINEA
PAPUA
CORAL SEA
PORT MORESBY
D'ENTRECASTEAUX ISLANDS
TROBRIAND ISLANDS
WOODLARK I.
Arawe
Kandrian
Gasmata
Finschhafen
Lae
HUON
Salamaua
Morobe
Buna
Kokoda
C. Nelson
Goodenough Bay
Milne Bay
FERGUSSON I.
NORMANBY I.
C. Vogel
Wedau
East Cape
LOCALITY MAP
PNGG1-17
BUREAU OF MINERAL RESOURCES, GEOLOGY AND GEOPHYSICS, SEPTEMBER 1964

Boundaries of Northern District

[End Map 2]

Map III


AWALA
AWALA PLANTATION
KAKITA
River
SINDUTA
SIVEPE
OLD SIVEPE PAMBA
SIVEPE LANDHOLDINGS AND GARDEN SITES
JEGASE LAND
LAND OF JEGASE MEN IN VILLAGES OTHER THAN SIVEPE
AREA CULTIVATED BY MEMBERS OF SAMPLE
COFFEE GARDEN
RUBBER STAND
SIVEPE EXISTING VILLAGE
ABANDONED VILLAGE
BOUNDARY BETWEEN LINEAGES
BOUNDARY BETWEEN HOUSEHOLDS WITHIN LINEAGES
0
100
200
YARDS

Source: Rimoldi 1966: 52

423
361
102
621
363
311


SIDE ELEVATION



[End Map 11(B)]

Map XIII


N
Tamboro R.
Endahi R.
KOIPA
Embogi R.
SANGARA PLANTATION Development Co. Ltd.
PUSAHAMBO
KIOROTA
Gagau R.
Etevo R.
Kakita R.
Ijoveno R. (SIRI)
IRIHAMBO
HOHORITA
Arake Ck.
IGOPA
EHAMU
BUMBURATA
SANGARA H. S.
HINGATURU GOV. ST. P.
Ambogo R.
DOUBLE CROSSING
MONGI
HUVIVI
HINGATURU
Gawane R.
Banguho R.
AVALANCHE VALLEY
2 mile radius
top of lava dome
MT. LAMINGTON CRATER major eruption 21st. Jan. 51
MT. LAMINGTON VOLCANIC AREA
LEGEND
BOUNDARY OF HOHORITA LANDS
* DOUBLE CROSSING
ROADS
HOHORITA VILLAGE LANDS (1966)

102
361
131
133
491

[End Map 12]

Map XIV

997
102
361
133
491


SANGARA PLANTATION
ROAD TO POPONDETTA ⟶
ROAD TO VILLAGE
APPROX. DIVISION BETWEEN FRONT AND BACK HALF
CREEK
SCHOOL BUILDINGS
CHURCH
CREEK
MISSION STATION
HONONITA VILLAGE

[End Map 13]

GLOSSARY

araha -- center area of a village (p. 136)
bande -- house (p. 135)
bende -- "side" of a village (p. 136)
da -- village (p. 135)

END 116 TEXT END 116 TEXT

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